RICHARD TRAVIS MORROW v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 22, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000894-MR
RICHARD TRAVIS MORROW
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CR-00029 AND 01-CR-00060
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Richard Travis Morrow has appealed from a final
judgment and sentence of the Pulaski Circuit Court entered on
April 18, 2003, which, after the jury found Morrow guilty on one
count of burglary in the first degree,1 one count of burglary in
the second degree,2 two counts of theft by unlawful taking, over
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 511.020.
2
KRS 511.030.
$300.00,3 and on one count of receiving stolen property,4
sentenced Morrow to ten years’ imprisonment in accordance with
the jury’s recommendations.
Having concluded that the submitted
jury instruction for Morrow’s receiving stolen property charge
was improper, we reverse Morrow’s conviction for that offense
and remand for further proceedings.
Having further concluded
that no other errors occurred which would warrant a reversal of
Morrow’s remaining convictions, we affirm that portion of the
trial court’s final judgment and sentence.
Shortly before midnight on January 17, 2001, Officer
Shannon Smith of the Somerset Police Department received a
message from dispatch informing him that a suspicious vehicle
had been reported near the Tom Buis residence in Somerset,
Pulaski County, Kentucky.
Dispatch also informed Officer Smith
that Buis was out of town at the time.
Upon his arrival at the
Buis residence, Officer Smith observed Morrow standing in Buis’s
yard near the home.
According to Officer Smith, Morrow was
removing work gloves from his hands and was attempting to place
the gloves in his pockets.
In addition, Officer Smith noticed
that the gloves smelled of gasoline and that Morrow was covered
with “brownish-gold” dust on his hands, shirt, and pants.
3
KRS 514.030.
4
KRS 514.110.
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Officer Smith also determined that the “suspicious vehicle” was
owned by David Lee Debord, II.
Officer Jeff Phillipi arrived on the scene shortly
thereafter and joined Officer Smith in the investigation.
Both
officers observed smoke coming from inside Buis’s home and
became concerned that the house might be on fire.
Consequently,
Officer Smith and Officer Phillipi entered the home and began
searching the house.
After gaining entry to the home, the
officers soon determined that the smoke was originating from the
basement.
Upon searching the basement, the officers discovered
a large, upright safe with a hole in one of the upper corners, a
portable gasoline-operated saw,5 and a sack containing several
collectible knives which had apparently been removed from the
safe.
In addition, the officers found Debord hiding underneath
the stairwell.
The following day, on January 18, 2001, Debord
gave recorded statements to police officers admitting that he
and Morrow had twice burglarized the Buis residence the previous
day.6
On February 21, 2001, and March 21, 2001, in separate
indictments, a Pulaski County grand jury indicted Morrow on one
5
The smoke in the house turned out to be the exhaust from the gasolineoperated saw. It was later determined that the saw had been stolen from Don
Molden Pipe Supply in Somerset approximately one month earlier.
6
Debord stated that he and Morrow took three guns from Buis’s home a few
hours prior to the time when they entered the house for a second time shortly
before midnight.
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count of burglary in the first degree, one count of burglary in
the second degree, two counts of theft by unlawful taking, over
$300.00, and on one count of receiving stolen property.7
Morrow
entered pleas of not guilty to all of the charges in his
indictment and the case proceeded to trial.
A jury trial was held on February 18-20, 2003, in the
Pulaski Circuit Court.
After hearing the evidence presented,
the jury returned a verdict finding Morrow guilty on all
charges.
The jury recommended that Morrow be sentenced to ten
years’ imprisonment for his conviction for burglary in the first
degree, five years’ imprisonment for his conviction for burglary
in the second degree, one year imprisonment for each conviction
for theft by unlawful taking, over $300.00, and one year
imprisonment for his conviction for receiving stolen property.
The jury recommended that all of Morrow’s sentences be served
concurrently for a total sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.
After Morrow’s post-judgment motions were denied and after a
pre-sentence investigation had been completed, the trial court
entered a final judgment and sentence on April 18, 2003,
sentencing Morrow to ten years’ imprisonment in accordance with
the jury’s recommendations.
This appeal followed.
7
Debord was indicted on identical charges under the same indictments. In
addition, Debord was charged as being a persistent felony offender in the
first degree. See KRS 532.080(3). According to the record, Debord was
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment as a result of his involvement with the
burglary at the Buis residence.
-4-
Morrow raises several arguments on appeal.
We first
turn to Morrow’s claim that he was denied due process of law and
the right to a fair trial when the Commonwealth’s Attorney
allegedly attempted to define reasonable doubt during the voir
dire stage of the proceedings below.
According to Morrow, the
trial court erred by not granting his request for a mistrial.
We disagree.
In Commonwealth v. Callahan,8 our Supreme Court
discussed the rule prohibiting either the prosecuting attorney
or defense counsel from attempting to define reasonable doubt:
The removal of the definition of
reasonable doubt from the instructions in
the Commonwealth is well founded in case and
textbook law. In 9 Wigmore, Evidence,
Section 2497 (Chadbourn rev. 1981), there is
contained an excellent annotation on the
subject, one quote, at page 412, reading:
We do not think that the
phrase “reasonable doubt” is of
such unknown or uncommon
signification that an exposition
by the trial judge is called for.
Language that is within the
comprehension of persons of
ordinary intelligence can seldom
be made plainer by further
defining or refining. All persons
who possess the qualifications for
jurors know that a doubt of the
guilt of the accused, honestly
entertained, is a reasonable
doubt.
8
Ky., 675 S.W.2d 391, 392-93 (1984).
-5-
Having prohibited the court from
definition of the term “reasonable doubt” in
the instructions, by RCr 9.56(2), we can
hardly condone a client-serving definition
by defense counsel or prosecutor in either
voir dire, opening statement or closing
argument. . . . We do not intend by this
holding that counsel cannot point out to the
jury which evidence, or lack thereof,
creates reasonable doubt, but all counsel
shall refrain from any expression of the
meaning or definition of the phrase
“reasonable doubt.”
In the case sub judice, Morrow contends that the
following statement made by the Commonwealth’s Attorney during
voir dire was an improper attempt to define reasonable doubt:
[Commonwealth’s Attorney]: One thing I kind
of touched on a little bit and I’ll get into
a little bit more. Obviously you’re here to
decide beyond a reasonable doubt – that’s
your standard – if he broke into this home
on January 17, 2001, and part of your duties
in doing that is it’s your job to –
everybody that takes the stand here, it’s
your job to assess their credibility. That
means it’s your job to decide if they’re
telling the truth or not. The fact that
we’re having a trial here pretty much means
you can expect we’re going to have some
conflicting testimony, and that’s your job
to wade through that. Just because we have
conflicting testimony doesn’t mean . . . Can
you all, as jurors, do that? Do you all
feel comfortable with deciding who’s telling
the truth and who’s not? Some people feel
like they shouldn’t do that.
One of the things that I’m going to
touch on here . . . I talked a little bit
about police officers are just like
everybody else. They’re police officers.
They’re human beings. They make mistakes.
I think you’re going to hear in this case
-6-
that some of this evidence they found that
night in the burglary, mainly [Morrow’s]
driver’s license, social security card and
some other things that were removed from the
car, the police have lost. They’ve lost
that evidence. We’re not going to hide it
from you. We’re not going to . . . I mean,
it’s a fact. I will show you that there’s
plenty, more than enough evidence to convict
him – in fact, there’s overwhelming evidence
to convict him, but do you all understand
we’re not here to decide if the police made
a mistake in losing the evidence? Because
I’ll tell you right now they did. They
shouldn’t have lost it. That’s a mistake.
I’m not happy about it. But it’s your job
to decide is there enough to convict him of
breaking into this house. Does anybody have
a problem with that?
Do you have a problem with that, sir?
Prospective Juror: Isn’t it beyond a
reasonable doubt then?
[Commonwealth’s Attorney]: Well, that’s not
. . . I feel I can. But do you understand
the question before you is not did the
police make a mistake?
A Callahan violation occurs where there has been an
attempt “to use other words to convey to the jury the meaning of
‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”9
In the case at bar, the
Commonwealth’s Attorney merely stated that he believed he had
enough evidence to convict Morrow of the crimes with which he
had been charged.
Simply stated, the above remarks did not
constitute an impermissible attempt to define reasonable doubt.
9
Simpson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 759 S.W.2d 224, 226 (1988).
-7-
Accordingly, Morrow’s first claim of error is plainly without
merit.
Next, Morrow contends that the trial court erred by
admitting into evidence a tape-recorded telephone conversation
between Morrow and two of his friends.
According to Morrow, the
audiotape of the telephone call, which was made by Morrow while
he was in jail, was of too poor a quality to be played to the
jury.
We disagree and hold that the trial court did not err by
admitting the audiotape into evidence.
“‘It is well settled that the admission of tape
recordings at trial rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court.’”10
The mere fact that some portions of an
audiotape may be difficult to understand because of background
noise or static does not necessarily preclude the admissibility
of the whole tape.11
An audiotape is properly admitted if there
are audible portions and if “the tapes [are] not so
incomprehensible as to the render them wholly untrustworthy.”12
10
Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 90 S.W.3d 39, 45 (2003)(quoting United States
v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1983)).
11
Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 890 S.W.2d 632, 636 (1994)(stating that
“[w]hile we agree with appellant that portions of the tapes are difficult to
readily hear and understand, due to background noise and static in
transmission, they are by no means wholly inaudible nor unintelligible. In
our opinion, the inaudible portions are not so substantial as to render the
recordings untrustworthy as a whole”).
12
Johnson, 90 S.W.3d at 46.
-8-
Our review of the audiotape in question shows that
while there are portions of the tape which are somewhat
difficult to understand, the tape is nonetheless of sufficient
clarity to be able to hear and understand the conversation
between Morrow and his friends.
Consequently, we cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this
audiotape into evidence.
In two closely-related arguments, Morrow argues that
both Deputy Scott Trotter of the Pulaski County Sheriff’s
Department and the Commonwealth’s Attorney improperly
“interpreted” statements that were made on the audiotape.
Morrow contends that these alleged errors warrant a reversal of
his convictions.
We disagree.
First, with respect to Deputy Trotter’s testimony,
Morrow claims that Deputy Trotter “was allowed to identify the
voice on the tape as the voice of [Morrow], which he should not
have been entitled to do.
The question of the identity of the
caller should have been left to the jury.”
This argument is
clearly without merit, since Deputy Trotter’s testimony was
offered simply as a means of authenticating the tape recording
in order to permit its introduction into evidence.13
13
See Brock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 30 (1997)(noting that after
the adoption of Kentucky Rules of Evidence 901(a) in 1992, a witness’s
testimony identifying an individual’s voice on a tape recording is sufficient
authentication to permit the introduction of the tape into evidence).
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Second, as for the allegedly improper comments made by
the Commonwealth’s Attorney, Morrow points to a statement made
by the prosecutor during the Commonwealth’s closing argument:
Take [a] listen to what he says on the
tape. He says, “Go over to Jessica’s (sic)
house,” said “We’re in trouble,” and then
said “burglary.”
While we agree that the above comments were probably
improper, we do not agree that this statement warrants a
reversal of Morrow’s convictions.
Initially, we note that Morrow failed to object to the
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s comments at trial.
As such, pursuant
to RCr14 10.26, we consider this claim of error under our
palpable error standard of review.
“A palpable error is one
which affects the substantial rights of a party and relief may
be granted for palpable errors only upon a determination that a
manifest injustice has resulted from the error.”15
For an error
to be palpable, it must have been “easily perceptible, plain,
obvious and readily noticeable.”16
Moreover, “[t]he reviewing
court must conclude that a substantial possibility exists that
the result would have been different in order to grant relief.”17
14
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
15
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996).
16
Burns v. Level, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (1998)(citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1995)).
17
Partin, 918 S.W.2d at 224.
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As a general rule, “[i]t is for the jury to determine
as best it can what is revealed in the tape recording without
embellishment or interpretation” by either a witness or the
counsel for either party.18
Hence, even though the
Commonwealth’s Attorney attempted to quote from the audiotape
during closing arguments,19 his comments could be characterized
as an improper “interpretation” since the audiotape was not
perfectly clear.
However, we cannot conclude that there is a
substantial possibility that the outcome would have been
different without these remarks, or that a “manifest injustice”
has resulted because of the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s
statements.
The audiotape was available for the jurors to
review during deliberations, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney
urged the jurors to do so.20
Accordingly, even if the
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s statements were improper, his comments
do not rise to the level of palpable error.
18
Gordon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 176, 180 (1995).
19
Our review of the audiotape shows that the Commonwealth’s Attorney
misquoted Morrow during closing arguments. Instead of saying “Go over to
Jessica’s house,” Morrow can be heard saying “over at next door, at what’s
his name’s place, go over there to the utility closet, and there’s some stuff
in there, get ‘em out and get the fuck rid of ‘em.” In addition, instead of
saying “we’re in trouble,” Morrow can be heard saying “we’re lookin’ at a lot
of time,” and “we’re lookin’ at some time.”
20
See Perdue v.
even though the
audiotape, such
transcript were
deliberations).
Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 148, 155 (1996)(holding that
prosecutor misquoted a statement made by the defendant on an
an error was “harmless” since the audiotape and accompanying
made available to the jurors for review during
-11-
We next address Morrow’s claim that the trial court
erred by submitting an improper jury instruction with regard to
his receiving stolen property charge.
Specifically, Morrow
argues that the submitted instruction failed to include a
scienter requirement, i.e., the instruction did not require the
jury to find that Morrow received the gasoline-operated saw
knowing that the saw had been stolen.
The Commonwealth has
conceded that the submitted instruction was indeed improper.21
21
The submitted instruction clearly omitted the required scienter element.
KRS 514.110(1) reads in full as follows:
A person is guilty of receiving stolen property
when he receives, retains, or disposes of movable
property of another knowing that it has been stolen,
or having reason to believe that it has been stolen,
unless the property is received, retained, or
disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner
[emphasis added].
The receiving stolen property instruction at issue stated in relevant part as
follows:
You will find the Defendant guilty of Receiving
Stolen Property under this Instruction if, and only
if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the following:
A.
That in this county on or about
the 17th day of January, 2001,
and before the finding of the
Indictment herein, he received
a saw which belonged to Don
Molden Pipe Supply;
B.
That said saw had been stolen
property [when] he received it;
C.
That he did not receive the saw
with the intention of restoring
it to its rightful owner; and
D.
That when the Defendant
received the saw it had a value
of $300.00 or more.
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The contested issues on appeal are whether the error has been
preserved for appellate court review, and if not, whether the
error constitutes “palpable error” warranting a reversal of
Morrow’s conviction for receiving stolen property.
We first conclude that this error was not properly
preserved, and that it will therefore be considered under our
palpable error standard of review.
“[I]n order to preserve the
giving or failure to give an instruction as error for appeal, it
is mandatory that an objection be made prior to the Court
instructing the jury and further that the objection must be
stated specifically together with grounds upon which the
objection is made” [emphasis added].22
In the instant case, no
objection was made to the receiving stolen property instruction
until after the instructions had been read to the jury.
Therefore, since this error was not properly preserved, we apply
our palpable error standard of review.
As we mentioned previously, the receiving stolen
property instruction was clearly an erroneous instruction since
it omitted the required scienter element.23
The Commonwealth
22
Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 488, 492 (1991). See also RCr
9.54(2)(stating that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless the party’s position has been fairly
and adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered instruction or by
motion, or unless the party makes objection before the court instructs the
jury, stating specifically the matter to which the party objects and the
ground or grounds of the objection” [emphasis added]).
23
See Grider v. Commonwealth, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 11, 12-13 (1972)(stating that
in a prosecution for receiving stolen property, the jury instruction was
-13-
argues that the faulty instruction was “harmless error” and does
not warrant a reversal of Morrow’s receiving stolen property
conviction.
In support of this argument, the Commonwealth
relies in part upon the following language from Brown v.
Commonwealth:24
Appellant Ross claims he was entitled
to a directed verdict of acquittal on
receiving stolen property. . . . Ross
insists that there was no proof that he knew
the property was stolen. However, direct
proof of knowledge is not required by our
statute. KRS 514.110(2) states: “The
possession by any person of any recently
stolen movable property shall be prima facie
evidence that such person knew such property
was stolen.” The owner testified that his
bicycle was stolen on the same date it was
found in Ross’s possession. Furthermore,
Ross fled and abandoned the bicycle when the
police stopped to speak to him. This was
sufficient to submit the charge of receiving
stolen property to the jury.
According to the Commonwealth, this language stands
for the proposition that under KRS 514.110, the prosecution “was
not required to prove that [Morrow] knew that the [ ] saw was
stolen when he possessed it.”
We disagree.
The above quoted
language from Brown merely states that in a prosecution for
receiving stolen property, the Commonwealth is not required to
proffer direct evidence tending to show that the defendant knew
the property had been stolen.
In other words, circumstantial
“fatally defective” for failing to include a requirement that the jury find
that the defendant knew the property had been stolen).
24
Ky.App., 914 S.W.2d 355, 357 (1996).
-14-
evidence tending to show that the defendant knew that the
property had been stolen will be sufficient to support a
conviction, and KRS 514.110(2) allows a trial court to submit a
case to the jury if there is evidence of the defendant having
possessed “recently stolen movable property.”25
Hence, KRS
514.110(2) does not relieve the Commonwealth of the burden of
proving the knowledge requirement in a prosecution for receiving
stolen property.
The Commonwealth further relies upon the following
language from Neder v. United States,26 where the Supreme Court
of the United States stated:
In this situation, where a reviewing
court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that the omitted element was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence, such
that the jury verdict would have been the
same absent the error, the erroneous
instruction is properly found to be
harmless.
25
It is important to note that KRS 514.110(2) is intended to act as a guide
for trial courts when determining whether the Commonwealth has proffered
sufficient proof to submit the case to the jury. It does not allow for the
inclusion of an instruction stating that the possession of “recently stolen
movable property shall be prima facie evidence that such person knew such
property was stolen.” See Jones v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 719, 165 S.W.2d
566, 567 (1942)(noting that the language stating that “‘[t]he possession by
any person of any stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of his guilt
under this section’ . . . does not direct that the jury be instructed that
the possession of stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of guilt.
The provision is more in the nature of a guide to be followed by the trial
judge in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant the
submission of a case to the jury”). The Jones case was decided under the
former receiving stolen property statute, KRS 433.290.
26
527 U.S. 1, 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).
-15-
The Commonwealth contends that in the case at bar, the
evidence related to the knowledge requirement was both
“uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence,” and that
as such, the improper jury instruction was harmless error.
do not agree.
We
Although the omitted element, i.e., knowledge,
may not have been contested by the introduction of conflicting
evidence, it was not “supported by overwhelming evidence.”
The
Commonwealth proffered evidence tending to show that a saw had
been stolen from Don Molden Pipe Supply in December 2000, and
that on the night of his arrest in January 2001, Morrow was in
possession of a saw matching the description of the stolen saw.
While this is some evidence of knowledge on Morrow’s part, we
cannot conclude that this amounted to “overwhelming evidence.”
Furthermore, although the Court in Brown upheld a
receiving stolen property conviction based upon evidence that
the defendant had possessed “recently stolen movable property,”
there is nothing in the Brown decision indicating that the jury
instructions in that case omitted the knowledge requirement.
Presumably, the jury instructions in Brown required the jury to
find that the defendant knew or had reason to know that the
property had been stolen.
Accordingly, we do not find the
language from Neder to be applicable under the facts of the
instant case.
-16-
Therefore, since the instructions in the case sub
judice permitted the jury to find Morrow guilty of receiving
stolen property without requiring a finding that he knew or
should have known that the saw had been stolen, and since the
evidence tending to establish the knowledge element was not
“overwhelming,” we conclude that the improper jury instruction
constituted palpable error.
Accordingly, we reverse Morrow’s
conviction for receiving stolen property.
Finally, we turn to Morrow’s claim that the bailiff
improperly answered a juror’s question during jury
deliberations.
According to the bailiff’s affidavit filed with
Morrow’s post-judgment motions, the bailiff, in response to a
juror’s question, informed the juror that “each instruction was
a separate offense and they could convict on each of them.”
Morrow argues that this conduct justifies a reversal of all of
his convictions.
We disagree and hold that while the bailiff’s
actions were clearly improper, Morrow has waived this claim of
error by failing to object in a timely manner.
We first note that the apparently inexperienced
bailiff clearly acted improperly by answering the juror’s
question.
27
As a general rule under RCr 9.68,27 RCr 9.74,28 and KRS
RCr 9.68 states in full as follows:
When the jury is kept together in charge of
officers, the officers must be sworn to keep the
jurors together, and to suffer no person to speak to,
-17-
29A.320(1),29 the officer in charge of the jury during
deliberations is prohibited from communicating with the jurors.30
However, Morrow waived this claim of error by failing to object
in a timely fashion.
After answering the juror’s question, the bailiff
informed the trial judge as to what had occurred.
The trial
judge, in turn, notified both the Commonwealth’s Attorney and
counsel for Morrow.
Our review of the record shows that
or communicate with, them on any subject connected
with the trial, and not to do so themselves.
28
RCr 9.74 reads in full as follows:
No information requested by the jury or any
juror after the jury has retired for deliberation
shall be given except in open court in the presence
of the defendant (unless the defendant is being tried
in absentia) and the entire jury, and in the presence
of or after reasonable notice to counsel for the
parties.
29
KRS 29A.320(1) states in full as follows:
When the case is finally submitted to the jury,
they shall retire for deliberation. When they
retire, they shall be kept together in some
convenient place, under the charge of an officer,
until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged by
the court, subject to the Supreme Court rules
permitting them to separate temporarily at night and
for their meals. The officer having them under his
charge shall not allow any communications to be made
to them, nor make any himself, except to ask them if
they have agreed upon their verdict, unless by order
of the court; and he shall not, before their verdict
is rendered, communicate to any person the state of
their deliberations, or the verdict agreed upon.
30
See also Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 258, 266 (1999)(stating
that “[a]pproximately ten minutes after the jury began their deliberations, a
deputy sheriff entered the jury room for the purpose of delivering lunch
menus. A juror asked the deputy if there would be a separate sentencing
phase of the trial in the event Appellant was found guilty and the deputy
answered, ‘Yes.’ We agree with Appellant that this brief colloquy violated
RCr 9.68, RCr 9.70, RCr 9.74 and KRS 29A.320(1)”).
-18-
Morrow’s counsel specifically chose not to move for a mistrial
at that time.31
Such an election on the part of defense counsel
constituted a waiver of the error.
In Gabow v. Commonwealth,32 the Supreme Court discussed
an analogous situation in which there were allegations of
impropriety regarding the sequestration of the jurors.
The
Supreme Court stated that since counsel for the defendant was in
the courtroom at the time of the alleged improprieties and was
aware of what was transpiring, he waived “any impropriety with
respect to the custody of the jury” by failing to object at the
time.33
The Court further stated that raising the issue for the
first time in a post-judgment motion for a new trial was
insufficient to preserve the error for appellate review.34
Similarly, in the instant case, Morrow was aware of
the bailiff’s conduct prior to the rendering of the jury’s
verdict, but deliberately chose not to object or move for a
mistrial at that time.
Instead, Morrow raised the issue for the
first time in his post-judgment motion for a new trial.
31
Our review of the record shows that when the trial court, Commonwealth’s
Attorney, and defense counsel were discussing options regarding the bailiff’s
conduct, the jury announced that it had reached a verdict. According to the
record, defense counsel for Morrow stated that he wanted to “let it ride,”
meaning that he did not wish to move for a mistrial.
32
Ky., 34 S.W.3d 63, 73 (2000).
33
Id.
34
Id.
-19-
Accordingly, Morrow has waived this claim of error.
Morrow will
not be permitted to remain silent in the face of a known error,
speculate on a favorable result, and subsequently raise the
error in an untimely manner only after receiving an unfavorable
verdict.35
Based on the foregoing, the final judgment and
sentence of the Pulaski Circuit Court is affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
John R. Tarter
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Ken Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
35
See Fuller v. State, 365 So.2d 1010, 1012 (Ala.Ct.App. 1978)(holding that
an error involving improper communications between a bailiff and a juror
would not be considered in the absence of a timely objection at trial: “to
allow defendant to complain of error at a later time would give him the
opportunity to be aware of the error, but to remain silent, speculate on a
favorable verdict, and in the event of an unfavorable verdict to obtain
reversal on a ground which defendant deliberately chose not to raise by
exception taken at the appointed time”).
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