BRIAN KEITH SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 15, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2003-CA-001089-MR
BRIAN KEITH SMITH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00107
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Following a jury trial, the Hardin Circuit Court,
by judgment entered November 26, 1997, convicted Brian Smith of
murdering his elderly neighbor1 and of burglarizing her
residence.2
The court sentenced Smith to life in prison without
benefit of parole for twenty-five years.
Claiming that his
trial was rendered unfair by the ineffective performance of
1
KRS 507.020.
2
KRS 511.020.
counsel, in September 2001 Smith sought relief from the 1997
judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied Smith’s motion by a thorough and
thoughtful order entered May 6, 2003.
Appealing from that
denial, Smith maintains that trial counsel’s failure to impeach
a key government witness, to prevent the bolstering of that
witness’s testimony, and to object to the admission of illegally
seized evidence were mistakes serious enough to call the
fairness of his trial into doubt.
Convinced that counsel’s
cross-examination of the witness was adequate and that the other
alleged errors are not likely to have been prejudicial, we
affirm.
The Commonwealth alleged that in the early morning
hours of April 27, 1995, Smith broke into a residence not far
from his Elizabethtown apartment, stabbed the elderly owner to
death, and stole various items including two television sets.
Smith’s live-in girlfriend at the time, Roxanne Bradley,
testified at trial that Smith, declaring that he was “on a
mission,” had left their apartment about midnight the night of
the murder and had awakened her with what was apparently his
return at about 4:30 a.m.
She identified the murder weapon
found at the scene as a knife from her and Smith’s kitchen.
She
recalled having found the stolen televisions in a closet in her
apartment and a pair of blood-stained gloves in the kitchen
2
waste basket.
And, most damningly, she testified that Smith had
confessed to her when on two occasions he described waiting at
the foot of the victim’s bed while she died.
Against this barrage, defense counsel elicited from
Bradley that she had been on probation at the time of the murder
and was, at the time of trial, on probation serving as an
informant for the drug task force.
She admitted that about two
or three months before the murder she had threatened to kill
Smith.
And she admitted that her prior statements to the police
were inconsistent with her testimony that Smith had confessed.
As Smith notes, serious errors by defense counsel that
are reasonably likely to have affected the trial’s outcome
violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.3
Smith insists that counsel’s cross-examination of Bradley was
ineffective and amounted to such a prejudicial error.
We
disagree.
Apparently Bradley was on probation for a drug-related
offense and apparently both she and Smith smoked crack cocaine
the day before the murder.
For strategic reasons, both Smith’s
counsel and counsel for the Commonwealth agreed to exclude from
the trial all evidence of drug use.
Smith now contends that
this was a poor strategy and that counsel should have confronted
3
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104
S. Ct. 2052 (1984); Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448
(2001).
3
Bradley with her crack smoking.
That evidence, he believes,
would have strengthened the suggestion that Bradley was
testifying falsely in order to avoid revocation of her probation
and prosecution for the drug offense.
As the trial court noted, however, counsel’s strategic
choices are not subject to second guessing in hindsight.4
Counsel’s decision to forego evidence of Bradley’s drug use in
order to keep evidence of Smith’s drug use from the jury was
reasonable.
Even without that evidence, moreover, counsel’s
cross-examination of Bradley adequately revealed that she had
reason to cooperate with the prosecution.
As noted above, on cross-examination Bradley admitted
that she had not told the police of Smith’s alleged confession
and in fact had given a statement inconsistent with that
testimony.
Smith contends that counsel erred by failing to go
further and introducing into evidence the following portion of
Bradley’s statement to the police:
[Smith] made a remark, he said, you know, he
said, “I’ve never seen a dead body.” I
guess that was later on [inaudible] that
lady’s body out, but that was later on. And
I had asked him the same thing again, “You
killed that old lady?” And he said, he
looked up at me and he said, “You know
what?” He said, “I have never seen a dead
body.” He said, “If I did anything,” he
4
Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 116 S.W.3d 463 (2003); Commonwealth
v. Tamme, Ky., 83 S.W.3d 465 (2002).
4
said, “I’d rob her,” he said, “but I would
not have killed her.”
Contrary to Smith’s assertion, we agree with the trial
court that this statement is subject to various readings not all
of which are favorable to Smith.
In particular, counsel is not
to be faulted in hindsight for deciding not to put before the
jury Smith’s apparent willingness to rob.
We conclude that
counsel’s cross-examination of Bradley adequately served Smith’s
right to a fair trial.
Smith next contends that counsel failed to object
effectively to hearsay testimony improperly bolstering Bradley’s
testimony about Smith’s confession.
Although she did not report
it to investigators, Bradley testified that within a few days of
hearing Smith’s confession she repeated it to three
acquaintances.
One of the acquaintances testified and was
permitted to say what Bradley told her.
She confirmed Bradley’s
version of Smith’s confession.
Bradley’s out-of-court statement to the acquaintance
was hearsay, of course, to which Smith’s counsel objected, but
it was admitted into evidence under an exception to the hearsay
rule that permits the introduction of a hearsay statement that
is
[c]onsistent with the declarant’s testimony
and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against the declarant of
5
recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive.5
Noting that this exception applies only to statements made
before the improper motive arose,6 Smith contends that it did not
apply to Bradley’s out-of-court statement because at the time
she made it Bradley already had a motive to lie: she wanted,
Smith claims, to divert suspicion from herself and also to make
herself useful to the police.
Counsel erred, Smith contends, by
failing to raise this ground of objection.
We need not address the evidentiary issue because even
if counsel erred as Smith contends, there is no reasonable
probability that exclusion of the acquaintance’s testimony would
have affected the result of Smith’s trial.
Our Supreme Court
held as much on direct review when it ruled that even if the
acquaintance’s testimony should not have been admitted, the
admission could not be deemed a palpable error, an error, that
is, calling into doubt the fairness of the trial.7
Smith does
not change that result merely by alleging that the error was
counsel’s instead of the court’s.8
5
KRE 801A(a)(2).
6
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 514 (1995).
7
Smith v. Commonwealth, 97-SC-0986-MR (December 16, 1999).
8
Hodge v. Commonwealth, supra.
6
Finally, Smith contends that counsel erred by failing
to seek suppression of the evidence derived from a pair of blood
spattered camouflage pants the police found wadded up inside a
duffle bag in Smith’s closet.
The pants were damaging to Smith
because Bradley testified that Smith was wearing camouflage
pants when he left on his “mission” the night of the crime, and
especially because DNA analysis indicated that some of the blood
on the pants matched the blood of the victim.
The police
officers who found the pants had not obtained a warrant to
search Smith and Bradley’s apartment.
Bradley’s consent.
They relied instead on
Smith maintains that Bradley was not
authorized to consent to a search of his private duffle bag and
thus that the fruits of that search should have been suppressed.9
Counsel erred, Smith insists, by failing to move for the
suppression.
Once again, we need not explore the merits of Smith’s
allegation of error because, given the overwhelming evidence
against him, the alleged error cannot be deemed prejudicial.
This is not to say that the DNA analysis linking the pants to
the victim was not significant and damaging evidence.
But it is
to say that even in the absence of the pants and the blood
tests, the evidence against Smith was so strong as virtually to
guarantee the same result.
9
United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1992).
7
The televisions discovered in Smith’s closet and shown
to match the televisions missing from the victim’s home provided
a material link between Smith and the victim.
And the bloody
gloves, together with the televisions, leant strong
corroboration to Bradley’s testimony, which we have already
noted was devastating.
Given this evidence, it is not
reasonably likely that the result would have been different even
had the camouflage pants and the DNA evidence been suppressed.
In sum, as has often been observed, our constitutions
do not guarantee perfect trials and ideal representation, only
fundamentally fair trials and reasonably effective
representation.
these standards.
Smith’s trial and counsel’s performance met
Accordingly, we affirm the May 6, 2003, order
of the Hardin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis J. Burke
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
8
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