CITY OF BEREA, KENTUCKY, AND BEREA CITY PLANNING COMMISSION v. BEREA AREA DEVELOPMENT, LLC
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RENDERED: JUNE 11, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2003-CA-001246-MR
CITY OF BEREA, KENTUCKY, AND
BEREA CITY PLANNING COMMISSION
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. JENNINGS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01063
BEREA AREA DEVELOPMENT, LLC
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; TACKETT AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
The City of Berea ("City") and the Berea City
Planning Commission ("Commission") appeal from the decision of
the Madison Circuit Court holding that the City could not
require Berea Area Development, LLC ("Developer") to build a
sidewalk along the driveway of a proposed nursing home.
The
City and Commission argue on appeal that the Developer's appeal
to the circuit court was time-barred under Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 100.347; that the Developer is estopped from
arguing that the Commission has no authority to require
sidewalks, since the sidewalks were one of the conditions which
the Developer agreed to in order to obtain the zoning change;
and that the circuit court erred in holding that the City had no
authority to require the Developer to build sidewalks.
We
affirm.
Developer's predecessor in title, Oliver Properties
Partnership, sought a zone change from Industrial to R-3
Residential for the purpose of developing a long-term care
nursing home.
6, 2002.
Oliver first applied for the zone change on March
Under the Berea zoning code, a nursing home requires a
conditional use permit in an R-3 classified area, so on April
11, 2002, Oliver sought a conditional use permit.
The Board of
Adjustment met and approved the conditional use provided that
Oliver obtain the zoning change.
On May 28, 2002, the
Commission considered the proposed development plan and approved
it with the added provision that it include interior sidewalks
from the building to Brooklyn Boulevard.
On June 11, 2002,
Oliver submitted an amended development plan including these
sidewalks, and the Commission granted the zone change
accordingly on June 18, 2002.
No appeal was taken from the
Commission's approval of the change.
Sometime after, Developer purchased the property from
Oliver.
On August 8, 2002, the Developer applied for an
amendment of the development plan.
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Initially, the request did
not include removal of the sidewalks; instead, this request was
added orally at the August 27, 2002 meeting of the Commission.
The amendments sought in the August 8 application were granted,
but the request to remove the sidewalks was not.
On September
18, 2002, Developer filed this action in the Madison Circuit
Court, seeking relief from the requirement that it build the
sidewalk.
The circuit court, after a hearing on April 16, 2003,
held that the City and Commission had no authority to require
sidewalks and granted the relief sought by the Developer.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the Appellants present three distinct
arguments.
First, they argue that the appeal taken was time-
barred under KRS 100.347, because the "final action" that should
have been the subject of an appeal was the June 18, 2002
approval of Oliver's development plan.
Second, they argue that
the Developer is estopped from arguing that it should not be
required to build sidewalks, since the inclusion of the
sidewalks was one of the conditions that induced the Commission
to approve the zoning change.
Last, they argue that the circuit
court erred by holding that the Appellants had no authority to
require these sidewalks.
We affirm.
With respect to the first argument, the law is
somewhat murky.
KRS 100.347 requires that an appeal must be
taken from a final action of a planning commission within 30
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days of the final action.
The developer argues that the action
was not time barred, because they filed an appeal within 30 days
of the denial of the requested amendment.
The developer further
asserts that even if the action is time-barred under KRS
100.347, Fiscal Court of Jefferson Co. v. Don Ridge Land
Developing Co., Inc., Ky., 669 S.W.2d 922 (1984), states that
they can maintain a separate action for the Appellants'
violation of Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution by attacking
the requirement of sidewalks as an arbitrary exercise of power.
The Appellants, by turn, respond to that argument by asserting
that if the Developer is correct, then a dissatisfied party can
always revive a dead right of appeal simply by filing another
request for an amendment.
It is worth noting that neither party has much
authority to support their respective positions.
The Appellants
cite none beyond the statute itself, save for a case on
detrimental reliance in the context of a contract, which has
little relevance to the question of whether the appeal was
timely.
The Developer, by contrast, cites Leslie v. Henderson,
Ky. App., 797 S.W.2d 718, 720 (1990), which dealt with a
significantly different factual situation in which an appeal was
taken outside of 30 days from the initial approval of the zone
change but within 30 days of the second reading and final
passage.
This Court held that the appeal was timely, because
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the action did not truly become final until it was formally
enacted at the second reading and final passage.
This case
involves a completely different situation, in which a developer
sought an amendment to the plan after final approval has been
granted.
It is unclear under what authority the Developer
sought this amendment, but the Commission did consider it rather
than dismissing it, and in fact granted five of its six
requests, denying only the request to remove the sidewalks from
the plan altogether.
We acknowledge the logic behind the
Appellants' position, but also acknowledge that unless the
statutory appeal from an application for an amendment to an
existing development plan is considered, the Commission's
decisions regarding amendments become unappealable, because the
"final action" will have occurred after the original zoning
change is granted.
We therefore hold that the court had subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal, as it was timely
filed from the date of the denial of the requested amendment.
We acknowledge also that the "Complaint and Appeal" filed by the
Developer does state a separate cause of action under Section 2
of the Kentucky Constitution, so even if the Developer's
statutory appeal was time-barred, under the Kentucky Supreme
Court's holding in Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Don Ridge
Land Developing Co., Inc., Ky., 669 S.W.2d 922 (1984), the
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Developer could still maintain this action as essentially a
collateral attack on an alleged arbitrary exercise of power.
Turning to the merits of the circuit court's holding
that the City and Commission lacked authority to require
sidewalks, we note that the Circuit Court's ruling in part
hinged on the use of the word "subdivision" in the applicable
zoning regulations.
The court wrote:
"The City points to its Subdivision
Regulations in support of its contention
that it has authority to require the
construction of sidewalks along the streets
in any commercial development. The
difficulty is that this proposed nursing
home facility, located in a residential
zone, involves neither a commercial
facility, a subdivision, or a street.
By definition, this is not a
subdivision of land and the requirements
applicable to subdivisions are not
applicable here. Berea contends that, under
its ordinance, a development plan is to be
considered a major preliminary subdivision
plat. Even so, however, nothing in the
Ordinance governing either development plans
or subdivision plats requires that sidewalks
be constructed on both sides of private
driveways. Although Berea's Ordinance
clearly contemplates that sidewalks
accompany streets in new subdivisions, as
previously mentioned, this is neither."
The court concluded that the City had no authority to
require a sidewalk on a "private driveway on wholly private
property."
On appeal, the City contends that the court
misinterpreted its zoning ordinances by construing them too
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narrowly.
However, reviewing the full text of the applicable
ordinances, we conclude that the circuit court was not in error
in holding that the City had no authority to require the
sidewalks.
The court held that because the development was not a
subdivision, subdivision regulations did not apply to it.
However, the applicable subdivision regulation clearly states
that "when a developer is required to obtain permission of the
planning commission prior to initiating development in a
residential district . . . the developer shall submit to the
planning commission a plan or plat of the development thereof
which shall be considered as a major preliminary subdivision
plat as above. . .
."
There is no dispute that the Developer
was required to obtain a conditional use permit before building
a nursing home.
Therefore, the above-cited ordinance applies to
this situation.
The ordinance clearly states that the
development plan will be considered as a major preliminary
subdivision plat.
There is no exception for property that is
not actually subdivided; all such developments, under the
ordinance, are considered in the same way as subdivisions.
Even
so, a complete review of the ordinances applicable to a
subdivision reveals no ordinance that authorizes the requirement
of a sidewalk on a wholly private driveway on wholly private
property.
Sidewalks are contemplated on public streets, it is
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true, but this case involves a driveway rather than a public
street.
The City also argues that it has a general authority to
require the developer to bear the cost of additional public
facilities made necessary by the development, citing Lampton v.
Pinaire, Ky. App., 610 S.W.2d 915, 919 (1980).
Unfortunately, a
review of the Lampton case reveals that the case does not really
support their position here.
Lampton dealt with a situation
where a developer was required to bear the cost of an
improvement to a public roadway, where the development would
significantly increase traffic on the roadway.
While the case
does indeed state that public policy requires that a developer
be required to bear the cost of additional public facilities
made necessary by the development, we do not believe that this
is the type of improvement where this policy should apply.
In
Lampton, the development would otherwise have required the
government to condemn additional property for an improvement to
the roadway at public expense, due to the increase in use of the
roadway created by the private development.
It was reasonable
to require the developer to bear that cost.
In this case,
however, the sidewalk is not something that would otherwise be
created at public expense; it is desired strictly for public
convenience at private expense.
Therefore, the principle
announced in Lampton is inapplicable here.
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Turning now to the argument that the Developer should
be estopped from arguing that it should not be required to build
sidewalks when the sidewalks were a condition on which the zone
change was originally granted, we reject this contention.
Developer is not the party who made this agreement.
The
Rather,
this agreement was made by the Developer's predecessor in title,
and the City cites no authority under which the Developer, who
had no chance to object to the requirement at the time, should
be bound by the principle of estoppel to its predecessor's
concession to the City.
We do not think the principle of
detrimental reliance is applicable here, as this is not a
contractual agreement but a legislative action, and we have seen
no authority that suggests that it should apply.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Madison
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James T. Gilbert
Coy, Gilbert & Gilbert
Richmond, Kentucky
Michael R. Eaves
Valerie J. Himes
Sword, Floyd & Moody PLLC
Richmond, Kentucky
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