CARL ALLEN v. KENTUCKY HORSE RACING AUTHORITY, SUCCESSOR TO THE KENTUCKY RACING COMMISSION, C. FRANK SHOOP, FRANK L. JONES, JR., BERNARD J. HETTEL, SAM P. BOWIE, WAYNE E. CARLISLE, ALICE H. CHANDLER, LON E. FIELDS, SR., V. RICHARD B. KLEIN, BARBARA TWAY PARTLOW, NATHAN SHOLAR and ROBERT G. STALLINGS
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May 14, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000869-MR
CARL ALLEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-01432
KENTUCKY HORSE RACING AUTHORITY,
SUCCESSOR TO THE
KENTUCKY RACING COMMISSION,
C. FRANK SHOOP,
FRANK L. JONES, JR.,
BERNARD J. HETTEL,
SAM P. BOWIE,
WAYNE E. CARLISLE,
ALICE H. CHANDLER,
LON E. FIELDS, SR.,
V. L. FISHER, JR., M.D.,
RICHARD B. KLEIN,
BARBARA TWAY PARTLOW,
NATHAN SHOLAR and
ROBERT G. STALLINGS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Carl Allen appeals from an opinion and order
of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming a decision by the
Kentucky Racing Commission.1
The KHRA decision disqualified
Allen’s horse, CR Commando, as the winner of two races held in
October 1998 at The Red Mile racetrack in Lexington, Kentucky.
Due to the disqualification of the horse in the two races, Allen
was required to return the prize money he had collected and was
not allowed to share in its redistribution.
We affirm the
circuit court’s opinion and order.
The KHRA is an independent agency of state government
and has the duty to regulate the conduct of horse racing and
pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing in the Commonwealth.
KRS2 230.225(1).
See
One of the purposes of the horse racing
statutes is to give the KHRA “forceful control of horse racing
in the Commonwealth with plenary power to promulgate
administrative regulations prescribing conditions under which
all legitimate horse racing and wagering thereon is conducted in
the Commonwealth[.]”
Further, a purpose of the statutes is to
give the KHRA the power “to regulate and maintain horse racing
. . . free of any corrupt . . . or unprincipled horse racing
practices, and to regulate and maintain horse racing . . . so as
to dissipate any cloud of association with the undesirable and
maintain the appearance as well as the fact of complete honesty
1
The Kentucky Horse Racing Authority is the successor to the Kentucky Racing
Commission. All further references in this opinion to the Kentucky Racing
Commission will be made to its successor, the Kentucky Horse Racing Authority
(KHRA).
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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and integrity of horse racing in the Commonwealth.”
230.215(2).
KRS
The KHRA’s powers include the power to prescribe
“necessary and reasonable administrative regulations and
conditions under which horse racing at a horse race meeting
shall be conducted in this state[.]”
KRS 230.260(3).
See also
Kentucky State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 301
(1972).
Allen owned and trained CR Commando for purposes of
harness racing.
On October 2, 1998, CR Commando finished first
in Race Number 7 at The Red Mile, winning $59,480 in prize
money.
Five days later, on October 7, 1998, CR Commando
finished first in Race Number 3 at The Red Mile, winning
$54,762.50 in prize money.
Following both races, CR Commando
was given routine urine tests by KHRA officials to check for
See 811 KAR3 1:090, Section 1(2).
prohibited foreign substances.
Each urine sample was divided into primary and
secondary containers.
The two primary samples were sent to
Truesdail Laboratories, Inc., in Tustin, California, for
testing.
The secondary samples were saved and isolated by the
KHRA in a locked freezer.
See 811 KAR 1:090, Section 2(1)(d).
Truesdail discovered the presence of flunixin4 in CR Commando’s
urine taken from the primary containers associated with each of
3
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
4
Flunixin is an anti-inflammatory drug.
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the two races.
The presence of flunixin in the horse’s urine
constituted a violation of 811 KAR 1:090, Section 4(1).
After the primary urine sample from the first race
tested positive for flunixin, Allen was given the option of what
to do with the secondary sample taken after that race.
KAR 1:090, Section 2(2)(a).
See 811
He chose to have the secondary
sample sent to a different laboratory to test specifically for
the presence of flunixin in the urine.
That sample was sent to
Iowa State University, and its analysis also confirmed the
presence of flunixin in the horse’s urine.
Allen opted to have
the secondary sample from the second race sent to Truesdail for
a full set of tests.
Truesdail again found flunixin in the
urine.
The judges who presided over the races thereafter
reviewed the test results and listened to Allen’s arguments.
They ruled that Allen had violated the regulation and ordered
him to return the purse money won by CR Commando in each race
and to pay a fine of $250 for each violation.
Allen appealed
the decisions to the KHRA, which heard the case de novo.
KRS 230.320(3).
See
Following a hearing, a hearing officer
recommended that the judges’ decision be upheld.
The KHRA
adopted the recommendations in an order entered on September 12,
2001.
-4-
Following the KHRA’s issuance of the final order,
Allen appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court pursuant to KRS
230.330.
In an eight-page opinion and order, the circuit court
affirmed the KHRA’s decision.
Allen then appealed to this court
pursuant to KRS 13B.160.
KRS 230.330 states that “[a]ny licensee or any
applicant aggrieved by any final order of the commission may
appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court in accordance with KRS
Chapter 13B.”
KRS 13B.150(2) provides in relevant part that
“[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”
Also, that statute provides that the court may affirm or
reverse, in whole or in part, the final order of an
administrative agency and may remand the case for further
proceedings if it finds that the agency’s order was in violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions, was in excess of the
agency’s statutory authority, was not supported by substantial
evidence, was arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse
of discretion, was based on an ex parte communication which
substantially prejudiced the rights of any party and likely
affected the outcome of the hearing, was prejudiced by a failure
of the person conducting a proceeding to be disqualified
pursuant to KRS 13B.040(2), or was deficient as otherwise
provided by law.
KRS 13B.150(2).
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Further, “[a]ny aggrieved
party may appeal any final judgment of the Circuit Court under
this chapter to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.”
KRS 13B.160.
Allen’s first argument relates to alleged due process
violations in connection with the KHRA decision.
He argues that
the KHRA offered no proof that flunixin was ever administered to
CR Commando, that the evidence against him was “rendered
worthless by countless violations of chain of custody
standards,” that exculpatory evidence in his favor was
intentionally destroyed, and that the KHRA failed to meet its
burden of proof.
While Allen refers to these allegations as due
process violations, they basically relate to whether the KHRA
decision was arbitrary.
The three-part test for determining the arbitrariness
of an administrative agency decision concerns whether the
agency’s action was within the scope of its granted powers,
whether the agency provided procedural due process, and whether
the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
See
Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet v. Liberty Nat’l Bank of
Lexington, Ky. App., 858 S.W.2d 199, 201 (1993), citing American
Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and
Zoning Comm’n, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450 (1964).
If the decision of
the administrative agency fails to meet any of these standards,
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it must be considered to be arbitrary.
Liberty Nat’l, 858
S.W.2d at 201.
If the findings of fact of an administrative agency
are supported by substantial evidence of probative value, then
they are binding on the reviewing court.
See Kentucky
Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. Landmark Community Newspapers of
Kentucky, Inc., Ky., 91 S.W.3d 575, 578 (2002).
The agency’s
findings must be upheld if based on substantial evidence “even
though there exists evidence to the contrary in the record.”
Id.
Substantial evidence is defined as “evidence of substance
and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable [persons].”
Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp. v. Golightly, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (1998).
If the
administrative agency decision was not supported by substantial
evidence, then it was arbitrary or clearly erroneous.
Landmark
Cmty. Newspapers, 91 S.W.3d at 579, citing Danville-Boyle Co.
Planning and Zoning Comm’n v. Prall, Ky., 840 S.W.2d 205, 208
(1992).
If there was substantial evidence to support the
agency’s decision, it cannot be said to be arbitrary.
Landmark
Cmty. Newspaper, 91 S.W.3d at 579, quoting Taylor v. Coblin,
Ky., 461 S.W.2d 78, 80 (1970).
Furthermore, the KHRA is given
great latitude in evaluating the evidence and the credibility of
the witnesses appearing before it.
308.
-7-
See Fuller, 481 S.W.2d at
Allen first argues that there was no proof that
flunixin was ever administered to CR Commando.
In support of
this argument, he refers to the testimony of Dr. Stephen Barker,
Allen’s expert witness, who testified that when flunixin is
metabolized by the horse’s liver, it is excreted as a metabolite
which is detectable in the horse’s urine for up to 54 hours
after being administered.
Noting that no metabolites of
flunixin were found in the horse’s urine, Allen maintains that
there was no proof that flunixin was administered to the horse.
Allen has overlooked the testimony of Dr. Norman
Hester, technical director for Truesdail Laboratories.
While
Dr. Hester acknowledged that no metabolites of flunixin were
found in the urine, he did testify that flunixin itself was
present in the urine sample.
He also testified that the absence
of metabolite “would support a premise that the drug may have
been given immediately before the race.”
We agree with the
circuit court that this testimony was substantial evidence to
support the KHRA’s determination that there was flunixin in the
horse’s urine sample.
As a second due process violation, Allen maintains
that the evidence against him was “rendered worthless by
countless violations of chain of custody standards.”
He
maintains that the KHRA “must produce complete, unbroken chains
of custody for this evidence; if they cannot, the evidence is
-8-
inadmissible.”
Allen then set forth various incidents in
support of his claim that the chain of custody was broken.
In Mollette v. Kentucky Personnel Bd., Ky. App., 997
S.W.2d 492 (1999), this court held that “it is unnecessary to
establish a perfect chain of custody or to eliminate all
possibility of tampering or misidentification, so long as there
is persuasive evidence that ‘the reasonable probability is that
the evidence has not been altered in any material respect.’”
Id. at 495, citing United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528,
1532 (10th Cir. 1989).
The KHRA concluded that “[t]he evidence
regarding each individual shipment when viewed as a whole
supports the conclusion that CR Commando’s urine samples were
shipped to the designated laboratories and tested by them.
In
addition, the evidence admitted at the hearing supports the
conclusion that there was no tampering or attempt to tamper with
any of the shipments to the laboratories.”
Having reviewed that
evidence, we agree that the KHRA’s conclusion was supported by
substantial evidence.
The third due process violation alleged by Allen is
that Truesdail intentionally destroyed test results which would
have served as exculpatory evidence for him.
In Tamme v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 759 S.W.2d 51 (1988), the Kentucky Supreme
Court noted that the lost evidence must “possess an exculpatory
value that was apparent before it was destroyed.”
-9-
Id. at 54,
quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S. Ct.
2528, 2534, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984).
The urine samples taken
from the horse were tested three times by Truesdail for
flunixin.
Allen argues that the first two test results were
intentionally destroyed because they failed to show the presence
of any prohibitive substance.
However, the record does not
support his assertion.
When urine samples are received by Truesdail, it is
standard operating procedure for it to test the samples for a
wide variety of illegal substances.
If any of the samples test
positive for one or more of these substances, a more thorough
test is conducted to confirm the presence of that specific drug.
While the results of the initial test are kept by the lab, the
actual test plates themselves are destroyed because they are
rendered useless by time.
There is no evidence that Truesdail
purposefully destroyed the test plates so as to harm Allen.
Moreover, Allen has provided no evidence in support of his
assertion that the test plates which were destroyed were somehow
exculpatory in nature.
In short, we find no due process
violation due to the destruction of these samples.
The fourth due process violation alleged by Allen is
that the KHRA failed to meet its burden of proof.
The burden of
proof in administrative hearings is “by a preponderance of
evidence in the record.”
KRS 13B.090(7).
-10-
In support of his
argument, Allen maintains that the KHRA did not demonstrate that
he had ever administered flunixin to CR Commando because there
were no metabolites of the drug in the horse’s urine.
As we
have noted, Dr. Hester testified that flunixin was in the urine
sample and that the absence of metabolites would support the
premise that the drug had been administered immediately prior to
the race.
In short, there was substantial evidence to support
the conclusion that Allen had violated the regulation.
Allen’s next argument is that the “trainer
responsibility rule,” the regulation making the trainer the
“sole insurer” of the horse for any rules violations, including
the presence of prohibited medication, is unconstitutional.
He
maintains that it is impossible for trainers to comply with such
a “zero tolerance” regulation.
In support of his argument,
Allen cites a study by the Swedish University of Agricultural
Science which found that horses may become contaminated from
their environment, through no fault of the trainer or owner, by
touching surfaces, bedding, hay, and water that may have been in
contact with a horse that had received flunixin.
Allen further
argues that the regulations are unreasonable and
unconstitutional because compliance therewith is impossible.
811 KAR 1:090, Section 5, provides as follows:
If the post-race test or tests
prescribed in Section 1 of this
administrative regulation disclose the
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presence in a horse of a medication,
stimulant, sedative, depressant, local
anesthetic, or any foreign substance except
as provided by Sections 14 and 15 of this
administrative regulation, in any amount, it
shall be presumed that the substance was
administered by the person having control,
care, or custody of the horse.
811 KAR 1:090, Section 7, states as follows:
(1) A trainer shall be responsible at all
times for the condition of all horses
trained by him.
(2) A trainer shall not start a horse or
permit a horse in his custody to be started
if he knows, or if by the exercise of
reasonable care he might have known or have
cause to believe, that the horse has
received a medication, stimulant, sedative,
depressant, local anesthetic, or any foreign
substance except as provided by Sections 14
and 15 of this administrative regulation.
(3) A trainer shall guard or cause to be
guarded each horse trained by him in a
manner and for a period of time prior to
racing the horse necessary to prevent a
person not employed by or connected with the
owner or trainer from administering a
medication, stimulant, sedative, depressant,
local anesthetic, or any foreign substance.
“The test of the constitutionality of a statute is
whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary.”
Buford v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 942 S.W.2d 909, 911 (1997), citing Moore
v. Ward, Ky., 377 S.W.2d 881, 883 (1964).
“The statute will be
determined to be constitutionally valid if a reasonable,
legitimate public purpose for it exists, whether or not we agree
with its ‘wisdom or expediency.’”
-12-
Id., citing Walters v.
Bindner, Ky., 435 S.W.2d 464, 467 (1968).
While Allen’s
arguments relate to the constitutionality of administrative
regulations and not statutes, we conclude that the same
principles concerning constitutionality apply.
In upholding the constitutionality of the regulations,
the circuit court held that the “trainer responsibility rule”
was not arbitrary.
The court stated that the rule was “a
reasonable means to promote safety within the harness racing
industry.”
Further, the court stated that “[d]rug bans would be
futile if the regulation required direct evidence or proof of
intent before any punishment could be imposed.”
Allen has not cited any case from any jurisdiction
which holds that the “trainer responsibility rule” is
unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the KHRA has cited cases
from several jurisdictions upholding the constitutionality of
such a rule.
We agree that the rule is not unconstitutional.
In Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 189 P. 2d
17 (Cal. 1948), the California Supreme Court held that “it is
not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious to provide that the
trainer guarantee the condition of a horse running in a race
upon the results of which there is wagering.”
Id. at 23.
In
upholding the constitutionality of a rule similar to that in
Kentucky, the court held that the rule was “designed to afford
the wagering public a maximum of protection against race horses
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being stimulated or depressed by making the trainer the insurer
of the horse’s condition.
That the wagering public merits such
protection is evident from the magnitude of its patronage.”
Id.
at 21.
Similarly, in addressing the argument that actual
knowledge of the trainer should be shown and that any rule to
the contrary would be unconstitutional, the court in Fogt v.
Ohio State Racing Comm’n, 210 N.E. 2d 730 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965),
stated that “[h]orse racing, at its best, is difficult to
control, and would be practically impossible to regulate if
every governing rule and regulation was made dependent for
validity upon the knowledge or motives of the person charged
with a violation.”
Id. at 733.
The court went on to state as
follows:
[W]hen viewed in the light of its overall
purpose, the business to which it relates,
and the potential evil which it is designed
to prevent, we cannot say that the rule is
unreasonable. Manifestly, it would be
almost impossible to prove guilty knowledge
or intent in cases of this kind, and the
futility of prosecutions under a rule
requiring probative evidence of guilty
knowledge and intent would eventually leave
the public interest and welfare to the mercy
of the unscrupulous.
Id.
Finally, in Casse v. New York State Racing & Wagering
Bd., 517 N.E. 2d 1309 (N.Y. 1987), the New York court upheld the
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validity of the trainer responsibility rule and stated as
follows:
Moreover, the trainer responsibility rule is
a practical and effective means of promoting
these State interests -- both in deterring
violations and in enforcing sanctions. The
imposition of strict responsibility compels
trainers to exercise a high degree of
vigilance in guarding their horses and to
report any illicit use of drugs, medications
or other restricted substances by other
individuals having access to their horses.
Additionally, the rebuttable presumption of
responsibility facilitates the very
difficult enforcement of the restrictions on
the use of drugs and other substances in
horse racing. Indeed, it would be virtually
impossible to regulate the administering of
drugs to race horses if the trainers, the
individuals primarily responsible for the
care and condition of their horses, could
not be held accountable for the illicit
drugging of their horses or for the failure
either to safeguard their horses against
such drugging or to identify the person
actually at fault. It is not surprising,
therefore, that trainer responsibility rules
have been upheld, almost without exception,
in other jurisdictions.
Id. at 1312.
We agree with the statements set forth in these
cases from other jurisdictions, and we hold that the trainer
responsibility rule set forth in 811 KAR 1:090 is not
unconstitutional.
Allen next argues that the regulations, as applied to
him in this case, unconstitutionally subjected him to double
jeopardy.
He notes that he was found to have violated the
regulations on two separate occasions based on one occurrence.
-15-
He asserts that research indicates that flunixin present in the
horse on October 2, 1998, would likely still be present five
days later on October 7, 1998.
Allen states that “[t]wo charges
based on one occurrence is clearly a violation of the double
jeopardy principle recognized by Kentucky.”
This argument is without merit for three reasons.
First, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution “protects only against the imposition of
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.”
Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493, 139 L. Ed.
2d 450 (1997).
[Emphasis in original.]
Therefore, as the
administrative action in this case was civil in nature rather
than criminal, double jeopardy principles do not apply.
Second,
CR Commando had flunixin in his urine on two separate occasions
or races.
Therefore, there were two violations.
Third, urine
testing following the second date revealed an even higher amount
of flunixin than after the first date.
This evidence leads to
the conclusion that additional flunixin was likely administered
to the horse after the first race and before the second one.
Thus, there is strong evidence that flunixin was administered to
the horse on separate occasions prior to each race.
In short,
there was no double jeopardy violation.
Allen further argues that his rights to equal
protection of the law were violated because Truesdail did not
-16-
have a written set of standard operating procedures, because
thin layer chromatography “is notoriously unreliable and highly
variable,” because use of flunixin is allowed in thoroughbred
racing, and because the KHRA had no standard operating procedure
for urine collection.
The first, second, and fourth reasons
stated above go to the credibility to be given to the test
results.
Having reviewed the evidence and testimony, we
conclude that the test results were sufficiently credible so as
to warrant their admissibility.
Thus, we find no error in the
KHRA’s reliance on that evidence.
Allen’s final argument is that prohibiting flunixin in
harness racing but not in thoroughbred racing deprives him of
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law.
The circuit court identified the level of scrutiny for this
different treatment as the “rational basis test.”
In
Commonwealth v. Meyers, Ky. App., 8 S.W.3d 58 (1999), this court
stated that “[t]he appropriate standard of review is whether the
difference in treatment . . . rationally furthers a legitimate
state interest.”
Id. at 61, quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 10-11, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992).
Dr. Nancy Davis, veterinarian at the KHRA, testified
at the administrative hearing that harness racing and
thoroughbred racing are different industries.
She noted that a
harness horse doesn’t have the agility that a thoroughbred has
-17-
because the harness horse is hooked to a racing bike and is
unable to step sideways quickly in order to avoid an accident.
She also noted that a harness horse does not have the ability to
jump over a down horse due to being hooked to the bike.
Dr.
Davis concluded that the harness industry had to be careful that
it did not allow a sore horse or a lame horse to mask its pain
in a race because of the possibility of hurting other horses in
the field in the event of an accident.
She also opined that a
less than sound horse in a harness race is more likely to break
its gait and probably lose the race.
She stated that in
fairness to the betters on the race, there should be no masking
of lameness in a horse because lame horses will likely break
their gait and lose the race.
In Barry v. Barchi, 443, U.S. 55, 99 S. Ct. 2642, 61
L. Ed. 2d 365 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with
“whether the State’s prohibition of administrative stays pending
a hearing in the harness racing context without a like
prohibition in thoroughbred racing denies harness racing
trainers equal protection of the laws.”
443 U.S. at 67.
In
resolving the issue, the Court noted that the appellant therein
had not “demonstrated that the acute problems attending harness
racing also plague the thoroughbred racing industry.”
Id.
Further, the Court stated that the appellant had not shown that
the two industries should be regulated identically in all
-18-
respects or that “the legislative facts on which the
classification is apparently based could not reasonably be
conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.”
Id. at
67-68, quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111, 99 S. Ct.
939, 950 59 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1979).
The Court also stated that
the state did not have the burden of disproving the appellant’s
“bare assertions that thoroughbred and harness racing should be
treated identically.”
Id. at 68.
Based on Dr. Davis’s
testimony and the safety considerations which differ between
harness racing and thoroughbred racing, we conclude there is a
rational basis for treating the two industries differently in
this area of racing regulation.
Thus, we conclude that the
regulation does not violate principles of equal protection.
The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Henry E. Davis
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, KENTUCKY RACING
COMMISSION:
J. Bruce Miller
Louisville, Kentucky
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