BILL DOUGLAS v. JIMMIE COFFMAN; AND TERESA COFFMAN
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 5, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001379-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001448-MR
BILL DOUGLAS
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM CASEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00200
JIMMIE COFFMAN; AND
TERESA COFFMAN
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Bill Douglas has appealed from a judgment of
the Casey Circuit Court entered on April 10, 2003, which found
that Douglas had failed to construct a house for Jimmie Coffman
and his wife, Theresa Coffman, in a workmanlike manner, and
awarded the Coffmans $13,964.61 in damages.
The Coffmans have
cross-appealed from that same judgment, arguing that the damages
awarded for the repair of the back porch were inadequate.
Having concluded that the circuit court erred by awarding
$4,941.00 in damages for the repair of the center beam of the
Coffmans’ home, but that the remaining arguments on the appeal
and cross-appeal are without merit, we affirm in part, reverse
in part and remand for further proceedings.
In early 2000 the Coffmans became interested in
building a home on their property in Liberty, Casey County,
Kentucky.
At the time, the Coffmans were living in a mobile
home on that same property.
After selecting a floor plan, the
Coffmans began searching for a contractor who would be willing
to build a home based upon the floor plan that the Coffmans had
chosen.
In February and March 2000, Douglas took the floor
plan provided by the Coffmans and prepared a handwritten bid.
The six-page bid outlined various details of the proposed
construction, and included a total price of $91,640.00.
The
parties eventually agreed to the terms as stated in the bid, and
Douglas began construction in March 2000.
Throughout the
construction, the Coffmans made periodic payments to Douglas as
various phases of the project were completed.
The Coffmans moved into the home after construction
was completed in September 2000.
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Shortly after moving in,
however, the Coffmans began to notice structural problems with
the home.
Specifically, there were cracks around the areas of
the door frames, doors that would not open and close correctly,
cracks in the walls and ceilings, cracks in the back porch
coupled with drainage problems, and problems with the wood
flooring.1
Because of these structural defects, the Coffmans
withheld payment on the final $8,981.27 that was due under the
parties’ agreement.
On November 10, 2001, the Coffmans filed a complaint
in the Casey Circuit Court naming Douglas as a defendant.2
Among
other things, the Coffmans alleged that Douglas “carelessly and
negligently constructed the residence in an unworkmanlike
manner, and has refused to make repairs or complete
construction.”
The Coffmans requested damages “to repair the
defective work of Douglas and to complete construction under the
contract.”
Douglas filed an answer on January 24, 2002, denying
the material allegations in the Coffmans’ complaint.
In
addition, Douglas asserted a counterclaim, asking that the
1
Jimmie testified by deposition that a “haze” formed on the flooring, which
was apparently glue residue that had been squeezed out from underneath the
floor.
2
The Coffmans also named as defendants Brian and Teresa Zajkowski, both
individually and d/b/a Magic Carpet & Floor Covering, and Mohawk Industries,
Inc. The Coffmans alleged that Magic Carpet “carelessly and negligently
installed the wood flooring,” and that the wood flooring manufactured by
Mohawk Industries was “defective in its finish.” At the close of the ensuing
bench trial, the circuit court granted these named defendants’ motions for a
directed verdict and dismissed the Coffmans’ claims against them. The
Coffmans have not appealed from that portion of the circuit court’s judgment
and those named defendants are not parties to this appeal.
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Coffmans be held liable for the remaining unpaid balance on the
parties’ agreement, plus any applicable interest.
After an extensive amount of discovery had taken
place, a bench trial was held in the Casey Circuit Court on
August 2-3, 2002.
The Coffmans and Douglas agreed that the
aforementioned problems with the home were caused by an excess
“settling” of the house, i.e., the center framework unexpectedly
subsided and/or dipped, causing the center walls to separate
from the ceiling.
As might be expected, however, the parties
disagreed as to the cause of the excess settling.
The Coffmans presented evidence in support of their
claim that Douglas had constructed the home in an unworkmanlike
manner, thereby causing the excess settling and the resulting
damage to the home.
However, Douglas argued that the excess
settling was caused by the poor soil conditions underneath the
home.
Douglas further argued that he should not be held liable
for the damage done to the Coffmans’ home, since he was unaware
of the alleged poor soil conditions underneath the home.
At the conclusion of the trial, and after considering
all of the evidence presented by both parties, the circuit court
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on
April 10, 2003.
Ultimately, the circuit court found that
Douglas had “failed to construct the residence in a workmanlike
manner,” and that this failure “caused major defects in the
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house.”
Consequently, the circuit court entered judgment
against Douglas in the amount of $13,964.61, which represented
the cost of repair to the Coffmans’ home.3
After post-judgment
motions from both parties were denied by the circuit court,
Douglas’s appeal and the Coffmans’ cross-appeal followed.
We first address Douglas’s claim that the circuit
court erred by determining that he was liable for the structural
damage done to the Coffmans’ home.
This argument is premised
upon his assertion that the poor soil conditions caused the
damage to the Coffmans’ home, and that the circuit court
erroneously determined that Douglas should be held liable for
the damage caused by those alleged poor soil conditions.
Douglas cites to and relies upon Surber v. Wallace,4 where this
Court stated that a builder is generally held liable for
structural damages caused by poor soil conditions if the builder
“‘knew or reasonably should have known’ of the subsurface
condition.”
Hence, according to Douglas, since “there was no
way that [he] should have known, or could have known” about the
alleged poor soil conditions, he could not be held liable for
the structural damage done to the Coffmans’ home.
We reject
this argument.
3
The circuit court also awarded Douglas $8,981.21 pursuant to his
counterclaim, which represented the unpaid balance on the parties’ agreement.
4
Ky.App., 831 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1992).
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Douglas’s reading of the circuit court’s judgment is
simply incorrect.
The circuit court did not base Douglas’s
liability upon a determination that he was responsible for the
soil conditions underneath the Coffmans’ home.
Rather, the
circuit court specifically found that Douglas had “failed to
construct the residence in a workmanlike manner,” which thereby
“caused major defects in the house.”
In short, there is nothing
in the circuit court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law
indicating that it found the soil conditions to be a cause of
the structural damage, or that the circuit court’s determination
of liability was based upon Douglas’s awareness, or lack
thereof, of those soil conditions.
Accordingly, Douglas’s first
claim of error is plainly without merit.
Next, we turn to Douglas’s claim that the circuit
court erred by determining that he failed to construct the home
in a workmanlike manner.
In essence, Douglas argues that based
upon the evidence presented at trial, the circuit court erred by
not determining that the alleged poor soil conditions were the
cause of the excess settling in the Coffmans’ home.
We
disagree.
Where conflicting evidence is presented at trial, the
circuit court’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal
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as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.5
Substantial evidence is defined as “evidence of substance and
relevant consequence sufficient to induce conviction in the
minds of reasonable people.”6
Our review of the record shows
that the circuit court’s determination as to the causation of
the excess settling in the Coffmans’ home was supported by
substantial evidence.
Mark Baxter, a foreman for Boyle Masonry, testified
that in his opinion, the pier pads7 installed as a part of the
house’s foundation were not sufficiently thick to support the
weight of the home.
Baxter further stated that the piers were
not properly centered on the pier pads, which, because of the
weight of the home, caused the piers to push down on the pads.
Hence, the piers tilted and dropped, resulting in the excess
settling near the center of the home.
5
See White v. Howard, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 589, 590 (1965)(stating that where
there was “substantial and credible evidence both ways” on a contested issue,
an appellate court would not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder); and Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 (providing in part
that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment.
. . . Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses [emphasis added]).
6
Sherfey v. Sherfey, Ky.App., 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (2002).
7
Pier pads are concrete slabs upon which blocks of concrete are placed
together to form piers. The piers are intended to provide center support
underneath the house.
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Howard Vanoy, a carpenter who was asked to inspect the
Coffmans’ home following the excess settling, also testified at
trial.
Vanoy stated that the pier pads had not been properly
centered underneath the home.
As a result, Vanoy testified that
the piers were improperly placed near the edges of the pads.
Vanoy stated that the weight of the home pushing down on the
pads caused the piers to tilt, which resulted in a failure of
the house’s center support system.
Finally, Jim Adams, the Boyle County Building
Inspector, testified that the pier pads and piers had been
improperly installed.
Adams stated that the placing of the
piers on the edge of the pads caused the center of the home to
subside.
Hence, although there may have been evidence presented
to the circuit court indicating that the alleged poor soil
condition was the cause of the excess settling of the home,
there was substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s
ultimate determination that the excess settling was caused by
Douglas’s failure to construct the home in a workmanlike manner.
No fewer than three expert witnesses testified that the improper
installation of the piers and pier pads was the cause of the
excess settling in the Coffmans’ home.
Accordingly, since the
circuit court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence in
the record, it will not be disturbed on appeal.
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Douglas next argues that the circuit court erred by
permitting Adams “to interpret and apply the law of the Kentucky
Building Code”8 during his testimony.
Specifically, Douglas
points to instances in which Adams was permitted to testify
regarding whether or not a particular area of the Coffmans’ home
had been constructed in accordance with requirements of the
building code.
error.
Douglas claims that this amounts to reversible
We disagree.
Without deciding whether the building code was
relevant to the issues litigated below,9 we hold that any error
the circuit court may have committed by permitting Adams to
discuss the building code during his testimony was harmless.10
Both Baxter and Vanoy testified that, in their respective
opinions, the failure to properly install the piers and pier
pads was the cause of the excess settling in the Coffmans’ home.
8
See Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 198B.
9
Despite arguing in his brief that “the Code was not even applicable to this
action,” Douglas failed to cite to any authority in support of this
proposition. The Coffmans have ignored this issue altogether in their brief
to this Court, and have offered no argument to rebut Douglas’s claim that
Adams improperly “testified to his interpretation of the Kentucky Building
Code.”
10
See CR 61.01 (providing that “[n]o error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating,
modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to
take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties”); and Davidson v. Moore, Ky., 340 S.W.2d 227, 229 (1960)(stating
that an appellate court “will not reverse or modify a judgment except for
error which prejudices the substantial rights of the complaining party”).
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Hence, even if a portion of Adams’s testimony was improperly
admitted into evidence at trial, there was other evidence of
substance supporting the circuit court’s determination that
Douglas’s failure to construct the home in a workmanlike manner
was the cause of the excess settling in the home.
Accordingly,
Douglas’s claim that the admission of Adams’s testimony
constituted reversible error is without merit.
We next address Douglas’s argument that the circuit
court made several errors in its calculation of damages.
Specifically, Douglas contends that the circuit court erred (1)
by awarding $4,941.00 for the repair of the center beam; (2) by
awarding $2,004.72 for the installation of reinforcing floor
joists; and (3) by awarding $838.89 for the installation of
braces for the roof trusses.
In State Property & Buildings Commission of the
Department of Finance v. H.W. Miller Construction Co., Inc.,11
the former Court of Appeals discussed the proper measure of
damages to apply for a breach of contract claim based upon
structural defects in a construction project:
“When the building is completed but the
construction is in some respect defective,
the principle upon which damages are to be
estimated will depend on whether the defect
can be remedied by the expenditure of a
reasonable amount of money. If in view of
11
Ky., 385 S.W.2d 211, 213 (1964)(quoting Sedgwick on Damages, § 644 (Vol. 2,
p. 1293)).
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the expense it is reasonable to remedy the
defect, then the measure of damages is the
cost of remedying it. If, on the other
hand, the value of the building with the
defect is greater than its value without the
defect less the cost of applying the remedy,
then the measure of damages is the
diminution in the value of the building by
reason of the defect.”
In other words, the appropriate measure of damages is
the amount reasonably necessary to remedy the structural defect,
as long as that amount does not exceed the difference between
the fair market value of the home as it should have been
constructed, and the fair market value of the home as
constructed with the structural defect.12
As Douglas has
conceded in his brief, neither party introduced evidence of fair
market values at trial.
Thus, we review the circuit court’s
damage awards merely to determine if the amounts were reasonably
necessary to remedy the structural defects.13
First, with respect to the $4,941.00 awarded for the
repair of the center beam, we conclude that such an amount was
unreasonably excessive.
The circuit court based this award upon
12
Id. at 214 (stating that “[a]s we construe the relationship between market
value and cost of remedying the defect, the latter becomes unreasonable only
(a) if it exceeds the difference between the market value of the building as
it should have been constructed and its market value as actually constructed
(assuming the defective condition to be known), or (b) if it amounts to more
than is reasonably necessary in order to bring the building into substantial
conformity with the contract”).
13
Obviously, if Douglas believed that the measure of damages should have been
based upon a “diminution in value” determination, it was incumbent upon him
to introduce evidence before the circuit court tending to show that such a
measure of damages would be the appropriate standard.
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a written estimate prepared by Baxter at the request of the
Coffmans.
However, Baxter testified at trial that he had
completed the repair work on the center beam, and that he had
been paid in full for the work at a price of $849.00.
Although
Baxter stated that Jimmie Coffman performed some of the repair
work to the center beam, no evidence was introduced at trial
showing the value of this work.
Accordingly, we reverse the
circuit court’s award of $4,941.00 for the repair of the center
beam, and remand with instructions to enter an award in the
amount of $849.00, which represents the cost of the repair work
to the Coffmans as established by the evidence at the trial.
Turning to the $2,004.72 awarded for the installation
of reinforcing floor joists, and the $838.89 awarded for the
installation of braces for the roof trusses, Douglas claims that
both awards were improper since the parties’ agreement did not
call for the construction of either the reinforcing floor joists
or the braces for the roof trusses.
However, this argument
overlooks the fact that these damages were awarded to remedy the
defects in construction.
As the former Court of Appeals clearly
stated in H.W. Miller Construction, supra, the general rule is
that where defects are discovered in a completed home, “the
measure of damages is the cost of remedying it.”
Vanoy
specifically testified at trial that $2,004.72 for the
installation of reinforcing floor joists, and $838.89 for the
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installation of braces for the roof trusses were reasonable
costs for repairing the defects in the Coffmans’ home.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by awarding these
damages.
Finally, we address the Coffmans’ sole argument on
their cross-appeal.
The Coffmans claim that the circuit court
“overlooked one item” when awarding damages.
Specifically, the
Coffmans argue that the circuit court erred by awarding only
$1,800.00 for the repair of the back porch.
The Coffmans
contend that they should have been awarded $10,850.00, which
represented the full amount contained in a written repair
estimate that was introduced at trial.
We reject the Coffmans’
argument.
The circuit court declined to award $10,850.00 for the
repair of the back porch based upon Douglas’s testimony at trial
that the total cost in building the back porch was somewhere
between $1,500.00 to $1,800.00.
Hence, the circuit court was
justified in concluding that an award of $10,850.00 was “more
than [was] reasonably necessary in order to bring the building
into substantial conformity with the contract.”14
Accordingly,
the Coffmans’ sole argument on their cross-appeal is without
merit and that part of the judgment is affirmed.
14
H.W. Miller Construction, 385 S.W.2d at 214.
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Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Casey
Circuit Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
Jerry L. Foster
Liberty, Kentucky
Richard Clay
Danville, Kentucky
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