TERRY FRAZIER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001277-MR
TERRY FRAZIER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOMMY W. CHANDLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CR-00078
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY AND MINTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Terry Frazier (“Frazier”) appeals from an
order of the Union Circuit Court denying his pro se RCr 11.42
motion for relief from a criminal judgment.
For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm.
On November 2, 1992, Frazier was indicted by the Union
County Grand Jury on charges of murder, first-degree robbery,
and first-degree burglary.
The charges stemmed from the
robbery, burglary, and murder of Tina Marie Wagner on October
16, 1992.
It was alleged that Frazier went to Wagner’s home in
Morganfield, Kentucky, where during the course of the robbery he
stabbed her multiple times resulting in her death.
After Frazier successfully moved for a change of
venue, he entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth.
The terms of the plea provided that Frazier would plead guilty
in exchange for the Commonwealth’s sentencing recommendation.
Pursuant to the plea, Frazier acknowledged his guilt and the
veracity of the charges against him.
On August 9, 1993, he was
sentenced to twenty (20) years in prison on each of the robbery
and burglary counts, and received a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole for twenty-five (25) years on the murder
charge.
The terms of imprisonment were ordered to run
consecutively.
On July 7, 1994, Frazier apparently filed a RCr 11.42
motion which was later withdrawn.
filed on July 17, 1996.
A second RCr 11.42 motion was
As a basis for the second motion,
Frazier alleged that the trial court improperly failed to find
aggravating factors and failed to suppress statements made
during police questioning.
1996.
The motion was denied on December 2,
Frazier appealed to this Court, which rendered an
unpublished opinion on October 23, 1998.
A panel of this Court
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion, but remanded
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that matter with instructions that the robbery and burglary
sentences run concurrently with the murder sentence.
On July 5, 2001, Frazier filed a third RCr 11.42
motion.
He alleged therein that his trial counsel, James
Crumlin (“Crumlin”), was suffering from serious mental and
physical impairment while representing Frazier, and that this
impairment resulted in the rendering of deficient performance.
Upon considering the motion, the circuit court entered an order
on May 19, 2003, which forms the basis of the instant appeal.
The circuit court denied the relief sought, and opined that the
claims had either already been addressed in prior motions, or
were conclusory allegations not supported by fact.
This appeal
followed.
Frazier now argues that the circuit court erred in
denying the July 5, 2001, RCr 11.42 motion for relief.
He first
claims that the trial court improperly failed to rule upon the
motion without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.
He
maintains that the court improperly failed to designate which
issues in his motion had been previously reviewed and which
issues the court believed were not sufficiently supported by
facts to support an evidentiary hearing.
Frazier also points to
a May, 2001 letter from Crumlin to the Kentucky Bar Association
(“KBA”)in which Crumlin stated that his health had deteriorated
to the point that he was “prevented from taking care of any kind
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of official business.”
Frazier contends that he alleged and
proved that Crumlin was physically and mentally impaired at the
time of the guilty plea proceedings, and that the trial court
erred in failing to conclude that Crumlin rendered ineffective
assistance.
We have closely examined the record and the law, and
find no error in the circuit court’s denial of Frazier’s motion
for relief.
Frazier’s argument centers on the May, 2001 letter
from Crumlin to the KBA in which Crumlin discusses his poor
health. Frazier relies on this impairment in support of his
contention that he received ineffective assistance from Crumlin.
We do not find this argument persuasive.
The letter in question
appears to be in response to a communication to Crumlin from the
KBA regarding a search for Frazier’s files.
In his letter,
Crumlin apologized for having no recollection of having
represented Frazier, and stated that he retired from the
practice of law in 1997.
He went on to state that “[m]y health
has deteriorated to the point that my sight, ability to speak,
think clearly and move without assistance prevents me from
taking care of any kind of official business.”
Frazier states as fact that he alleged and proved that
Crumlin was physically and mentally impaired at the time of the
guilty plea proceedings.
This assertion is far from accurate.
Crumlin represented Frazier in or about 1993, but wrote of his
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physical and mental impairment some eight years later in 2001.
Crumlin’s 2001 letter provides no indication of physical or
mental impairment in 1993, and we cannot find that the circuit
court erred in so concluding.
Frazier also relies on Crumlin’s 2001 letter in
support of the assertion that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the motion for relief.
As the parties are well
aware, an RCr 11.42 movant is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the motion where the allegations contained in the
motion are justiciable by reference to the record.
Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 338 (2001).
Hodge v.
In Hodge, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held that the dispositive inquiry on the issue
of whether a hearing is required is whether the record refutes
the allegations raised.
In the matter at bar, the eight year
span between Crumlin’s representation of Frazier and Crumlin’s
statement regarding his incapacitation refutes Frazier’s claim
that he “alleged and proved that his trial attorney, James A.
Crumlin, was physically and mentally impaired at the time of the
guilty plea proceedings . . . .”
If Crumlin’s statement
regarding his poor health was not so remote in time from the
representation, Frazier may have been entitled to a hearing on
the issue.
We cannot conclude, however, that Crumlin’s
declining health in 1997 compels the trial court to investigate
his health in 1993.
This is especially true in light of the
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fact that competent representation is presumed and does not have
to be proven.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2032, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Accordingly, we cannot conclude
that the circuit court erred in refusing to conduct a hearing on
Frazier’s motion for relief.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Union Circuit Court overruling Frazier’s motion for RCr 11.42
relief.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Terry Frazier, Pro Se
Central City, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
James Havey
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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