GLORIA DUNCAN v. NORTON SUBURBAN HOSPITAL
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
JULY 9, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001039-MR
GLORIA DUNCAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-005396
v.
NORTON SUBURBAN HOSPITAL
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, MINTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Gloria Duncan brings this appeal from a May 2,
2003, summary judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
We
reverse and remand.
On July 18, 2002, appellant filed a pro se complaint1
against inter alia appellee.
Therein, it was alleged that
appellee failed to meet the standard of care as to the
1
It was established that an attorney from Ohio assisted appellant in drafting
the complaint.
administration of anesthesia during a surgical procedure
performed on July 19, 2001.
She alleged to have suffered brain
damage as a result of the surgery.
On August 6, 2002, appellee
filed an Answer and propounded Request for Admissions to
appellant.
The requests were personally served upon appellant.
On September 17, 2002, counsel for appellant entered
an appearance and on October 3, 2002, filed a motion seeking
leave of court to file a late Response to Admissions propounded
by appellee.
The circuit court ultimately denied appellant’s
motion to file the response by order entered December 6, 2002.
On March 13, 2002, appellee moved for summary judgment.
On May
2, 2003, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of
appellee based on the admissions, thus precipitating this
appeal.
Appellant contends the circuit court committed
reversible error by denying her motion to file a late response
to admissions propounded by the appellee.
We must agree.
The admissions at issue were as follows:
REQUEST NO.1:
Please admit or deny that the Plaintiff
or the Plaintiffs’ representative did not
consult with any qualified health care
professional prior to the filing of this
action, to determine if the care provided to
Gloria D. Duncan by this specific Defendant,
as distinguished from the Co-Defendants
herein, deviated from the accepted standard
of hospital care.
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REQUEST NO. 2:
Please admit or deny that no qualified
health care professional has criticized the
care rendered by this specific Defendant, as
distinguished from the Co-Defendants herein,
to Gloria D. Duncan as having deviated from
the accepted standard of hospital care.
REQUEST NO. 3:
Please admit or deny that Plaintiffs
are unable to state through expert testimony
that the care rendered by this specific
Defendant, as distinguished from the CoDefendants herein, to a reasonable degree of
medical probability, caused Gloria D.
Duncan’s injuries.
REQUEST NO. 4:
Please admit or deny that Plaintiffs
are unable to state through expert testimony
that the care rendered by this specific
Defendant, as distinguished from the CoDefendants herein, to a reasonable degree of
medical probability, was a substantial
factor in the cause of Gloria D. Duncan’s
injuries.
REQUEST NO. 5:
Please admit or deny that the Plaintiffs are
unable to state through expert testimony
that the care rendered by this specific
Defendant, as distinguished from the CoDefendants herein, to Gloria D. Duncan
deviated from the accepted standard of
hospital care.
Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 36.01 governs requests for
admissions and states, in relevant part, as follows:
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(1) A party may serve upon any other party a
written request for the admission, for
purposes of the pending action only, of the
truth of any matters within the scope of
Rule 26.02 set forth in the request that
relate to statements or opinions of fact or
of the application of law to fact, including
the genuineness of any documents described
in the request. . . .
(2) Each matter of which an admission is
requested shall be separately set forth.
The matter is admitted unless, within 30
days after service of the request, or within
such shorter or longer time as the court may
allow, the party to whom the request is
directed serves upon the party requesting
the admission a written answer or objection
addressed to the matter, signed by the party
or by his attorney, but, unless the court
shortens the time, a defendant shall not be
required to serve answers or objections
before the expiration of 45 days after
service of the summons upon him. . . .
CR 36.02 governs the effect of admission and is as
follows:
Any matter admitted under Rule 36 is
conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of
the admission. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial
order, the court may permit withdrawal or
amendment when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the party who obtained the
admission fails to satisfy the court that
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him
in maintaining his action or defense on the
merits. An admission made by a party under
Rule 36 is for the purpose of the pending
action only and is not an admission by him
for any other purpose nor may it be used
against him in any other proceeding.
(Amended effective October 1, 1971.)
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Juxtaposing CR 36.01 and CR 36.02, we are of the opinion that an
admission is deemed admitted if a party fails to respond within
thirty (30) days after service or within such time as the court
may specify; thereafter, the admission is conclusively
established unless it is withdrawn or amended.
Here, appellant failed to respond within the specified
time period (thirty days) to the admission; thus, the admission
was conclusively established.
Any effort to set aside that
admission must proceed under CR 36.02.
Even though appellant
cited CR 36.01 in her motion to file late responses to
admissions, we believe the appropriate procedure was to file a
motion for withdrawal or amendment of admission under CR 36.02.
We shall consider her motion as being filed under CR 36.02 and
analyze this issue accordingly.2
Under CR 36.02, withdrawal or amendment of admission
is allowed when “the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or
amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense on the merits.”
Indeed, it has been pointed out that
2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) is substantially similar to Ky. R. Civ. P. 36.02. The
Federal Courts have recognized that a request to file late answers to
admissions is equivalent to a request to withdraw admissions under Rule 36(b)
and such request should be analyzed under Rule 36(b). See Warren v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1976); Herrin
v. Blackman, 89 F.R.D. 622 (1981).
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“[t]he burden is on the party resisting the amendment to prove
prejudice.”
6 Kurt A. Philipps, Jr., Kentucky Practice, CR
36.02 (5th ed. 1995).
In this case, we believe it evident that amendment of
the admissions would certainly promote the presentation of the
case upon the merits.
Indeed, we can hardly say the interests
of justice are furthered by having dispositive issues decided by
way of a missed deadline.
Moreover, appellee failed in this
appeal and also failed below to present sufficient evidence of
prejudicial effect.
The admissions were propounded on August 6,
2002, and appellant filed the motion to respond on October 31,
2002, some twenty-seven days after its due date.
We observe the
circuit court did not make a finding of prejudice as required
under CR 36.02 and failed to consider if the merits of the case
would be subserved by amendment as also required under CR 36.02.
In sum, we are of the opinion the circuit court
committed error by failing to allow appellant to amend the
admissions under CR 36.02.
Additionally, we view the admissions
relied upon by the circuit court in its summary judgment as
being less than dispositive of appellee’s liability.
v. Kenady, Ky., 894 S.W.2d 619 (1994).
See Lewis
As the circuit court
erroneously relied upon the admissions in granting summary
judgment, we conclude that summary judgment was improper.
56.
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CR
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed and this cause is remanded
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
F. Larkin Fore
Sarah M. Fore
Fore, Miller & Schwartz
Louisville, Kentucky
Martin A. Arnett
William P. Swain
Phillips Parker Orberson &
Moore, PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Heather L. Clark
Louisville, Kentucky
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