RICHARD W. LUNSFORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JULY 9, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001103-MR
RICHARD W. LUNSFORD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00592
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Richard W. Lunsford has appealed from the final
judgment and sentence of imprisonment entered by the Fayette
Circuit Court on April 29, 2003, which convicted him of
possession of marijuana, while in possession of a firearm,1 and
possession of drug paraphernalia, second offense.2
Having
concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Lunsford’s
motions for a directed verdict of acquittal, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1422 and KRS 218A.992.
2
KRS 218A.500.
On March 19, 2002, at approximately 10:30 p.m.,
Officer James Moore and Officer Michael Carroll of the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Division of Police were
dispatched to 374 Preston Avenue in Lexington, Kentucky, to
investigate a call from a female in distress.
Upon arriving at
the scene, Officer Moore and Officer Carroll approached the
front door of the residence and announced their presence.
Although they received no response, Officer Moore and Officer
Carroll entered the residence after Officer Moore observed a
rifle leaning against a wall in the living room.3
Officer Moore
and Officer Carroll proceeded to search the residence for
occupants and during the search they observed what appeared to
be marijuana and drug paraphernalia on a coffee table in the
living room.
After determining that no one was present in the
residence, Officer Moore contacted his supervisor, Officer Dan
Fleischer, and apprised him of the situation.
Officer Fleischer
then contacted Detective Keith Ford, who proceeded to secure a
search warrant for the premises.
According to Officer Moore, he
remained at the scene while Officer Carroll and Officer
3
According to Officer Moore, he noticed the rifle when he “peered” through
the front door, which was cracked open.
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Fleischer canvassed the neighborhood.
Approximately one and
one-half hours later, Det. Ford returned with a search warrant.4
An ensuing search of the residence revealed five
individually wrapped baggies of marijuana, several partially
burnt marijuana cigarettes, digital scales, several items of
drug paraphernalia, an SKS (Samozariadnyia Karabina Simonova)
rifle, a .22 caliber revolver, two 20-gauge shotguns, and a
flintlock derringer pistol.5
The baggies of marijuana and
digital scales were found under a coffee table in the living
room.
The partially burnt marijuana cigarettes were found in an
ashtray on top of the coffee table and in a can located under
the table.
The SKS rifle was found leaning against a wall near
a couch in the living room.6
The .22 caliber revolver was found
in the front bedroom along with a lockbox containing several
items of drug paraphernalia.7
The derringer pistol and 20-gauge
shotguns were found in the back bedroom.
The search also
revealed evidence indicating that Lunsford resided at 374
4
During the interim, Officer Fleischer learned that Jody Franklin resided at
374 Preston Avenue. Officer Fleischer subsequently located Franklin at her
place of employment and transported her back to her residence.
5
Det. Ford, Officer Moore, Officer Carroll, and Officer Fleischer all
participated in the search. Sergeant Mark Simmons also participated in the
search.
6
The rifle was not equipped with its standard 10-round magazine and no
magazines were discovered in the residence.
7
Franklin provided the key to the lockbox.
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Preston Avenue with Franklin.8
A warrant was issued for
Lunsford’s arrest and he was taken into custody on March 27,
2002.9
Lunsford was unarmed when he was arrested.
On May 28, 2002, Lunsford was indicted by a Fayette
County grand jury and charged with, inter alia, trafficking in a
controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a school,10 while in
possession of a firearm, and possession of drug paraphernalia,
second offense.11
Franklin was also indicted and charged with
trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a
school, while in possession of a firearm, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
Lunsford and Franklin were tried jointly before
a Fayette County jury in March 2003.
Several witnesses testified on behalf of the
Commonwealth at trial.
Officer Moore stated that he
participated in the search and he identified the SKS rifle that
was seized from the living room.
Officer Moore testified that
the rifle was found “in close proximity” to the marijuana found
in the living room.
More specifically, Officer Moore opined
8
The police found mail addressed to Lunsford in the residence.
9
Lunsford was arrested at his brother’s residence in Lexington.
10
KRS 218A.1411. 374 Preston Avenue is located within 1,000 yards of Ewan
Elementary School.
11
The indictment also charged Lunsford with receiving stolen property over
$300.00 (KRS 514.110), leaving the scene of an accident (KRS 189.580) and
operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license (KRS 186.620). These
charges were severed from the drug charges prior to trial and are not at
issue in this appeal.
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that “you could reach both [the drugs and the rifle] at the same
time if you needed to.”
Det. Ford testified that he obtained a
search warrant for the residence based on information provided
by Officer Moore and Officer Carroll.
Det. Ford identified and
described the various items of contraband that were seized from
the residence and he opined that the evidence was indicative of
drug trafficking.
Det. Ford testified that during the search
Franklin informed him that the guns found in the residence
belonged to her two teenage sons.
Sgt. Simmons opined that the
items seized during the search were indicative of drug
trafficking and he stated that drug traffickers typically use
firearms to protect their “stash.”
Special Agent Scott Teal from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms testified that the SKS rifle seized during
the search was a Chinese prototype of a military rifle
originally produced by the Soviets.12
Teal explained that the
weapon was not inoperable despite the fact it did not have a
magazine.
Teal maintained the weapon could be loaded manually
and fired one round at a time.
Teal opined that the weapon was
not an ideal hunting rifle because, among other things, it did
not have a scope and it lacked “knock down power.”
Teal further
testified that the flintlock derringer pistol seized during the
12
The SKS was the predecessor to the AK-47 (Avtomat Kalashnikov) assault
rifle.
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search is not considered a firearm under federal law.
Teal
opined that the .22 caliber revolver found in the front bedroom
appeared to be inoperable due to a broken hammer.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief,
Lunsford and Franklin moved the trial court for directed
verdicts of acquittal on the trafficking charges13 on the grounds
that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for
trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a
school, while in possession of a firearm.14
The trial court
denied both motions.
Lunsford testified in his own defense and denied that
he sold marijuana.
Lunsford claimed the marijuana found at his
residence was solely for personal use.
Lunsford explained that
he consumed marijuana on a regular basis and he considered
himself to be a marijuana “connoisseur”.
Lunsford testified
that he purchased marijuana in large quantities because it was
more cost-effective.
Lunsford stated that on some occasions he
purchased as much as four ounces of marijuana at a time.
Lunsford insisted that he kept his marijuana in separate
individually wrapped baggies because it was more practical to
carry smaller amounts when he was working.
Lunsford claimed he
13
Franklin also moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the possession
of drug paraphernalia charge.
14
Lunsford did not raise any specific arguments with respect to the firearm
enhancement charge. He merely asserted that the evidence was insufficient to
support the trafficking charge.
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used the scales to make sure he “didn’t get ripped off” when he
purchased large quantities of marijuana.
Lunsford testified that Franklin purchased the SKS
rifle from one of his friends as a gift for her sons.
Lunsford
stated that he did not have a magazine for the rifle.
Lunsford
claimed the rifle was in the living room because he was in the
process of converting it into a hunting rifle.
Lunsford further
testified that the shotguns seized from his residence belonged
to Franklin’s sons and were used for hunting.
Lunsford insisted
that the flintlock derringer pistol was nothing more than a
“conversation piece.”
Lunsford claimed the .22 caliber revolver
found in the front bedroom was inoperable.
In closing, Lunsford
testified that all of the marijuana and drug paraphernalia
seized from his residence belonged to him.
testify.
Franklin did not
Lunsford and Franklin renewed their motions for
directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of all the evidence,
both of which were denied.15
The jury acquitted Lunsford of trafficking in a
controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a school, while in
possession of a firearm, and convicted him of the lesserincluded offense of possession of marijuana, while in possession
of a firearm, and possession of drug paraphernalia, second
15
Once again, Lunsford did not raise any specific arguments with respect to
the firearm enhancement charge.
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offense.16
On April 29, 2003, the trial court entered its final
judgment and sentence of imprisonment.
The trial court
sentenced Lunsford to prison for one year on the conviction for
possession of marijuana, while in possession of a firearm, and
to one year on the conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia, second offense.
The trial court ordered the
sentences to be served consecutively.17
This appeal followed.
Lunsford argues on appeal that the trial court erred
by denying his motions for a directed verdict of acquittal.
Lunsford contends the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth at
trial was insufficient to support his conviction for possession
of marijuana, while in possession of a firearm.
In sum,
Lunsford claims the Commonwealth failed to establish a
sufficient nexus between the firearms and marijuana that were
seized from his residence.18
We disagree.
It is well-established that in order to preserve an
insufficiency-of-the-evidence allegation for appellate review, a
defendant must specifically mention the error alleged in his
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.19
Simply put, a
general motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is not
16
Franklin was acquitted on all charges.
17
The jury recommended that the sentences be served concurrently.
18
Lunsford does not challenge his conviction for possession of marijuana.
simply takes issue with the firearm enhancement conviction.
19
He
See, e.g., Anastasi v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (1988); and
Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 805 S.W.2d 144, 148 (1990).
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sufficient.
A thorough review of the record indicates that
Lunsford never raised any arguments with respect to the firearm
enhancement charge in either of his motions for a directed
verdict of acquittal.
In fact, no mention was ever made of the
Commonwealth’s alleged failure to establish a nexus between the
firearms and marijuana seized from Lunsford’s residence.20
Consequently, the trial court was never given an opportunity
“‘to pass on the issue in light of all the evidence[.]’”21
Thus,
Lunsford has failed to preserve his insufficiency-of-theevidence allegation for appellate review.
Nevertheless, since a conviction based on insufficient
evidence would undoubtedly deprive a criminal defendant of
substantial due process rights,22 we will review Lunsford’s
insufficiency of the evidence argument under the standard
articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham:23
20
As previously discussed, Lunsford merely asserted that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trafficking charge. In addition, Lunsford
offered no objection to the firearm enhancement instruction that was given to
the jury.
21
Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 830, 836 (2003)(quoting Baker
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 54, 55 (1998)).
22
See Schoenbachler, supra at 837 n.10 (“‘[a]ppellee argues that these
[insufficiency of the evidence] errors are not preserved for our review since
appellant made no motion for a directed verdict at any point during the
trial. Ordinarily, we would agree with appellee, but a conviction in
violation of due process constitutes “[a] palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party” which we may consider and relieve though it
was insufficiently raised or preserved for our review’”)(quoting Perkins v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 694 S.W.2d 721, 722 (1985)).
23
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991).
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On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserv[e] to the
jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable
for a jury to find guilt, only then is the
defendant entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.24
KRS 218A.992 increases the penalty for drug-related
offenses when the offender “at the time of the commission of the
offense” was “in possession of a firearm[.]”25
In Commonwealth
v. Montaque,26 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that KRS
218A.992(1) “requires a nexus between the crime committed and
24
Schoenbachler, 95 S.W.3d at 837 (quoting Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187).
25
The statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) Other provisions of law notwithstanding, any
person who is convicted of any violation of this
chapter who was at the time of the commission of
the offense in possession of a firearm, shall:
(a) Be penalized one (1) class more severely than
provided in the penalty provision pertaining to
that offense if it is a felony; or
(b) Be penalized as a Class D felon if the
offense would otherwise be a misdemeanor.
26
Ky., 23 S.W.3d 629 (2000).
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the possession of a firearm.”27
The Court further held that
“mere contemporaneous possession of a firearm is not sufficient
to satisfy the nexus requirement.”28
Montaque had been arrested after police discovered
several items of contraband in an apartment she occupied with
Ronald Johnson while executing a search warrant.29
The police
subsequently found an unloaded semi-automatic handgun in the
trunk of a Cadillac parked outside her apartment.
The police
found the gun wrapped in a plastic shopping bag along with two
ammunition clips and a box of loose shells.
find any drugs in the Cadillac.
The police did not
Montaque claimed she had
borrowed the Cadillac from Johnson’s mother.
Montaque insisted,
however, that she was not using the Cadillac at the time of the
search because she had recently purchased a car of her own.
Montaque further claimed that the gun belonged to a friend who
had asked her “to store it for him.”30
A Jefferson County jury
convicted Montaque of, inter alia, trafficking in a controlled
27
Id. at 632. The Court reasoned that “[r]equiring proof of a nexus between
the commission of the offense and the possession of the firearm reduces or
eliminates [the risk of punishing non-criminal activity] without lessening
the statute’s legitimate penal purpose.” Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 630. Specifically, the police found approximately nine ounces of
cocaine, digital scales, knives, cellular phones and plastic bags in the
apartment.
30
Id. at 631.
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substance in the first degree (cocaine),31 while in possession of
a firearm.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
Commonwealth had failed to establish a nexus between the
contraband that was seized from Montaque’s residence and the gun
that was found in the Cadillac.
The Court stated that “when it
cannot be established that the defendant was in actual
possession of a firearm or that a firearm was within his or her
immediate control upon arrest, the Commonwealth must prove . . .
some connection between the firearm possession and the crime.”32
The Court noted that the gun was not in “Montaque’s actual
possession or within her immediate control when she was
arrested[,]” and “there [was] nothing to connect the gun or the
Cadillac to the possession or the trafficking of drugs.”33
The
Court stated, however, that “if drugs had been found in the
Cadillac along with the gun, then a sufficient connection would
have been established to create a question of fact for the
jury.”34
In the case sub judice, the SKS rifle was found in
close proximity to the drugs, which Lunsford admitted to
31
KRS 218A.1412.
32
Montaque, 23 S.W.3d at 633.
33
Id.
34
Id.
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possessing.
Lunsford’s own testimony, coupled with that of
Officer Moore, established that the gun was present and within
his immediate control during the commission of the offense.
“Once it is established that a defendant was in possession of a
weapon during the commission of an offense, a presumption arises
that such possession was connected to the offense[,]” and “[t]he
government does not have to produce any further evidence
establishing a connection between the weapon and the offense”
[emphasis original].35
In sum, we are persuaded that the
evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to infer
that a nexus existed between the SKS rifle seized from
Lunsford’s residence and the drug offense for which he was
convicted.36
Consequently, the trial court did not err by
denying Lunsford’s motions for a directed verdict of acquittal.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the final judgment and
sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
35
United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1460 (6th Cir. 1991)(construing §
2D1.1(b)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines). This presumption is
not conclusive, however, as the defendant may introduce evidence to the
contrary which would create an issue of fact for the jury to resolve.
Montaque, 23 S.W.3d at 633.
36
Id.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael C. Lemke
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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