CYNTHIA DAVIS-JOHNSON, ON BEHALF OF SON, RYAN B. DAVIS v. CHARLES W. PARMELEE III AND HONORABLE JOSEPH W. O'REILLY, JUDGE, JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
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RENDERED: May 14, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000848-MR
CYNTHIA DAVIS-JOHNSON,
ON BEHALF OF SON,
RYAN B. DAVIS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-006089
v.
CHARLES W. PARMELEE III
AND
HONORABLE JOSEPH W. O’REILLY,
JUDGE, JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGES.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM, AND VANMETER,
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Cynthia Davis-Johnson appeals from an
opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on
April 2, 2003.
The order granted Charles W. Parmelee III, the
father of Cynthia’s son Ryan, a writ of prohibition and set
aside an order of the Jefferson Family Court that had granted
Cynthia the right to proceed with a motion to establish child
support.
The question on appeal is whether the circuit court
erred in deciding that Cynthia’s motion to establish child
support pursuant to KRS1 407.5201 is barred under the “law of the
case” doctrine.
We conclude that Cynthia’s motion is so barred
and thus affirm.
In 1983, Cynthia and Charles, who were never married,
were domiciled in Kentucky where they had a child together.
Charles left Kentucky before the birth of the child and went to
Texas.
He subsequently moved to Florida.
Cynthia and the child
also left Kentucky and now reside in Michigan.
In 1995, Cynthia filed a civil complaint in Jefferson
Family Court, seeking to adjudicate Ryan’s paternity and to
obtain support.
A conflict developed over whether the family
court had long-arm jurisdiction over Charles.
The family court
dismissed Cynthia’s action on the grounds that, under KRS
454.220, an action for support against a nonresident such as
Charles had to be filed within one year of his moving his
domicile from the state of Kentucky.
Cynthia appealed unsuccessfully to the Jefferson
Circuit Court, arguing that the family court had jurisdiction
over Charles pursuant to KRS 454.210, the general long-arm
statute.
This court accepted discretionary review, and on
October 1, 1999, entered an opinion concluding that the family
court did have jurisdiction over Charles solely for the purpose
of establishing paternity, but not for adjudicating support.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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See Davis-Johnson v. Parmelee, Ky. App., 18 S.W.3d 347 (1999).
On June 7, 2000, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied Charles’s
request for discretionary review.
On December 11, 2001, the family court entered a
judgment of paternity, finding Charles to be the father of Ryan.
Then, on January 28, 2002, Cynthia moved the family court to set
a hearing to determine support, asserting that the court had
jurisdiction pursuant to KRS 407.5201.
Charles appeared and objected to Cynthia’s motion,
arguing that under the “law of the case” doctrine the family
court was bound by this court’s holding in our 1999 opinion
regarding the unavailability of that court as a forum to
adjudicate support.
The family court disagreed, deciding that
the 1999 opinion did not preclude the exercise of its
jurisdiction to determine support pursuant to KRS 407.5201.
Charles thereafter filed a Petition for Writ of
Prohibition as well as motions for injunctive relief in the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
The circuit court granted an
injunction to stay the proceedings and, in an Opinion and Order
dated April 2, 2003, it granted the writ of prohibition on the
grounds that “the law of the case doctrine must control and
preclude any support award by the Jefferson Family Court.”
appeal by Cynthia followed.
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This
The “law of the case” doctrine stands for the
principle “that a final decision, whether right or wrong, is the
law of the case and is conclusive of the questions therein
resolved and is binding upon the parties, the trial court, and
the Court of Appeals.”
Hogan v. Long, Ky., 922 S.W.2d 368, 370
(1995) citing Martin v. Frasure, Ky., 352 S.W.2d 817 (1961).
Hence, “it is the duty of the lower court, on the remand of the
cause, to comply with the mandate of the appellate court and to
Preece v. Woolford, 200 Ky. 604,
obey the directions therein."
255 S.W. 285, 286 (1923)(citations omitted).
“No new defense
may be entertained or heard in opposition to rendering a
judgment in accordance with the mandate.”
City of Lexington v.
Garner, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 54, 55 (1959)(citations omitted).
Furthermore, “the Court of Appeals has no power on a second
appeal to correct an error in the original judgment which either
was, or might have been relied upon in the first appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Schaefer, Ky., 639 S.W.2d 776, 777 (1982).
The “law of the case” in the 1999 opinion was
generated by this court’s interpretation of three statutes (KRS
406.031, KRS 454.210, and KRS 454.220) to determine whether the
family court could exercise jurisdiction over Charles for the
purposes of adjudicating paternity and child support.
KRS
406.031 provides for an 18-year statute of limitations for the
determination of paternity.
KRS 454.210(2)(a)(8), the general
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long-arm statute, provides that a nonresident may be subject to
a paternity action in Kentucky if the child was conceived in
Kentucky under certain conditions.
Finally, KRS 454.220
requires a party seeking support from a nonresident to bring the
cause of action within one year of the date the respondent
departed the state.
Charles had argued that Cynthia’s action
for paternity and support was completely barred by KRS 454.220
because she had brought the action later than one year after he
had left Kentucky.
The 1999 opinion held that the general long-arm
statute provided for an adjudication of paternity under the 18year limitation set in KRS 406.031, whereas the one-year
limitation in 454.220 barred the support action.
The 1999
opinion stated in pertinent part:
Although we believe KRS 454.210(2)(a)(8)
amply confers personal jurisdiction
regarding a filiation action, it is our
opinion, under the specific facts of this
case, that paternity, absent support, is all
the statute permits to be adjudicated.
Should paternity be affirmatively
established, then Cynthia is entitled to
move the court for an award of support.
However, this action would be governed by
KRS 454.220 as it is undeniably a “family
court proceeding involving a demand for
support . . . [and] shall be filed within
one (1) year of the date the respondent or
defendant became a nonresident of, or moved
his domicile from, this state.” KRS
454.220. As Cynthia failed to meet the
requisite statute of limitations, she is
foreclosed from pursuing a claim for support
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in Kentucky’s courts. In this vein, should
Cynthia prevail in the filiation matter, we
believe she can readily pursue a support
action in another forum vis a vis the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.
In accordance with the foregoing, the
decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
reversed and remanded with instructions to
enter an order permitting the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over appellee for the
sole purpose of conducting a paternity
determination. Personal jurisdiction is
authorized pursuant to KRS
454.210(2)(a)(8)(a) or (b).
Davis-Johnson, 18 S.W.3d at 352-53.
Cynthia is now claiming that, notwithstanding the 1999
opinion, the family court has jurisdiction to entertain her
motion for child support under KRS 407.5201.
That statute was
enacted in 1998 under Congressional direction as part of the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act(UIFSA).
It states in
pertinent part:
In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or
modify a support order or to determine
parentage, a tribunal of this state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident individual or the individual’s
guardian or conservator if:
(6) The individual engaged in sexual
intercourse in this state and the child may
have been conceived by that act of
intercourse; . . .[.]”
KRS 407.5201.
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The family court agreed with Cynthia that the law of
the case established in the 1999 opinion did not bar her action
for child support.
It reasoned that the 1999 opinion did not
apply or make any reference to KRS 407.5201 apart from the
reference to the UIFSA and that, in fact, KRS 407.5201 did not
exist when the initial decision was rendered and when the
original appellate issues were framed.
On these grounds, the
family court held that it could exercise jurisdiction over
Cynthia’s support action because it presented a question of law
and fact that had not been considered by this court in the 1999
opinion.
The Jefferson Circuit Court, in its opinion granting
the writ to prohibit the family court from proceeding with the
child support action, maintained that the 1999 opinion had
clearly decided that paternity was the only issue that could be
adjudicated and that the lower courts were bound by this ruling.
The circuit court also noted that this court was well aware of
UIFSA at the time it rendered its decision since KRS 407.5201
became effective in March 1998 and the 1999 opinion was rendered
on August 27, 1999.
We agree with the circuit court.
Although the 1999
opinion does not explicitly mention KRS 407.5201, the directive
from this court is unequivocal: the family court may only
adjudicate paternity, whereas a support action is barred.
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The
issue of support raised in this action is the same issue that
was resolved in the 1999 opinion.
Furthermore, there is no
indication that the panel of this court that rendered the 1999
opinion was unaware of the implications of the UIFSA.
Therefore, issue of support is precluded from further
consideration under the law of the case doctrine.
The last issued raised by Cynthia is that Charles was
not entitled to a writ of prohibition based upon a dispute over
jurisdiction.
She notes that the primary requirement for
granting a writ of prohibition is that the petitioner has no
adequate remedy upon appeal.
S.W.3d 861, 865 (2001).
See Ignatow v. Ryan, Ky., 40
The circuit court rejected Cynthia’s
argument, citing Chamblee v. Rose, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 775 (1952).
In the Chamblee case the court distinguished between
cases where the lower court lacks jurisdiction and cases where
the lower court has jurisdiction but is proceeding erroneously.
Id. at 776-77.
The court therein noted that “the remedy by way
of appeal is not the controlling consideration where the
inferior court is without jurisdiction.”
Id. at 777.
Further,
the court in that case concluded that if the lower court lacked
jurisdiction, then “it would be a most inept ruling to deny the
writ, require a trial on the merits, and then on appeal be
forced to reverse the case on the very question which is now
before us.”
Id.
The court then stated that if the lower court
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lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, then
the petitioner would be entitled to the writ of prohibition.
Id.
In the prior Davis-Johnson case, a panel of this court
reversed the circuit court and remanded the case with
instructions to permit “the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over appellee for the sole purpose of conducting a paternity
determination.”
As we have previously determined herein, the
law of the case doctrine precludes jurisdiction over Charles for
the purpose of setting child support.
Therefore, were the
family court to proceed to exercise jurisdiction over Charles
and render a support order, it would be acting without
jurisdiction.
In short, pursuant to the principles in the
Chamblee case, the circuit court did not err in granting a writ
of prohibition in Charles’s favor.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rocco J. Celebrezze
Louisville, Kentucky
Mike Kelly
Louisville, Kentucky
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