AK STEEL CORPORATION v. RAY ALLEN; HON. JAMES L. KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND DEPARTMENT WORKERS' CLAIMS,
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 20, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001100-WC
AK STEEL CORPORATION
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-02-00220
RAY ALLEN; HON. JAMES L. KERR,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
DEPARTMENT WORKERS’ CLAIMS,
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: McANULTY, MINTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
McANULTY JUDGE:
AK Steel Corporation (AK Steel) seeks review of
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) upholding
the determination of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that
appellee Ray Allen is entitled to permanent partial disability
benefits.
AK Steel contends that the ALJ erred by failing to
exclude that portion of Allen’s hearing loss attributable to the
natural aging process and by applying the times-two multiplier
provided for in KRS1 342.730(1)(c)2.
For the reasons stated
below, we affirm the ALJ’s exclusion of the natural aging
process in assessing Allen’s hearing loss impairment, but
reverse the ALJ’s application of the times-two multiplier
contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 in calculating Allen’s
disability benefits.
In 1965 Allen was employed by AK Steel.
His
workstation was a steel mill, and over the next 37 years or so,
Allen was exposed to loud industrial noise at work on a regular
and daily basis.
According to Allen, beginning in early 2000 he
began to notice difficulty hearing when talking to people.
Allen testified that he could hear noise but could not
distinguish words, and that his hearing problem progressed and
worsened over time.
Allen last worked for AK Steel on January
31, 2002, at which time he voluntarily left its employ, due in
part to his hearing problems, but also due to shoulder problems,
diabetes, and prostate cancer.
AK Steel conducted annual hearing tests at the mill,
and Allen acknowledged being informed by AK Steel that he was
developing hearing loss; however, Allen testified that he was
first informed that his hearing loss was work-related on
February 14, 2002, by Dr. Charles Hieronymus following a medical
examination.
1
As a result, on February 19, 2002, Allen filed an
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Application for Resolution of Hearing Loss Claim with the
Department of Workers’ Claims pursuant to KRS 342.7305.
After filing his application, Allen was ordered to
undergo an independent hearing loss evaluation by university
evaluator Dr. Ian Windmill pursuant to KRS 342.315.
Dr.
Windmill determined that Allen displayed a hearing loss greater
than would be expected for someone 60 years of age and,
consequently, diagnosed Allen as suffering from hearing loss due
to work-related noise exposure.
On the other hand, Dr. Windmill
also determined that approximately 25 to 30 percent of Allen’s
hearing loss could be explained based upon the natural aging
process for a 60-year-old man.
Based upon his evaluation, Dr.
Windmill diagnosed Allen as suffering from an 8% functional
impairment to his body as a whole.
Following a hearing, on December 11, 2002, the ALJ
entered an opinion and award in which he expressly determined
that Allen had an 8% occupational hearing loss as testified to
by Dr. Windmill, and adopted this 8% impairment rating to be
utilized in calculating an award of benefits.
In calculating
Allen’s benefits, among other things, the ALJ applied the timestwo multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2.
In total, Allen
was awarded $56.17 per week for permanent total disability
benefits for 425 weeks.
3
AK Steel subsequently appealed the ALJ’s award of
benefits to the Board.
On April 30, 2003, the Board entered an
opinion affirming the ALJ’s determinations.
This petition for
review followed.
First, AK Steel contends that the ALJ erred by failing
to carve out the portion of Allen’s hearing impairment
attributable to the effects of the natural aging process as
required by KRS 342.0011(1) and KRS 342.730(1)(e).
The ALJ made a specific finding that Allen suffered an
8% occupational hearing loss as testified to by the university
evaluator, Dr. Windmill.
The ALJ summarized Dr. Windmill’s
evaluation, in relevant part, as follows:
Dr. Ian Windmill testified that plaintiff
has a permanent functional impairment of 8%
which is consistent with work-related noise
exposure. He causally connected
approximately 25 – 30% of plaintiff’s
hearing loss based to the natural aging
process. . . .
Dr. Windmill was deposed
and asked about the assessment that about
25% of plaintiff’s hearing loss is
attributable to natural aging. Dr. Windmill
was not able to state within a reasonable
medical probability that some portion of
plaintiff’s 8% impairment is not due to
noise exposure.
While the ALJ found that Allen had an 8% permanent
functional hearing impairment, he also found that 25 – 30
percent of his hearing loss was related to the natural aging
process.
KRS 342.7305(2) provides as follows:
4
Income benefits payable for occupational
hearing loss shall be as provided in KRS
342.730, except income benefits shall not be
payable where the binaural hearing
impairment converted to impairment of the
whole person results in impairment of less
than eight percent (8%). No impairment
percentage for tinnitus shall be considered
in determining impairment to the whole
person. (Emphasis added).
AK Steel argues that “in order to recover income
benefits under KRS 342.7305, Allen is required to establish that
he has at least an eight percent (8%) impairment after all non
work-related factors, including age, are excluded.”
AK Steel
contends that since Allen’s total assessment is 8%, under Dr.
Windmill’s assessment, which attributes some of Allen’s hearing
loss to the natural aging process, Allen does not meet the 8%
requirement imposed by KRS 342.7305.
Relying upon the rationale contained in an unpublished
opinion of this Court in AK Steel Corporation v. Daniels, 2000CA-002876-WC, rendered March 8, 2002, which addressed this
issue, and quoting extensively therefrom, the Board affirmed the
ALJ’s decision not to exclude any portion of the hearing loss
due to natural aging so as to reduce Allen below the 8%
requirement imposed by KRS 342.7305.
AK Steel asks us to
“reconsider” the Daniels decision on the basis that Daniels
failed to take into consideration KRS 342.730(1)(e).
5
We begin by noting that pursuant to the Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.28(4)(c), unpublished cases are not
to be cited as precedent in Kentucky.
Further, unpublished
opinions are not binding on this panel as precedential
authority.
Id.
Nevertheless, Daniels is precisely on point2 and
though not bound by its holding, we, like the Board, are
persuaded by the rationale of Daniels, and elect to follow its
reasoning:3
On appeal, AK Steel argues the ALJ erred in
failing to apportion some of [the
employee’s] hearing impairment to the
effects of the natural aging process. [AK
Steel] submits that since KRS 342.7305
requires at least an 8% whole person
impairment before an employee may receive an
award, that had the ALJ apportioned part of
the impairment as due to the natural aging
process, Daniels's claim would be rendered
noncompensable. AK Steel points to the
definition of "injury" found in KRS
342.0011(1) which states:
"Injury" when used generally, unless the
context indicates otherwise, shall include
an occupational disease.[4]
. . . .
It argues therefore that the ALJ erred in
failing to apply the natural aging exclusion
2
Interestingly, even the employer, AK Steel; the university evaluator, Dr.
Windmill; and the percentage impairment, 8%, are the same in both Daniels and
the present case.”
3
It should be noted that in Daniels, the Panel adopted the Board’s reasoning
as its own; hence, the quoted portions were originally contained in the
Board’s decision in the Daniels case.
4
We note that KRS 342.0011 also states that “‘Injury’ does not include the
effects of the natural aging process[.]”
6
to Daniels's occupational hearing loss
claim. In response, [the employee] argues
that since KRS 342.7305 does not contain a
specific exclusion for the natural aging
process, the ALJ did not err.
The Supreme Court in Alcan Foil Products v.
Huff, Ky. App., 2 S.W.3d 96 (1999), noted
that depending on the proof a hearing loss
could be either an injury or an occupational
disease. We recognize that the definition
of injury as contained in KRS 342.0011(1)
includes an occupational disease. We
believe further, however, that because of
the difficulty in categorizing hearing
losses that the Legislature, by the creation
of KRS 342.7305, established that a hearing
loss was in reality its own entity
containing elements of both an injury and
occupational disease and by this
establishment created a compensable
condition which upon a showing of workconnectedness is controlled by the specific
language of that section.
. . . .
Although the ALJ concluded the natural aging
language as contained in the statutory
definition of injury was not applicable
because he considered this an occupational
disease, we reach the same conclusion except
we believe it is not applicable because
hearing losses were intended to be
controlled by the specific provisions of KRS
342.7305.
The definition of injury is a general
statutory provision. Alternatively, the
provision dealing with hearing loss is
specific. If in an application there
appears to be an apparent conflict between
two statutory provisions dealing with the
same matter, the specific provision is
controlling over the general. See Boyd v. C
& H Transport, Ky., 902 S.W.2d 823 (1995).
Further, in considering statutory
7
construction, one considers not only what is
said but also what is not said. If the
Legislature excludes certain items but does
not exclude others, then it is presumed they
did so with intent. [Palmer v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 3 S.W.3d 763, 764 (1999).] Here, the
intent is shown specifically, in our
opinion, at KRS 342.7305(2) wherein the
Legislature mandates that in order to have a
compensable hearing loss there must be at
least an 8% impairment and in considering
that impairment tinnitus is excluded. By
excluding tinnitus but at the same time
excluding no other condition, we believe it
was clearly the intent of the Legislature
that "natural aging" to the extent that it
applies in a hearing loss is not excluded.
There is, we believe, a logic to this
legislative intent. The Legislature first
obligates that there be an establishment of
impairment related to work either in a
single traumatic event or repetitive
exposure to hazardous noise. The
Legislature further recognize[d] that some
levels of hearing impairment (less than 8%)
is [sic] occupationally insignificant. If,
however, the occupational impact in
combination with other conditions, excluding
tinnitus, are at 8% or above then the work
has proximately caused a level of impairment
that is vocationally significant. We
further believe it is a recognition of the
Legislature that the hearing loss impairment
of repetitive exposure to hazardous noise
will most frequently occur in older workers.
As one ages, it can be expected there will
be some degree of reduction in hearing.
However, absent the occupational
contribution of the noise exposure, the
individual would not reach that level of
impairment for which compensability is
assessed pursuant to KRS 342.7305. We
therefore conclude that the statutory
provision notwithstanding what questions may
have existed on the medical form created by
the Department is controlling and loss
particularly related to age is not at issue
8
once it is established that there is workrelated hearing loss.
Although not directly addressed by either
the ALJ or the parties, we would note that
it was not incumbent upon the ALJ to grant
presumptive weight to all aspects of Dr.
Windmill's report. Any medical report,
including medical reports pursuant to KRS
342.315, are likely to contain multiple
opinions. While a report and all of its
opinions may be accepted by an ALJ, the ALJ
continues to have the authority to pick and
choose from those opinions. Codell
Construction Co. v. Dixon, Ky., 478 S.W.2d
703 (1972). Of course, if it is an opinion
offered by a University evaluator and thus
entitled to presumptive weight, if the ALJ
chooses to reject a portion of the
University evaluator's opinions then he must
provide a reasonable basis for doing so in
accordance with Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, et
al, Ky., 19 S.W.3d 88 (2000).
AK Steel argues that the Daniels decision is flawed
because it failed to take into account KRS 342.730(1)(e).
KRS
342.730(1)(e) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
For permanent partial disability, impairment
for nonwork-related disabilities, . . . and
hearing loss covered in KRS 342.7305 shall
not be considered in determining the extent
of disability or duration of benefits under
this chapter.
Since KRS 342.7305(2) provides that “[i]ncome benefits
for occupational hearing loss shall be as provided in KRS
342.730 . . .”
AK Steel argues that the hearing loss statute
expressly excludes consideration of “nonwork-related
9
disabilities . . . in determining the extent of disability or
duration of benefits under [Chapter 342].”
We construe the provision of KRS 342.7305(2) that
“income
benefits for occupational hearing loss shall be as
provided in KRS 342.730 . . .” as meaning simply that the
calculation of benefits for a hearing loss impairment is to be
the same as the calculation of benefits for a non-hearing loss
impairment under KRS 342.730.
Further, KRS 342.730(1)(e)
excludes hearing loss covered in KRS 342.7305 from a general
determination of permanent partial disability, supporting the
rationale in Daniels that KRS 342.7305 is a specific statute
which is to control over a general statute such as KRS
342.730(1)(e).
AK Steel also argues that the Board’s decision in a
recent case, AK Steel v. Jack Mealey, Claim No. 02-00217,
undermines the reasoning of Daniels.5
While we would not be
bound by the Board’s decision in Mealy, nevertheless, we agree
with the Board that Daniels and Mealey are distinguishable and
adopt the Board’s discussion of this issue as our own:
In Mealy, supra, the Board reversed the
ALJ’s opinion that the statute of
limitations contained in KRS 342.185 for
injury claims did not apply to hearing loss
claims under KRS 342.7305. As properly
pointed out by AK Steel, the rationale for
5
The Board’s decision in Mealy is currently on appeal to this Court, See
Mealy v. AK Steel, Case 2003-CA-000027, and AK Steel v. Mealy, Case No. 2003CA-000202-MR.
10
the ALJ’s holding was that the specific
statue governing hearing loss claims (KRS
342.7305), did not contain a statute of
limitations provision. Therefore, the ALJ
determined that the specific statute
controlled over the general injury statute
of limitations was [sic] contained in KRS
342.185 and reasoned that hearing loss
claims were subject to no limitations period
whatsoever. In reversing the ALJ in Mealey,
supra, the Board affirmed that “occupational
hearing loss is a cumulative trauma within
the context of the definition of injury
provided in KRS 342.0011(1).” Thus we
reasoned that the lack of a specific
limitation provision in KRS 342.7305 was of
no consequence.
By analogy, AK Steel now argues that the
Board erred in its earlier analysis in
Daniels, supra, with regard to the natural
aging language also contained in KRS
342.0011(1). We disagree and stand by our
earlier ruling in Daniels as affirmed by the
court of appeals. As stated above, KRS
342.7305 contains a specific exclusion for
tinnitus, but does not mention any exclusion
for the natural aging process. By contrast,
there is no specific statutory language
contained in KRS 342.7305 regarding a
separate statute of limitations for hearing
loss claims. Hence, we continue to believe
that the general statute of limitations for
injury claims contained in KRS 342.185
controls hearing loss claims because no
specific limitations provision for hearing
loss claims exists elsewhere. By contrast
KRS 342.7305 does contain specific language
regarding exclusion of certain medical
conditions that does not include impairment
due to the natural aging process. As we
stated in Daniels, supra, since there
appears to be an apparent conflict between
two statutory provisions dealing with the
same subject matter, as a matter of law the
specific provision in KRS 342.7305 must be
considered controlling over the general
11
language contained in KRS 342.0011(1).
v. C & H Transport, supra.
Boyd
Next, AK Steel contends that the ALJ erred by applying
the times-two multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 when
Allen had retired and never returned to work.
KRS
342.730(1)(c)2 provides as follows:
If an employee returns to work at a weekly
wage equal to or greater than the average
weekly wage at the time of injury, the
weekly benefit for permanent partial
disability shall be determined under
paragraph (b) of this subsection for each
week during which that employment is
sustained. During any period of cessation of
that employment, temporary or permanent, for
any reason, with or without cause, payment
of weekly benefits for permanent partial
disability during the period of cessation
shall be two (2) times the amount otherwise
payable under paragraph (b) of this
subsection. This provision shall not be
construed so as to extend the duration of
payments.
AK Steel argues that the clear and unambiguous
language of the statute compels a finding that the times-two
multiplier should apply only in the event an employee had
returned to work at a same or greater wage and, subsequently,
ceased that employment for whatever reason.
According to AK
Steel, the statute has no application to a situation in which
the employee never returns to employment at an equal or greater
wage as is the situation in this case.
AK Steel asserts that
KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 is simply not triggered unless, “an employee
12
returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater than the
average weekly wage at the time of the injury . . . .”
AK Steel
contends that only then, “during any period of cessation of that
employment,” is the employee entitled to the times-two
multiplier.
Under AK Steel’s interpretation, reference to “that
employment” in the second sentence can only be interpreted to
refer to “that employment” referenced in the first sentence,
i.e., employment to which the plaintiff has returned at the same
or greater wage.
In affirming the ALJ, the Board relied upon, and
quoted extensively from, this Court’s unpublished opinion in
Laurel Cookie Factory v. Forman, Case No. 2002-CA-000608-WC,
opinion rendered September 20, 2002.
In that case a Panel of
this Court held that an injured employee was eligible to receive
the times-two multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 even
though the employee did not return to work following her workrelated injury.
We note that on October 7, 2003, in an
unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the
interpretation of KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 expressed by the Panel in
Case No. 2002-CA-000608-WC.
See Laurel Cookie Factory v.
Forman, Case No. 2002-SC-0867-WC, opinion rendered September 18,
2003, modified October 7, 2003.
The decision in the Supreme
Court case became final on January 22, 2004.
Because the
Supreme Court decision was unpublished, it cannot be cited as
13
legal authority and we are not bound by its holding. CR
76.28(4)(c).
In his opinion and award, the ALJ stated “[a]ddressing
whether plaintiff has the physical capacity to return to the
type of work performed at the time of the injury due to hearing
loss, it appears to the undersigned and the undersigned so finds
that, based upon the testimony of Dr. Windmill, the plaintiff
can return to the type of work performed at the time of the
injury.”
The record further discloses that Allen did not return
to the type of work previously performed at AK Steel, and that
Allen did not, in fact, return to any type of employment.
Since the inception of the Act, income benefits have
been awarded on the basis of occupational disability.
In
Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968), the
Court defined occupational disability, taking into account
various factors that result in a loss of wage-earning capacity
following an injury.
That definition was later codified in
KRS 342.0011(11), and KRS 342.730(1) authorized income benefits
based upon the percentage of occupational disability.
In 1996, KRS 342.0011(11) was amended as part of a
major revision of the Act.
At the same time, KRS 342.0011(34),
(35), and (36) were enacted, and KRS 342.730(1)(b) and (c) were
amended.
As a result, partial disability was re-defined to
14
require both a permanent disability rating and an ability to
work.
A table found in KRS 342.730(1)(b) listed a factor for
various ranges of AMA impairment, with the factor increasing as
the corresponding range of impairments increased.
As set forth
in KRS 342.0011(36), the worker's percent of impairment and the
corresponding factor were multiplied to arrive at a disability
rating from which the income benefit was determined.
KRS
342.730(1)(c)1 provided for a 50% increase in the benefit of an
individual who did not retain the physical capacity to return to
the previous type of work, and KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 provided for a
50% reduction in the benefit of a worker who returned to
work at a wage that equaled or exceeded the wage when injured.
Thus, the benefit of an individual who retained the physical
capacity to return to the previous type of work but failed to do
so was calculated under KRS 342 .730(1)(b) and was neither
enhanced nor reduced.
Effective July 14, 2000, the method for awarding
permanent partial disability benefits was amended again.
factors contained in KRS 342.730(1)(b) were decreased.
The
KRS
342.730(1)(c)1 was amended to provide for a triple benefit if
the worker did not retain the physical capacity to return to the
previous work, with KRS 342.730(1)(c)3 providing additional
multipliers based upon age and education. In addition, KRS
15
342.730(1)(c)2 was amended to its current language, including
the provisions for a times-two enhancement.
As under the 1996 amendments, KRS 342 .730(1)(b) and
(c) provide a system for calculating partial disability
benefits.
KRS 342.730(1)(b) continues to provide for a basic
partial disability benefit, but because the factors are smaller
than under the 1996 Act, the benefit is smaller.
Under KRS
342.730(1)(c)1 and 3, an individual who does not retain the
physical capacity to return to the previous type of work
receives triple the basic benefit and may be entitled to
additional multipliers based upon age and education.
Whereas,
under KRS 342.730(1)(c)2, an individual who returns to work
earning the same or greater wage receives the basic benefit but
is entitled to a double benefit for any period that the
employment ceases, regardless of the reason .
When determining that KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 authorized a
double benefit on these facts, the ALJ and the Board failed to
address the implications of the finding that the claimant
retained the physical capacity to return to his previous work
and the fact that he failed to attempt any type of work after
his injury.
KRS 342.710(1) states that one of the primary goals
of Chapter 342 is to encourage injured workers to return to
work, preferably with the same employer and to the same or
similar work.
A traditional means for encouraging this has been
16
to limit income benefits for partial disability to two-thirds of
the worker's average weekly wage, up to a maximum of 75% of the
state's average weekly wage, so that it was less profitable to
be disabled than to be employed.
Although the 1996 and 2000
versions of KRS 342.730(1)(b) and (c) retain the same maximums,
they also provide a financial incentive for partially disabled
workers who retain the physical capacity to return to the type
of work they performed until the injury to do so.
Consistent
with the policy of awarding benefits in proportion to
occupational disability, the greatest benefits are provided to
those workers who do not retain the physical capacity to do so,
for those are the workers who would be expected to suffer the
greatest wage loss due to their injuries.
The 1996 version of KRS 342.730(1)(b) and (c) provided
a basic benefit for those who retained the physical capacity to
return to the previous type of work and provided
an enhanced benefit to those who lacked the physical capacity to
return to their previous work.
Furthermore, because individuals
who returned to work at the same or greater wage were permitted
to receive a partial income benefit in addition to their postinjury earnings, the statute provided a financial incentive for
workers who retained the physical capacity to return to their
previous work to do so.
The apparent goal of the
17
2000 amendments is to provide an even greater incentive for that
group of workers to return to their previous type of work and,
presumably, to earn the same or a greater wage than when
injured.
Thus, those who fail to do so are limited to the basic
benefit under KRS 342.730(1)(b), with the benefit based upon a
lower statutory factor than under the 1996 Act.
In contrast,
those who return to work at the same or a greater wage
are permitted to receive the basic income benefit in addition to
their earnings.
Furthermore, they are assured a double benefit
during periods that the employment is not sustained, regardless
of the reason.
Thus, workers who retain the physical capacity
to perform their previous work are rewarded for attempting to do
so even if the attempt later proves to be unsuccessful.
After reviewing the lay and medical evidence, the ALJ
determined that the claimant retained the physical capacity to
return to his previous work.
Allen, however, made no attempt to
return to his previous work or any other work.
Under those
circumstances, Allen is entitled to receive only the basic
income benefit that is provided in KRS 342.730(1)(b).
The decision of the Board is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the claim is remanded to the ALJ for the
entry of an award of income benefits which excludes the timestwo multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2.
ALL CONCUR.
18
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher A. Dawson
Vanantwerp, Monge, Jones &
Edwards
Ashland, Kentucky
Robert G. Miller, Jr.
Perry, Preston & Miller
Paintsville, Kentucky
19
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