EDWARD GREEN JAMESON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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August 6, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000967-DG
EDWARD GREEN JAMESON
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-M-01796, 00-M-01797 AND 02-XX-00004
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Edward Green Jameson has petitioned for review
from an order of the McCracken Circuit Court entered on April
10, 2003, which affirmed an order of the McCracken District
Court denying Jameson’s motion to declare McCracken County
Ordinance No. 2000-4 unconstitutional and to dismiss the
criminal complaint against him.1
1
Having concluded that recent
After Jameson’s motion to declare Ordinance
denied by the district court, Jameson entered
the charges against him, while preserving his
court the determination as to the ordinance’s
No. 2000-4 unconstitutional was
a conditional plea of guilty to
right to appeal to the circuit
constitutionality. Hence, as
case law from the Supreme Court of the United States requires
that this matter be remanded for further fact-finding, but that
the McCracken District Court did not otherwise err by denying
Jameson’s motion, we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand
for further proceedings.
McCracken County Ordinance No. 2000-4 became effective
on April 26, 2000.2
The ordinance provided for the “regulation
of sexually oriented businesses and their employees.”
Among
other things, the ordinance classified certain establishments as
falling within the definition of what was termed an “Adult
Cabaret.”3
The ordinance restricted the times during which an
compared to other cases dealing with the constitutionality of regulations
which target sexually-oriented businesses, the case at bar arrives before us
in a somewhat unusual manner. Typically, when a First Amendment challenge is
made against a regulation which targets sexually-oriented businesses, the
aggrieved party will file an original action at the circuit court level
seeking injunctive relief to prohibit the enforcement of the regulation at
issue. See, e.g., Restaurant Ventures, LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government, Ky.App., 60 S.W.3d 572, 575 (2001)(noting that “[s]everal adult
entertainment establishments and their employees brought [an action in
Fayette Circuit Court] challenging the constitutionality of ordinances
enacted by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government”); and Schultz v.
City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2000)(noting that “plaintiffs
sued Cumberland in [federal] district court seeking a permanent injunction
against enforcement of the” regulation in question).
2
Ordinance No. 2000-4 was enacted by the McCracken County Fiscal Court.
3
Ordinance No. 2000-4(II)(3) provides in full as follows:
“Adult Cabaret” means a night club, bar, restaurant,
or similar commercial establishment which regularly
features:
(a)
Persons who appear in a state of
nudity or semi-nude; or
(b)
Live performance[s] which are
characterized by the exposure of
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adult cabaret could remain open for business,4 and provided for
the regulation of any “live performances” that might take place
within the establishment.
According to the terms of the
ordinance, it was aimed at controlling the alleged negative,
secondary effects associated with sexually-oriented businesses,
e.g., increased crime rates and decreased property values in and
around the areas where such businesses are located.
In August 2000 Jameson was employed as a manager of
Regina’s II5 in Paducah, McCracken County, Kentucky.
There is no
dispute that Regina’s II, which featured live exotic dancing,
was an “Adult Cabaret” as defined by Ordinance No. 2000-4.
On
August 19, 2000, Jameson was criminally charged by a member of
the McCracken County Sheriff’s Department for various violations
of Ordinance No. 2000-4.
Specifically, Jameson was cited for
operating past the 1:00 a.m. mandatory closing time, for
permitting the dancers to appear totally nude while performing,
“specified anatomical areas” or by
“specified sexual activities”; or
(c)
Films, motion pictures, video
cassettes, slides, or other
photographic reproductions which
are characterized by the depiction
or description of “specified sexual
activities” or “specified
anatomical areas”.
4
Ordinance No. 2000-4 (IV)(e) provided that “[n]o establishment, except for
an adult motel, shall remain open at any time between the hours of one
o’clock (1:00) a.m. and six o’clock (6:00) a.m.”
5
According to the record, Regina’s II was owned by Nightclubs, Inc.
-3-
and for allowing physical contact between the dancers and the
patrons.
On October 31, 2000, Jameson filed a motion with the
McCracken District Court, asking the court to declare Ordinance
No. 2000-4 unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him,
and to dismiss the criminal complaint against him.
Jameson
argued that Ordinance No. 2000-4 violated several provisions of
the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution.
Jameson argued, inter alia, that Ordinance No. 2000-4 as applied
to him imposed an impermissible burden on his right to freedom
of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 1 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Approximately one year later, on October 18, 2001, an
evidentiary hearing on the matter was held before the district
court.
During this hearing, Jameson introduced evidence in an
attempt to show that the alleged negative, secondary effects
associated with sexually-oriented businesses were not present in
and around the area of Regina’s II.
Jameson argued that this
evidence supported his claim that Ordinance No. 2000-4 was not
enacted to combat these secondary effects, but that it was
instead enacted specifically to prohibit nude dancing and
related forms of expression.
On May 31, 2002, the district court entered an order
denying Jameson’s motion to declare Ordinance No. 2000-4
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unconstitutional and to dismiss the criminal complaint against
him.
On July 2, 2002, Jameson entered a conditional plea of
guilty to the various charges against him, while preserving his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to declare the
ordinance unconstitutional.
Jameson was sentenced to 90 days in
jail, which was probated for a period of two years, and fined
$500.00.
Jameson appealed to the McCracken Circuit Court and
once again argued that Ordinance No. 2000-4 as applied to him
was an unconstitutional restraint on his freedom of expression.
On April 10, 2003, the circuit court entered an order affirming
the district court’s denial of Jameson’s motion to declare
Ordinance No. 2000-4 unconstitutional.
Jameson subsequently
filed a motion seeking discretionary review with this Court,
which was granted on October 14, 2003.
Jameson raises several arguments on appeal.
He first
claims that Section VII(b) of the ordinance, which is among
those provisions regulating live performances, is “a contentbased regulation of speech,” and must therefore be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny.
Section VII(b) of the ordinance
states in full as follows:
No person shall appear nude or in a
state of nudity while engaged in any live
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performance on the premises of any sexually
oriented business.6
“Nude” or “state of nudity” is further defined in Section II
(15) as:
[T]he showing of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, anal
cleft or cleavage with less than a fully
opaque covering, the showing of the female
breast with less than a fully opaque
covering of any part of the nipple, or the
showing of the covered male genitals in a
discern[i]bly turgid state.
Jameson claims that Section VII(b)’s purpose “is
specifically and solely to ban nude dancing in sexually oriented
businesses; a specific type of speech at a specific type of
establishment.”
Hence, Jameson argues that this provision
represents a regulation of the particular message involved and
that it must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.7
Thus, Jameson contends that the district court erred by not
analyzing Section VII(b) pursuant to a strict scrutiny standard.
While we agree that Section VII(b) is a content-based regulation
of speech, we do not agree that strict scrutiny is the correct
6
Section II(20) defines “Sexually Oriented Business” as “an adult amusement
arcade, adult book store, adult novelty store, adult video store, adult
cabaret, adult motel, adult motion picture theater, adult stage theater,
escort agency, or sexual encounter center.”
7
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2539, 105 L.Ed.2d
342 (1989)(stating that if a regulation is related to expression,
intermediate scrutiny is not appropriate and a more “demanding” standard is
required).
-6-
standard to be used to determine the constitutionality of this
provision.
As an initial matter, we note that exotic dancing is
generally considered to be a form of expression which enjoys at
least some protection under the First Amendment.
In Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc.,8 Chief Justice Rehnquist in writing for the
plurality stated that “nude dancing of the kind sought to be
performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters
of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally
so.”
In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth has conceded
that, from a factual standpoint, the type of exotic dancing
featured at Regina’s II fell within this particular realm of
protected speech.
Thus, since the First Amendment is in fact implicated,
we turn to determining whether strict scrutiny analysis is
required.
The Supreme Court of the United States has provided
lower courts with two somewhat differing, yet overlapping
standards by which to determine the constitutionality of
regulations specifically targeting sexually-oriented businesses.
8
501 U.S. 560, 566, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2460, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991)(plurality
opinion). See also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66, 101
S.Ct. 2176, 2181, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981)(stating that “nude dancing is not
without its First Amendment protections from official regulation”); and City
of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 146 L.Ed.2d
265 (2000)(plurality opinion)(stating that “[b]eing ‘in a state of nudity’ is
not an inherently expressive condition. As we explained in Barnes, however,
nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we
think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s
protection”).
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Due to the complexity of these standards, a review of the
development of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area is
in order.
We first turn to the Supreme Court’s treatment of
zoning ordinances which specifically target sexually-oriented
businesses.
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,9 the
Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a
portion of the City of Detroit’s zoning ordinance which required
that “adult” theaters “not be located within 1,000 feet of any
two other ‘regulated uses’ or within 500 feet of a residential
area” [footnote omitted].10
Although a majority of the justices
could not agree on a single rationale, a majority of the Court
did recognize that even though the adult theaters were singled
out under the zoning laws because of the content of the films
that were shown in those establishments, the city could
constitutionally regulate the businesses in that manner since
the purpose was to control the negative, secondary effects
associated with such establishments.11
9
10
427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976).
427 U.S. at 52.
11
Id. 427 U.S. at 62-63 (holding that “[p]utting to one side for the moment
the fact that adult motion picture theaters must satisfy a locational
restriction not applicable to other theaters, we are also persuaded that the
1,000-foot restriction does not, in itself, create an impermissible restraint
on protected communication. The city’s interest in planning and regulating
the use of property for commercial purposes is clearly adequate to support
that kind of restriction applicable to all theaters within the city limits.
In short, apart from the fact that the ordinances treat adult theaters
-8-
Approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court
upheld a similar zoning ordinance in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.12
The Court invoked a three-step analysis in
upholding the city’s zoning ordinance.
First, since the
ordinance did “not ban adult theaters altogether,” but merely
regulated where the theaters could be located, “[t]he ordinance
[could be] properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and
manner regulation.”13
The Court next asked whether the ordinance
was content-based or content-neutral.
If the Court determined
that the ordinance was content-neutral, it would be upheld “so
long as [it was] designed to serve a substantial governmental
interest and [did] not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.”14
In determining whether the ordinance was content-based
or content-neutral, the Court noted that the ordinance did “not
appear to fit neatly into either the ‘content-based’ or the
‘content-neutral’ category.”15
However, in keeping with its
prior decision in American Mini Theatres, the Court held that
differently from other theaters and the fact that the classification is
predicated on the content of material shown in the respective theaters, the
regulation of the place where such films may be exhibited does not offend the
First Amendment”).
12
475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986).
13
475 U.S. at 46.
14
Id. 475 U.S. at 47.
15
Id.
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even though “the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in
adult films differently from other kinds of theaters[,]” the
ordinance was nonetheless “completely consistent with our
definition of ‘content-neutral’ speech regulations[.]”16
Therefore, the Court held that the ordinance, which was aimed at
combating the negative, secondary effects associated with
sexually-oriented businesses, would be subjected to review under
the standards reserved for “content-neutral” time, place and
manner regulations.17
Finally, in the third step of its
analysis, the Court held that the ordinance did serve a
substantial governmental interest without unreasonably limiting
alternative avenues of communication.
Hence, American Mini Theatres and Renton both stand
for the proposition that a content-based zoning ordinance
targeting sexually-oriented businesses may nevertheless be
treated like a content-neutral regulation if the ordinance is
aimed at combating the negative, secondary effects associated
with such businesses.18
16
In other words, since these ordinances
Id. 475 U.S. at 47-48.
17
Id. 475 U.S. at 49 (stating that “[i]t was with this understanding in mind
that, in American Mini Theatres, a majority of this Court decided that, at
least with respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials,
zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of
such businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to
‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations”).
18
As some lower federal courts have noted, the better reading of Renton is
that the Court treated a technically content-based regulation as if it were a
content-neutral regulation. See Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Nichols, 137 F.3d
-10-
do not totally prohibit sexually-oriented businesses, but merely
restrict the areas in which these businesses may be located, the
ordinances are not subjected to strict scrutiny analysis.
Rather, since the ordinances are aimed at combating the
negative, secondary effects associated with such businesses,
they are instead subjected to an intermediate level standard of
review.
We next turn to the Supreme Court’s consideration of
regulations governing nudity.
In Barnes, the regulation at
issue was an Indiana statute “proscribing public nudity across
the board.”19
As applied to establishments featuring exotic
dancing, the statute had the effect of requiring the dancers to
wear “pasties” and “G-strings.”
The Court upheld the statute,
but found itself fragmented, with no single rationale uniting a
435, 440 (6th Cir. 1998)(stating that “[o]ver the last decade, some courts
reviewing these type of regulations started simply referring to them as
content-neutral without explaining, as the Supreme Court carefully did in
both American Mini Theatres and City of Renton, that they are in fact
content-based but are to be treated like content-neutral regulations for some
purposes. Thus, in some cases, a kind of legal fiction has been created that
calls regulation of such literature ‘content neutral’ when what is meant is
only that the regulation is constitutionally valid [emphasis
original][citations omitted]”); and DiMa Corp. v. Town of Hallie, 185 F.3d
823, 828 (7th Cir. 1999)(discussing Renton and stating that “[t]he Court held
that regulation of sexually explicit material would be treated like contentneutral time, place, and manner regulations, not that it was content-neutral
[emphases original]”). See also City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
535 U.S. 425, 448, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 1741, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002)(Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment)(noting that designating ordinances like those at
issue in Renton as being content-neutral “was something of a fiction,” but
that despite the fact that such ordinances are in reality content-based, “the
central holding of Renton is sound: A zoning restriction that is designed to
decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny”).
19
501 U.S. at 566.
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majority of the justices.
However, as lower federal courts have
noted, Justice Souter’s opinion concurring in the judgment was
“on the narrowest grounds,” and therefore became “binding” on
lower courts.20
Justice Souter agreed with the plurality that the less
stringent test as announced in United States v. O’Brien,21 should
be the standard by which to determine the statute’s
constitutionality.
In O’Brien, the Court announced a four-
pronged test for determining the constitutionality of
regulations that were aimed at conduct, but which also had the
effect of placing incidental limitations on speech:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.22
With respect to the second prong from O’Brien, Justice
Souter cited the Court’s previous holding in Renton and stated
that “substantial governmental interests” should include goals
20
See DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 408-09 (6th Cir.
1997)(citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993-94,
51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)(instructing lower courts that where no single opinion
unites a majority of the Court, they should follow the opinion concurring in
the judgment on the narrowest grounds)).
21
391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).
22
391 U.S. at 377.
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of “preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and other criminal
activity” that is associated with sexually-oriented businesses.23
Hence, Justice Souter concluded that Indiana’s public nudity ban
could be constitutionally applied to prohibit totally nude
dancing in order to further the state’s interest in controlling
the negative, secondary effects that sexually-oriented
businesses had on the surrounding areas of the community.
Finally, with respect to the fourth prong from
O’Brien, Justice Souter stated that it too had been satisfied:
The fourth O’Brien condition, that the
restriction be no greater than essential to
further the governmental interest, requires
little discussion. Pasties and a G-string
moderate the expression to some degree, to
be sure, but only to a degree. Dropping the
final stitch is prohibited, but the
limitation is minor when measured against
the dancer’s remaining capacity and
opportunity to express the erotic message.24
Subsequently, in Pap’s A.M., a four-justice plurality
once again applied the O’Brien test in upholding a city
ordinance prohibiting persons from appearing in public “in a
state of nudity.”25
As in Barnes, exotic dancers were compelled
to wear “pasties” and “G-strings” in order to comply with the
terms of the ordinance while performing in sexually-oriented
23
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 583.
24
Id. 501 U.S. at 587.
25
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 283.
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businesses.
In writing for the four-justice plurality, Justice
O’Connor stated that applying the ban to prohibit totally nude
dancing was justified on grounds that “the ordinance seeks to
deter crime and the other deleterious effects caused by the
presence of such an establishment in the neighborhood.”26
In discussing the fourth prong of the O’Brien test,
Justice O’Connor stated:
The fourth and final O’Brien factor--that
the restriction is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of the
government interest--is satisfied as well.
The ordinance regulates conduct, and any
incidental impact on the expressive element
of nude dancing is de minimis. The
requirement that dancers wear pasties and Gstrings is a minimal restriction in
furtherance of the asserted government
interests, and the restriction leaves ample
capacity to convey the dancer’s erotic
message.27
Thus, as in Barnes, the ordinance in Pap’s A.M. withstood a
First Amendment challenge.
Therefore, both Barnes and Pap’s A.M. stand for the
proposition that a content-neutral, general ban on public nudity
may be constitutionally applied to prohibit totally nude dancing
in order to combat the negative, secondary effects associated
with sexually-oriented businesses.
Under both of these cases,
the Supreme Court applied an intermediate level standard of
26
Id. 529 U.S. at 293.
27
Id. 529 U.S. at 301.
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review in upholding the regulations at issue.
Finally, both
Barnes and Pap’s A.M. indicate that requiring exotic dancers to
wear pasties and G-strings has a de minimis impact on the
message being conveyed.
The preceding summary shows that the Supreme Court has
developed two somewhat distinguishable, yet overlapping
standards to guide lower courts when determining the
constitutionality of regulations targeting sexually-oriented
businesses.
As the Court in Barnes noted, the Renton-type time,
place and manner test “has been interpreted to embody much the
same standards as those set forth in [O’Brien].”28
Thus, having
established a basic framework, we now apply the aforementioned
principles to Section VII(b).
As we mentioned above, Section VII(b) prohibits a
person from appearing nude or in a state of nudity “while
engaged in any live performance on the premises of any sexually
oriented business.”
Thus, unlike the statute at issue in
Barnes, and the ordinance at issue in Pap’s A.M., Section VII(b)
28
See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 298, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3071, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)(noting that
there is little, if any, difference between the four-pronged O’Brien test and
the standard applied to time, place and manner restrictions); and Ben’s Bar,
Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 714 (7th Cir. 2003)(stating that
“the analytical frameworks and standards utilized by the Court in evaluating
adult entertainment regulations, be they zoning ordinances or public
indecency statutes, are virtually indistinguishable”). But see Peek-A-Boo
Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, Florida, 337 F.3d 1251, 1265
n.13 (11th Cir. 2003)(analyzing a zoning ordinance governing sexuallyoriented business pursuant to the Renton time, place and manner standard, and
an ordinance governing public nudity under the O’Brien standard).
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is not a content-neutral ban on nudity.
Rather, Section VII(b)
only prohibits nudity in a sexually-oriented business if an
individual is “engaged in any live performance.”
Apparently,
under the terms of this provision, an individual would not be in
violation of Section VII(b) if she appeared nude while merely
serving drinks to the patrons.
Therefore, since Section
VII(b)’s ban on nudity is content-based, it does not fit
squarely under the Barnes and Pap’s A.M. mode of analysis.
Similarly, Section VII(b) is not a zoning-type
regulation which merely restricts the availability of exotic
dancing to certain locations within the county; it is a complete
ban on totally nude live performances on the premises of
sexually-oriented businesses.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s Renton-
type analysis would also seem to be inapplicable.
Hence, at
first blush, it would appear that Section VII(b) should be
subjected to a strict scrutiny standard of review.
However,
taking into account the overlapping nature of the two standards
discussed above, we hold that Section VII(b) may be properly
analyzed pursuant to an intermediate level standard of review.
In both Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Barnes,
and Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Pap’s A.M., the
“secondary effects” rationale from Renton was extended to
justify the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny to
the Court’s consideration of public nudity bans.
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In both cases,
the application of the general public nudity bans against
sexually-oriented businesses was upheld in light of the
governments’ efforts to control the negative, secondary effects
associated with such businesses.
In the case sub judice, Ordinance No. 2000-4 is
clearly aimed at controlling those same negative, secondary
effects.
The McCracken County Fiscal Court made several
findings linking the presence of sexually-oriented businesses in
an area to decreased property values, increased crime rates, and
increased risks of the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases.
Accordingly, a logical extension of Renton, Barnes, and Pap’s
A.M. is that a prohibition on totally nude dancing, although
content-based, may nevertheless be subjected to an intermediate
level standard of review if the regulation is aimed at
controlling the negative, secondary effects associated with
sexually-oriented businesses.
While it is true that Section VII(b) effectuates a
complete ban on totally nude dancing, whereas the ordinance at
issue in Renton did not ban adult theaters altogether, we
conclude that the “de minimis” language from Barnes and Pap’s
A.M. further justifies the application of an intermediate level
standard of review.
For example, in Pap’s A.M., the plurality
stated that any “muting” of the erotic message that took place
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by prohibiting the “last stitch” from being dropped during an
exotic dance was de minimis.29
Under Ordinance No. 2000-4, exotic dancers are
permitted to perform “semi-nude.”30
Similar to the situations in
Barnes and Pap’s A.M., this has the effect of requiring female
dancers to wear pasties and G-strings.
Therefore, in keeping
with the decisions in Barnes and Pap’s A.M., as between totally
nude exotic dancing and exotic dancing that is accompanied by
pasties and G-strings, we hold that any muting of the erotic
message that occurs by prohibiting the totally nude exotic
dancing is de minimis.31
Accordingly, Section VII(b) may be
appropriately analyzed pursuant to an intermediate level
standard of review.
We find support for this result in Fly-Fish, Inc. v.
City of Cocoa Beach.32
In Fly-Fish, the United States Court of
29
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 294.
30
Section II(17) defines “semi-nude” as follows:
“Semi-nude” or in a “semi-nude condition” means the
showing of the female breast below a horizontal line across
the top of the areolae at its highest point or the showing
of the male or female buttocks. This definition shall
include the entire lower portion of the human female
breast, but shall not include any portion of the cleavage
of the human female breast exhibited by a dress, blouse,
skirt, leotard, bathing suit, or other wearing apparel
provided the areolae is not exposed in whole or in part.
31
This holding is further bolstered by different language from Barnes and
Pap’s A.M., which indicates that nude dancing is only “marginally” protected
by, or within the “outer ambits of” the First Amendment. See Barnes, 501
U.S. at 566; and Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289.
32
337 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered a constitutional
challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting employees of sexuallyoriented businesses from appearing totally nude within those
establishments.
The Eleventh Circuit held that although the
ordinance was clearly content-based, inasmuch as it specifically
targeted nude dancing,33 it would nonetheless be subjected to an
intermediate level standard of review.
The Court stated that
since the ordinance merely regulated the manner in which the
erotic message was conveyed, i.e., it did not prohibit exotic
dancing, but merely required that there be “more clothing on the
messenger,” and that since any muting of the message caused by a
ban on total nudity was de minimis, an intermediate level
standard of review was appropriate.34
Therefore, Section VII(b) may be appropriately
analyzed pursuant to an intermediate level standard of review.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Jameson’s
request to apply a strict scrutiny standard of review.
33
Similar to the ordinance in the instant case, the ordinance at issue in
Fly-Fish was not a content-neutral ban on public nudity in general, but was
instead a ban on nudity within sexually-oriented businesses only. Id. at
1306.
34
Id. at 1308. See also Schultz, 228 F.3d at 847 (applying intermediate
level scrutiny to a content-based ordinance prohibiting employees of
sexually-oriented businesses from appearing nude within those establishments
and stating that “[i]nsofar as [the ordinance] prohibits full nudity and
requires dancers to wear pasties and G-strings while performing, [the
ordinance] does not offend the First Amendment”).
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We next turn to Jameson’s claim that if we determine
that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
review, the case must nonetheless be remanded to the district
court in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alameda
Books.35
We agree.
In Alameda Books, the Supreme Court’s plurality
opinion clarified the procedure involved when a party has
challenged a regulation targeting the secondary effects
associated with sexually-oriented businesses:
In Renton, we . . . held that a
municipality may rely on any evidence that
is “reasonably believed to be relevant” for
demonstrating a connection between speech
and a substantial, independent government
interest. This is not to say that a
municipality can get away with shoddy data
or reasoning. The municipality’s evidence
must fairly support the municipality’s
rationale for its ordinance. If plaintiffs
fail to cast direct doubt on this rationale,
either by demonstrating that the
municipality’s evidence does not support its
rationale or by furnishing evidence that
disputes the municipality’s factual
findings, the municipality meets the
standard set forth in Renton. If plaintiffs
succeed in casting doubt on a municipality’s
rationale in either manner, the burden
shifts back to the municipality to
supplement the record with evidence renewing
support for a theory that justifies its
35
535 U.S. at 425. Alameda Books was rendered on May 13, 2002. In the case
at bar, the district court’s order denying Jameson’s motion to declare
Ordinance No. 2000-4 unconstitutional was entered on May 31, 2002. Our
review of the briefs filed with the district court shows that it was likely
not aware of the Alameda Books decision prior to denying Jameson’s motion.
-20-
ordinance [citations omitted][emphasis
added].36
The Supreme Court has noted that when enacting
ordinances aimed at combating the negative, secondary effects
associated with sexually-oriented businesses, cities are
entitled to rely on studies from other municipalities and even
prior court precedents which tend to establish the link between
sexually-oriented businesses and those negative, secondary
effects.37
However, as Alameda Books makes clear, if a party
challenging the regulation casts doubt on the city’s pre-
36
535 U.S. at 438-39.
37
See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-97 stating:
[I]n terms of demonstrating that such secondary
effects pose a threat, the city need not ‘conduct new
studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities’ to demonstrate the
problem of secondary effects, ‘so long as whatever
evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed
to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses.’ Because the nude dancing at Kandyland is
of the same character as the adult entertainment at
issue in Renton, American Mini Theatres, and
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34
L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), it was reasonable for Erie to
conclude that such nude dancing was likely to produce
the same secondary effects. And Erie could
reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation set
forth in Renton and American Mini Theatres to the
effect that secondary effects are caused by the
presence of even one adult entertainment
establishment in a given neighborhood. In fact, Erie
expressly relied on Barnes and its discussion of
secondary effects, including its reference to Renton
and American Mini Theatres. Even in cases addressing
regulations that strike closer to the core of First
Amendment values, we have accepted a state or local
government’s reasonable belief that the experience of
other jurisdictions is relevant to the problem it is
addressing” [citations omitted].
-21-
enactment rationale, the burden shifts back to the city to
proffer supplemental evidence justifying the regulation.
In Peek-A-Boo Lounge, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that “[t]he significance
of Alameda Books is that it clarifies how the court is to
interpret the third step of the Renton analysis as well as the
second prong of the O’Brien test,” i.e., the reviewing court
must determine whether the legislative body can proffer
supplementary evidence tending to show that the challenged
regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest without
unreasonably limiting alternative avenues of communication.38
Accordingly, post-Alameda Books, when a party successfully casts
doubt on a government’s pre-enactment rationale for regulating
sexually-oriented businesses, legislative bodies are required to
supplement their evidence before the court to show that the
challenged regulation furthers the government’s interest in
combating the negative, secondary effects associated with
sexually-oriented businesses.
In the instant case, our review of the record shows
that Jameson presented unrebutted evidence before the district
court which tended to cast doubt on the fiscal court’s preenactment justifications for Section VII(b).
For example, Brent
Stringer, chief dispatcher for Paducah/McCracken E-911
38
337 F.3d at 1264-65.
-22-
Communications Services, offered records from his department
indicating that the number of times local police officers had
been asked to respond to various incidents at Regina’s II and
The Playhouse, two sexually-oriented businesses, was lower than
at two non-sexually-oriented nightclubs in the same area of the
city.
In addition, Jameson offered the deposition testimony of
George Wiley, a realtor, who stated that property values in and
around the area where Regina’s II was located had actually
increased over time.
Finally, Jameson presented the testimony
of Joann Warner, owner of The Playhouse, and Melissa Meyer, an
employee of The Playhouse.
Both women testified regarding
various rules and regulations that were in place to prevent the
spread of sexually-transmitted diseases at that establishment.
Hence, in light of Alameda Books, we conclude that
Jameson’s unrebutted evidence was sufficient to cast doubt on
the fiscal court’s pre-enactment rationale for Section VII(b).
In the face of such evidence, the burden has shifted back to the
fiscal court to proffer supplementary evidence justifying the
regulation.
However, since Alameda Books had not yet been
rendered at the time of the evidentiary hearing conducted on
October 18, 2001, the fiscal court must be given an opportunity
to respond to Jameson’s evidence.
Accordingly, a remand of this
matter to the district court is necessary to determine whether
the fiscal court can proffer supplementary evidence indicating
-23-
that Section VII(b)’s ban on totally nude dancing furthers a
substantial governmental interest in McCracken County without
unreasonably limiting alternative avenues of communication.39
On
remand, the fiscal court’s legislative judgment should be upheld
as long as the evidence upon which it relies is credible.40
We next turn to Jameson’s claim that Ordinance No.
2000-4, as a whole, represents an example of “arbitrary
legislation,” which, according to Jameson, violates Section 2 of
the Kentucky Constitution.
In support of this argument, Jameson
restates his previous assertions that the fiscal court acted
improperly by (1) initially enacting Ordinance No. 2000-4
without establishing a specific link between sexually-oriented
businesses and negative, secondary effects in McCracken County;
and (2) by failing to produce evidence at the October 18, 2001,
hearing justifying the enactment of Ordinance No. 2000-4.
To the extent Jameson is asking for the same type of
relief he seeks with respect to his federal constitutional
39
See id. at 1273 (stating that “in light of our finding that the Adult
Lounges have managed to cast direct doubt on the County’s rationale for
adopting Ordinance 99-18, the District Court must decide by a preponderance
of the available evidence (including whatever additional evidence the County
places in the record) whether there remains credible evidence upon which the
County could reasonably rely in concluding that the ordinance would combat
the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments in Manatee
County. The burden lies with the County in this regard” [emphasis added]).
40
Id. (stating that on remand, “the District Court should be careful not to
substitute its own judgment for that of the County. The County’s legislative
judgment should be upheld provided that the County can show that its judgment
is still supported by credible evidence, upon which the County reasonably
relies”).
-24-
arguments, our preceding analysis renders this claim moot, and
we need not address this issue any further.41
To the extent
Jameson is requesting additional relief,42 Jameson has not
attacked any specific provision within Ordinance No. 2000-4 as
being arbitrary and in violation of Section 2.
Accordingly, we
decline to discuss the merits of this argument on appeal.
Next, we address Jameson’s claim that since the
regulations prohibiting nude dancing only apply to “sexually
oriented businesses,” Ordinance No. 2000-4 is a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Kentucky Constitution.43
Specifically, Jameson argues:
[A]ny business in McCracken County can have
nude entertainment as long as it is not
considered part of the regular performances
due to the fact that it does not fall within
the definition of a sexually oriented
business. Such a distinction without any
rational relation is discriminatory.
As this Court has previously noted, the negative,
secondary effects associated with sexually-oriented businesses
are unique to those establishments.44
Therefore, the fiscal
41
See Murphy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 50 S.W.3d 173, 184 (2001)(stating that
issues raised on appeal which are rendered moot “require no further
discussion”).
42
It is unclear whether Jameson’s Section 2 constitutional claim is offered
as a request for additional relief, or as an alternative basis for
invalidating the ordinance.
43
See Ky. Const. § 3.
44
See Restaurant Ventures, 60 S.W.3d at 579 (rejecting a similar Equal
Protection Clause argument).
-25-
court could have reasonably concluded that an establishment
which regularly features adult entertainment would be more
likely to attract the negative, secondary effects associated
with sexually-oriented businesses than an establishment which
only occasionally features adult-type entertainment.
Accordingly, we reject Jameson’s claim that such a distinction
is “without any rational relation,” and violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Kentucky Constitution.
Jameson next claims that Ordinance No. 2000-4 is
unconstitutionally overbroad, and that Section VII(d), which
prohibits physical contact between customers and dancers, is
unconstitutionally vague.
We reject both contentions.
With respect to Jameson’s overbreadth claim, he
appears to argue that since some “mainstream” movies shown in
conventional theaters depict sexual activities which would not
be permitted at Regina’s II, Ordinance No. 2000-4 reaches “a
range of protected speech” and is therefore unconstitutionally
overbroad.
Obviously, this argument overlooks the important
difference between the depiction of a certain sexual activity on
film and the live performance of that same activity in front of
a group of customers at an adult cabaret.
Accordingly,
Jameson’s overbreadth argument is plainly without merit.
With respect to Jameson’s vagueness claim, he asserts
that Section VII(d), which prohibits physical contact between
-26-
patrons and exotic dancers, does “not clearly draw[ ]” the line
between prohibited and acceptable conduct.
Specifically, he
contends that it could be interpreted to prohibit “social
niceties, such as a handshake.”
We disagree.
A law is impermissibly vague if it is worded in such a
way that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot reasonably
discern what activity is prohibited.45
Section VII(d) states in
full that “[n]o entertainer or employee shall be permitted to
have any physical contact with any patron during any
performance.”
Hence, Section VII(d) only prohibits physical
contact between patrons and dancers while the dancer is engaged
in an exotic performance.
Accordingly, since Section VII(d)
clearly defines the prohibited activity, it is not void for
vagueness.
Finally, Jameson argues that Section VI of the
ordinance, which requires a sexually-oriented business to submit
to inspection by county officials “at any time it is occupied or
open for business” violates the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
We disagree.
Although the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
applies to administrative searches and extends to protect
45
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33
L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)(stating that “[i]t is a basic principle of due process
that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined,” and that persons of ordinary intelligence must have a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited).
-27-
commercial businesses,46 the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized an exception for so-called “closely-regulated”
industries in New York v. Burger.47
The Supreme Court stated
that a statute or ordinance granting government officials the
discretion to inspect such a business without a warrant must,
inter alia, be “‘carefully limited in time, place, and scope’”
[citations omitted].48
We first note that the issue of whether sexuallyoriented businesses as defined by Ordinance No. 2000-4 fell
within the definition of a “closely-regulated” industry was not
a contested issue below or on this current appeal.49
Indeed, in
his brief to this Court, Jameson has apparently conceded that
46
See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2537-38, 69
L.Ed.2d 262 (1981)(stating that “[o]ur prior cases have established that the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches applies to
administrative inspections of private commercial property”).
47
482 U.S. 691, 702-03, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2644, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987).
48
Id. 482 U.S. at 703.
49
Our research indicates that this issue is one which is open for debate.
See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298, 1306 (5th Cir.
1988)(vacated in part on other grounds 493 U.S. 215, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107
L.Ed.2d 603 (1990)(upholding portion of a zoning regulation requiring
sexually-oriented businesses to submit to inspections whenever the premises
were occupied or open for business and stating that the regulation permitted
“reasonable” searches of “pervasively regulated business[es]”); and Alexis,
Inc. v. Pinellas County, Florida, 194 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1350 n.15 (M.D. Fla.
2002)(referencing a previous order of the Court finding that the sexuallyoriented business at issue fell within the definition of a “highly regulated”
business as contemplated by Burger). But see J.L. Spoons, Inc. v. City of
Brunswick, 49 F.Supp.2d 1032, 1040 (N.D. Ohio 1999)(finding that “because
sexually oriented businesses enjoy a degree of First Amendment protection,”
they “do not qualify as highly regulated industries”); and Pentco, Inc. v.
Moody, 474 F.Supp. 1001, 1009 (S.D. Ohio 1978)(determining, prior to Burger,
that the regulation of massage parlors was not “‘deeply rooted’ in government
control as the Supreme Court found with respect to firearms in United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972)”).
-28-
Regina’s II fits within the definition of a “closely-regulated”
business as defined by Burger.
Thus, without deciding whether
Jameson’s concession is warranted, we proceed with our analysis
according to the issue as framed by the parties on appeal.
In Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc. v. City of
Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky,50 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky recently
invalidated a somewhat similar regulation on grounds that the
provision governing administrative inspections had “no [ ]
limitation upon the time of the searches.”
The Court went on to
state that adding the phrase “reasonable times” would correct
the ordinance’s Fourth Amendment defect with respect to the time
element.51
In the instant case, Section VI expressly limits the
time for administrative inspections to those occasions when the
business is either occupied or open for business.
Accordingly,
unlike the regulation at issue in Kentucky Restaurant Concepts,
since Section VI “carefully limits” the time for conducting
administrative inspections, we conclude that Jameson’s Fourth
Amendment claim is without merit.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the McCracken
District Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and this
50
209 F.Supp.2d 672, 691 (W.D. Ky. 2002).
51
Id. Similar to the case at bar, whether sexually-oriented businesses fell
within the definition of a “closely-regulated” industry as contemplated by
Burger does not appear to have been a contested issue in Kentucky Restaurant
Concepts.
-29-
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Emily Ward Roark
Paducah, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Y. Boaz
McCracken County Attorney
Christopher Shea Nickell
Asst. County Attorney
Paducah, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher Shea Nickell
Asst. County Attorney
Paducah, Kentucky
-30-
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