T.S.B. v. S.B.
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RENDERED: JUNE 11, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000861-MR
T.S.B.1
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LEWIS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00226
v.
S.B.
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
T.S.B. has appealed, pro se, from an order of
the Lewis Circuit Court entered on February 22, 2003, which
denied his pro se motion seeking visitation with his minor
child.
Having concluded that the issue of whether T.S.B. had a
right to personally appear at the hearing regarding his motion
for visitation is not properly before this Court, but that the
trial court erred by failing to make the necessary factual
1
The parties will be referred to by initials to protect the interests of the
minor child.
findings in denying T.S.B.’s motion for visitation, we vacate
and remand for further proceedings.
T.S.B. and S.B. were married in Lewis County,
Kentucky, in January 1999, when both were approximately 20 years
of age.
On August 25, 1999, S.B. gave birth to the couple’s
only child, A.D.B.
Approximately one year later, in October
2000, the couple separated.
At some point prior to the
separation, T.S.B. allegedly raped S.B.’s sister, who was 13
years old at the time.
As a result of this incident, T.S.B. was
convicted of rape in the second degree,2 and is currently
incarcerated.3
On December 5, 2000, S.B. filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in the Lewis Circuit Court.
Among other
things, S.B. asked that she be awarded “sole care, custody, and
control” of A.D.B.
T.S.B. was eventually appointed a guardian
ad litem and filed a response to S.B.’s petition for dissolution
of marriage on May 31, 2001.
In his response, T.S.B. asked that
his parents and S.B. be awarded joint custody of A.D.B., and
that he be granted visitation rights.
On January 10, 2002, a hearing was held before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner regarding S.B.’s petition for
dissolution of marriage.
Although S.B. was present with her
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.050.
3
The term of T.S.B.’s sentence is not clear from the record.
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attorney at this hearing, T.S.B. was not in attendance due to
the fact that he had already begun serving his prison sentence
in LaGrange, Kentucky.
However, T.S.B. was represented at the
hearing by his guardian ad litem.
In addition, on February 6,
2002, T.S.B. testified via deposition from prison regarding the
pending matters in the couple’s dissolution proceedings.
Following the hearing and the taking of T.S.B.’s
deposition, the Commissioner filed recommended findings of fact
and conclusions of law on November 8, 2002.
The Commissioner
recommended, inter alia, that S.B. be awarded sole custody of
A.D.B., and that T.S.B. have no visitation with A.D.B. during
his period of incarceration.
T.S.B. filed objections to the
Commissioner’s recommendations on November 12, 2002.
T.S.B.
argued that he was “a fit and proper person to have joint
custody” of A.D.B., and that his visitation rights should not be
denied.
On November 21, 2002, T.S.B. filed a pro se motion for
visitation.
On December 9, 2002, the trial court entered an order
overruling T.S.B.’s objections to the Commissioner’s
recommendations.
One week later, on December 16, 2002, the
trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
decree of dissolution of marriage.
In addition to dissolving
the marriage between T.S.B. and S.B., the trial court awarded
S.B. sole custody of A.D.B.
The trial court also denied
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T.S.B.’s request for visitation on grounds that “[f]orcing a
minor child to visit with [T.S.B.] at his place of incarceration
would prove harmful to [A.D.B.’s] physical, emotional, mental
and spiritual well-being.”
On January 30, 2003, T.S.B. filed another pro se
motion for visitation, which was in large part identical to his
previous motion.
On February 22, 2003, the trial court entered
an order denying T.S.B.’s motion:
[The trial court] has reviewed the case
law and factual arguments proposed by
[T.S.B.] in his [m]otion and remains
convinced that forcing a child of such
tender years, age [three], to visit with a
parent she has barely known in a restrictive
environment of a medium level security
prison would impose harm upon the child’s
emotional and mental well-being and would
pose an undue hardship on the custodial
parent. Thus, the [c]ourt declines to force
visitation between [T.S.B.] and the minor
child at the current time.
On March 10, 2003, T.S.B. filed a pro se motion for
reconsideration, wherein he again asked for visitation with
A.D.B., and asserted for the first time that the trial court had
erred by denying his previous motions without first conducting a
hearing.
On March 28, 2003, the trial court entered an order
denying T.S.B.’s motion for reconsideration.
The trial court
once again found that “requiring visitation in a prison
environment with a parent with whom the young child has had
little to no contact would prove detrimental to the child’s
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emotional, physical, mental and spiritual well-being.”
In
addition, the trial court determined that since T.S.B. had
testified via deposition regarding the pending matters in the
dissolution proceedings, the hearing requirement had been
satisfied.
This appeal followed.
T.S.B. raises two claims of error on appeal.
First,
he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for
visitation without first conducting a hearing.
T.S.B. claims
that this alleged error denied him due process of law.
We
disagree.
We first note that T.S.B. is simply incorrect in his
assertion that the trial court failed to conduct a hearing with
respect to the issue of visitation.
The record shows that a
hearing before the Domestic Relations Commissioner was conducted
on January 10, 2002.
At this hearing, evidence was presented
concerning all of the relevant issues related to the dissolution
proceedings, including the issue of T.S.B.’s request for
visitation.
Accordingly, T.S.B.’s claim that the trial court
erred by failing to conduct a hearing regarding his motion for
visitation is clearly without merit.
In a related argument, T.S.B. appears to argue that he
had a right to personally attend the hearing held before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner.
However, this issue is not
properly before this Court on appeal.
-5-
In Alexander v.
Alexander,4 this Court held that where an incarcerated father had
failed to request that the trial court make arrangements for his
personal attendance at a hearing to consider his motion for
visitation, the question of whether the father had a right to
personally attend such a hearing was not properly presented to
the Court on appeal:
Although appellant is entitled to a
hearing, the question of whether he has the
right to attend the hearing is not properly
presented to this court. Appellant mentions
in his brief that he has transportation
available to a hearing should he be so
entitled; there is no assertion, nor
authority cited, however, which would
support his right to attend. And, he has
not named as parties the warden or any other
custodian who could be ordered to provide
transportation. Moreover, the record
reveals that the only request for
transportation made before the trial court
was to a November 1990, custody hearing. As
a result of the failure to properly present
the issue to this court, we decline to
decide whether an inmate has a right to
attend a visitation or custody hearing. It
is sufficient to state that this appellant
does not [citation omitted].
Similarly, in the case sub judice, the record shows
that T.S.B. was served with notice through his guardian ad litem
that a hearing before the Domestic Relations Commissioner would
be held on January 10, 2002, during which time “all issues
related to the parties’ divorce” were to be considered.
However, there is no evidence in the record indicating that
4
Ky.App., 900 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1995).
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T.S.B. took any affirmative steps with the trial court to secure
his presence at this hearing.
Therefore, the issue of whether
T.S.B. had a right to personally attend the January 10, 2002,
hearing is not properly before this Court.5
Regardless of this procedural defect, however, we note
that T.S.B. was represented at the January 10, 2002, hearing by
his court-appointed guardian ad litem, who, as the record shows,
was given an opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses on
T.S.B.’s behalf.
Further, T.S.B. was afforded an opportunity to
testify via deposition regarding any issues related to the
dissolution proceedings.
Therefore, under the facts of the case
at bar, we reject T.S.B.’s claim that he was denied due process
of law.6
T.S.B. next argues that in denying his motion for
visitation, the trial court erred by failing to make specific
factual findings that T.S.B.’s visitation with A.D.B. would
“seriously endanger” A.D.B.’s “physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health.”
We agree.
5
See also Hall v. Arnett by Greene, Ky.App., 709 S.W.2d 850, 853
(1986)(stating that issues not raised before the trial court will not be
considered on appeal).
6
See Alexander, 990 S.W.2d at 617 (Howerton, J., concurring)(stating that
“[i]t is simply not essential that a party be present at every civil hearing.
There are times when, for economic, distance, time, logistical, or
psychological reasons, etc., a party may be ‘present’ by deposition or
counsel, or not at all. Larry Alexander has a right to notice of the
[hearing regarding his motion for visitation], but he has no right to be
taken from the prison and transported under guard at the expense and
inconvenience of the State”).
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“[T]his Court will only reverse a trial court’s
determinations as to visitation if they constitute a manifest
abuse of discretion, or were clearly erroneous in light of the
facts and circumstances of the case.”7
Pursuant to KRS
403.320(1), “[a] parent not granted custody of the child is
entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds,
after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously the
child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health [emphasis
added].”
In the instant case, we hold that in denying T.S.B.’s
motions for visitation, the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to make the required specific factual findings.
As we mentioned previously, the trial court on three
occasions denied T.S.B.’s requests for visitation on grounds
that “forcing” A.D.B. to visit T.S.B. in a prison setting would
either “harm” or would be a “detriment” to A.D.B.’s “emotional,
physical, mental and spiritual well-being.”8
Simply stated,
these factual findings fall short of meeting the serious
endangerment standard as contemplated by KRS 403.320(1).
This
is especially true in light of this Court’s decision in Smith v.
Smith,9 where it was stated that a parent’s “status as an inmate
7
Drury v. Drury, Ky.App, 32 S.W.3d 521, 525 (2000).
8
Although the trial court also found that granting T.S.B. visitation would
place an “undue hardship” on S.B., our reading of the trial court’s orders
shows that its principal reason for denying T.S.B.’s motions for visitation
was his status as an inmate.
9
Ky.App., 869 S.W.2d 55, 57 (1994).
-8-
in a penal institution alone does not make visitation with his
child inappropriate.”
As our Supreme Court noted in Reichle v. Reichle,10
when a trial court is called upon to apply statutory standards
in child custody disputes, it is “particularly important” for
the trial court to make specific findings of fact “so that a
reviewing court may readily understand the trial court’s view of
the controversy.”
This reasoning applies with equal force when
a trial court is asked to determine visitation issues under KRS
403.320.
Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order denying
T.S.B.’s motion for visitation, and remand this matter with
instructions to make specific factual findings based upon the
evidence of record.
After making the necessary factual
findings, the trial court should then rule on T.S.B.’s motion
for visitation.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Lewis Circuit
Court is vacated and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I concur with the
majority opinion but desire to state my views separately.
As
noted by the majority, KRS 403.320(1) requires that a parent not
10
Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986).
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granted custody of his or her child is entitled to reasonable
visitation rights unless the court finds “that visitation would
endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health.”
The trial court determined that the child’s
emotional and mental well-being would be harmed by ordering
visitation in light of the child’s young age, the fact that she
has barely known the appellant, and the fact that visitation
would occur in a prison.
The majority concluded that the
factual determinations made by the trial court fell short of
meeting the serious endangerment standard.
I believe these
facts are sufficient evidence to meet a finding of serious
endangerment.
However, I agree with the majority that the trial
court did not make such a finding as required by the statute.
Therefore, I agree that the order must be vacated and the case
remanded to the trial court for more specific findings.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
T.S.B., Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Elizabeth Opell Thomas
Ashland, Kentucky
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