CLARK JUSTICE v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 30, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000679-MR
CLARK JUSTICE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES E. LOWE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01260
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MINTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
In this bad faith action, Clark Justice
(hereinafter “Justice”) has appealed from the Pike Circuit
Court’s March 19, 2003, Order and Judgment granting Allstate
Insurance Company’s (hereinafter “Allstate”) motion for a
judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the complaint with
prejudice.
The sole issue on appeal is whether a secondary
insurer has a duty to attempt to settle with a plaintiff in a
case where it was reasonable to expect a judgment in excess of
the coverage of both the primary and secondary insurers.
Having
considered the arguments in the parties’ briefs, the record, and
the applicable case law, we affirm.
On September 5, 2002, Justice filed a complaint in
Pike Circuit Court alleging a bad faith claim against Allstate
in that Allstate violated the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
Act1 by refusing to make any type of settlement offer in his
uninsured motorist (hereinafter “UM”) action.
Justice was
involved in a motor vehicle accident on April 10, 2001, while a
passenger in a car driven by Joey Branham, who was insured by
Kentucky National Insurance Company (hereinafter “Kentucky
National”).
Allstate provided insurance for Justice.
An
uninsured motorist hit the car Branham was driving, causing
injury to Justice, and there was no dispute that the uninsured
motorist was solely at fault.
The policy limit of both
Branham’s and Justice’s UM coverage was $50,000.
Justice filed
suit in Pike Circuit Court2 to recover UM benefits both from
Kentucky National, as the primary insurer, and from Allstate,
the secondary insurer.
Justice attempted to settle with both
insurers prior to trial for their respective policy limits.
Kentucky National apparently offered to settle for an amount
below the policy limits, but Allstate did not reply to Justice’s
1
KRS 304.12-230.
Justice v. Allstate Insurance Company and Kentucky National Insurance
Company, Pike Circuit Court case No. 01-CI-00600.
2
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request for a settlement offer.
Following a trial, the jury
returned a verdict for Justice in the amount of $214,419.71, and
the circuit court entered a final judgment on August 28, 2002,
allowing him to recover $204,419.713 from Allstate and Kentucky
National, or the extent of each insurer’s policy limits for UM
coverage, whichever was less.
Upon the entry of the final
judgment, both insurers paid their policy limits of $50,000.
Kentucky National also paid an additional $25,000 to prevent an
unfair claims settlement practices act claim from being brought.
In the present action, Justice claimed that Allstate violated
the act by failing to offer to settle the UM action even though
its liability was reasonably clear pursuant to KRS 304.12230(6).
Allstate filed an answer, asserting that Justice
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted and that his failure to exhaust Kentucky National’s
policy limits prior to the entry of the final judgment in the
underlying claim obviated its obligation to offer any excess
coverage.
Allstate then filed a motion for a judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to CR 12.02(f) and CR 12.03, arguing that as
it was the secondary excess insurer, it did not owe any coverage
until Kentucky National’s primary coverage was exhausted, citing
the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Motorists Mut. Ins.
3
The circuit court deducted $10,000 from the total amount of the jury verdict
for the PIP benefits previously paid.
-3-
Co. v. Glass, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 437 (1999).
Justice responded
that because liability was reasonably clear, Allstate had an
obligation to respond to his request for a settlement offer.
On March 19, 2003, the circuit court entered an Order
and Judgment as follows:
This matter is before the Court on the
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. The Court has reviewed the
Motion and the Responses and Replies filed
thereto.
The Plaintiff’s “bad faith” claim is
based upon the Defendant’s failure to pay
its excess uninsured motorist coverage
before the primary uninsured carrier,
Kentucky National Insurance Company, had
paid its policy limits.
Curry v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.,
Ky., 784 S.W.2d 176, 178 (1989), adopted the
elements of proving bad faith from Justice
Leibson’s dissent in Federal Kemper
Insurance Co. v. Hornback, Ky., 711 S.W.2d
844, 846 (1986):
An insured must prove three
elements in order to prevail
against an insurance company for
alleged refusal in bad faith to
pay the insured’s claim: (1) the
insurer must be obligated to pay
the claim under the terms of the
policy; (2) the insurer must lack
a reasonable basis in law or fact
for denying the claim; and (3) it
must be shown that the insurer
either knew there was no
reasonable basis for denying the
claim or acted with reckless
disregard for whether such a basis
existed. . . . An insurer is . .
. entitled to challenge a claim
-4-
and litigate it if the claim is
debatable on the law or the facts.
An “excess” insurer does not owe any
coverage until primary coverage is
exhausted. Motorist Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Glass, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 437, 453 (1999). The
Plaintiff argues that this case is
distinguishable from Glass, because Glass
dealt with underinsured (“UIM”) coverage
while this case deals with uninsured (“UM”)
coverage. UIM coverage serves the same
purpose and follows the same pattern as UM
coverage. While the wording of the UIM
statute is different from that of the UM
statute, there is no fundamentally different
insurance arrangement from that provided for
under the UM statute. Coots v. Allstate
Insurance Co., Ky., 853 S.W.2d 895, 898
(1993).
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, and
the Plaintiff’s Complaint against the
Defendant is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Due
to this ruling, the trial scheduled for
April 23, 2003, is CANCELED.
There being no just cause for delay,
this is a final and appealable Order, and
this cause is STRICKEN from the docket.
On appeal, Justice continues to argue that Allstate
violated KRS 304.12-230(6) by refusing to attempt a settlement
of his claim for which its liability was reasonably clear.
In
support, he points out that the jury’s verdict well exceeded
$100,000, the combination of the two UM insurers’ policy limits.
Justice also makes a brief argument that the circuit court’s
dismissal pursuant to CR 12.03 was inappropriate because there
-5-
were never any matters presented outside of the pleadings.
On
the other hand, Allstate argues that the circuit court properly
applied the three-part test for bad faith claims as set forth by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Curry, supra, and Wittmer v.
Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885 (1993), and held that Justice could
not establish that Allstate had violated the prong requiring
that the insurer lack a reasonable basis in law or fact in
denying the claim.
Justice could not show any lack of a
reasonable basis because Allstate’s obligation to pay any excess
coverage did not arise until Kentucky National had paid its
policy limits pursuant to Glass, supra.
Pursuant to CR 12.02(f), a defendant may assert a
defense, either in the answer or by motion, that a plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
CR
12.03 also permits any party to move for a judgment on the
pleadings after the pleadings are closed.
In the present
matter, the parties did not present, nor did the circuit court
accept, any matters outside of the pleadings.
Therefore, the
circuit court properly and appropriately considered the motion
purely on the pleadings.
In Wittmer v. Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885 (1993), the
Supreme Court addressed the degree of proof necessary to
establish a bad faith claim.
Quoting Justice Leibson’s dissent
from Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, Ky., 711 S.W.2d 844
-6-
(1986), Wittmer provided for a three-prong test, which included
a requirement that the insurer lack a reasonable basis for
denying the claim.
In Glass, the Supreme Court made it clear
that an excess insurer did not owe any coverage until the
primary insurer’s coverage was exhausted.
Co. v. Glass, 996 S.W.2d at 453.
Motorists Mut. Ins.
Although Justice claims that
Glass is inapplicable because it deals with UIM coverage rather
than UM coverage, this argument is without merit.
In Coots v.
Allstate Insurance Co., Ky., 853 S.W.2d 895, 898 (1993), the
Supreme Court clearly held that “UIM coverage serves the same
purpose and follows the same pattern as UM coverage.
While the
wording of the UIM statute is different from that of the UM
statute, we can discern no fundamentally different insurance
arrangement from that provided under the UM statute.”
Under the applicable law of the case, Justice failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
As the
secondary insurer, which Justice admitted Allstate to be in his
complaint, Allstate had no obligation to pay any excess coverage
until Kentucky National had paid its policy limits.
supra.
Glass,
Although Kentucky National extended a settlement offer
prior to trial for less than its policy limits, Justice did not
accept this offer and the matter proceeded to trial, after which
the jury returned a verdict in Justice’s favor.
Kentucky
National did not pay out any of its benefits until AFTER the
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final judgment had been entered.
Once Kentucky National paid
the limits of its policy, Allstate then followed by paying out
its policy limits pursuant to the final judgment.
Allstate was
under no obligation to pay any benefits until Kentucky National
had paid its policy limits, and there is no dispute that
Allstate fulfilled this obligation.
This is not to say that
Allstate, as an excess insurer, would have been precluded from
offering a settlement prior to trial even if Kentucky National
had opted not to do so.
However, there was no legal requirement
that Allstate do so because its liability had not yet arisen.
Because Justice could not state a claim for bad faith upon which
relief could be granted, the circuit court properly granted
Allstate’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings and dismissed
the complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, the Pike Circuit Court’s
Order and Judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Phil A. Stalnaker
Pikeville, KY
A. Campbell Ewen
William P. Carrell, II
Louisville, KY
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