JOYCE RIDDLE v. CHRIS RIDDLE and HARRY FLOOD HARDESTY v. PAMELA RAY HARDESTY
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RENDERED: JULY 2, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000562-MR
JOYCE RIDDLE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00374
v.
CHRIS RIDDLE
APPELLEE
consolidated with
NO.
2003-CA-000599-MR
HARRY FLOOD HARDESTY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00166
PAMELA RAY HARDESTY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
Judge.1
1
COMBS, Chief Judge; DYCHE, Judge; and EMBERTON, Senior
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE.
The appellants, Joyce Riddle and Harry
Flood Hardesty, appeal from orders of the Shelby Circuit Court
entered in their respective dissolution actions on February 11,
2003.
In the combined order under review, the trial court
upheld the constitutionality of KRS2 61.690(2) as amended
effective July 14, 2000.
The statute relates to the treatment
of retirement benefits of members of the Kentucky Retirement
System with respect to dissolution of marriage actions.
It was
very short-lived as it was repealed by the 2002 General
Assembly.
However, during its brief existence, the statute had
provided as follows:
A retirement allowance, a disability
allowance, a member’s accumulated
contributions, or any other benefit under
the system shall not be classified as
marital property or as an economic
circumstance as provided in KRS 403.190 in
an action for dissolution of marriage.
Relying on Waggoner v. Waggoner, Ky., 846 S.W.2d 704
(1992), a case involving a similar statute relating only to
teachers’ pensions, the trial court upheld the state’s interest
in protecting the pensions of state employees.
Appellants
challenged the statute as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
They argued that it created a preference for
state workers as a class and accordingly caused prejudice to the
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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class of their spouses, who were thereby excluded from receiving
distribution in such benefits as marital property.
While most other benefits programs are subject to
distribution as marital property in a divorce proceeding, this
statutory exemption resulted in disparate treatment for that
class of persons married to state employees.
Thus, the benefits
packages of state workers would not be subject to inclusion in
the marital estate for purposes of division in a property
settlement following a dissolution of marriage.
This
distinction constituted the basis of the equal protection
challenge.
We need not resolve this issue based on the
constitutional argument, however.
We have concluded that the
trial court erred as a matter of law in applying the statute
after its repeal to these dissolution actions.
Thus, we vacate
and remand.
No.
2003-CR-000562-MR
Appellant Joyce Riddle argues that the court’s ruling
is moot because the statute was repealed effective July 15,
2002, prior to the entry of the decree of dissolution in her
case.
The appellee, Chris Riddle, ignores the mootness argument
and instead agrees that the court’s decision must be reversed
and that the matter be remanded for a proper resolution of the
division of his pension benefits pursuant to the current state
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of the law.
We agree.
The statute had no legal effect after
its repeal.
Accordingly, the appeal is vacated and the matter
is remanded for division of the Riddles’ marital estate pursuant
to the law in effect at the time of the division of marital
property.
No.
2003-CA-000599-MR
We believe the same result is required in the
Hardestys’ appeal.
The appellee, Pamela Hardesty, filed a
petition seeking to dissolve the parties’ twenty-seven-year
marriage on May 8, 2000.
A decree of dissolution was entered on
February 21, 2001, reserving all issues pertaining to the
division of property and marital debts.
Those issues were
referred to the Domestic Relations Commissioner for resolution.
At the parties’ request, the Commissioner initially
addressed only the pension-related issues.
were undisputed.
The relevant facts
Pamela had worked for Kentucky state
government for many years and had accumulated approximately
$44,000 in her retirement account at the time of dissolution.
Harry, who was employed by Porter Paint, transferred his funds
in the retirement account maintained by his employer after the
company was sold.
He placed the proceeds, nearly $49,000, in an
Individual Retirement Account (IRA) at Hilliard Lyons.
The
matter was somewhat complicated by the fact that some funds had
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accrued in Pamela’s retirement account before her marriage.
Additionally, the parties had borrowed about $9,000 against
their marital residence (a debt which remained at the time of
dissolution) in order to enhance Pamela’s retirement fund by the
purchase of thirty-six months of service.
On March 12, 2001, the Domestic Relations Commissioner
recommended:
(1) that Pamela’s pension be totally exempted from
classification as marital property pursuant to KRS 61.690(2);
(2) that all of Harry’s investment account be treated as marital
property and divided equally; and (3) that the trial court
consider the debt incurred by the parties in purchasing
additional service time for Pamela in its division of marital
property in just proportions.
Thereafter, the Hardestys reached
an agreement dividing all of their property and marital debts
with the exception of their two retirement accounts.
Harry filed timely exceptions to the Commissioner’s
report challenging the constitutionality of KRS 61.690(2).
In
the alternative, he argued that his account at Hilliard Lyons
should be treated as a retirement account for purposes of the
set-off provisions of KRS 403.190(4).
While the matter was
pending in the circuit court, KRS 61.690(2) was repealed.
It
had been repealed for several months prior to entry of the trial
court’s final order completing the division of the Hardestys’
assets.
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There is nothing in this record or in the record
compiled in the Riddles’ dissolution to indicate that the trial
court was aware of the change in the law or that any of the
parties brought the repeal of KRS 61.690(2) to its attention.
On February 11, 2003, the court entered its order applying the
repealed statute and adopting the Commissioner’s recommendations
with respect to the Hardestys’ retirement funds.
The court
noted that “however inequitable [KRS 61.690(2)] may be in some
applications, [it] does not suffer from constitutional
infirmity.”
This appeal followed.
Apparently, the Legislature was aware of the potential
for inequity inherent in KRS 61.690(2) as amended in 2000 since
its repeal followed so quickly in 2002.3
The Hardestys’
situation highlights the injustice resulting from the statute’s
application.
Pamela, the spouse with the pension fund
administered by state government, was awarded her entire
retirement fund as her non-marital property.
However, the funds
set aside to secure Harry’s retirement were treated as marital
property and were divided equally.
Pamela thus received 100% of
her retirement benefits plus 50% of Harry’s.
Although both of
the parties had invested approximately the same amount of money
for their individual retirement at the time of dissolution, the
3
KRS 61.690(2) in its present form concerns the retirement system’s
obligation to honor child support orders and is not implicated in these
appeals.
-6-
application of KRS 61.690(2) resulted in Pamela’s receipt of
pension benefits worth more than three times those awarded to
Harry.
In light of the length of the marriage and the fact that
the parties are near retirement age, the impact of the inequity
created by the exemption is inescapable.
In acting swiftly to repeal the statute, the
Legislature intended to remedy the flaws inherent in the 2000
version of KRS 61.690(2) and to restore the state retirement
funds to their previous status as marital property (to the
extent they were accrued during the marriage).
The repeal of
KRS 61.690(2) (as amended effective July 14, 2000) thus had no
legal effect after its repeal -- as we have held with respect to
the Riddle appeal.
As to the Hardesty appeal, the unresolved
property issues pending at the time of the statute’s repeal
should have been governed by the law in effect at the time of
the effective date of the final judgment.
Thus, on remand, the
trial court is directed to treat both pensions (valued as of the
time of dissolution) as marital property.
The judgments of the Shelby Circuit Court are vacated,
and both matters are remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT JOYCE
RIDDLE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CHRIS
RIDDLE:
David W. Williams
Simpsonville, Kentucky
Christopher W. Broaddus
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT HARRY
FLOOD HARDESTY:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE PAMELA RAY
HARDESTY:
Richard J. Head
Louisville, Kentucky
Joseph Y. Yates
New Castle, Kentucky
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