JOHN LAWSON REALTY CO., INC.; MAC PROPERTIES, INC. v. DON ERLER; RE/MAX COMMERCIAL BROKERS
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 17, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001176-MR
JOHN LAWSON REALTY CO., INC.;
MAC PROPERTIES, INC.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-006569
DON ERLER;
RE/MAX COMMERCIAL BROKERS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
SCHRODER AND TACKETT, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TACKETT, JUDGE:
John Lawson Realty Co., Inc. and MAC
Properties, Inc. bring this appeal from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment to Don Erler
and Re/Max Commercial Brokers on their claim that they were
entitled to compensation for their efforts in assisting the
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Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
appellants in a real estate transaction; from an order awarding
Erler $13,675.00 for his efforts in the transaction; and from an
order denying the appellants’ motion to alter amend or vacate
judgment.
Because the circuit court correctly granted the
appellees summary judgment on the issue of their entitlement to
compensation for their participation in the real estate
transaction, and because we find no error in the circuit court’s
assessment of proper compensation, we affirm.
Don Erler is a real estate agent in Jefferson County,
Kentucky, and is the owner of Re/Max Commercial Brokers.
Erler
acted as Re/Max Commercial Brokers’ agent in the events
surrounding this case.
Erler became aware of property for
residential apartment housing owned by John Lawson Realty and
MAC Properties located on Haney Way in Jefferson County.
John
Lawson is the president of John Lawson Realty and MAC Properties
and acted as their agent in the transactions described herein.
Erler also became aware that Chris Dischinger, a developer
acting as agent for Equity Holdings Group, LLC, was interested
in purchasing property in this zoning category.
With the
intention of facilitating the sale and purchase of the subject
property, Erler introduced Lawson and Dischinger.
Erler
subsequently went out of town.
During his absence Erler received word from Dischinger
that Lawson wanted to sign a contract on the Haney Way property
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which would include a compensation provision for Erler.
told Dischinger to go ahead and sign the contract.
Erler
A 90 day
option contract, with an additional 60 day extension provision,
was executed on February 27, 2002, entitling Dischinger to
purchase the property for $425,000.
Paragraph 4(e) of the
contract included the provision “Sellers are to pay a finder’s
fee to Don Erler, Re/Max Commercial Brokers per separate
agreement.”
The paragraph also contained a provision that John
Lawson Realty was to receive a commission from MAC Properties
per separate agreement.
No separate written agreement between
Lawson and Erler was ever executed.
Dischinger and Lawson did not consummate the original
option contract by the termination date of the agreement.
On
August 1, 2002, Lawson and Dischinger executed an agreement
voiding the February 27, 2002, agreement; however, on August 2,
2002, Dischinger and Lawson entered into a second agreement.
The second agreement was reflected in two separate contracts.
The first contract provided for the sale of the property owned
by MAC Properties to be purchased by Dischinger for $185,000.
The second contract provided for the purchase of the property
owed by John Lawson Realty to be purchased by Dischinger for
$240,000.
The new contracts omitted any provision for a fee to
be paid to Erler, though the MAC Properties contract retained a
provision for payment of a commission by MAC Properties to John
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Lawson Realty Co.
carried forward.
The deposits from the original agreement were
This time the terms of the agreement were
fulfilled, and the property was transferred to Dischinger’s
principal, Equity Holdings Group.
Erler sought payment for a commission or finder’s fee
on the transaction; however, he could not reach an agreement
with Lawson.
On August 30, 2002, Erler and Re/Max Commercial
Brokers filed a complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court against
John Lawson Realty Co. and MAC Properties seeking payment of a
commission or finder’s fee for their participation in the sale
of the Haney Way property.
Each side moved for summary judgment.
On January 9,
2003, the trial court entered an order granting Erler summary
judgment on his claim for compensation for his participation in
the sale of the Haney Way property.
The decision reflected that
statute of frauds issues had been satisfied, and stated that
Erler was entitled to be compensated for his efforts pursuant to
the doctrine of quantum meruit.
On March 21, 2003, a bench
trial was held on the issue of damages.
On April 14, 2003, the
trial court entered an order awarding Erler $13,675.00 as
compensation for his participation in the sale.
The trial court
denied the appellants’ motion to alter, amend or vacate.
appeal followed.
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This
The appellants contend that Erler is not entitled to
compensation for his participation in the sale of the Haney Way
property because such compensation amounts to a real estate
commission in the absence of a writing in contravention of
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 371.010(8) and Louisville Trust
Co. v. Monsky, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 120 (1969).
KRS 371.010(8)
provides as follows:
No action shall be brought to charge any
person:
. . . .
Upon any promise, agreement, or contract for
any commission or compensation for the sale
or lease of any real estate or for assisting
another in the sale or lease of any real
estate
. . . .
unless the promise, contract, agreement,
representation, assurance, or ratification,
or some memorandum or note thereof, be in
writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by his authorized
agent.
“[KRS 371.010(8) is plain, positive, and unambiguous.
It is controlling of [the] right to sue on a verbal contract.
[There is] no such right.”
Monsky, supra, at 121.
Moreover, a
real estate agent may not recover in quantum meruit in the
absence of a written contract.
Id.
In Louisville Trust Co. v. Monsky, Thomas C. Bean was
a licensed real-estate broker.
Bean called Monsky and asked if
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the latter was interested in selling his real estate consisting
of a full block at Thirtieth and Chestnut Streets in Louisville.
About a year later, Cabot Corporation signed a “real estate and
purchase contract” addressed to Thomas C. Bean “as agent,” in
which Cabot agreed to purchase the property for $125,000.
The
contract included the provision that “Seller [Monsky] will pay
any real estate commission payable.”
on June 23, 1965.
Monsky accepted this offer
Pursuant thereto, on July 8, 1965, Monsky
deeded the property to Cabot.
A dispute arose at this time in
which Monsky contended he did not agree to pay Bean a
commission, or that having once agreed to pay the commission, he
later terminated that agreement.
Bean took the position that he
and Louisville Trust Company (which provided Bean office space)
were entitled to a 5-percent commission.
Monsky held that Bean was not entitled to a commission
for his participation in the sale because there was no writing
as required by the statute of frauds provision contained in KRS
371.010(8).
The decision also held that Bean was not entitled
to recover on quantum meruit in the absence of a written
contract or memorandum complying with the statute of frauds.
The present case is distinguishable from Monsky
because the February 27, 2002, writing signed by Lawson as agent
for the appellants was sufficient to comply with the statute of
frauds.
The whole purpose of the writing required by a Statute
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of Frauds is to provide evidence of a contract.
Shpilberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Ky., 535 S.W.2d
227, 229 (1976).
A memorandum signed by the party to be charged
is sufficient if it relieves the court of the necessity of
relying upon parol evidence to establish the existence of the
Koplin v. Faulkner, Ky., 293 S.W.2d 467, 470 (1956).
contract.
KRS 371.010(8) requires only a memorandum or note of the
agreement signed by the person to be charged.
It follows that
the agreement need not be a formal contract between the parties,
but, rather, the writing need only establish the existence of
the contract.
133 (1981);
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 131, §
Elizabethtown Lincoln-Mercury v. Tucker, Ky., 240
S.W.2d 847 (1951) (handwritten memorandum signed by president of
company and on company stationary reciting in general way terms
of employment satisfies statute of frauds).
Hence, unlike in Monsky the statute of frauds was
complied with in this case because the February 27, 2002, option
contract comprises a written note or memorandum supporting the
existence of a contract between the appellants and Erler for the
payment of a fee in connection with the Haney Way real estate
transaction.
It makes no difference that Erler was not a party
to the agreement or that the contract was eventually voided.
While the general rule is that a broker cannot recover
for the reasonable value of services rendered on a theory of
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quantum meruit where an agreement to pay a broker’s commission
is unenforceable for want of a writing, where the statute of
frauds is satisfied by a writing, a claim under a theory of
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment will lie.
Rader Company v.
Stone, 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 27, 223 Cal.Rptr 806, 814 (1986).
Because the February 27, 2002, writing satisfied the
statute of frauds, because Monsky is inapplicable, because there
are otherwise no genuine issues of material fact, because it is
undisputed the Erler expended efforts in organizing the Haney
Way transactions, and because Erler is entitled to compensation
for those efforts pursuant to the doctrine of quantum meruit,
the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Erler on
the issue of whether he was entitled to compensation.
In the alternative the appellants contend that the fee
awarded by the trial court was excessive.
The fee was
determined by the trial court sitting without a jury.
“In all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall
find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment; . . . .
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
CR
52.01.; Colston Investment Co. v. Home Supply Co., Ky. App., 74
S.W.3d 759, 764 (2001).
Findings of fact are not clearly
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erroneous if supported by substantial evidence.
Janakakis-
Kostun v. Janakakis, Ky. App., 6 S.W.3d 843, 852 (1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 811, 121 S.Ct. 32, 148 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000).
The
test for substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone,
or in the light of all the evidence, it has sufficient probative
value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298,
308 (1972).
At the March 21, 2003, bench trial each side called an
expert witness to testify as to a reasonable fee.
Erler called
Barry Bohannon, who testified that he had been a commercial
realtor for some 12 years and had participated in hundreds of
transactions.
Bohannon testified that in his expert opinion
Erler was entitled to a fee of 3 1/2 percent of the $185,000 MAC
Properties contract price, plus 6 percent of the $240,000 John
Lawson Realty contract price, for a total fee of $20,875.2
Winston Wilson testified on behalf of the appellants.
Wilson is a past president of the Kentucky Board of Realtors and
has been a broker for over 20 years.
Wilson testified that
Erler was entitled to only a “finder’s fee” or “referral fee,”
2
The reason for the difference in the commission rates is that John Lawson
Realty Co. was paid a 7 percent commission by MAC Properties and Erler
assumed the position that he was entitled to a one-half share of that
commission. There was no commission provision for the John Lawson Realty Co.
transaction, and Erler asserted a claim to a full share of the standard 6
percent commission. It is unclear why a 7 percent commission, rather than
the standard 6 percent commission, was associated with the MAC Properties
transaction.
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which is normally understood to mean 20 percent of the buyer’s
side of an agreement.
Thus Wilson recommended a fee of
$2,550.00, or 20 percent of 3 percent (one-half of 6 percent) of
$425,000.00
"Quantum meruit" as an amount of recovery simply means
"as much as deserved," and measures the recovery under an
implied contract to pay compensation as the reasonable value of
services rendered.
Kintz v. Read
28 Wash.App. 731, 735, 626
P.2d 52, 55 (1981); Blacks Law Dictionary, (6th ed., 1990), p.
1243.
The circuit court established a fee of $13,675,
representing 3 1/2 percent of $185,000 plus 3 percent of
$240,000.
This method uses standard commission rate principals
in arriving at Erler’s fee, and this valuation falls squarely
within the range of values established by the expert witnesses.
The court’s figure clearly falls within the range of competent
testimony.
Underwood v. Underwood, Ky. App., 836 S.W.2d 439,
444 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Neidlinger v.
Neidlinger, Ky. 52 S.W.3d 513 (2001).
We conclude that the
findings of fact made by the trial court in its establishment of
a fee were not clearly erroneous, and that the method used in
arriving at the valuation was not an abuse of discretion.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce Garrett Anderson
Louisville, Kentucky
Clifford H. Ashburner
Louisville, Kentucky
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