MARK AARON EMBRY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 2, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001349-MR
MARK AARON EMBRY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00371-002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, Mark
Aaron Embry (hereinafter “Embry”) has appealed from the Daviess
Circuit Court’s April 18, 2003, order denying his motion to
suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his
automobile.
Having considered the parties’ briefs, the record
and the applicable case law, we must reverse and remand.
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
On September 4, 2002, the Daviess County Grand Jury
indicted Embry and Christopher Allen McClure (hereinafter
“McClure”) on one count of Burglary in the First Degree2 for
entering and remaining unlawfully in the residence of Gary
Bivins in Philpot, Kentucky, on July 5, 2002, while armed with a
deadly weapon.
Embry was also charged with being a Persistent
Felony Offender in the Second Degree.3
Embry and McClure filed a
motion pursuant to RCr 9.78 to suppress evidence obtained in the
search of Embry’s vehicle by the Tipton County, Tennessee,
Sheriff’s office.
The circuit court held a suppression hearing
on March 26, 2003.
At the suppression hearing, Deputy Daniel Walls of the
Tipton County Sheriff’s office (hereinafter “Deputy Walls”)
testified that he observed a Black Camaro with Kentucky license
plates weaving in and out of its lane on Highway 51 in Tipton
County, Tennessee.4
Deputy Walls stopped the vehicle at 10:38
p.m. local time based upon the weaving to determine whether the
driver was under the influence of an intoxicant or was
experiencing a medical problem.
He approached the driver’s side
and began a conversation with Embry, the driver.
passenger in the vehicle.
McClure was a
During this conversation, Embry
indicated that he was tired from driving and that he and McClure
2
KRS 511.020.
KRS 532.080.
4
Tipton County is located approximately thirty miles north of Memphis,
Tennessee.
3
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were on the way to California for a wedding.
Another responding
officer indicated to Deputy Walls that McClure reported that
they were on the way to Las Vegas, Nevada, and that they had
just left a wedding in Kentucky.
Deputy Walls did not detect any odor of an intoxicant,
but had Embry exit the vehicle to give him the opportunity to
stretch and wake up.
Fifteen minutes later, Deputy Walls felt
that Embry was sufficiently awake to be able to drive safely and
was free to go, but never expressed this to Embry.
Furthermore,
Deputy Walls never returned Embry’s driver’s license.
At 11:05
p.m., Deputy Walls decided to call for a canine unit to test for
the presence of illegal drugs based upon his observations of
Embry’s lack of eye contact and his nervous behavior.
Additionally, Deputy Walls thought Embry was not acting like a
reasonable person after being told he was stopped for being
under the influence.
Furthermore, Embry was anxious for Deputy
Walls to issue him a ticket so that he could leave.
Deputy
Walls indicated that he was not going to issue a traffic ticket
because Embry had not violated any statute.
The drug dog
arrived at 11:22 p.m. and alerted on the driver’s side of the
car.
The vehicle was searched, and a gold pipe and marijuana
were located and seized.
At this point, the whole car was
searched, and police recovered a brown purse with the
identification of Gary Bivins and an income tax refund check
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made out to Gary Bivins.
Both Embry and McClure were arrested
when a sawed-off shotgun was located.
Following the hearing, the circuit court made findings
of fact and then denied the motion to suppress, holding that the
period of time Embry and McClure were detained was not
unreasonable under the circumstances of the case so that there
was no violation of the 4th Amendment.
The circuit court entered
the following order on April 18, 2003, memorializing its oral
ruling:
This matter having come to the Court’s
attention on Wednesday, March 26, 2003, on
Defense Counsel’s Motion to Suppress, the
defendants being in Court and represented by
the Hon. Rich Walls for McClure and the Hon.
Evan Taylor for Embry, the Court having
heard testimony from Deputy Daniel Walls of
the Tipton County, Tennessee Sheriff’s
Office and from each defendant and after
having heard arguments of counsel FINDS AS
FACTS as follows:
1. That on July 5, 2002 at
approximately 10:38 p.m. in Tipton, County,
Tennessee, Deputy Daniel Walls of the Tipton
County Sheriff’s Office observed a motor
vehicle operated by the defendant, Mark
Aaron Embry, weaving in and out of both
lanes on a highway with five to seven other
cars in the immediate area.
2. That Deputy Walls had duty or
obligation to make a traffic stop on the
vehicle operated by Embry, and occupied by
McClure as a front seat passenger.
3. That upon making the traffic stop,
Deputy Walls noticed that the defendant
driving, Mark Aaron Embry, had bloodshot
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eyes and was mumbling and that Embry stated
to the officer he was tired.
4. That it was reasonable under the
circumstances for Deputy Walls to ask the
defendants to step out of the motor vehicle,
to ascertain whether the defendant was
intoxicated and after determining within 15
minutes of the stop that the defendant was
not intoxicated the deputy was still
concerned for the defendant’s safety and the
safety of others on the road due to Embry’s
assertion that he was tired and continued to
engage in conversation with the defendant
and thereby continued to observe his
condition, and realized that the defendant,
Embry, and passenger, McClure gave
inconsistent responses to questions and
further that defendant, Embry, was evasive
in his responses and his mannerisms were
unusual and that Deputy Walls testified he
has five years experience as a police
officer and that he has made over 5,000
traffic stops and that the defendant, Embry,
was unusually nervous as compared to the
other traffic stops.
5. That from the initial traffic stop
until the drug dog arrived, 44 minutes had
elapsed, but that based upon the totality of
the circumstances, Deputy Walls did not
obtain reasonable suspicion until 15 – 20
minutes after the stop that the defendants
were engaged in drug/criminal activity and
at that point requested a drug dog to come
to the scene which arrived within 15 – 20
minutes thereafter which is not unreasonable
under this case scenario.
6. The Court finds that the detention
of the defendants was reasonable and not
violative of the Fourth Amendment and once
the certified and trained drug dog hit on
the automobile, Deputy Walls then had
probable cause to search the entire vehicle.
Based upon the above finding of fact,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Defense Counsels joint motion to suppress be
and is hereby OVERRULED in its entirety.
Following the entry of this order, Embry moved the circuit court
to enter a conditional guilty plea on an amended charge of
Burglary in the Second Degree, with his persistent felony
offender charge being dismissed.
The circuit court accepted his
conditional guilty plea, and on June 16, 2003, entered a
judgment to that effect and sentenced him to eight years in the
penitentiary in accordance with the plea agreement.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Embry argues that the warrantless search of
his vehicle was illegal because it did not meet any of the
accepted exceptions to the rule that searches must be
accompanied by a warrant.
Furthermore, the length of his
detention was unreasonable and the facts did not support Deputy
Walls’ claim that he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth argues that
Deputy Walls properly stopped Embry’s vehicle because he was
weaving in traffic, that the observations made by Deputy Walls
provided him with enough suspicion of criminal activity to
justify his calling in a drug dog for further investigation, and
that the indication by the drug dog that drugs were present
provided the probable cause to search the vehicle.
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In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress
following a hearing, this Court must first determine whether the
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
those findings are conclusive.
If so,
RCr 9.78; Adcock v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998).
We must then perform
a de novo review of those factual findings to determine whether
the circuit court’s decision is correct as a matter of law.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134
L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Commonwealth v. Banks, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 347,
349 (2001); Stewart v. Commonwealth, Ky., 44 S.W.3d 367, 380
(2000).
At the outset, we note that we agree with the
Commonwealth that there is no question that the initial traffic
stop was proper.
In the interest of both the public’s and
Embry’s safety, Deputy Walls was required to stop the vehicle to
ascertain whether Embry was intoxicated or suffering from a
medical problem.
Furthermore, once the drug dog indicated the
presence of drugs in the vehicle, sufficient probable cause
existed to support a warrantless search.
However, it is the
period of time Embry was detained from Deputy Walls’
determination that he was once again safe to drive to the call
for the drug dog that is problematic in this case.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct.
1868 (1968), the United States Supreme Court tested police
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conduct under the 4th Amendment’s proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures that it defined as
“necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat” which would not be
subject to the warrant procedure.
An officer “must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905-
06, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.
The Terry Court’s final holding was as
follows:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others’
safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such person in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to
assault him.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911, 88 S.Ct. at 188485.
The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals later addressed this
standard in United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 901, 918 (8th
Cir. 1994), as related to traffic stops:
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If, during a traffic stop, an officer
develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that a vehicle is carrying contraband, he
has “justification for a greater intrusion
unrelated to the traffic offense.” []
[United States v.] Cummins, 920 F.2d [498,]
502 [(8th Cir. 1993)]. We assess the factors
on which an officer based his claim of
reasonable suspicion as a totality and in
light of the officer’s experience.
In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 84 L.Ed.2d
605, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed the
difference between a de facto arrest and an investigative stop,
noting that:
[O]ur cases impose no rigid time limitation
on Terry stops. While it is clear that “the
brevity of the invasion of the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests is an important
factor in determining whether the seizure is
so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable
on reasonable suspicion,” . . . we have
emphasized the need to consider the law
enforcement purposes to be served by the
stop as well as the time reasonably needed
to effectuate those purposes. . . . Much as
a “bright line” rule would be desirable, in
evaluating whether an investigative
detention is unreasonable, common sense and
ordinary human experience must govern over
rigid criteria. (Citations omitted.)
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 84 L.Ed.2d at 615, 105 S.Ct. at 1575.
As to the determination regarding whether a detention is too
long, a court should consider, “whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or
dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was
necessary to detain the defendant,” and that, “[a] court making
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this assessment should take care to consider whether the police
are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases
the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.”
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 84 L.Ed.2d at 616, 105 S.Ct. at 1575.
See also Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 916-17.
The United States
Supreme Court has also identified “nervous, evasive behavior” as
“a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 145 L.Ed.2d 570, 577,
120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
The courts in Kentucky have also addressed this issue.
In Simpson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 834 S.W.2d 686 (1992), this
Court addressed whether police had a legitimate reason to stop
and question Simpson while he was standing on a street corner.
The Court applied the Terry standard, in which “a police officer
can subject anyone to an investigatory stop if he is able to
point to some specific and articulable fact which, together with
rational inferences from those facts, support ‘a reasonable and
articulable suspicion’ that the person in question is engaged in
illegal activity.”
Id. at 687.
The Simpson Court also noted
that, “the question of whether there is ‘a reasonable and
articulable suspicion’ is a question of fact which must be
determined in each situation from the totality of the
circumstances.”
Id.
At the time police stopped him, Simpson
was observed walking back and forth on a sidewalk and into a
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parking lot, in which large sign prohibiting trespassing and
loitering was displayed.
Simpson was observed again in the same
location fifteen minutes later.
Based upon the totality of the
circumstances, the Court held that the police at that point were
justified in approaching Simpson, asking him what he was doing,
and asking for identification.
In Commonwealth v. Banks, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 347 (2001),
the Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld a stop and frisk by police:
When Officer Bloomfield seized [Banks], he
had reasonable suspicion to believe that
[Banks] may be engaged in criminal activity.
[Banks] was in a high crime area.[] He was
present on the property of an apartment
complex where a “No Trespassing” sign was
posted. The officers did not recognize
[Banks] as a resident of the complex with
which they were familiar. The officers
approached [Banks], and he appeared to be
startled. [Banks] then attempted to turn
and evade the officers by walking in the
opposite direction.[] Then, after [Banks]
took a few steps away from the officers, he
instantly stopped. These facts justified
the officers’ belief that [Banks] may have
been engaging in criminal activity. The
fact that [Banks] took his hands out of his
pockets and a bulge still remained in one
pocket, gave rise to a reasonable belief
that he may have been armed and dangerous.
Under the totality of the circumstances,
Officer Bloomfield was justified in stopping
and frisking [Banks]. (Footnotes omitted.)
Id. at 350.
See also Kotila v. Commonwealth, Ky., 114 S.W.3d
226, 232 (2003).
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In the matter at bar, the circuit court’s findings of
fact were supported by substantial evidence of record, and are
therefore conclusive.
Therefore, we shall review the circuit
court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress de novo using
those factual findings.
We must disagree with the circuit
court’s conclusion that the length of time Embry was detained
was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
We first observe that Deputy Walls properly stopped
Embry after he observed his vehicle weaving in traffic and
straddling both lanes of the highway.
Deputy Walls quickly
determined that Embry was not intoxicated, as he did not detect
the odor of an intoxicant, or that he was suffering from a
medical problem, but rather was tired.
The stop occurred at
10:38 p.m., and in approximately fifteen minutes, Deputy Walls
determined that Embry was sufficiently awake to drive safely.
We also observe that at some point during their conversation,
Deputy Walls asked for permission to search the vehicle, which
Embry declined.
At 11:05 p.m., Deputy Walls decided to call in
a drug dog based upon his observations that Embry was avoiding
eye contact, was overly nervous and was muttering and smoking
heavily.
Deputy Walls also observed that Embry’s vehicle was
overpacked, and that Embry was anxious to receive a ticket.
Finally, Deputy Walls determined that Embry and McClure had
somewhat different stories as to their destination.
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Although Deputy Walls testified that Embry was at
least initially free to leave, it is apparent from the record
that this was not the case.
Deputy Walls took Embry’s driver’s
license and never returned it to him during the stop.
Embry
testified that he did not get his license back until he was in
jail.
Embry would not have been able to legally drive without
his license, so that he was in fact detained for the whole
period of time, including the time prior to which Deputy Walls
thought criminal activity was afoot.
Based upon the applicable
case law, we cannot hold that Deputy Walls’ continued detention
of Embry was reasonable under the circumstances of this case.
Embry was not in a high crime area or engaged in any apparent
criminal activity when he was stopped.
Deputy Walls himself
testified that Embry had not broken any traffic laws and that he
was not going to issue him a traffic ticket.
There is no
evidence that Embry tried to elude Deputy Walls or any of the
other responding officers, there was nothing in plain view to
establish criminal activity, and the statements Embry and
McClure provided were not sufficiently different to reasonably
raise suspicion.
Therefore, the circuit court erred in denying
the motion to suppress evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Daviess
Circuit Court denying Embry’s motion to suppress is reversed,
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and this matter is remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
from the majority opinion.
Respectfully, I dissent
While I agree with much of the
reasoning of the majority opinion, I disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that the police officers detained Embry
for too long.
In assessing whether a detention is too long in
duration to be justified as an investigative stop, the courts
must consider whether the police diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant.
A court making this assessment should take care
to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly
developing situation, and in such cases the court should not
indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.
United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616, 105 S. Ct.
1568, 1575 (1985).
Furthermore, the question is not simply
whether some other alternative was available, but whether the
police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue
it.
Id. at 687, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 616, 105 S. Ct. at 1576.
Although the current case is a close call, I believe that the
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police officer’s actions were reasonable under the
circumstances.
As the majority correctly notes, there is no question
that the initial traffic stop was proper.
Likewise, Deputy
Walls clearly had reasonable grounds to detain Embry until he
determined that Embry was not intoxicated or presented a danger
to the driving public.
It is agreed that Deputy Walls made this
determination within fifteen minutes of the stop.
During this
time, however, Deputy Walls observed that Embry was acting
strangely – avoiding eye contact, muttering, and smoking heavily
even while informing Deputy Walls that he was not a heavy
smoker.
He also noted that the vehicle appeared to be very
heavily packed for two people.
In addition, Deputy Walls
learned that the passenger, McClure, had given another officer a
somewhat different account of the reasons and destination for
their trip.
Admittedly, none of these circumstances are illegal or
necessarily suggest criminal conduct.
However, they did provide
Deputy Walls with reasonable and articulable grounds to suspect
that something was amiss.
The trial court noted that a total of
forty-four minutes elapsed from the initial traffic stop until
the drug dog arrived.
This means that Deputy Walls detained
Embry about twelve minutes from the time he made the
determination that Embry was not intoxicated until he requested
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that a drug-dog be brought to the scene.
An additional
seventeen minutes elapsed until another officer arrived with the
drug dog.
Thus, from the time Deputy Walls determined that
Embry was not intoxicated until the dog arrived on the scene, a
total of twenty-nine minutes had passed.
Based upon the facts presented in this case, I agree
with the trial court that Deputy Walls had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to detain Embry even after he determined
that Embry was not intoxicated.
Furthermore, I would also find
that Deputy Walls acted reasonably and diligently to investigate
these suspicions.
I agree that the length of the detention
would be a significant inconvenience to any individual who has
been stopped by the police under similar circumstances.
Nonetheless, I find no indication that the length of the delay
was unnecessary to the scope of a reasonable investigation.
See
also United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 350-352 (6th Cir.,
1997); and United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 216-18 (6th
Cir., 1990).
Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s order
denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized during the
warrantless search of Embry’s automobile.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Gregory D. Stumbo
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Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, KY
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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