JUNE SMITH PFIESTER v. AMELIA FRANKLIN ADAMS
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RENDERED: MAY 21, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001140-MR
JUNE SMITH PFIESTER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-004395
AMELIA FRANKLIN ADAMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
June Smith Pfiester (“Ms. Pfiester”) appeals
from findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of
Amelia Franklin Adams (“Adams”).
As a basis for the summary
judgment, the court opined that Ms. Pfiester failed to prosecute
her legal malpractice action against Adams within the one-year
statutory period commencing at the time Ms. Pfiester learned of
the alleged malpractice.
For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm.
Beginning in 1990, Adams, an attorney licensed to
practice in Kentucky, represented Ms. Pfiester in a dissolution
of marriage proceeding.
A property settlement agreement was
negotiated between the parties, which provided in relevant part
as follows:
The Respondent [Mr. Pfiester] shall receive
the Deferred Compensation account valued at
approximately $32,033.10 and the First
Credit Union account valued at approximately
$14,087 in return for his equity in the
residence and furniture. The Respondent
shall continue to carry the Petitioner [Ms.
Pfiester] as his beneficiary on the
retirement accounts in the event he should
predecease her . . . .
Ms. Pfiester executed the agreement on February 13, 1991.
On or about February 20, 1996, Mr. Pfiester wrote a
letter to Ms. Pfiester stating that the Kentucky Retirement
System had informed him that as a divorced spouse, she would
receive no retirement benefits upon his death.
Ms. Pfiester
contacted the Kentucky Retirement System, which advised her that
KRS 61.542(b) dictated that upon Mr. Pfiester’s death, any
remaining retirement benefits or residuary would go to his
estate rather than to Ms. Pfiester.
On July 19, 1996, attorney Leland Howard (“Howard”)
contacted Adams by way of letter on behalf of Ms. Pfiester.
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Adams sought to resolve the issue by filing a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order with the circuit court for the purpose of naming
Ms. Pfiester as a beneficiary of Mr. Pfiester’s retirement plan
pursuant to KRS 61.542(5)(b).
Relying on KRS 61.542(2)(b), the
Kentucky Retirement System rejected the order.
On June 18,
2001, Mr. Pfiester died intestate.
On June 11, 2002, Ms. Pfiester filed the instant
action against Adams in Jefferson Circuit Court alleging that
Adams committed legal malpractice by advising Ms. Pfiester to
execute the settlement agreement.
Adams moved for summary
judgment, claiming that Ms. Pfiester’s action was barred by KRS
413.245, the one-year statute of limitation.
Adams argued that
the alleged malpractice occurred when she advised Ms. Pfiester
to execute the settlement agreement in 1991, that it was
discovered in 1996, and that any claim for legal malpractice
must be brought, if at all, within one year of one of those
dates.
Upon taking proof, the circuit court determined that by
operation of statute Ms. Pfiester was never entitled to claim
Mr. Pfiester’s retirement benefits.
It determined that her
damages, if any, occurred when she executed the settlement
agreement and unknowingly gave up other property rights because
she believed that she would receive Mr. Pfiester’s retirement
benefits upon his death.
The court granted summary judgment in
favor of Adams on April 15, 2003, by way of findings of fact,
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conclusions of law, and order.
Ms. Pfiester’s subsequent motion
to alter, amend or vacate the order was denied, and this appeal
followed.
Ms. Pfiester now argues that the trial court committed
reversible error in granting Adams’s motion for summary
judgment.
Her primary argument is that no actual damages were
incurred until Mr. Pfiester died, and that accordingly the oneyear statutory period for bringing a legal malpractice claim
should have commenced on that date.
She also argues that
summary judgment should not have been rendered until questions
concerning a possible waiver of the statute of limitations
defense can be resolved.
She seeks an order reversing the
circuit court’s order granting summary judgment, and remanding
the matter for further proceedings.
Having closely examined the record, the law, and the
written arguments, we find no error in the order granting
summary judgment.
KRS 413.245 sets forth the statutory period
during which a civil action must be brought to recover damages
for professional service malpractice.
It states that,
a civil action, whether brought in tort or
contract, arising out of any act or omission
in rendering, or failing to render,
professional services for others shall be
brought within one (1) year from the date of
the occurrence or from the date when the
cause of action was, or reasonably should
have been, discovered by the party injured.
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Clearly, the statute directs one to the date of the occurrence
or the date when the cause of action was, or should have been,
discovered.
The dispositive issue, then, is whether the circuit
court properly concluded that 1) the date of the occurrence was
when Adams advised Ms. Pfiester to execute the settlement
agreement, and 2) that the date of discovery was in 1996 when
she learned that the Kentucky Retirement System would deny
benefits to her if Mr. Pfiester pre-deceased her.
The question
may also be stated in terms of whether the circuit court
properly rejected Ms. Pfiester’s assertion that the statutory
period actually began when Mr. Pfiester died and she allegedly
suffered actual pecuniary damages.
We believe these questions must be answered in the
affirmative.
There seems to be little question but that the
date of discovery for purposes of KRS 413.245 was in early 1996
when Ms. Pfiester was made aware that the Kentucky Retirement
System intended to deny any future claim for benefits if Mr.
Pfiester pre-deceased her.
As to the question of when Ms.
Pfiester suffered the alleged damages, we agree with Adams and
the circuit court in that the alleged damages were incurred, if
at all, when Adams advised Ms. Pfiester to execute the
settlement agreement rather than when Mr. Pfiester died.
As the
circuit court properly noted, Ms. Pfiester was never entitled to
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receive Mr. Pfiester’s retirement benefits if he pre-deceased
her.
As such, Ms. Pfiester suffered no pecuniary damages when
he died because she was never entitled to receive the benefits.
Ms. Pfiester asserts that her damages were speculative
until Mr. Pfiester died.
She contends that if she had brought
the instant action in 1996 upon learning that she was not
entitled to the benefits at issue, it would have been proper to
dismiss the action because the damages were speculative.
For
example, she notes that if she pre-deceased Mr. Pfiester, there
would be no damages at all.
We are not persuaded by this argument for the abovestated reasons.
Again, Ms. Pfiester was never entitled to Mr.
Pfiester’s retirement benefits, irrespective of the advice she
received from Adams, and irrespective of who died first.
By
virtue of this fact, her only damages could have been the loss
of her ability to negotiate a more favorable property settlement
in lieu of the settlement she executed.
Thus, she was allegedly
damaged at the time she executed the settlement agreement and
not when Mr. Pfiester pre-deceased her.
As between the date of
injury and the date of discovery, the date of discovery in 1996
was the latter and represented the date at which the statutory
period commenced.
The circuit court properly so found, and we
find no error on this issue.
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Ms. Pfiester also argues that the entry of summary
judgment was premature because a genuine issue of material fact
remained on the question of whether an agreement was entered
into by the parties, the effect of which was to toll the running
of the statute of limitations.
After the motion for summary
judgment had been tendered, but before the motion had been
granted, Adams testified that a tolling agreement was prepared
by her counsel and sent to Ms. Pfiester’s attorney.
Ms.
Pfiester contends that an issue of fact remains as to whether
this agreement operates to affect the issues at bar, and she
argues that a resolution of this issue necessarily must precede
the entry of summary judgment.
We are not persuaded by Ms. Pfiester’s argument on
this issue.
Though Adams did testify that her counsel sent a
tolling agreement to Ms. Pfiester’s counsel, she went on to
state that Ms. Pfiester’s counsel never signed and returned it,
and that nothing became of it.
There is no affirmative evidence
in the record supportive of the assertion that an enforceable
tolling agreement ever existed, and we cannot conclude that the
trial court erred in failing to characterize it as a genuine
issue of material fact.
Ms. Pfiester contends that more
discovery is needed to resolve the issue, but the burden was on
her to raise it in response to Adams’s motion for summary
judgment and to show that a genuine issue existed.
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The record
contains no evidence that a tolling agreement was executed, and
as such there is no genuine issue of material fact on this
issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph Michael Kelly
Louisville, KY
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
Mark B. Wallace
Louisville, KY
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