TROY F. TOWNSEND v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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December 23, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000937-MR
TROY F. TOWNSEND
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00085
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Troy F. Townsend appeals from a judgment of the
Simpson Circuit Court, entered April 2, 2003, sentencing him to
five years’ in prison following conviction by a jury for
trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine), first degree.
We affirm.
In February 2001, Detective Jere Hopson with the Drug
Enforcement Special Investigative Section of the Kentucky State
Police arranged for Kerry Hinton to serve as a confidential
informant participating in undercover drug buys in Simpson
County.
Hinton had contacted the police and indicated that he
was willing to provide information and assist the police in
arresting persons who had provided drugs to him in the past.
On the afternoon of February 9, 2001, Detective Hopson
asked Hinton to arrange a drug purchase from a person who had
previously supplied Hinton with drugs and who was known to him
as Troy Granger (hereinafter referred to as Townsend)1.
Hinton
made several recorded telephone calls to the seller eventually
arranging to buy $40.00 of crack cocaine at the parking lot of a
supermarket.
Detective Hopson placed an audiotape transmitter
on Hinton and they went to the supermarket in separate
automobiles.
Detective Hopson watched and listened as Hinton
exited his vehicle and got into the back seat of a white Nissan
Maxima containing a large black male and a black female.
The
black male sold Hinton a piece of crack cocaine for $40.00 with
very little conversation occurring between them.
Afterward,
Detective Hopson followed Hinton to a church parking lot and
received the cocaine purchased in the transaction.
Hinton
described the transaction to Detective Hopson identifying the
seller as Townsend.
The next day, Detective Hopson went to Townsend’s
apartment and observed a white Nissan Maxima, similar to the one
involved in the drug transaction, parked outside.
The vehicle
was registered to Townsend.
1
Troy Granger is the same person as appellant, Troy Townsend.
was legally changed from Granger to Townsend in 1995.
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His last name
On May 21, 2001, the Simpson County grand jury
indicted Townsend on one felony count of trafficking in a
controlled substance, first degree (Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 218A.1412).
Townsend’s trial, which began on December 11,
2002, ended in a mistrial.
March 6, 2003.
A second trial was rescheduled for
On February 27, 2003, the Commonwealth filed a
motion in limine, seeking a ruling to permit the admission of
Townsend’s cell phone records as self-authenticating business
records.
On March 3, 2003, the trial court conducted a pretrial
hearing on the motion and ruled that the cell phone records were
admissible business records under Kentucky Rules of Evidence
(KRE) 803(6) and KRE 902(11).
Townsend’s second trial was held on March 6 and 7,
2003.
Detective Hopson, Hinton, and two forensic laboratory
chemists testified for the Commonwealth.
Townsend, Townsend’s
half-brother, Stephon Granger, Townsend’s friend and neighbor,
Justin Reynolds, and Reynolds’ mother, Josephine Hall, all
testified on behalf of the defense.
Townsend denied being
involved in the drug transaction and claimed to have been at his
apartment with Justin Reynolds at the time of the incident.
In
addition to the witnesses’ testimony, the Commonwealth
introduced a short videotape of the incident taken by Detective
Hopson showing Hinton getting out of his vehicle, getting into a
white Nissan Maxima, and returning to his vehicle.
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The
Commonwealth also introduced an audiotape containing the
telephone calls setting up the drug purchase, along with
records for Townsend’s cell phone.
The jury found Townsend guilty of trafficking in a
controlled substance (cocaine), first degree, and recommended
the minimum sentence of five years.
On April 2, 2003, the trial
court sentenced Townsend to serve five years’ in prison.
This
appeal follows.
Townsend raises three evidentiary issues and also
alleges misconduct by the prosecutor during his closing
argument.
We will address each alleged error raised by
Townsend.
First, Townsend contends the trial court erred by
excluding evidence of pending criminal charges in Tennessee
against Hinton that were pending at the time of the second
trial.
At the time of the trial, Hinton had seven outstanding
felony warrants pending against him in Tennessee.
The warrants
were dated September 2001 and July 2002 and, thus, were issued
after Townsend’s indictment in this case.
The Commonwealth
objected to the introduction of any evidence regarding Hinton’s
pending charges in Tennessee.
Hinton was unaware of the pending
arrest warrants in Tennessee.
The trial court ruled that unless
the defendant could show that Hinton had some motive to lie
because of the charges, then the Defendant could not introduce
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this evidence at trial.
Both the prosecutor and Detective
Hobson stated on the record that there had been no agreement to
assist Hinton in any manner with the pending criminal charges in
Tennessee.
Townsend wanted evidence of the pending charges
admitted to impeach Hinton by showing the charges conflicted
with the testimony he gave during the first trial which, as
noted, ended in a mistrial.
We begin our analysis by noting that a witness may be
cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case
including credibility.
KRE 611(b).
Thus, the credibility of a
witness my be impeached by evidence that the witness has been
convicted of a crime, but only if the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment of one year or more.
KRE 609(a), and
Slaven v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 845 (1997)(holding that
only felony convictions can be used for impeachment in
Kentucky); see also
Ky. R. Civ. R. (CR) 43.07.
Evidence that a
witness has been arrested or charged with a criminal offense, as
opposed to a conviction, is not admissible for purposes of
attacking the witness’s credibility.
See Moore v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 634 S.W.2d 426 (1982).
However, there are a few exceptions to this general
rule including one that permits admission of evidence of a
pending charge to show interest, motive, or bias of the witness.
See Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 569 S.W.2d 139 (1978)(holding
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that a defendant may question a witness about criminal charges
pending against him to show that he possesses a motive to lie
to curry favorable treatment from the prosecution).
In Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 80 S.W.3d 405 (2002),
the Supreme Court held that evidence of pending charges in one
county was not admissible to show bias of a prosecution witness
in a trial in another county because the prosecutor lacked
authority to grant any favor or leniency to the witness on the
charges in a county outside his jurisdiction.
Thus, a defendant
must present some evidence beyond the mere existence of pending
charges, especially when the charges are in another
jurisdiction, to create an inference of bias sufficient to
justify admission of evidence on those charges for use in crossexamination of the witness.
Townsend’s reliance on Adcock v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 440 (1986) and Commonwealth v.
Cox, Ky., 837 S.W.2d 898 (1992) is misplaced because those cases
involved witnesses on active parole and probation in Kentucky,
and they predate Bowling.
In the current case, Townsend failed to present
sufficient evidence to create a reasonable inference of bias in
connection with the pending warrants against Hinton in
Tennessee.
Both Detective Hopson and the prosecutor stated
there was no deal or agreement with Hinton to assist him in any
way with the handling of the warrants and any potential
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prosecution on the forgery charges.
The warrants and alleged
offenses were based in Tennessee, so the Simpson County
prosecutor had no authority nor apparent ability to influence
resolution of those charges.
In fact, the record indicates that
Hinton was not even aware of the warrants prior to the second
trial.
We, therefore, conclude Townsend has not established
that the evidence of Hinton’s Tennessee arrest warrants was
admissible to show bias.
Townsend’s second alleged error arises from the trial
court granting the Commonwealth’s motion in limine concerning
Townsend’s cell phone records.
The Commonwealth used this
evidence to establish Hinton called Townsend on his cell phone
to set up the drug buy.
The court ruled that the Cingular
Wireless records were admissible as evidence pursuant to the
hearsay exception found in KRE 803(6) and the self
authenticating requirements for business records in KRE 902(11).
Townsend argues the Commonwealth failed to comply with the
requirements of KRE 902(11) because the affidavit of the
Cingular Wireless’s records custodian did not satisfy the
“personal knowledge” requirement.
We note that the standard of review of a trial court’s
decision to admit hearsay evidence under the business record
exception is whether the court abused its discretion.
See Welsh
v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., Ky. App., 128 S.W.3d 41 (2001);
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United States v. Given, 164 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 1999).
KRE 803(6)
provides an exception to the hearsay rule for records of
regularly conducted activity.
KRE 902(11) facilitates the
introduction of business records under KRE 803(6) by providing
for self-authentication of business records if certified by an
authorized custodian, thereby permitting parties to satisfy the
authentication requirement for admissibility of records without
extrinsic evidence or having to call a witness at trial for that
purpose.
See also KRE 803(6)(A).
KRE 902(11)(A) requires the
custodian to certify that the record:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Was made, at or near the time of the
occurrence of the matters set forth, by
(or from information transmitted by) a
person with knowledge of those matters;
Is kept in the course of the regularly
conducted activity; and
Was made by the regularly conducted
activity as a regular practice.
Accompanying the cell records produced by Cingular
Wireless was a notarized affidavit signed by Rhonda Clark
stating as follows:
1.
I, Rhonda Clark [handwritten], am the
Custodian of Records of Cingular
Wireless, with an office located at
5600 Glenridge Drive, Atlanta, Georgia
30342 and am authorized to certify
those records.
2.
After performing a diligent search, I
affirm that, to my knowledge, the
attached documents are true and correct
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copies of all the records in Cingular
Wireless’s possession that are
responsive to the Plaintiff, Defendant
and/or Government Agency.
3.
Such records are prepared by the
personnel of Cingular Wireless in the
ordinary course of business and are
recorded at the time of the acts,
transactions, occurrences or events
that the records describe, or within a
reasonable time thereafter. These
records were not created for the
purpose of this or any other
litigation.
Townsend asserts the affidavit of certification does
not satisfy the “personal knowledge” requirement of KRE
902(11)(A)(i) because it does not state that a person with
“personal knowledge” compiled the information.
However, the
affidavit states that personnel of Cingular Wireless created the
records “in the ordinary course of business” at or near the time
of the transaction.
We believe the identification of personnel
within the business acting in the regular course of business is
sufficient to satisfy KRE 902(11)(A), and there is no need to
provide identification of the specific employees who prepared
the records.
With respect to the “personal knowledge”
requirement, we find the comments of Professor Robert Lawson
instructive:
It is important to understand what the
rule [KRE 902(11)] requires and does not
require in the way of personal knowledge.
It does not require personal knowledge by
foundation witnesses except for personal
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knowledge about the record keeping system
that is needed to satisfy the foundation
requirement. In fact, most of the records
offered under the rule will be offered by
witnesses who have no personal knowledge
concerning the preparation of the records or
the events recorded therein. It does not
require a showing that the maker of the
record had personal knowledge of the matters
recorded in the record. Instead, it
requires a showing that someone in the chain
of production of the record (and who was
involved in the activity of the business)
had personal knowledge of the events sought
to be proved by introduction of the record.
In implementing the requirement, courts
have taken cognizance of the complexity of
modern business practices and the difficulty
that would be encountered if foundation
witnesses were required to identify specific
sources of information contained in the
records offered under the exception.
Although both the source of the information
in a record and personal knowledge by that
source are part of the foundation
requirement, the case law shows that the
requirement can be satisfied by proof that
there existed a regular business practice of
obtaining information (for the records) from
persons in the business who would personally
know of the events recorded in those
records.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.65[5] at 683-684
(4th ed. 2003)(footnotes and citations omitted).
While the
affidavit could have been more explicit on the issue of personal
knowledge, we believe the certification provided by Cingular
Wireless’s records custodian was sufficient and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the cell phone
records.
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Townsend’s third alleged error looks to the trial
court’s handling of statements by the prosecutor during closing
argument.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated with
reference to the testimony of Townsend’s brother, Stephon
Granger:
“If I didn’t know his name when he got on the stand, I
wouldn’t have believed him when he was under oath for even his
name.
You all take it however you want to.
him as far as I could throw him.”
I wouldn’t trust
Defense counsel voiced an
objection and the prosecutor immediately stated that he was
going to withdraw the comment.
The trial court then admonished
the jury as follows:
I am going to admonish the jury. It is not
counsel’s place in the trial to pass on to
you who he believes and disbelieves. That
is your function. So disregard Mr. Willis’s
remark. It is your prerogative and your
province to weigh the evidence and to decide
whether you believe witness Granger, or
disbelieve him. Proceed.
The prosecution continued stating, “Let me clarify what I meant
to say.
What I meant to say was believe the defendant’s
convicted felon brother if you want to.”
Townsend asserts that the trial court “did not
admonish the jury to disregard the comments” and his conviction
should be reversed because the comments substantially prejudiced
him.
However, the record reflects that the trial court did in
fact admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s comments.
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It is ordinarily presumed that a jury will follow an admonition.
See Clay v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 200 (1993).
Furthermore, “it has long been the law in Kentucky that an
admonition to the jury to disregard an improper argument cures
the error unless it appears the argument was so prejudicial,
under the circumstances than an admonition could not cure it.”
Price v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 878, 881 (2001)(citations
omitted).
Because prosecutors are given leeway in presenting
arguments to the jury, misconduct of a prosecutor in presenting
closing argument must be so serious that it renders “the entire
trial fundamentally unfair.”
See Butcher v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
96 S.W.3d 3, 12 (2002)(citing Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57
S.W.3d 787, 805 (2001)).
When prosecutorial misconduct is asserted, the
relevant inquiry by the appellate court should always look to
the overall fairness of the trial and not the culpability of the
prosecutor.
Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 129 S.W.3d 343 (2004).
Accordingly, Townsend has not shown that the comments made by
the prosecutor were so prejudicial as to render the trial
fundamentally unfair or prevent the admonition from curing the
error.
Townsend’s final argument is that Detective Hopson’s
testimony included several instances of inadmissible
investigative hearsay.
“Investigative hearsay” consists of out-
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of-court statements made to the police.
The Kentucky Supreme
Court has rejected the existence of an exception to the hearsay
rule for so-called “investigative hearsay” or information
obtained through statements of other persons based on offering
the evidence to explain the action taken by the police unless
the taking of that action is an issue in the case.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 541 (1988).
See Sanborn
A police
officer may provide some testimony on the course of an
investigation even though it is based on otherwise hearsay
information, but the testimony must be limited to only general
information alluding to the defendant as a suspect in criminal
behavior.
See Gordon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 176
(1995).
Townsend asserts that Hopson made “investigative
hearsay” statements throughout his testimony, including that
Hinton told Hopson that Townsend was a drug dealer and that
Townsend had answered Hinton’s cell phone call to get up the
drug buy.
However, Townsend concedes defense counsel did not
object to this testimony during the trial, and now seeks review
based on RCr 10.26, the palpable or substantial error rule.
In order to obtain relief under RCr 10.26, the
defendant must show the existence of a palpable error that
affects his substantial rights resulting in manifest injustice.
See also KRE 103(e).
“In determining whether an error is
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palpable, ‘an appellate court must consider whether on the whole
case there is a substantial possibility that the result would
have been any different.’”
Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky., 82 S.W.3d
894, 895 (2002)(quoting Commonwealth v. McIntosh, Ky., 646
S.W.2d 43, 45 (1983)).
Having thoroughly reviewed Hopson’s testimony, we
believe the admission of this testimony was not sufficient to
constitute a palpable error.
The drug transaction was set up
through telephone calls to a cell phone owned by Townsend.
The
videotape showed the scheduled meeting between Hinton and a
person fitting Townsend’s general description driving a car
identified as belonging to Townsend.
Townsend admitted that he
and Hinton were acquainted with each other.
Townsend’s alibi
evidence was not credible and he lived only a short distance
from the meeting place.
Accordingly, we do not believe that
admission of this evidence resulted in manifest injustice
substantially affecting the result of the trial.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Simpson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul J. Neel, Jr.
Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
John R. Tartar
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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