COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. CLEAVON BRADLEY
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RENDERED: MARCH 19, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000642-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-001256
CLEAVON BRADLEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting Cleavon Bradley’s
motion to suppress evidence.
We affirm.
On September 15, 2000, at 4:00 a.m., Cleavon Bradley
was in his brother’s car in the Iroquois housing project in
Louisville when he was pulled over by Officer Bryan Royse.
Bradley was arrested on a bench warrant charging him with being
a probation violator, and he was also charged with driving on a
suspended license.
During a pat-down search of Bradley
following his arrest, Officer Royse discovered a folded bandana
containing ten grams of crack cocaine in Bradley’s pocket.
Bradley was subsequently indicted for trafficking in cocaine,
operating a motor vehicle without a license, and persistent
felony offender in the second degree.
Prior to trial Bradley filed a motion to suppress the
cocaine as evidence.
Therein, he alleged that Officer Royse had
illegally stopped and detained him and that the subsequently
seized cocaine was therefore inadmissible evidence.
An
evidentiary hearing was held as required by RCr1 9.78.
Bradley testified at the hearing that he was not
driving erratically or doing anything else to give Officer Royse
a reason to stop his automobile.
Although Officer Royse
acknowledged that Bradley was not driving erratically or
committing a traffic violation, he testified that he could see
that it was Bradley in the automobile and that he knew Bradley
was wanted on a bench warrant for being a probation violator.
He stated that he had seen the bench warrant earlier the
previous morning.
Officer Royce also testified that he knew
Bradley did not have a valid driver’s license and should not
have been driving.
Further, Officer Royce testified that he
recognized Bradley because he had stopped him on previous
occasions.
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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During the cross-examination of Officer Royse, attacks
were made on his credibility as a witness.
Specifically,
attacks were made on his testimony that he knew Bradley before
pulling him over.
Officer Royse maintained that he knew Bradley
because he had previously stopped him and that the police radio
room would have a record of these contacts.
to support his testimony.
The records failed
Officer Royse also produced a
notebook wherein he had written Bradley’s name.
Although he
testified that this was written sometime before the night in
question, that fact could not be positively established.
The court found “that the Officer did not have a
lawful basis to stop Mr. Bradley.”
Although the court stopped
short of saying that it did not believe the officer’s testimony
or that he was lying, it was clear that the court questioned the
officer’s credibility.
Noting the weaknesses in the officer’s
testimony, the court held that the Commonwealth had not met its
burden of proof.
This appeal by the Commonwealth followed.
“[A] police officer can subject anyone to an
investigatory stop if he is able to point to some specific
articulable fact which, together with rational inferences from
those facts, support ‘a reasonable and articulable suspicion’
that the person in question is engaged in illegal activity.”
Simpson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 834 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1992),
citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d
-3-
889 (1968).
Here, Officer Royse could have legally stopped
Bradley if he had reason to believe Bradley was operating the
automobile on a suspended license or if he believed there was an
outstanding warrant for Bradley’s arrest.
While the officer
testified that he stopped Bradley for those two reasons, the
court obviously did not believe his testimony was credible.
“With regard to the factual findings of the trial
court ‘clearly erroneous’ is the standard of review for an
appeal of an order denying suppression.”
Ky., 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (2001).
Commonwealth v. Banks,
“However, the ultimate legal
question of whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop or
probable cause to search is reviewed de novo.”
Id.
In
reviewing orders from the circuit court on suppression motions,
“a reviewing court should give due weight to the assessment by
the trial court of the credibility of the officer and the
reasonableness of the inferences.”
Commonwealth v. Whitmore,
Ky., 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (2002).
“When a pre-trial hearing on the issue of suppression
is conducted to determine the admissibility of evidence obtained
during a search, a trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive
if they are supported by substantial evidence.”
S.W.2d at 687; RCr 9.78.
Simpson, 834
“Substantial evidence” has been
defined as “evidence of substance and relevant consequence
having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of
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reasonable men.”
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly,
Ky., 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (1998).
Having reviewed the tape of
the suppression hearing, we conclude there was substantial
evidence to support the court’s findings.
It is not for this
court to second-guess the circuit court’s determination of the
officer’s credibility.
The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred
in forcing it to meet a higher burden of proof than that
required by law.
The parties agree that the standard of proof
was the preponderance of the evidence.
The Commonwealth argues
that the court required proof of some physical or documentary
evidence that the officer knew Bradley previously and that the
lack of such evidence caused the court to automatically reject
the officer’s testimony and hold that the burden of proof had
not been met.
On the other hand, Bradley asserts that the court
merely rejected the officer’s testimony on grounds of
credibility and that no higher burden of proof was assigned by
the court.
We agree with Bradley.
As we have noted, this court
must give the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the
officer due weight.
Whitmore, supra.
The Commonwealth’s second argument is that, even if
the stop was illegal, the search and seizure of the crack
cocaine incident to Bradley’s arrest is not improper as a “fruit
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of the poisonous tree” from the illegal stop because the search
was “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.”
See United
States v. Fazio, 914 F. 2d 950, 957 (7th Cir. 1990).
argument may have some merit.
F. 3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997).
This
See United States v. Green, 111
However, the Commonwealth did not
raise this issue to the circuit court.
“A new theory of error cannot be presented on appeal.”
Ruppee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by Lovett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 103
S.W.3d 72 (2003).
Because the Commonwealth raised only the
issue of the legality of the stop at the trial court level, we
decline to address this issue.
Neither the Commonwealth’s
argument that questions of law are to be reviewed de novo nor
its argument that the error constitutes palpable error under RCr
10.26 persuades us otherwise.
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
VANMETER, JUDGE, DISSENTING BY SEPARATE OPINION:
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority opinion,
which agrees that the Commonwealth’s argument regarding
attenuation “may have some merit,” but fails to consider the
argument under the palpable error rule of RCr 10.26.
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The plain language of RCr 10.26 states that “[a]
palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
may be considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even
though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the error.” (Emphasis
added.)
While the Commonwealth has not cited and we have not
found any case which extends the benefits of RCr 10.26 to the
Commonwealth, the language of the rule does not foreclose its
use by the Commonwealth, and no reported case holds that the
rule is not to be so applied.
In addition, the history of the
rule supports its application to the Commonwealth, as well as to
a defendant.
Prior to the 1981 promulgation of RCr 10.26, RCr
9.26 provided that “[a] conviction shall be set aside . . ., or
the judgment reversed on appeal, for any error or defect when,
upon consideration of the whole case, the court is satisfied
that the substantial rights of the defendant have been
prejudiced.” (Emphasis added.)
This rule was substantially
modified in 1981, when it was effectively replaced by RCr 10.26
as quoted above.
Thus, the rule clearly applies to the
substantial rights of both defendants and the Commonwealth.2
2
A defendant may not be retried following an acquittal, notwithstanding that
the acquittal may have been based on an improper ground. Commonwealth v.
Mullins, 405 S.W.2d 28, 29 (1966). Therefore, as a practical matter, the
application of RCr 10.26 to the benefit of the Commonwealth has limited
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Kentucky courts have consistently held that an
appellate court may consider an unpreserved issue if the error
is a palpable one which affected the party’s substantial rights
and resulted in a manifest injustice.
Schoenbachler v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 830, 836 (2003); Commonwealth v.
Pace, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (2002).
“In determining whether
an error is palpable, ‘an appellate court must consider whether
on the whole case there is a substantial possibility that the
result would have been any different.’”
Id. at 895 (quoting
Commonwealth v. McIntosh, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1983)).
In the instant case, this standard has been met.
The
trial court has determined to suppress evidence without which
the Commonwealth cannot proceed.
If the unpreserved error were
to be considered and the evidence were not excluded, a
substantial possibility exists that the result would be
different.
The facts are that the defendant had an active
warrant against him, which made him subject to arrest.
In
United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997), the court
found that the initial stop of the defendant’s automobile was
not justified.
However, the court stated:
It would be startling to suggest that
because the police illegally stopped an
automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is
found to be wanted on a warrant. . . . Because
the arrest is lawful, a search incident to the
impact, and only on appeal of the grant of a defendant’s suppression or
similar pretrial motion.
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arrest is also lawful. The lawful arrest of [the
occupant] constituted an intervening circumstance
sufficient to dissipate any taint caused by the
illegal automobile stop.
Id. at 521.
Similarly, courts in other jurisdictions have held
that the discovery of an outstanding warrant overcomes any taint
of an impermissible initial encounter.
See, e.g., People v.
Hillyard, 589 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1979); State v. Foust, 262 So.2d
686, 687 (Fla. App. 1972); People v. Murray, 728 N.E.2d 512,
516-17 (Ill. App. 2000); Quinn v. State, 792 N.E.2d 597, 599-601
(Ind. App. 2003); State v. Jones, 17 P.3d 359, 360 (Kan. 2001);
State v. Hill, 725 So.2d 1282, 1284-87 (La. 1998); State v.
Thompson, 438 N.W.2d 131 (Neb. 1989); Neese v. State, 930 S.W.2d
792, 801-03 (Tex. App. 1996); Reed v. State, 809 S.W.2d 940
(Tex. App. 1991); State v. Rothenberger, 440 P.2d 184 (Wash.
1968).
But see Frierson v. State, 851 So.2d 293, 300 (Fla. App.
2003); Jefferson v. State, 780 N.E.2d 398, 400 (Ind. App. 2002)
(holding that illegal initial detention required suppression of
subsequently found evidence, notwithstanding existence of
outstanding arrest warrant).
The rationale behind the cases that do not suppress
due to intervening warrants lies in the Supreme Court’s
rejection of the argument that a “but for” test exists under the
fourth amendment.
In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95
S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the Court noted that
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“not . . . all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal
actions of the police” (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).
The
real question is whether, given the original illegality, the
evidence came to light by reason of the “‘exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.’” Brown, 422 U.S. at 599, 95
S.Ct. at 2259.
See also Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d
745, 748 (2002) (court recognizing attenuation doctrine, citing
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805, 104 S.Ct. 3380,
3385, 82 L.Ed.2d 599, 608 (1984), and Wong Sun, supra).
In
making this determination of whether the discovery of evidence
is attenuated, the Court in Brown suggested the consideration of
three factors: (1) temporal proximity; (2) “the presence of
intervening circumstances”; and (3) “the purpose and flagrancy
of the official misconduct.”
422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at
2261-62.
Applying the Brown test to the instant case, while the
first factor points to exclusion, the second factor clearly
favors attenuation.
Although the arrest and subsequent search
were close in time to the improper stop, the preexisting
outstanding warrant constitutes an intervening circumstance
which carries more weight than temporal proximity.
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See Green,
111 F.3d at 521 (court holding time span of five minutes between
police misconduct and search is not dispositive).
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Green that
the third factor, that of the “purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct,” is tied to the purpose of the exclusionary
rule, i.e., to deter, to compel respect for constitutional
guaranties, and to remove any incentives to disregard these
guaranties.
Id. at 523.
As noted by the 10th Circuit, this
prong of Brown “can only be aimed at exploring whether the
police have exploited their illegal” action.
United States v.
Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1055 (10th Cir. 1994).
In this
case, although the trial court did not believe the police
officer’s testimony that he had had prior contact with the
appellee and was aware of the outstanding warrant, the facts are
undisputed that the search came only after the officer called in
to verify the existence of the outstanding warrant and placed
the appellee under arrest.
Thus, as recognized by the court in
Green, the search was not an exploitation of the illegal stop.
111 F.3d at 523.3
3
The instant facts are unlike those present in United States v. McSwain, 29
F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994), in which the stop was illegal and no arrest warrant
had been issued. In that case, the court found the police exploited the
illegal stop to obtain “consent” to search. In State v. Hill, 725 So.2d at
1287, the court looked to whether the police officers had a “quality of
purposefulness” in their conduct, whether that conduct was calculated to
cause surprise, fright or confusion, and whether that conduct was a flagrant
abuse of police power. The record in this case indicates there was no
flagrant show of police authority, and no lights or sirens. Instead, the
officer simply pulled over the appellee, asked for identification and
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The appellee cites Churchwell v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 843 S.W.2d 336 (1992), and United States v. McSwain, 29
F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994), in support of his argument that the
illegal stop dictated that all subsequently-discovered evidence
must be suppressed.
However, both cases are factually
distinguishable in that neither involved the existence of an
outstanding warrant for an occupant of the car involved in the
stop.
I would vacate the order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court, and remand for further proceedings.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Franklin P. Jewell
Louisville, Kentucky
Jeanne Anderson
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Louisville, Kentucky
license, and called the radio room which verified a suspended license and
warrant. These facts stand in contrast to those present in Brown v. Illinois,
in which the defendant was approached by armed detectives, with revolvers
drawn, and was advised that he was under arrest. The detectives had
previously broken into and searched his apartment, all without probable cause
or warrant. 422 U.S. at 592-94, 95 S.Ct. at 2256-57.
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