AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY v. SASAN SHAFAGHI; AND NURDAN SHAFAGHI
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
October 22, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000792-MR
AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-02647
SASAN SHAFAGHI; AND
NURDAN SHAFAGHI
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; AND MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
American National Property and Causality
Company (ANPACC) has appealed from the trial order, verdict and
judgment entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on February 7,
2003, which, following a jury trial, awarded the appellees,
Sasan and Nurdan Shafaghi, $127,500.00 in damages on their
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
breach of contract claim against ANPACC and $51,000.00 in
attorneys’ fees pursuant to KRS2 367.220(3).
Having concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s award,
and sufficient to support the jury’s finding that ANPACC acted
“in an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive manner” when
handling the Shafaghis’ claim, we affirm.
On February 4, 2000, the Shafaghis’ home, which is
located in Lexington, Fayette County, Kentucky, was severely
damaged by fire.
As a result of the damage caused by the fire,
the Shafaghis were forced to relocate.
On February 5, 2000, the
Shafaghis reported the incident to their insurance carrier,
ANPACC.
On February 7, 2000, an adjusting agent from ANPACC,
Clark Short, met with the Shafaghis and inspected their home.
Shortly thereafter, Short contacted First General Services, a
restoration company, to seek an estimate of the cost to repair
the damage caused by the fire.
On February 22, 2000, Rick
Garrison, an estimator employed by First General, submitted a
bid estimating that it would cost $74,056.33 to repair the
damage to the Shafaghis’ home caused by the fire.
On February
23, 2000, the Shafaghis entered into a written contract with
First General, whereby they agreed to pay First General
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-
$74,056.33 to repair their home.3
In the months that followed, a dispute arose between
the Shafaghis and ANPACC which primarily concerned the extent of
the repair work.
The dispute involved the Shafaghis’ demand for
the replacement of all of the siding and brick on their home,
and the extent of the repairs necessary to restore the roof.
The disputed items were not covered in the $74,056.33 figure
agreed to between the Shafaghis and First General.
The
Shafaghis and ANPACC were unable to reach an amicable resolution
concerning the extent of the repair work necessary to restore
the Shafaghis’ home to its condition before the fire.
In April
2000 First General stopped work on the house.4
Between March, 7, 2000, and May 16, 2000, ANPACC
issued several checks to the Shafaghis and their mortgage
company totaling $63,390.77, which it claimed represented the
“actual cash value” of the damage to their home.5
Between
February 7, 2000, and July 7, 2000, ANPACC also paid the
Shafaghis $25,282.48 for “personal property loss” and $14,112.07
for “additional living expenses” resulting from the fire.
3
Pursuant to the contract, the Shafaghis were required to pay First General
directly for the cost to repair their home.
4
The record is unclear as to the extent of the work performed by First
General prior to the time it ceased working on the house in April 2000.
5
Pursuant to the Shafaghis’ insurance policy with ANPACC, “actual cash
value” is defined as “the amount it would currently cost to repair or replace
the covered property with new material of like kind and quality, less
allowance for physical deterioration and depreciation, including
obsolescence.”
-3-
ANPACC informed the Shafaghis that any additional costs
necessary to repair their home would be governed by the
“replacement cost” provision contained in their insurance
policy, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1)
We will pay the cost of repair or
replacement without deduction for
depreciation, but not exceeding the
smaller of the following amounts:
(a)
(b)
the replacement cost of that
part of the building damaged for
equivalent construction and use
on the same premises;
(c)
the amount actually and
necessarily spent to repair or
replace the damaged building; or
(d)
(2)
the limit of liability under
this policy applying to the
building;
the replacement cost of your home
or any part as described in [the]
. . . [d]escription of [y]our
[h]ouse [emphasis original].
We will pay the actual cash value of
the damage not to exceed the
applicable limit of liability, until
actual repair or replacement is
completed [emphasis added].
In sum, ANPACC maintained that it was not required to pay for
any replacement costs “until such time as the repairs were
completed.”
On July 18, 2000, the Shafaghis filed a complaint
against ANPACC, in which they alleged, inter alia, breach of
-4-
contract and violations of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act6
and the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.7
On
September 1, 2000, ANPACC filed an answer, in which it denied
the allegations set forth in the Shafaghis’ complaint.
In early 2001 while their case against ANPACC was
pending in the Fayette Circuit Court, the Shafaghis contacted
Jeff Wolfe, a restoration contractor, to seek another estimate
for the cost of the repair work necessary to restore their home.
After inspecting the residence, Wolfe submitted a bid estimating
that it would cost $59,523.92 to repair the damage caused by the
fire.
On April 20, 2001, the Shafaghis authorized Wolfe to
begin making the necessary repairs to their home.
Wolfe
subsequently submitted several change orders which brought the
total estimate for the repairs to $106,612.73.8
the repair work in June 2001.
Wolfe started
As of July 31, 2001, Wolfe had
received payment for services rendered in the amount of
$49,370.88.
On August 30, 2001, Wolfe sent the Shafaghis an
invoice totaling $23,728.74.
Wolfe was not paid for this
invoice, and in September 2001 he ceased working on the house
and filed a lien against the Shafaghis’ residence.
6
KRS 367.110 et seq.
7
KRS 304.12-230 et seq.
8
The Shafaghis authorized the change orders.
-5-
In January 2003 after a great deal of procedural
maneuvering between the parties, the Shafaghis’ case was tried
before a Fayette County jury.
After hearing several days of
testimony concerning the extent of the damage caused by the fire
and the cost of the repair work necessary to restore the
Shafaghis’ home to its condition before the fire, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the Shafaghis.9
In sum, the jury
awarded the Shafaghis $127,500.00 on their breach of contract
claim against ANPACC.10
According to the verdict, $49,000.00 of
this amount represented the cost of repairing the damage caused
by the fire to the Shafaghis’ home; $8,500.00 represented
additional living expenses the Shafaghis incurred as a result of
the fire; and $70,000.00 represented the cost of replacing the
personal property damaged by the fire.11
On January 27, 2003, the Shafaghis requested an award
of attorneys’ fees pursuant to KRS 367.220(3), which provides
for the allowance of attorneys’ fees and costs arising from a
successful prosecution for a violation of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act.
9
On February 7, 2003, the trial court entered a
ANPACC moved for a directed verdict, which was denied.
10
The jury also found the ANPACC had acted
or deceptive manner” when dealing with the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act. See KRS
award any punitive damages with respect to
Act claim.
11
“in an unfair, false, misleading,
Shafaghis in violation of the
367.110 et seq. The jury did not
the Shafaghis’ Consumer Protection
These amounts were in addition to the amounts ANPACC had already paid to
the Shafaghis under the policy.
-6-
trial order, verdict and judgment confirming the jury’s award.12
In addition, the trial court awarded the Shafaghis $51,000.00 in
attorneys’ fees.
On February 19, 2003, ANPACC filed a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for a new
trial, and a motion to alter, amend, or vacate judgment.
On
March 25, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying
ANPACC’s various post-trial motions.
This appeal followed.
ANPACC raises several issues on appeal.
In sum,
ANPACC contends (1) it was not required to pay for any
“replacement costs” related to the damage caused by the fire
“until actual repair or replacement [was] completed;” (2) the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the
jury’s determination that the Shafaghis were entitled to an
award of $49,000.00 for the cost of repairing the damage to
their home caused by the fire; (3) the damages awarded by the
jury were speculative and excessive; (4) the evidence presented
at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s award of
$8,500.00 for additional living expenses; and (5) the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s
finding that ANPACC acted “in an unfair, false, misleading, or
deceptive manner” when handling the Shafaghis’ claim.
ANPACC’s contention that it was not required to pay
for any “replacement costs” related to the damage caused by the
12
The trial court also awarded the Shafaghis $566.90 in court costs.
-7-
fire “until actual repair or replacement was completed” ignores
the disputed fact concerning the need to replace all the siding
and brick because appropriate matches could not be made.
In
sum, ANPACC contends that under the terms of the policy it was
only required to pay the “actual cash value” of the damage
caused by the fire until the repair work was completed.
ANPACC
maintains that it paid the Shafaghis the “actual cash value” of
the damage to their home.13
However, the Shafaghis’ breach of
contract claim was based in part on their contention that the
amount ANPACC tendered as the “actual cash value,” $63,390.77,
did not represent the true value of the “cost to repair or
replace [the damage caused by the fire] with new material of
like kind and quality, less allowance for physical deterioration
and depreciation, including obsolescence.”
In awarding the
Shafaghis the additional $49,000.00, the jury found that the
Shafaghis “replaced or reasonably contracted to replace the
damage resulting directly from the fire loss,” and that the
additional $49,000.00 would “fairly and reasonably compensate
them for the cost of repairing or replacing the damage to the
house caused by the fire[.]”
13
As previously discussed, between March, 7, 2000, and May 16, 2000, ANPACC
issued several checks to the Shafaghis and their mortgage company totaling
$63,390.77, which it claimed represented the “actual cash value” of the
damage to their home.
-8-
ANPACC further contends that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support the jury’s determination that
the Shafaghis were entitled to an award of $49,000.00 for the
cost of repairing the damage to their home caused by the fire.
ANPACC is essentially arguing that the trial court erred by
failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict with respect
to this issue.
In Bierman v. Klapheke,14 our Supreme Court
explained the standard for appellate courts to follow when
reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for directed
verdict in a civil case:
In reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence, the appellate court must respect
the opinion of the trial judge who heard the
evidence. A reviewing court is rarely in as
good a position as the trial judge who
presided over the initial trial to decide
whether a jury can properly consider the
evidence presented. Generally, a trial
judge cannot enter a directed verdict unless
there is a complete absence of proof on a
material issue or if no disputed issues of
fact exist upon which reasonable minds could
differ. Where there is conflicting
evidence, it is the responsibility of the
jury to determine and resolve such
conflicts, as well as matters affecting the
credibility of witnesses. . . . The
reviewing court, upon completion of a
consideration of the evidence, must
determine whether the jury verdict was
flagrantly against the evidence so as to
indicate that it was reached as a result of
passion or prejudice. If it was not, the
jury verdict should be upheld.15
14
Ky., 967 S.W.2d 16 (1998).
15
Id. at 18-19.
-9-
Wolfe testified at trial that it would cost from
$40,000.00 to $50,000.00 to repair the remaining damage to the
Shafaghis’ home caused by the fire.
Wolfe stated that this
amount was in addition to the $23,728.74 the Shafaghis still
owed on the invoice he submitted on August 30, 2001.
While
ANPACC introduced testimony contradicting Wolfe’s assessment as
to the extent of the damage caused by the fire, we cannot
conclude that the jury’s verdict was “flagrantly against the
evidence so as to indicate that it was reached as a result of
passion or prejudice.”16
“[Q]uestions of credibility and weight
of the evidence are jury matters.”17
ANPACC next contends that the damages awarded by the
jury were speculative and excessive.18
ANPACC raised this issue
in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, its
motion for a new trial, and its motion to alter, amend, or
vacate judgment, which the trial court denied.
In Davis v.
Graviss,19 our Supreme Court explained the test for a trial court
16
Id. at 19.
17
Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191, 193 (1997).
18
ANPACC does not specify which portion of the jury’s award it considers
speculative and excessive. Thus, we will assume that ANPACC is arguing that
the entire award was speculative and excessive.
19
Ky., 672 S.W.2d 928 (1984). Davis was overruled on other grounds by Sand
Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Ky., 83 S.W.3d 483, 493-95 (2002). Sand
Hill was subsequently vacated by Ford Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith, 538 U.S.
1028, 123 S.Ct. 2072, 155 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2003).
-10-
to follow when reviewing an award of actual damages20 for
excessiveness or inadequacy:
When presented with a motion for new trial
on grounds of excessive damages, the trial
court is charged with the responsibility of
deciding whether the jury’s award appears
“to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice or in disregard of the
evidence or the instructions of the court.”
[Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure] CR
59.01(d).
This is a discretionary function assigned to
the trial judge who has heard the witnesses
firsthand and viewed their demeanor and who
has observed the jury throughout the trial.21
The Court went on to state the appropriate standard
for an appellate court to follow when reviewing a trial court’s
ruling on the issue of excessive or inadequate damages:
“Upon reviewing the action of a trial judge
in (granting or denying a new trial for
excessiveness), the appellate court no
longer steps into the shoes of the trial
court to inspect the actions of the jury
from his perspective. Now, the appellate
court reviews only the actions of the trial
judge . . . to determine if his actions
constituted an error of law. There is no
error of law unless the trial judge is said
to have abused his discretion and thereby
rendered his decision clearly erroneous.”22
20
It is important to note that the jury in this case did not award any
punitive damages against ANPACC.
21
Davis, 672 S.W.2d at 932.
601 (2001).
See also Miller v. Swift, Ky., 42 S.W.3d 599,
22
Davis at 932 (quoting Prater v. Arnett, Ky.App., 648 S.W.2d 82, 86 (1983).
See also Burgess v. Taylor, Ky.App., 44 S.W.3d 806, 813 (2001)).
-11-
After a thorough review of the record, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
ANPACC’s motion for a new trial with respect to the issue of
damages.
We now turn to ANPACC’s assertion that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s award
of $8,500.00 for additional living expenses.
In sum, ANPACC
maintains that the Shafaghis had a duty to mitigate any damages
for loss of use “by acting with due diligence to repair their
property.”
Since we have concluded that the jury’s award for
the repairs to the house was supported by the evidence, it also
follows that the Shafaghis were entitled to reasonable living
expenses for a delay caused by ANPACC.
Thus, we cannot conclude
that the jury’s award of $8,500.00 for additional living
expenses was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence.
In closing, ANPACC contends the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s finding that ANPACC acted “in
an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive manner” when handling
the Shafaghis’ claim.
In sum, ANPACC asserts that “[t]he
Shafaghis presented no credible, substantive or probative
evidence at trial which would remotely support a finding of bad
faith[.]”23
We disagree.
23
We note that the claim submitted to the jury was for a violation the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act not the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act.
-12-
KRS 367.220(1) authorizes “[a]ny person who purchases
or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or
household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of
money or property . . . as a result of . . . a method, act or
practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170[.]” to bring an action
for violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.
It has
been held that purchasing an insurance policy is a service
within the meaning of the Act.24
The Shafaghis’ cause of action
for violation of the Act was premised on its contention that
ANPACC acted in an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive
manner when handling their claim.25
A thorough review of the
record reveals that a genuine dispute existed as to whether
ANPACC acted in an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive
manner in refusing to pay the Shafaghis the “actual cash value”
for the damage to their home and the full value of their
“personal property loss.”
As noted above, “it is the
responsibility of the jury to determine and resolve such
conflicts[.]”26
In sum, we cannot conclude that the evidence
24
See Stevens v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., Ky., 759 S.W.2d 819, 820
(1988) (holding that “[t]he Kentucky Consumer Protection Act . . . provide[s]
a homeowner with a remedy for the conduct of their own insurance company in
denying such a claim because the act has provided a ‘statutory’ bad faith
cause of action”).
25
See KRS 367.170(1). ANPACC’s contention that the Shafaghis’ consumer
protection claim should have been bifurcated from its breach of contract
claim is entirely without merit. See, e.g., Tharpe v. Illinois National
Insurance Co., 199 F.R.D. 213, 214-15 (W.D.Ky. 2001).
26
Bierman, 967 S.W.2d at 19.
-13-
presented at trial was not sufficient to sustain the jury’s
verdict with respect to the Shafaghis’ claim for violation of
the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.27
Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial order,
verdict and judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
E. Patrick Moores
Lexington, Kentucky
Thomas K. Herren
Lexington, Kentucky
27
ANPACC further requests that the portion of the judgment awarding
attorneys’ fees be reversed. ANPACC provides no argument with respect to
this issue. A trial court’s decision on a motion for attorneys’ fees under
KRS 367.220(3) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Alexander v. S &
M Motors, Inc., Ky., 28 S.W.3d 303, 305 (2000)(stating that “[w]e, therefore,
read [KRS 367.220(3)], to authorize, but not mandate, an award of attorney
fees and costs in an action brought under the Kentucky Consumer Protection
Act. Of course, whether to award such is a decision subject to the sound
discretion of the trial judge”). We cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by awarding the Shafaghis $51,000.00 in attorneys’ fees
pursuant to KRS 367.220(3).
-14-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.