BRIDGITTE MCCLEASE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 1, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2003-CA-000577-MR
BRIDGITTE MCCLEASE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00073
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an amended judgment
entered by the Franklin Circuit Court after appellant Brigitte1
McClease entered a guilty plea to the amended charge of
first-degree manslaughter.
Appellant contends that the trial
court erred by finding that she was ineligible for probation
even though she was a victim of domestic violence.
1
We affirm.
Appellant’s first name has been spelled in various ways throughout these proceedings. Although lower court
documents and the notice of appeal show appellant’s name as “Bridgitte,” she signed the notice of appeal as
“Brigitte” and her briefs on appeal show her name as “Brigitte.”
Appellant and her brother, Anthony McClease, were
adult residents of their parents’ home.
It is undisputed that
Anthony physically abused appellant and other family members on
numerous occasions.
During the late evening hours of April 23,
2001, Anthony was intoxicated when he entered the house and
engaged in a confrontation with appellant.
Anthony allegedly
raised his hand to strike appellant, who responded by stabbing
him in the abdomen with a kitchen knife.
Appellant then
informed their father of what had occurred, and she called 911
for assistance.
Despite surgical efforts, Anthony died several
hours later.
Appellant, who was charged with murder, eventually
entered an Alford plea to first-degree manslaughter.
On January
27, 2003, after an evidentiary hearing pursuant to KRS 439.3402,
the trial court concluded that the domestic violence exception
to the violent offender provisions of KRS 439.3401 did not apply
to appellant, and that she was ineligible for probation.
However, the court subsequently reconsidered and set aside its
January 27 order.
On February 26, 2003, the court entered an
amended judgment which noted that appellant had appeared with
counsel “in open court on 2-21-03 (*).”
The asterisk was
explained at the bottom of the page as follows:
(*) (Order Setting Aside Judgment of 1-27-03
entered Feb. 6, 2003)
-2-
(*) Pursuant to KRS 439.3402, the Court has
determined the defendant to be a victim of
domestic violence or abuse with regard to
this offense and thus, [to] be exempt from
the Parole Restrictions stated within KRS
439.3401. The defendant will be eligible
for Parole in the manner specified in KRS
439.3401.
Further, the amended judgment noted that “the Court finds: Mt
for Probation/denied” for two reasons, marked as follows:
[XX] the Victim suffered death or physical
injury;
[ ] imprisonment is necessary for
protection of the public because:
[ ] there is a likelihood that during
a period of probation with an
alternative sentencing plan or
conditional discharge Defendant will
commit a Class D or Class C felony or a
substantial risk that Defendant will
commit a Class B or Class A felony;
[XX] Defendant is in need of
correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by the
defendant’s commitment to a
correctional institution;
[ ] probation, probation with an
alternative sentencing plan, or
conditional discharge would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the
Defendant’s crime;
[ ] Defendant is ineligible for
probation, probation with an
alternative sentencing plan, or
conditional discharge because of the
applicability of KRS 532.060[.]
-3-
This appeal followed, but it subsequently was held in abeyance
pending the circuit court’s ruling on appellant’s motion for
shock probation.
On November 12, 2003, the trial court entered
an order noting that it previously had denied probation based on
the victim’s death and appellant’s need for correctional
treatment.
The court gave similar reasons for denying shock
probation.
The appeal was returned to this court’s active
docket.
Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously
found that even though she was a victim of domestic violence,
she was ineligible for probation.
We disagree.
KRS 439.3401 specifies that a violent offender is
ineligible for release on probation or parole until that
offender has served at least twenty years or eighty-five percent
of the sentence, depending on the offense and the length of the
sentence imposed.
However, KRS 439.3401(5) provides an
exception for “a person who has been determined by a court to
have been a victim of domestic violence or abuse pursuant to KRS
533.060 with regard to the offenses involving the death of the
victim or serious physical injury to the victim.”
KRS
533.060(1) in turn provides that a person who used a firearm in
the commission of a Class A, B or C felony is ineligible for
“probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, except”
when the victim “had previously or was then engaged in an act or
-4-
acts of domestic violence against” the defendant or a family
member.
Here, the parties do not dispute that appellant is a
domestic violence victim who is exempt from the KRS 439.3401
provisions which otherwise would restrict her ability to be
considered for parole.
However, the Commonwealth disagrees with
appellant’s assertion that under Commonwealth v. Vincent, Ky.,
70 S.W.3d 422 (2002), the trial court erred by finding appellant
ineligible for probation despite the KRS 533.060(1) exemption of
domestic violence victims from statutory restrictions against
the granting of probation to those who commit Class A, B, or C
felonies while armed with firearms.
Regardless of whether KRS 533.060(1) applies to
situations in which defendants are armed with knives rather than
with firearms, it is clear that appellant’s argument on appeal
lacks merit.
Neither Vincent nor the domestic violence
exceptions to KRS 439.3401 and KRS 533.060(1) require courts to
grant probation or parole to all domestic violence victims.
Instead, those authorities merely provide that certain felons,
who would be statutorily ineligible for probation or parole but
for the fact that they are domestic violence victims, may be
considered for probation or parole just as if there were no
statutory prohibitions against probation or parole for persons
who committed similar crimes.
-5-
Here, despite appellant’s assertion, the record does
not show that the trial court ultimately found her to be
statutorily ineligible for probation.
Regardless of whether the
trial court may have made comments to the contrary before the
initial judgment, the court’s subsequent amended judgment
clearly reflects that the court considered appellant’s motion
for probation but denied that motion because the victim died and
because appellant needed correctional treatment.
The amended
judgment further shows that the court specifically declined the
opportunity to find that appellant was statutorily ineligible
for “probation, probation with an alternative sentencing plan,
or conditional discharge[.]”
Thus, there is no merit to
appellant’s allegation that the trial court erroneously
concluded “that a victim of domestic violence is never eligible
for probation after committing a crime involving the death of
the perpetrator of the domestic abuse.”
The court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Natalie Lewellen
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
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