ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS OF KENTUCKY, INC., d/b/a ANTHEM BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD v. ACADEMY OF MEDICINE OF CINCINNATI; A. LEE GREINER, M.D.; RAYMOND WILL, M.D.; VICTOR SCHMELZER, M.D.; KARL S. ULICNY, JR., M.D.; E. DOUGLAS BALDRIDGE, M.D.; P. SCOTT BECKER, M.D.; AND NORTHERN KENTUCKY MEDICAL SOCIETY UNITED HEALTH CARE OF OHIO, INC. v. ACADEMY OF MEDICINE OF CINCINNATI; A. LEE GREINER, M.D.; RAYMOND WILL, M.D.; VICTOR SCHMELZER, M.D.; KARL S. ULICNY, JR., M.D.; E. DOUGLAS BALDRIDGE, M.D.; P. SCOTT BECKER, M.D.; AND NORTHERN KENTUCKY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
October 29, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000752-MR
ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS OF KENTUCKY, INC.,
d/b/a ANTHEM BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
v.
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00903
ACADEMY OF MEDICINE OF CINCINNATI;
A. LEE GREINER, M.D.; RAYMOND WILL,
M.D.; VICTOR SCHMELZER, M.D.; KARL S.
ULICNY, JR., M.D.; E. DOUGLAS BALDRIDGE,
M.D.; P. SCOTT BECKER, M.D.; AND NORTHERN
KENTUCKY MEDICAL SOCIETY
AND:
APPELLEES
NO. 2003-CA-000753-MR
UNITED HEALTH CARE OF OHIO, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00903
ACADEMY OF MEDICINE OF CINCINNATI;
A. LEE GREINER, M.D.; RAYMOND WILL,
M.D.; VICTOR SCHMELZER, M.D.; KARL S.
ULICNY, JR., M.D.; E. DOUGLAS BALDRIDGE,
M.D.; P. SCOTT BECKER, M.D.; AND NORTHERN
KENTUCKY MEDICAL SOCIETY
APPELLEES
AND:
NO. 2003-CA-000754-MR
AETNA HEALTH, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00903
ACADEMY OF MEDICINE OF CINCINNATI;
A. LEE GREINER, M.D.; RAYMOND WILL,
M.D.; VICTOR SCHMELZER, M.D.; CARL S.
ULICNY, JR., M.D.; E. DOUGLAS BALDRIDGE,
M.D.; P. SCOTT BECKER, M.D.; AND NORTHERN
KENTUCKY MEDICAL SOCIETY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUIDUGLI, JUDGE; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE1 AND MILLER,
SENIOR JUDGE.2
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.
The appellees are physicians and
nonprofit medical societies who filed this action against the
appellants, Anthem Health Plans of Kentucky, Inc., United Health
Care of Ohio, Inc., Aetna Health, Inc., and Humana Health Plans
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
-2-
of Ohio, Inc.,3 alleging that appellants conspired to fix and
lower the insurance reimbursement rates paid to hospitals and
physicians in violation of Kentucky’s antitrust statute, KRS4
367.175.
The issue presented is whether the antitrust claims
fall within the scope of the arbitration clauses in the
contracts between the appellants and appellees.
We agree with
the trial court that the antitrust claims are not subject to
arbitration and affirm its refusal to compel arbitration.
Appellants are the primary providers of group health
insurance policies in the Northern Kentucky region.
Appellees
allege that appellants agreed among themselves to set
reimbursement rates paid to doctors and hospitals below the
reasonable cost of those services.
There can be no dispute that
the provider contracts contain clauses stating that “any
disputes arising out of or relating to” the provider agreement
or “business relationship is to be resolved through arbitration,
mediation, or some form of alternative dispute resolution.”
Whether an antitrust claim is subject to arbitration
is a question of law, and therefore, our standard of review is
de novo.5
Both the federal law, The Federal Arbitration Act
codified at 9 U.S.C.A. § 1, et seq., and the state law codified
3
Humana Health Plans of Ohio, Inc., was dismissed as a party to the appeal.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
5
Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, Ky. App., 47 S.W.3d 335, 340
(2001).
-3-
at KRS 417.045, et seq., provide that arbitration is to be
favored by the law and “arbitration agreements are enforced to
the standards applied to other contracts.”6
There has been,
however, reluctance by the federal and state courts to compel
arbitration of antitrust claims.7
The Florida appellate court
summarized the reasoning of these courts:
The oft-cited reasons underlying these
uniform holdings are (1) because a wide
range of public interests are affected by
private antitrust claims, a “claim under the
antitrust laws is not merely a private
matter,”; (2) the complexity of the issues
and extensiveness of the evidence generally
involved in antitrust litigation make
resolution of these claims more appropriate
for the judicial forum; (3) it is unwise to
allow commercial arbitrators, “frequently
men drawn for their business expertise . . .
to determine these issues of great public
interest,”; and (4) because arbitrators are
not bound by rules of law and need not give
reasons for their rulings, there is no way
to insure consistency of interpretation of
statutory law or application of arbitration
awards.8 (Citations omitted.)
Despite the precedent refusing to compel arbitration
in antitrust claims, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court held that there is no
6
Id. at 339.
7
See e.g., Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576
F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); American
Safety Equipment Corp v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2nd Cir. 1968).
8
Sabates v. International Medical Centers, Inc., 450 So.2d 514, 517 (1984).
9
473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985).
-4-
prohibition to arbitration in cases involving international
transactions.
Although not overruling federal cases holding
otherwise in domestic cases, the court questioned the reasoning
of those courts and opened the door for federal courts to hold
that such claims can be arbitrated.10
There is no Kentucky case specifically addressing
whether such claims can be arbitrated.
Although we believe
there is soundness in the reasoning that public policy
considerations favor judicial resolution, we decide this case on
the basis that the antitrust claims alleged are simply outside
the scope of the arbitration agreements.
A party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
unless both parties have agreed that the dispute be arbitrated.11
Where the alleged injurious conduct does not arise from the
employment relationship and is independent from it, the courts
will not expand the arbitration agreement merely for the purpose
of efficiency.12
The alleged antitrust violations do not arise
from or relate to the service provider contracts.
This was the
result reached by the Ohio court in a proceeding parallel to the
case before us alleging the precise antitrust claims against the
10
See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994); Hough v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
11
Oakwood Mobile Homes v. Sprowls, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 193, 195 (2002).
12
Hill v. Hilliard, Ky. App., 945 S.W.2d 948 (1996).
-5-
same parties under Ohio law.
We adopt the reasoning of our
sister state:
Here, the parties’ dispute centers on
whether the HMOs conspired and/or colluded
to set reimbursement rates in this region
that were lower than the “prevailing
reimbursement rates in other comparable Ohio
health care markets such as Dayton, Columbus
and Cleveland.” In determining whether this
claim was within the scope of the
arbitration agreements, “[a] proper method
of analysis here is to ask [whether this]
action could be maintained without reference
to the [provider agreement] or [business]
relationship at issue. If it could, it is
likely outside the scope of the arbitration
agreement.” (Footnote omitted.)
After reviewing the complaint and the
remainder of the record, we conclude that
the doctors’ antitrust claim could be
maintained without reference to their
individual provider agreements. To maintain
an antitrust claim pursuant to R.C. Chapter
1331, the doctors have to prove that two or
more persons came together to illegally
concentrate a particular business in the
hands of a few for the purpose of
controlling prices and that injury resulted
from that restraint of trade. (Footnote
omitted.) The express elements of an
antitrust claim do not depend, as a matter
of law, on the provider agreements between
the individual doctors and HMOs.
The doctors’ allegations in their
complaint (1) that the HMOs conspired and/or
colluded with one another to illegally lower
and fix the reimbursement rates for medical
procedures to medical practitioners in the
region; (2) that the anticompetitive
behavior caused a decline in the number of
doctors willing to practice medicine here,
which resulted in the number of hospitals
and hospital beds available for patient care
-6-
dropping by nearly 50 percent and a decline
in the quality of health care available for
the consumer; and (3) that the HMOs’
anticompetitive behavior precipitated a drop
in physicians’ salaries in the area neither
relied on nor referred to a contract or a
provider agreement between the doctors and
the HMOs. Instead, the antitrust claim was
based upon a statutory remedy the
legislature has provided to persons harmed
by illegal price fixing. . . .13
The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ANTHEM
HEALTH PLANS OF KENTUCKY,
INC.:
Sheryl G. Snyder
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
Louisville, Kentucky
H. Lawson Walker II
James R. Adams
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
Cincinnati, Ohio
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT UNITED
HEALTHCARE OF OHIO, INC.:
Stephen J. Butler
Carey A. Greiner
THOMPSON HINE LLP
Cincinnati, Ohio
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Richard S. Wayne
Thomas P. Glass
Joseph J. Braun
STRAUSS & TROY
Cincinnati, Ohio
Michael R. Barrett
BARRETT & WEBER, L.P.A.
Cincinnati, Ohio
Stanley M. Chesley
Terrence L. Goodman
Jean M. Geoppinger
WAITE, SCHNEIDER, BAYLESS &
CHESLEY CO., L.P.A.
Cincinnati, Ohio
13
Academy of Medicine of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., 155 Ohio App.3d
310, 312, 800 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (2003).
-7-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT AETNA
HEALTH INC.:
Gerald F. Dusing
ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN &
DUSING, PLLC
Covington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Richard S. Wayne
Cincinnati, Ohio
Stanley M. Chesley
Cincinnati, Ohio
Robert J. Fogarty
HAHN LOESER & PARKS LLP
Cleveland, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS:
Sheryl S. Snyder
Louisville, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.