EDWARD T. BOWLES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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DECEMBER 17, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001127-MR
EDWARD T. BOWLES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. HIGGINS, Jr., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-00438
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Edward T. Bowles appeals from an opinion and
judgment entered by the Christian Circuit Court denying his RCr
11.42 motion.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Bowles was convicted of murder following a trial by
jury.
1
The judgment and sentence on plea of not guilty adjudging
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 100(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
Bowles guilty of murder and sentencing him to life in prison was
entered on October 4, 1996.
Thereafter, his conviction was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in a not-to-bepublished memorandum opinion of the court rendered April 16,
1998.2
On May 27, 1998, Bowles filed a pro se motion to vacate
judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.
While his RCr 11.42 motion was
pending, his trial attorney, Joel R. Embry was indicted on
several criminal charges.
During the pendency of the criminal
charges against him, Embry refused to consult with the
Commonwealth Attorney’s office relative to Bowles’s RCr 11.42
motion.
As such, the pending RCr 11.42 motion was placed on
hold until Embry’s criminal charges were resolved.
Once the
conflict had been resolved, the circuit court held a two-day
evidentiary hearing and permitted the parties to file
supplemental briefs.
Thereafter, the Christian Circuit Court
entered its opinion and judgment denying Bowles’s RCr 11.42
motion.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Bowles raises the following five
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel as to Embry’s
trial representation:
(1) Counsel’s failure to properly address
and preserve for appellate review the issue of hit and run
evidence; (2) counsel’s failure to be able to introduce James
[Bowles’s] Maryland court opinion of his rape conviction; (3)
2
Case No. 96-SC-446-MR.
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counsel’s failure to investigate and call witnesses and to
attack the character and credibility of James Bowles, including
counsel’s failure to utilize readily available work product of
predecessor counsel and information from first trial; (4)
counsel’s failure to seek a jury instruction for First Degree
Manslaughter; and (5) cumulative error.
We shall address each
allegation separately and in the order presented by Bowles.
Before we review the issues raised by Bowles on
appeal, it is necessary to set forth the standard of review
applicable to an appellate review of a RCr 11.42 motion.
The
Supreme Court of Kentucky recently revisited the issue of RCr
11.42 post-conviction proceedings in Haight v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436 (2001).
In Haight, the Court held:
We believe it is valuable to again set
out the standard of review of claims raised
in a collateral attack under RCr 11.42,
alleging ineffective assistance of trial
counsel at the original trial. Such a
motion is limited to the issues that were
not and could not be raised on direct
appeal. An issue raised and rejected on
direct appeal may not be relitigated in
these proceedings by simply claiming that it
amounts to ineffective assistance of
counsel. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975
S.W.2d 905 (1998); Brown v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 788 S.W.2d 500 (1990) and Stanford v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
The standards which measure ineffective
assistance of counsel are set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord
Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37
-3-
(1985); Sanborn, supra. In order to be
ineffective, performance of counsel must be
below the objective standard of
reasonableness and so prejudicial as to
deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a
reasonable result. Strickland, supra.
“Counsel is constitutionally ineffective
only if performance below professional
standards caused the defendant to lose what
he otherwise would probably have won.”
United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229
(6th Cir. 1992). The critical issue is not
whether counsel made errors but whether
counsel was so thoroughly ineffective that
defeat was snatched from the hands of
probably victory. Morrow, supra. The
purpose of RCr 11.42 is to provide a forum
for known grievances, not to provide an
opportunity to research for grievances.
Gilliam v. Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d
856, 858 (1983).
In considering ineffective assistance,
the reviewing court must focus on the
totality of evidence before the judge or
jury and assess the overall performance of
counsel throughout the case in order to
determine whether the identified acts or
omissions overcome the presumption that
counsel rendered reasonable professional
assistance. See Morrow; Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91
L.Ed.2d 302 (1986).
A defendant is not guaranteed errorless
counsel, or counsel judged ineffective by
hindsight, but counsel likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance.
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 70
(1997). Strickland notes that a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. The
right to effective assistance of counsel is
recognized because of the effect it has on
the ability of the accused to receive a fair
trial.
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In a RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant
has the burden to establish convincingly
that he was deprived of some substantial
right which would justify the extraordinary
relief afforded by the post-conviction
proceeding. Dorton v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (1968). Even when the
trial judge does conduct an evidentiary
hearing, a reviewing court must defer to the
determination of the facts and witness
credibility made by the trial judge.
Sanborn; McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721
S.W.2d 694 (1986); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99
F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 441-442.
With this standard in mind, we now address Bowles’s
arguments.
First, he contends that Embry failed “to properly
address and preserve for appellate view of the issue of [the]
hit and run evidence.”
The facts relating to the hit and run
incident are somewhat complex, but we will attempt to make them
clear.
Following the disappearance of the victim, Jackie
Leavell, both Bowles and is brother, James Bowles, as well as
other individuals, were interviewed by the police.
later, the police discovered Leavell’s body.
Several days
It had been dumped
over the guardrail and down an embankment near Clarksville,
Tennessee.
The police again went to interview several persons.
Police Detective Mary Martins attempted to locate Bowles.
went to his sister’s home but was advised he was not there.
She
As
the detective was returning to the police station, she was
advised over the police radio that Bowles had been involved in a
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hit and run accident, had rammed another police officer’s
cruiser and had left the scene of the accident.
After leaving
the scene of the accident, Bowles apparently contacted the
police and advised them that his car had been stolen.
Police
responded to Bowles’s telephone call and arrested him for DUI,
hit and run, and making a false police report.
At trial, several police officers were permitted to
testify as to events leading to Bowles’s arrest following the
hit and run incident, including statements Bowles had made to
the affect that he did not know Leavell.
to this testimony at trial.
Embry never objected
It should be noted at this point
that this was the second trial for Bowles on the murder charge.
The first trial had ended in a mistrial.
At the first trial,
lead defense attorney, Adam Zeroogian (with Embry as second
seat) had objected to this testimony, but the trial court had
overruled the objection.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky addressed the issue as follows:
At the first trial, appellant objected
to the admission of the evidence of this hit
and run, but the trial court overruled the
motion, stating that it would allow such
evidence in as evidence of guilt under KRE
404(b). Appellant did not renew his
objection at the second trial and the claim
of error is unpreserved.
The Commonwealth introduced the evidence of Bowles’s
DUI, hit and run and falsely reporting an accident as evidence
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of flight tending to prove guilt.
At the RCr 11.42 evidentiary
hearing, Embry could not explain why he had not objected to this
evidence at the second trial.
On appeal, Bowles contends
Embry’s failure to object to this evidence was extremely
prejudicial to his case and there is no valid explanation for
his failure to object.
The Commonwealth argues that it was
within the perimeters of sound trial strategy and was admissible
evidence so any objection would have been futile.
The circuit
court addressed this issue in its order denying his RCr 11.42
motion as follows:
Mr. Embry was in chambers prior to the
beginning of the first trial on April 22,
1996, with the Defendant and with Attorney
Zeroogian and actively involved in arguing
various motions and objected when the Court
ruled to allow the Commonwealth to offer
evidence of the hit and run incident. It
should be stated here that at the time
Attorney Zeroogian moved the Court to
exclude evidence of the hit and run
incident, the trial had not started, so the
motion was a motion in limine, made before
trial, and when the Court overruled the
motion, Attorney Embry objected. Later, at
the second trial, he did not object when
this evidence was offered, but he might
reasonably have thought the question was
preserved due to his original objection made
before any trial. (Tape 04/22/96 @ 9:32:00
et. seq.). It is not necessary to make
continuing objections once a ruling has been
made. (Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 SW2d
484 (Ky.App. 1993). Also, if a Court rules
upon an objection out of the hearing of the
jury, it preserves the error for judicial
review. (KRE103D). Attorney Embry stated
at the evidentiary hearing that he did not
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remember why he did not object at the second
trial. He handled the matter in his closing
argument, pointing out that this client had
been drinking at the time he ran the stop
sight and ran into the Sheriff’s automobile
and he left the scene because he was on
parole and did not want to be identified and
arrested as that would affect his parole
status. Mr. Embry further pointed out to
the jury that if the Defendant was trying to
run from the police because of the Jackie
Leavell murder, he would not have called
them, as he did, to report that his car had
been stolen. The Court having previously
ruled to allow the hit and run evidence to
be introduced, Mr. Embry decided to handle
it as he did and this appears to be
reasonable trial strategy under the
circumstances.3
Whether the evidence was admissible under KRE 404(b)
is the primary issue.
KRE 404(b) provides:
(b)
(1)
If offered for some other purpose, such
as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or
accident; or
(2)
3
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible:
If so inextricably intertwined with
other evidence essential to the case
that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious
adverse effect on the offering party.
At page 7 of the March 27, 2003 opinion and judgment, TR p. 214.
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The Commonwealth contends that the trial court’s
ruling at the first trial was correct in that the evidence was
used to show “guilty knowledge” on the part of Bowles.
Citing
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, Ky., 107 S.W.3d 215, 219-220 (2003),
it argues that evidence of flight is “an expression of a sense
of guilt, within the meaning of KRE 404(b)(1).”
However, the
facts of Rodriguez and other cases cited by the Commonwealth are
easily factually distinguishable.
occurred on September 13, 1994.
filed the next day.
In this case, the murder
A missing person’s report was
Both Bowles and his brother, James, were
interviewed because another witness, Stanley Earthman, the
victim’s cousin, had placed Leavell in their company on the day
she was last seen.
1994.
Leavell’s body was discovered on October 4,
On October 5, 1994, Detective Martins went looking for
Bowles for further questioning into the death of Leavell.
detective spoke to Bowles’s sister, Eloise Butler.
The
Butler
informed the police that Bowles was not at her house but that
she would notify Bowles that the police was looking for him.
Approximately an hour and a half later, Bowles was involved in
the hit and run accident with the police.
As a result of the
hit and run accident and Bowles’s ensuing actions, he was
charged with DUI, hit and run and making a false police report.
During his murder trial, the police were permitted to testify as
to Bowles’s conduct relative to this incident, including rude
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comments he made to the police and his lying to the police about
his personal knowledge of the murder victim, Leavell.
This
testimony significantly impacted Bowles’s credibility, yet Embry
failed to object to it.
It is important to note that the Commonwealth did not
present any evidence that Bowles had knowledge prior to this
incident that Leavell’s body had been discovered or that he had
been informed that the police were looking for him in connection
with this discovery.
What is clear is that Embry did not object
to this evidence and the Kentucky Supreme Court did not address
the issue on direct appeal because the issue had not been
preserved.
This evidence did become a focus point of both
parties in the closing statements.
Embry tried to explain that
Bowles’s actions and flight were the result of his fear of
arrest for DUI since he was on parole.
The Commonwealth
emphasized Bowles’s guilty mind and the inference the jury could
infer from his actions by fleeing and making false statements.
To further complicate this issue is the fact that this was a
case based upon credibility, in particular, Bowles’s credibility
versus his brother’s, James.
murder.
Each was accusing the other of the
There was no physical evidence to which the
Commonwealth could rely upon to convince the jury that Bowles
was the murderer.
Instead, the Commonwealth had offered James a
deal in which he would receive a ten (10) year sentence for
-10-
complicity if he testified that Bowles had killed Leavell.
James’s credibility was already in question because he had given
several different versions of how the murder had occurred and
what his role in the murder was.
The case against Bowles was
based upon circumstantial evidence and James’s testimony and
credibility.
By portraying Bowles as being untruthful, violent,
irresponsible, on parole and willing to do anything to get away
from the police may have given the jury just enough reason to
convict Bowles of murder.
Embry’s failure to object to this
testimony was extremely prejudicial to Bowles’s defense.
Also,
his lack of any explanation as to why he did not object at the
second trial (Embry stated he did not remember why he did not
object), negates the court’s explanation that it was trial
strategy.
Embry’s failure to object and preserve the issue for
appellate review is ineffective assistance of counsel.
Bowles also contends that Embry’s failure to present
certified records of James’s rape conviction in Maryland was
highly prejudicial to his defense.
Again, the issue of
credibility was at center stage in this case, and while Embry
did ask James about his Maryland conviction, he failed to
preserve the record by having properly authenticated documents
from Maryland, which would have put before the jury greater
details of James’s criminal behavior than merely asking the
witness if he had ever been convicted of the charge of rape.
-11-
On
direct appeal, the Supreme Court refused to address this issue
because it had not been preserved for review.
That Court went
into significant detail as to this issue only to say it was not
preserved and thus, not to be addressed.
The following is an
excerpt of the Supreme Court’s April 16, 1998, opinion:
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING
DETAILS OF JAMES BOWLES’ PRIOR RAPE
CONVICTION
Appellant’s brother James Bowles, the
Commonwealth’s principal witness, was
convicted of rape in the state of Maryland
in 1978. Appellant sought to inquire of
James whether he had been convicted of a
felony, a practice authorized by KRE 609,
and to support his claim that James was the
killer, appellant also wanted to question
James about the details of the prior crime.
At a pre-trial hearing, appellant asserted
that such evidence was admissible under KRE
404(b) as proof of James’ motive, intent or
plan regarding Ms. Leavell’s murder.
Appellant argued that the facts surrounding
the prior crime were similar to the facts in
evidence here. The trial court overruled
appellant’s motion.
KRE 609 provides for proof a prior
felony conviction for the purpose of
impeachment. Under this rule, a witness may
be impeached by a prior conviction if that
conviction was for an offense punishable as
a felony. Professor Lawson described the
narrow scope of KRE 609 as such:
KRE 609 precludes an impeaching
party from revealing the nature of
the crime for which a witness has
been convicted. The impeachment
is limited to revealing the fact
of conviction of a felony crime.
The objective of this rule is to
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provide a measure of protection to
the witness . . . from the risk of
prejudice.
R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law
Handbook, § 4.30, p. 219 (3d ed. 1983).
Appellant’s claim under KRE 404(b)(1)
with regard to evidence of the details of
James’ prior felony conviction for rape is
more difficult. This Court has recently
dealt with this issue in Commonwealth v.
Maddox, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 718 (1997), and
required that a connection be established
between the proposed cross-examination and
the facts in evidence. We expressed the
view that a defendant is not at liberty to
present unsupported theories in the guise of
cross-examination. We reiterated the broad
discretion of the trial court which respect
to admission and exclusion of evidence. We
recognized, however, that in certain
circumstances where the requirements of KRE
404(b)(1) are satisfied, evidence of similar
facts tending to establish modus operandi
may be proven.
In determining whether prior bad
acts should be admitted, this
Court has placed emphasis upon
common facts, and has held that
the facts of the prior bad acts
must be so similar as to indicate
a reasonable probability that the
acts were committed by the same
person.
Id. at 722.
Despite the thought-provoking nature of this
issue, the Commonwealth has asserted, and we
agree, that the question is not preserved. In
the course of a colloquy between the court and
counsel, appellant’s counsel expressed
acquiescence in the trial court’s decision to
allow evidence of a prior conviction and evidence
that it was for rape. After this ruling,
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appellant sought no additional relief and it
clearly appears that an agreement had been
reached.
The Christian Circuit Court, in its order denying
Bowles’s RCr 11.42 motion, stated that Embry did not object to
the court’s ruling limiting this evidence.
The circuit court
also indicated that the Supreme Court’s opinion held that “the
details of the past crime [James’s] were properly excluded by
the trial court and thus Embry’s failure to object was not
prejudicial to Bowles’s defense.”
What the Supreme Courts
opinion actually held was Bowles’s contention that James’s
statement “I ain’t never hurt nobody” did not open the door for
the admission of the details of the prior rape charge.
Bowles’s
and James’s credibility was the focus of the testimony and
evidence in this trial.
Embry’s failure to preserve an issue of
such importance as the admissibility of the details of James’s
prior rape conviction went to the heart of Bowles’s defense and
such action can only be viewed as ineffective assistance of
counsel and below the objective standard of reasonableness and
so prejudicial as to deprive Bowles of a fair trial and a
reasonable result.4
There are several other areas of ineffective
assistance of counsel that Bowles points out that rendered
Embry’s trial representation ineffective.
4
See Strickland, supra.
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We do not believe any
particular one of these issues alone would be cause to reverse
Bowles’s murder conviction.
But when combined with the two
issues previously discussed, they do show an overall failure on
Embry’s part to be adequately prepared for a trial of such
significance.
Embry’s failure to adequately prepare for trial,
call necessary witnesses, thoroughly cross-examine witnesses as
to significant issues and properly preserve issues for appellate
review, leaves little doubt that his representation of Bowles
was ineffective.
The fact that Bowles had some involvement in
Leavell’s death is not at issue before this Court.
The issue is
did his attorney meet the standard of ineffective assistance of
counsel set out in Strickland.
involved the answer is yes.
Unfortunately for all parties
Embry’s performance as trial
counsel was below the objective standard of reasonableness and
so prejudicial that it deprived Bowles of a fair trial and a
reasonable result, giving this Court no alternative but to
reverse the conviction and to remand this matter for a new
trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion and judgment
entered by the Christian Circuit Court on March 27, 2003,
denying Bowles’s RCr 11.42 motion is reversed and this matter is
remanded for a new trial.
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
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KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
Respectfully, I dissent
from the majority opinion because I do not agree that any errors
by trial counsel unfairly prejudiced the defense.
As discussed
in the majority’s thorough opinion, Bowles’s trial counsel
failed to object to the admission of evidence involving Bowles’s
hit-and-run accident and failed to properly introduce evidence
of James Bowles’s Maryland rape conviction.
Although the
Kentucky Supreme Court declined to address these issues on the
merits due to lack of preservation, the trial court viewed trial
counsel’s failure to object on the first issue as reasonable
trial strategy, and viewed the Supreme Court’s opinion as
affirming its evidentiary ruling on the second issue.
Because
the trial court proceeded from these erroneous premises, I agree
with the majority that it considered Bowles’s RCr 11.42 motion
under the wrong standard.
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), a person who seeks to
collaterally attack a conviction must show not only that
counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, but also
that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, accord Gall v.
Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky., 1985).
Although we owe
deference to the trial court’s factual findings denying the
motion, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.
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However, the majority opinion assumes that the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings were incorrect and then proceeds to conclude
that counsel’s failure to preserve these issues was prejudicial.
I disagree with this conclusion because it is not clear from the
record that the result would have been different even if trial
counsel had preserved these issues for appellate review.
The majority implicitly finds that evidence of
Bowles’s hit-and-run on October 5, 1994, was not admissible and
that counsel’s failure to object to its admission unfairly
prejudged the defense.
But as the Commonwealth correctly notes,
evidence of flight may be admissible.
Rodriguez v Commonwealth,
107 S.W.3d 215, 218-19 (2003); citing KRE 401.
While there is
some question whether the Commonwealth laid a proper foundation
for admission of this evidence, based on the record I cannot say
that the evidence was clearly inadmissible.
Likewise, the majority implicitly finds that the
details of James Bowles’s Maryland conviction would have been
admissible had Bowles’s trial counsel presented properly
authenticated documents preserving his objection to the trial
court’s exclusion of the evidence.
I agree that evidence of a
prior felony conviction was relevant to James Bowles’s
credibility.
KRE 609.
However, trial counsel was able to
inform the jury of the fact that James Bowles had a conviction
for rape from Maryland, which is permitted under KRE 609.
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Since
James Bowles admitted to the fact of the conviction, details of
the crime were not admissible except under a different rule.
As
the Supreme Court noted in its opinion in the direct appeal,
evidence of prior bad acts may only be admitted when the facts
of the prior bad act are so similar as to indicate a reasonable
probability that the acts were committed by the same person.
Citing KRE 404(b)(1) and Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718
(Ky., 1997).
The majority assumes that the details of James
Bowles’s Maryland rape conviction would have been admissible if
the records had been properly certified and introduced by
avowal.
I do not find any support in the record for this
conclusion.
Bowles bore the burden of establishing convincingly
that he has been deprived of some substantial right which would
justify the extraordinary relief afforded by post-conviction
proceedings.
2003).
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Ky.
If the evidence was improperly admitted or excluded,
then trial counsel’s failure to properly preserve these issues
was prejudicial.
Thus, a new trial would be mandated.
However,
if the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were correct, then
counsel’s alleged errors did not prejudice the defense and no
new trial is necessary.
While Bowles makes a convincing
argument that his trial counsel’s failure to preserve these
issues was deficient, he has failed to show a reasonable
-18-
likelihood that he would have been granted a new trial if the
alleged errors had been properly preserved for appellate review.
Lastly, the majority cites to a number of omissions by
trial counsel which, while not prejudicial in themselves, “when
combined with the other two issues previously discussed, … show
an overall failure on [trial counsel’s] part to be adequately
prepared for a trial of such significance”.
In Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S.510, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003),
the United States Supreme Court recently addressed the standard
for reviewing such failure-to-investigate claims against trial
counsel.
The focus of the inquiry must be on whether counsel’s
decision not to investigate potentially mitigating evidence or
testimony was objectively reasonable.
In assessing counsel’s investigation, we
must conduct an objective review of their
performance, measured for “reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms”,
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, [80 L.Ed.2d
674,] 104 S.Ct. 2052, which includes a
context-dependent consideration of the
challenged conduct as seen “from counsel’s
perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, [80
L.Ed.2d 674,] 104 S.Ct. 2052. (“Every
effort [must] be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight”).
Wiggins, at 523, 123 S.Ct. at 2536, 156 L.Ed.2d at 486.
The trial court specifically rejected Bowles’s claims
that his trial counsel was unprepared for trial.
The court also
found that trial counsel’s decision not to call certain
witnesses was objectively reasonable because there were
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significant questions about those witnesses’ credibility.
Based
on the record, I cannot agree with the majority that these
findings were clearly erroneous.
Therefore, I would affirm the
trial court’s order denying Bowles’s RCr 11.42 motion.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Margaret Foley Case
Public Advocate
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Joseph Ray Myers
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, KY
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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