LYNN MEERS, AS GUARDIAN FOR LESLIE MEERS v. DEBBIE MEDLEY; JIM FLYNN, MARY COMER; AND LEON MOONEYHAN JOEY ROGERS v. DEBBIE MEDLEY; JIM FLYNN, MARY COMER; AND LEON MOONEYHAN
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 29, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001003-MR
LYNN MEERS, AS GUARDIAN FOR
LESLIE MEERS
v.
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00077
DEBBIE MEDLEY; JIM FLYNN,
MARY COMER; AND LEON MOONEYHAN
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 2003-CA-001008-MR
JOEY ROGERS
v.
APPELLANT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00076
DEBBIE MEDLEY; JIM FLYNN,
MARY COMER; AND LEON MOONEYHAN
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE:
MINTON, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Lynn Meers brings Appeal No. 2003-CA-001003-MR
from an April 25, 2003, Order of the Shelby Circuit Court.
Joey
Rogers brings Appeal No. 2003-CA-001008-MR from an April 25,
2003, Order of the Shelby Circuit Court.
We reverse and remand
both appeals.
Meers and Rogers were students at Shelby County High
School.
Both suffer from severe disabilities and were placed
into the special education program at the high school.
On
February 7, 2002, Meers and Rogers filed complaints in the
Shelby Circuit Court, alleging that their teacher, Debbie
Medley, physically and mentally abused them.
Specifically, it
was further alleged that both Meers and Rogers were “berated,
harassed, embarrassed, abused physically and mentally by
Medley.”
Meers and Rogers also claimed that Jim Flynn
(Principal of Shelby County High School), Mary Comer (Special
Education Coordinator), and Leon Mooneyhan (Superintendent)
(collectively referred to as appellees) “acted negligently,
recklessly and/or grossly negligently” by failing to remove
Medley as a teacher, by failing to monitor Medley, by failing to
act on complaints about Medley, and by failing to enforce school
policies.
Each defendant/appellee was named in his/her
individual capacity only.
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Meers and Rogers claimed relief under 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004), Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter
344 (the Civil Rights Act), the torts of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, assault, battery, negligence, and
defamation.
There are no claims asserted in the complaints
under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20
U.S.C.A. § 1400-1491o (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
Appellees filed motions to dismiss in each case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 12.02),
claiming Meers and Rogers failed to exhaust administrative
remedies as required by the IDEA.
actions.
The court dismissed the
These appeals follow.
In dismissing Meers’ and Rogers’ actions, the circuit
court merely stated “[u]pon motion being made, and the Court
being sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this
action be DISMISSED with prejudice.”
No grounds are stated for
dismissal nor can we determine what part of the record, if any,
was considered by the court in this ruling.
As there exists
interrogatory answers, verified responses, and other documents
filed in the record, we assume the circuit court considered same
and, thus, view the orders dismissing the actions as summary
judgments.
See Ferguson v. Oates, Ky., 314 S.W.2d 518 (1958).
Summary judgment is proper where there exists no issue
of material fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
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of law.
CR 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Resolution of both appeals centers upon a singular
issue – whether Meers and Rogers were required to exhaust
administrative remedies under the IDEA.
For the reasons
hereinafter stated, we are of the opinion the IDEA is
inapplicable; thus, the circuit court improperly dismissed the
actions.
The specified stated purposes of the IDEA are:
(1)(A) to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes
special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs and
prepare them for employment and independent
living;
(B) to ensure that the rights of children
with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected; and
(C) to assist States, localities,
educational service agencies, and Federal
agencies to provide for the education of all
children with disabilities;
(2) to assist States in the implementation
of a statewide, comprehensive, coordinated,
multidisciplinary, interagency system of
early intervention services for infants and
toddlers with disabilities and their
families;
(3) to ensure that educators and parents
have the necessary tools to improve
educational results for children with
disabilities by supporting systemic-change
activities; coordinated research and
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personnel preparation; coordinated technical
assistance, dissemination, and support; and
technology development and media services;
and
(4) to assess, and ensure the effectiveness
of, efforts to educate children with
disabilities.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
At issue in these appeals is the exhaustion of
administrative remedies provision found in the IDEA, which reads
as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
to restrict or limit the rights, procedures,
and remedies available under the
Constitution, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.], or other
Federal laws protecting the rights of
children with disabilities, except that
before the filing of a civil action under
such laws seeking relief that is also
available under this subchapter, the
procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of
this section shall be exhausted to the same
extent as would be required had the action
been brought under this subchapter.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(l) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
Under the above
exhaustion provision, an individual is required to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing a judicial action to
obtain relief under the IDEA or before bringing a judicial
action to obtain relief that is also available under the IDEA.
The Courts have not been consistent in interpreting the
exhaustion of remedies provision of the IDEA.
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In Covington v.
Knox County School System, 205 F.3d 912, 915-916 (6th Cir. 2000),
it was specifically observed that courts have given the
provision varied interpretations:
We note that some courts have interpreted §
1415 to require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies even when the
plaintiffs do not rely exclusively on the
IDEA as the source of their claims. For
example, several courts have held that
exhaustion is required when plaintiffs bring
§ 1983 suits based on violations of the
IDEA. See, e.g., N.B. v. Alachua County Sch.
Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir.1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1092, 117 S. Ct. 769,
136 L.Ed.2d 715 (1997); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi,
832 F.2d 748, 756 (2d Cir.1987); W.L.G. v.
Houston County Bd. of Educ., 975 F. Supp.
1317, 1328 (M.D.Ala.1997). Additionally,
some courts have held that whenever a claim
falls within the purview of the IDEA--that
is, whenever it relates to the provision of
a "free appropriate public education" to a
disabled child exhaustion is required,
whether or not the plaintiff characterizes
the claim as one arising under the IDEA.
In the case sub judice, we are persuaded by the
reasoning contained in Stutts v. Eastern Kentucky University,
307 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857-858 (E.D.Ky. 2004) and adopt its
interpretation of the exhaustion of remedies provision:
In determining whether relief is available
under the IDEA where claims are brought
pursuant to other statutes, courts have
looked to the nature of the wrongs alleged.
Complaints concerning the general
disciplinary practices of a school district
have been understood to relate to the way
that the district provides education and
"thus necessarily come within the scope of
the IDEA." Covington, 205 F.3d at 916
-6-
(citing Hayes, 877 F.2d at 812- 13; Moore v.
Harriman City Schools, No. 92-5572, 1994 WL
18021, at 1 (6th Cir.Jan.21, 1994);
Waterman, 739 F. Supp. at 365; Pullen v.
Botetourt County Sch. Bd., No. 94-686-R 1995
WL 738983, at 4 (W.D.Va. Feb. 13, 1995)). By
contrast, allegations of physical assault or
sexual abuse of a student by a school staff
member or administrator would fall outside
of the scope of the IDEA since they are not
related to the way that a school provides
education. (footnote omitted).
Under this interpretation of the exhaustion provision,
allegations relating to school discipline are deemed as claims
available under the IDEA and are subject to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement of the IDEA.
By contrast,
allegations relating to physical assault or abuse are deemed as
claims outside the scope of the IDEA and are not subject to the
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement.
In the case at hand, Meers and Rogers specifically
claim:
Medley verbally threatened and harassed Joey
throughout the school year. She humiliated
him by telling his [sic] he ate like an
animal. Medley repeatedly and abusively
berated Joey for his inability to stop
drooling. She threatened him with a balled
fist if he could not or did not do what she
told him to do. Medley also physically
abused him and treated him roughly under the
guise of assisting him. Joey was also
greatly distress [sic] as he witnessed
Medley physically and mentally abuse other
students in the FMD [Functional Mental
Disabilities] class on a daily basis and he
was forced to withstand the hostile
classroom environment. . . .
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Leslie was also subject to Medley’s
daily verbal and physical abuse at least as
far back as August 2000 and until March 2001
when Medley was (temporarily) removed from
the classroom. Leslie was harassed,
verbally assaulted and humiliated by Medley.
Medley also repeatedly used abusive and
unnecessary physical restraint with Leslie,
stepping on Leslie’s hair, pinching her
buttocks and bending her fingers back among
other things. Leslie has also come home
from school with scratches and red marks on
her after her mother and guardian, Lynn
Meers, complained to the school of Leslie’s
treatment at the High School.
Appellant’s Brief at 9-10.
We do not view Meers’ and Rogers’ allegations as
encompassing “general disciplinary practices.”
Rather, we think
the allegations asserted by Meers and Rogers are best described
as allegations of physical and mental assault and/or abuse,
which are not within the scope of the IDEA.
Our decision is
further supported by the report of the Cabinet for Families and
Children.
This report substantiated that adult “abuse” had
occurred by Medley against students in her classroom.1
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that Meers’ and
Rogers’ claims are not within the scope of the IDEA and, thus,
exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA is not
1
Additionally, even if the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
(20 U.S.C.A. § 1400-1491o (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)) were applicable, we
harbor grave doubt as to whether Meers’ and Rogers’ civil rights claims under
Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 344 would be subject to the exhaustion of
remedies requirement of the IDEA.
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required.
As such, we conclude the circuit court erroneously
entered summary judgments dismissing Meers’ and Rogers’ actions.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Shelby
Circuit Court are reversed and these causes are remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
F. Larkin Fore
Sarah M. Fore
FORE, MILLER & SCHWARTZ
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, DEBBIE
MEDLEY:
John Frith Stewart
Stephen C. Emery
SEGAL, STEWART, CUTLER,
LINDSAY, JANES & BERRY, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, JIM
FLYNN, MARY COMER AND LEON
MOONEYHAN:
John C. Fogle, III
CHENOWETH LAW OFFICE
Frankfort, Kentucky
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