SAEID SHAFIZADEH v. AAMCO TRANSMISSION, INC.; LOUISVILLE AAMCO TRANSMISSION DEALERS ADVERTISING POOL, INC.; D.B.O., INC.; DONALD G. OLSON; GARRY N. STUCKER; AND JOHN N. FERRITTO, D/B/A AAMCO TRANSMISSION
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RENDERED: MAY 21, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001261-MR
SAEID SHAFIZADEH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-006339
AAMCO TRANSMISSION, INC.;
LOUISVILLE AAMCO TRANSMISSION
DEALERS ADVERTISING POOL, INC.;
D.B.O., INC.; DONALD G. OLSON;
GARRY N. STUCKER; AND JOHN N.
FERRITTO, D/B/A AAMCO TRANSMISSION
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND DYCHE, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
In this matter appellant, Saeid Shafizadeh,1
alleges numerous counts after problems arose when he had his van
serviced several times at an independently owned and operated
AAMCO Transmissions, Incorporated, franchise.
1
Appellee Donald
Appellees note in their brief that, since the time this litigation started,
Shafizadeh, who represents himself, has graduated from law school and passed
the Kentucky Bar Examination.
G. Olson was the owner/operator of the franchise for the AAMCO
in question at the time the dispute arose.
Olson incorporated
appellee DBO to operate the franchise and was the sole officer
and shareholder of DBO.
franchise agreement.
DBO, however, was not a party to the
Appellee Garry N. Stucker was the customer
service manager employed by AAMCO at the time Shafizadeh took
his van in for repair work.
Appellee John Ferritto purchased
the assets of AAMCO from Olson in March of 2000, which was after
Shafizadeh’s problems arose with AAMCO.
Also named in the
complaint was Louisville AAMCO Dealers Advertising Pool,
Incorporated, which advertises for AAMCO franchisees, including
the AAMCO in question.
In September of 1998, Shafizadeh contacted AAMCO
regarding problems with his van.
He maintains that Stucker
first quoted him a price of $240 over the telephone to reseal
the transmission.
When Shafizadeh took the van into the AAMCO
center, Stucker told him it would cost $360, instead of $240, to
fix the problems.
After the repairs were completed, Shafizadeh
continued to have problems with his van, and he maintains that
the van actually developed new problems.
He took his van back
to the AAMCO shop, and after an inspection Shafizadeh was told
that the transmission needed a complete overhaul at a cost of
$900.
He contends that, unless he agreed to this, AAMCO would
not provide a warranty for the work previously done.
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He argues
that he agreed to have the work done, but that he was coerced
into it.
When Shafizadeh picked up his van and received the
written warranty, the warranty had been marked as six months
instead of the one-year warranty previously agreed upon and the
nationwide warranty had been eliminated.
In its place only the
local AAMCO, where the work was done, was included in the
warranty.
Shafizadeh noticed more problems with the van after
driving it for a few days.
He took it to another transmission
mechanic, who recommended that the transmission needed to be
overhauled again.
Thereafter, Shafizadeh took the van back to
AAMCO, which did more repair work.
were more problems with the van.
However, once again there
According to Shafizadeh, Olson
promised to fix any problems with the van’s transmission.
This cycle of repairs and problems continued several
more times.
After Shafizadeh contacted the AAMCO franchisor and
complained, Shafizadeh maintains that Olson agreed to repair the
transmission again at no additional cost.
After the van was
inspected, Shafizadeh says that Olson contacted him and informed
him that it would cost another $600 to fix the transmission
because a separate, unrelated problem with the van’s
transmission needed repair.
Shafizadeh refused to pay, and the
van was only temporarily fixed.
-3-
Thereafter, Shafizadeh filed suit in Jefferson County
Circuit Court against appellees alleging RICO violations, civil
conspiracy, outrage, breach of contract, breach of duty of good
faith in performance of contract, unfair and deceptive trade
practices in violation of the consumer protection act, fraud,
negligence in the repair of the vehicle and in the selection of
the franchisee, breach of implied warranty of merchantability,
and breach of express warranty.
Appellees timely removed the
matter to the United States District Court, Western District of
Kentucky, based upon the allegations of federal RICO violations.
The federal court granted appellees’ motions for summary
judgment on the RICO claim and remanded the remaining claims to
state court.
Shafizadeh did not appeal this ruling to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.2
Although the appeal in the state matter was taken
after the state circuit court granted summary judgment to
appellees on all counts, the only real issue involves the
circuit court’s decision to deny additional discovery because
the discovery deadline in the federal matter had ended.
Upon
review, we hereby affirm.
By way of background, in the federal matter, the
parties jointly agreed to a period of approximately six months
to complete discovery.
Although Shafizadeh maintains that he
2
To the extent that Shafizadeh complains about the way the case was handled
at the federal level, our Court cannot grant any relief.
-4-
reluctantly signed the discovery plan in federal court on June
8, 2001, he never moved for an extension, nor did he file any
motions to compel during or after the period for discovery.
In
fact, almost half the period for discovery passed before
Shafizadeh sent appellees a letter on September 5, 2001,
identifying witnesses he wanted to depose and seeking dates to
do so.
Shafizadeh maintains that during this time he was doing
research and other investigation on the matter.
Ultimately, he
only filed notices for the depositions of Olson and Stucker and
served written discovery requests on only four of the six
defendants.
Honorable James D. Moyer, United States Magistrate for
the Western District of Kentucky, held a status conference on
November 13, 2001, and substantially adopted the deadlines set
forth in the parties’ joint report.
Although discovery was set
to end on November 1, 2001, the Magistrate granted Shafizadeh
until December 31, 2001, to take Olson’s deposition.
Shafizadeh
was also given until December 1, 2001, to file a motion to
compel regarding appellees’ interrogatory responses.
The
deadline for dispositive motions was moved from December 17,
2001, to January 31, 2002.
All other remaining deadlines
remained the same.
Shafizadeh took Olson’s deposition on December 14,
2001, but filed no motions to compel any other discovery.
-5-
He
did, however, file objections to the Magistrate’s order on
November 29, 2001, seeking additional time for discovery.
While
these objections were pending, appellees filed their motions for
summary judgment in accordance with the scheduling order.
Shafizadeh’s objections were overruled on May 1, 2002, by the
federal district court.
Shafizadeh thereafter filed a motion to
reconsider the denial of his objections.
His motion was denied
at the same time the federal district court entered an order
dismissing the RICO count and remanding the case to state court
for the remaining state claims.
In the state court matter, appellees AAMCO, DBO, Olson
and Stucker filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining
claims on October 23, 2002.
Although Shafizadeh had not
previously sought any additional discovery in state court, on
November 11, 2002, he filed notices to take the depositions of
David B. Butke, Jeremy Fox, and Thomas Vittitow, whose
depositions were not noticed while discovery was pending in the
federal matter.3
The next day Shafizadeh filed a response to the
motion for summary judgment on the basis that discovery had not
been completed and asserted no other grounds for denial of the
motion.
Appellees filed a motion for a protective order to
prevent these depositions from taking place arguing that the
3
Fox and Vittitow were formerly employees of DBO and worked at the AAMCO
center operated by DBO. Butke was the accountant for DBO.
-6-
deadline for discovery had passed.
The circuit court heard oral
arguments on the matter on December 12, 2002, and granted the
motion for a protective order and refused to allow Shafizadeh
any additional time for discovery.
The circuit court made oral
findings of fact and conclusions of law4 on the record holding
that Shafizadeh had participated in the discovery plan and had
agreed to it.
The circuit court refused to reopen discovery
after the federal court had ruled on a discovery plan and had
given an opportunity for discovery.
The case had been filed
over two years earlier, and the discovery deadline had ended a
year earlier.
Thus, the circuit court concluded that Shafizadeh
had an opportunity for discovery but failed to take advantage of
it.
Our standard of review in matters involving a trial
court's rulings on evidentiary issues and discovery disputes is
abuse of discretion.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson,
Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (2001); Sexton v. Bates, Ky. App., 41
S.W.3d 452, 455 (2001).
"The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Goodyear
supra, at 581 (citation omitted).
4
To the extent Shafizadeh argues that written findings of fact and
conclusions of law were required, we disagree. Findings of fact and
conclusions of law are required under CR 52.01 only if issues of fact are
tried before the court; rulings on motions are exempt. Clay v. Clay, Ky.,
424 S.W.2d 583, 584 (1968).
-7-
We agree with the trial court that Shafizadeh was
given ample opportunity to complete discovery in this matter.
During the six-month period for which discovery was allowed, he
never attempted to take the depositions of Butke, Fox, or
Vittitow.
Further, the case was remanded to state court in May
of 2002, yet Shafizadeh waited nearly six months while the
matter was pending before seeking any additional discovery.
And
his notices to take depositions were filed two weeks after
appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.
Moreover, Shafizadeh did not argue at the circuit
court level nor before this Court that additional discovery is
necessary because the claims differ in any way from those
litigated in the federal court.
In fact, in the federal matter,
appellees moved for summary judgment on all claims, not just the
federal RICO claims.
While Shafizadeh claims that appellees
have not been prejudiced, we disagree.
They have practiced
their cases based on the fact that the discovery period had
closed.
Shafizadeh did not even attempt to meet the deadline
in federal court and then asked the state circuit court to allow
him to open discovery a year after the discovery deadline had
passed.
The federal court ruled on this matter, including
objections to the discovery deadline, and the circuit court
relied on this determination.
Because the merits litigated in
-8-
the federal matter were the same as those litigated in the state
matter, we can find no abuse of discretion.
Contrary to
Shafizadeh’s contentions, we find no merit in his argument that
he was not given an opportunity to pursue discovery.
He was
indeed given the opportunity; he simply failed to take advantage
of it.
Shafizadeh also cursorily charges that there were
indeed genuine issues of fact and that summary judgment was
inappropriate.
However, he has failed to cite to this Court
what those issues of fact are.
Furthermore, in his response to
the motions for summary judgment, Shafizadeh only relied on his
argument that he needed additional discovery and did not present
evidence supporting factual issues.
Accordingly, we find no
basis to reverse the circuit court’s order of summary judgment.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Saeid Shafizadeh, Pro Se
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES AAMCO;
D.B.O; OLSON; STUCKER; AND
FERRITTO:
Diane M. Laughlin
Blackburn, Hundley & Domene,
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Joni L. Grayson
Vissing & Grayson, LLP
Jeffersonville, Indiana
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