DAN HALLAHAN v. THE COURIER-JOURNAL
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RENDERED:
June 25, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2003-CA-000526-MR
DAN HALLAHAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOM McDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-005176
THE COURIER-JOURNAL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE;1 SCHRODER AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Dan Hallahan appeals from an opinion and order
of the Jefferson Circuit Court that granted summary judgment to
The Courier-Journal and dismissed Hallahan’s complaint for
employment related disability discrimination brought pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 344.
I.
1
We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Judge Emberton concurred in this opinion prior to his retirement effective
June 2, 2004.
Hallahan became employed at The Courier-Journal in the
sales department in May 1986 while attending college.
In 1990,
he was transferred to the circulation department and eventually
promoted to the position of Metro Division Manager.
As a
division manager in the company’s main offices, Hallahan’s job
duties included supervising 30 to 40 newspaper carriers,
training carriers, placing carriers in open delivery routes,
delivering newspapers to customers who did not receive a
newspaper, filling in temporarily when a carrier was
unavailable, and other related general customer services.
In early 1998, The Courier-Journal decided that as a
part of a restructuring plan related to the delivery of
newspapers, all division managers, including Hallahan, would be
relocated from the main offices in downtown Louisville to
various distribution centers where the bulk newspapers were
received from the printer and redistributed to individual
carriers for designated surrounding areas.
In conjunction with
these new distribution procedures, division managers were
required to remove the newspapers from the semi-trailer delivery
trucks and distribute the bundled newspapers to the individual
carriers under their supervision.
In addition, division
managers became personally responsible for delivering individual
newspapers to customers who received no or incomplete
newspapers.
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In March 1998, Hallahan relocated to a distribution
center from the main downtown offices and assumed the abovedescribed additional responsibilities requiring him to
physically handle heavy bundles of newspapers, which he had not
done previously.
Hallahan alleges that as a result of the
physical labor and lifting required, he injured his lower back2
in August 1998 but continued working.
Hallahan states that he
gave his supervisor an admittedly vague note from his physician
in December 1998, which recommended restrictions on his lifting
at work.3
In January 1999, Chris Bauscher became Hallahan’s new
direct supervisor.
Hallahan claims that even after notifying
Bauscher of his back problem, Bauscher told him that he needed
someone that could do the manual labor and that if he could not,
he needed to leave.
Hallahan asserts that he felt compelled to
continue to do some lifting of newspaper bundles, but other
employees helped him when they were available.
In late July or early August 1999, Hallahan applied
for an open position in single copy sales, but he was not
interviewed for and did not receive the position.
Although
2
In August-September 1998, Hallahan was diagnosed as having spinal stenosis
and a mild herniation of a lumbar disc. He filed an application for workers’
compensation in February 2000, which was ultimately denied because he was
unable to establish work-related causation for his impairment.
3
The Courier-Journal has no record that Hallahan furnished this information
to his supervisors.
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admitting he has no firm supporting evidence, Hallahan contends
that the failure to even give him a courtesy interview was
related to the restrictions associated with his spinal
condition.
Shortly thereafter, Hallahan discovered a note in
his personnel file stating that while his performance was
satisfactory under prior evaluation standards, it would be
considered unsatisfactory under newer standards.
The
circumstances surrounding placement of the note in his file are
unknown.
In September 1999, Hallahan applied for an open
position as State Division Manager, which had duties and salary
similar to the job he was performing except that it involved a
rural area in Indiana with delivery boxes along roadways.
Hallahan asserts that Tom Campbell, the supervisor of the State
Division, initially encouraged him to apply for the position,
but Campbell later expressed reservations based on Hallahan’s
physical limitations.
Hallahan was not hired for the State
Division Manager’s position, but The Courier-Journal provided
evidence that Campbell had no authority over the decision on
filling that position.
In October 1999, Bauscher gave Hallahan a written
reprimand that detailed several instances of violations of
company policies occurring between September 1 and October 20,
1999.
In the letter, Bauscher identified one incident where
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Hallahan had placed a carrier on a route prior to completing the
requirement that the carrier be bonded; one incident where
Hallahan allowed a carrier to be hired for a route without
proper training resulting in faulty performance; and seven
incidents where Hallahan failed to deliver replacement
newspapers to customers who had not received their newspapers
from the carrier.
Bauscher warned Hallahan that additional
violations of company policies would result in further
disciplinary action up to and including termination.
In November 1999, Hallahan met with several
supervisors including Bauscher concerning his physical
limitations after he complained to Paula Warman, the Employee
Relations Manager, about his difficulty in performing the manual
labor associated with his job.
In the meeting, Hallahan was
told that his physical restrictions would be accommodated by not
requiring him to lift or move newspaper bundles out of the
delivery trucks, but instead allowing him to use a pushcart.
Hallahan alleges that even after this meeting, he was required
to do some lifting of heavy bundles of newspapers and carrying
newspapers in a shoulder bag on routes while replacing absent
carriers.
Following the meeting, in late November 1999,
Hallahan provided a written statement from his family physician
stating that he should not do any heavy lifting or lifting above
the shoulder level.
After requesting clarification, The
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Courier-Journal received a second letter from Hallahan’s
physician stating that Hallahan should not be required to bend
or lift objects over 20 pounds, or lift his arms above chest
level.
On February 9, 2000, company management and human
resources personnel met with Hallahan concerning new policy
violations occurring after the October 1999 written reprimand
that were similar to the prior violations.
For instance, on two
occasions in early February 2000, Hallahan failed to deliver
nine replacement newspapers, and in late January, he again
allowed a carrier to be placed on a route without personally
orienting him to the route.
Hallahan argued that he had not
received the messages on his pager about the replacement
newspapers and that the carrier was experienced and was familiar
with the new route.
On February 21, 2000, The Courier-Journal
notified Hallahan in writing that he was being terminated for
repeated policy violations after having received a prior
reprimand and warning concerning additional violations.
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 27, 2001, Hallahan filed a complaint for
disability discrimination and retaliation pursuant to The
Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344 et seq.
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He claimed that The
Courier-Journal denied him alleged promotions to the State
Division Manager, Division Manager in another area, and Single
Copy Sales positions, and terminated his employment because of
The Courier-Journal’s perception about his lower back condition.
Hallahan stated that non-disabled employees with less experience
and education had been hired for the positions he did not
receive.
On April 16, 2002, The Courier-Journal filed a motion
for summary judgment arguing that Hallahan had failed to present
evidence that he was disabled or regarded as disabled, or that
he suffered an adverse employment action because of his alleged
disability under the standards applicable to a disability cause
of action.
The Courier-Journal suggested that Hallahan was
terminated because of inadequate job performance.
On May 23,
2002, Hallahan filed a response contending there was sufficient
evidence that he had been perceived as having a disability and
was treated differently because of his lower back condition.
He
asserted that The Courier-Journal fabricated the claim of
inadequate performance in order to justify terminating him.
On
July 22, 2002, the trial court entered a brief opinion and order
denying the motion for summary judgment based on a finding that
genuine issues of material fact were in dispute.
In preparation for trial, on October 2, 2002, the
parties entered into and filed joint stipulations narrowing the
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issues.
Hallahan stipulated that he did not have a “disability”
as defined in the disability discrimination statute while
employed at The Courier-Journal, and that his only remaining
claim was based on the ground that The Courier-Journal regarded
him as having an impairment that substantially limited the major
life activity of working.
Given Hallahan’s abandonment of some
of his claims, on November 8, 2002, The Courier-Journal filed a
renewed motion for summary judgment.
It again argued that there
was insufficient evidence that management at The Courier-Journal
regarded Hallahan as disabled or that he suffered any adverse
treatment in his employment because of an alleged disability.
In response, Hallahan asserted that The Courier-Journal’s
arguments were barred by res judicata because the trial court
had previously denied summary judgment raising the same grounds.
The Courier-Journal filed a reply stating that res judicata does
not apply in this situation.
On February 11, 2003, the trial court entered an
opinion and order granting The Courier-Journal’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Hallahan’s complaint.
The court
held that res judicata did not apply because the first order
denying summary judgment was not a final order, and there was no
evidence showing that The Courier-Journal had perceived Hallahan
as having a disability that substantially limited a major life
activity.
This appeal followed.
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III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court
grants a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial court
correctly found there were no genuine issues as to any material
fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Palmer v. International Ass’n of Machinists,
Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1994); Stewart v. University of
Louisville, Ky. App., 65 S.W.3d 536, 540 (2001); Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
The movant bears the initial
burden of convincing the court by evidence of record that no
genuine issue of fact is in dispute, and then the burden shifts
to the party opposing summary judgment to present “at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (1991).
See also City of
Florence, Kentucky v. Chipman, Ky., 38 S.W.3d 387, 390 (2001).
“The party opposing summary judgment cannot rely on their own
claims or arguments without significant evidence in order to
prevent a summary judgment.”
Wymer v. JH Properties, Inc., Ky.,
50 S.W.3d 195, 199 (2001)(citing Harker v. Federal Land Bank of
Louisville, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 226 (1984)).
The court must view
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
resolve all doubts in his favor.
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Commonwealth v. Whitworth,
Ky., 74 S.W.3d 695, 698 (2002); Lipsteuer v. CSX Transportation,
Inc., Ky., 37 S.W.3d 732, 736 (2000).
"The inquiry should be
whether, from the evidence of record, facts exist which would
make it possible for the nonmoving party to prevail.
In the
analysis, the focus should be on what is of record rather than
what might be presented at trial."
Welch v. American Publishing
Co. of Kentucky, Ky., 3 S.W.3d 724, 730 (1999).
See also Murphy
v. Second Street Corp., Ky. App., 48 S.W.3d 571, 573 (2001).
An
appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision on
summary judgment and will review the issue de novo because only
legal questions and no factual findings are involved.
See Lewis
v. B & R Corp., Ky. App., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (2001); Barnette v.
Hospital of Louisa, Inc., Ky. App., 64 S.W.3d 828, 829 (2002).4
4
We note that Hallahan has not challenged the trial court’s decision that it
was not precluded from granting The Courier-Journal’s second summary judgment
motion after denying the first because of res judicata. Nonetheless, we
agree with the trial court that res judicata is not applicable because the
first order denying the summary judgment motion was not a final judgment and
it did not involve a separate, collateral proceeding. See generally Yeoman
v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 459 (1998). The more
applicable doctrine, which Hallahan failed to raise, is law of the case. The
doctrine of law of the case establishes a presumption that a ruling made at
one stage of a lawsuit will be adhered to throughout the lawsuit. See
Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 148 (2nd Cir. 1999). Res
judicata regulates judicial affairs in subsequent actions following a final
judgment; whereas, law of the case involves issue preclusion in the same case
prior to final judgment. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Sav-A-Lot of
Winchester, 291 F.3d 392, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2002); N.L.R.B. v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Buffalo, Inc., 55 F.3d 74, 77 (2nd Cir. 1995). A judge has
discretionary authority to reconsider a ruling. See, e.g., CR 54.02; 18B
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4478.1 (2d ed. 2002). Generally, a judge may reexamine an
earlier ruling and rescind it if he has a reasonable conviction that it was
wrong and it would not cause undue prejudice to the party that benefited from
it. See Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th
Cir. 1995); Pacific Employers, 291 F.3d at 398 (court may reconsider prior
determination under abuse of discretion standard of review). It is well
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Given similar language and the stated purpose of KRS Chapter 344
to embody the federal civil rights statutes, including the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), this court may look to
federal case law in interpreting the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
with respect to Hallahan’s claim of disability discrimination
under KRS 344.040.
See, e.g., Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, Ky.,
127 S.W.3d 589 (2003)(citing Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. v. Murphy,
Ky., 52 S.W.3d 540, 544 (2001)); Noel v. Elk Brand Mfg. Co., Ky.
App., 53 S.W.3d 95 (2000); Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149
F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 1998); Summers v. Middleton & Reutlinger,
P.S.C., 214 F.Supp.2d 751, 755 (W.D. Ky. 2002); KRS
344.020(1)(a); compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)(1) with KRS
344.040(1).
IV. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
A. Prima Facie Case
established that a trial court may reconsider and grant summary judgment to a
party subsequent to an earlier denial. See 18B Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4478.1, at 699-700; Curran v. Kwon, 153 F.3d 481,
486-87 (7th Cir. 1998)(denial of the first motion for summary judgment was not
the law of the case so as to bar allowance of a second motion); Fisher v.
Trainor, 242 F.3d 24, 29 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001)(indicating it is simply wrong to
say that denial of summary judgment forecloses a subsequent grant of summary
judgment under law of the case). Hallahan failed to establish undue
prejudice from the trial court’s action. Accordingly, the trial court was
not precluded from and did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering its
prior decision denying summary judgment.
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Under KRS 344.040(1), it is unlawful for an employer
to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because the person is a “qualified individual with a
disability.”
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination
against the defendant.5
Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care System,
355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004); Snead v. Metropolitan Property &
Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2001).
In order to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on a
5
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has created two procedural sets of
criteria for establishing a disability discrimination claim based on the use
of direct or circumstantial evidence. Where the plaintiff presents direct
evidence of disability discrimination, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing: (1) that he is disabled; (2) that he is “otherwise qualified”
for the position despite his disability: (a) without accommodation from the
employer; (b) with an alleged “essential” job requirement eliminated; or (c)
with a proposed reasonable accommodation. The employer bears the burden of
proving that a challenged job criterion is essential, and therefore a
business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will impose an undue
hardship on the employer. Where the plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence, he may present a prima facie case of disability discrimination by
showing: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is “otherwise qualified” for the
position with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he suffered an adverse
employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of the
plaintiff’s disability; and (5) the position remained open while the employer
sought other applicants or the disabled plaintiff was replaced. The employer
must then offer a legitimate explanation for its action. If the employer
satisfies this burden of production, the plaintiff must introduce evidence
showing that the proffered explanation is pretextual. See Monette v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996); Hedrick v.
Western Reserve Care System, 355 F.3d 444, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2004). The latter
prima facie scheme is derived from the burden shifting approach developed for
discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The Sixth Circuit has stated that “[t]he direct
evidence and circumstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive; a
plaintiff need only prove one or the other, not both.” Kline v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 128 F.3d 337, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1997)(involving age and race
discrimination). This dual procedural paradigm does not affect the outcome
in the current case because both paths require the plaintiff to establish
that he is “disabled” under the statute, which we find Hallahan did not do.
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disability, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that he had a
disability as that term is used under the statute (i.e., the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act in this case); (2) that he was
“otherwise qualified” to perform the requirements of the job,
with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that he
suffered an adverse employment decision because of the
disability.
See Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 649 (6th
Cir. 2001); Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 475 (1st Cir.
2003); Cameron v. Community Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335
F.3d 60, 63 (2nd Cir. 2003).
Under KRS 344.010(4), a “disability” is defined as:
(a) A physical or mental impairment6 that
substantially limits one (1) or more of the
major life activities of the individual;
(b) A record of such an impairment; or
(c) Being regarded as having such an
impairment.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Whether the plaintiff has an
impairment and whether the conduct affected by the impairment is
a major life activity under the statute are legal questions.
See Doebele v. Sprint/United Management Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1129
(10th Cir. 2003).
The ultimate determination of whether the
impairment substantially limits the major life activity
generally is a factual issue for the jury, but it may be
6
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) regulations include
musculoskeletal disorders or conditions within the definition of physical
impairments. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).
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resolved upon summary judgment under the appropriate
circumstances.
Id. at 1130 n.5.
See also Bristol v. Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Clear Creek, 281 F.3d
1148, 1157-60 (10th Cir. 2002).
While The Courier-Journal disputes whether the failure
to hire Hallahan for the other positions within the company
constituted adverse employment decisions because they would have
been lateral transfers, see, e.g., Mercer v. Brunt, 299
F.Supp.2d 21, 29 (D.Conn. 2004)(failure to grant lateral
transfer not an adverse employment action), we need not
determine that question because his termination clearly was an
adverse action under the law.
See Snead, 237 F.3d at 1089;
Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1115 (7th Cir.
2001).
Furthermore, Hallahan was “otherwise qualified” for the
job positions.
Consequently, we will assume that Hallahan could
satisfy the second and third elements of his prima facie case.
The central issue is whether he was “disabled” under the
statute.
B.
“Regarded As” Basis for Disability Claim
In the current case, Hallahan has admitted that he was
not actually disabled and does not assert a claim based on a
record of impairment, but relies solely on the “regarded as”
basis for his claim.
As with actual impairments, the perceived
impairment under the “regarded as” prong must be one that, if
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real, would substantially limit a major life activity of an
individual.
See Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., 357 F.3d
1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2004).
In Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149-50, 144 L.Ed.2d
450 (1999), the Supreme Court stated that an individual may fall
within the provision for being “regarded as” having a disability
if:
(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes
that a person has a physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life
activities, or (2) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that an actual,
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits
one or more major life activities. In both
cases, it is necessary that a covered entity
entertain misperceptions about the
individual-it must believe either that one
has a substantially limiting impairment that
one does not have or that one has a
substantially limiting impairment when, in
fact, the impairment is not so limiting.
See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l).
The Court noted that the purpose
of the “regarded as” prong is to cover individuals rejected from
a job because of the myths, fears and stereotypes associated
with disabilities.
527 U.S. at 489-90, 119 S.Ct. at 2150
(citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(l)).
The record suggests, and The Courier-Journal does not
contest, that Hallahan had a physical impairment, i.e., a
herniated lumbar disc, that somewhat restricted his physical
activities.
The mere fact that The Courier-Journal had
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knowledge of Hallahan’s medical problems, however, was not
sufficient to show that it regarded him as having a disabling
impairment.
See Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 109
(3rd Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93
F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996); Conant v. City of Hibbing, 271
F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2001).
In analyzing whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity, these two factors should be
considered in tandem with respect to the particular individual
claimant and life activity.
The Supreme Court has noted that
generally, “substantially” suggests “considerable” or “specified
to a large degree.”
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491, 119 S.Ct. at 2150.
See also Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir.
2002)(noting that “substantially limits” and “major life
activities” are terms of art under the statutes).
defines “substantially limited” as meaning:
The EEOC
“(i) unable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or (ii) significantly restricted
as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform the same
major life activity.”
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
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C.
“Working” as “Major Life Activity”
According to his stipulations, Hallahan relies on the
major life activity of “working” to support his claim.7
The
issue of whether a plaintiff’s impairment substantially limits
the major life activity of working involves a multi-level
analysis of the particular plaintiff’s job skills and the nature
of the jobs he was prevented from performing as well as those he
is still able to perform.
The inquiry looks to the specific
plaintiff’s education level, training, job skills, expertise,
and knowledge in relation to his actual and potential employment
status.
Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 F.3d
54, 59 (1st Cir. 2001); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. at
2147 (“The definition of disability also requires that
disabilities be evaluated ‘with respect to an individual’ and be
determined based on whether an impairment substantially limits
the ‘major life activities of such individual.’ [42 U.S.C.] §
12102(2).
Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA
is an individualized inquiry.”); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. §
7
The Supreme Court in Sutton questioned and recognized the conceptual
difficulty in classifying working as a major life activity because it in
effect creates a circular argument - i.e., if one is excluded from working
because of an impairment then he is disabled and one is disabled because he
is excluded from working or in other words the inability to work cannot
logically be both the cause and result of the same disability – but decided
not to exclude it from the category of major life activities. 527 U.S. at
492, 119 S.Ct. at 2151. See also Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358
F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2004)(discussing analytical problems with including working
as a major life activity). But see Reed L. Russell, Arguing for More
Principled Decision Making in Deciding Whether an Individual is Substantially
Limited in the Major Life Activity of Working under the ADA, 47 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 1057 (1998).
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1630.2(j)(“The determination of whether an individual has a
disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of
the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that
impairment on the life of the individual”).
impairment work history may be relevant.
A plaintiff’s post-
Gelabert-Ladenheim,
252 F.3d at 59; Pollard v. High’s of Baltimore, Inc., 281 F.3d
462, 471 (4th Cir. 2002)(obtaining a new job is evidence that an
impairment is not substantially limiting).
A plaintiff must
also show that his impairment significantly restricts his
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs, and not just his current or a single job.
U.S. at 491-92, 119 S.Ct. at 2151.
Sutton, 527
The EEOC regulations provide
with respect to the major life activity of working:
(i) The term substantially limits means
significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared
to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular
job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of
working.
(ii) In addition to the factors listed in
paragraph (j)(2)8 of this section, the
following factors may be considered in
determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in the major life
activity of “working”:
8
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) lists the following factors: (i) The nature and
severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
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(A)
The geographical area to which
the individual has reasonable
access;
(B)
The job from which the
individual has been
disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number and
types of jobs utilizing
similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within
that geographical area, from
which the individual is also
disqualified because of the
impairment (class of jobs);
and/or
(C)
The job from which the
individual has been
disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number and
types of other jobs not
utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills or
abilities, within that
geographical area, from which
the individual is also
disqualified because of the
impairment (broad range of
jobs in various classes).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(3).
As a result, a plaintiff must
demonstrate not only that the employer thought that he was
impaired in his ability to do the particular job, but also that
the employer regarded him as substantially impaired in either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523, 119
S.Ct. 2133, 2138, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999); Sullivan v. Neiman
Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d at 117; Colwell v Suffolk County
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Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 647 (2nd Cir. 1998); Henderson v.
Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d at 651-52; Cooper v. Olin Corp.,
Winchester Division, 246 F.3d 1083, 1089-90 (8th Cir. 2001); Cash
v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2000); Doebele v.
Spring/United Management Co., 342 F.3d at 1133.
Hallahan contends that the trial court incorrectly
concluded there was insufficient evidence that The CourierJournal perceived him as having a disability.
He asserts that
the trial court erroneously discounted alleged direct evidence
of discrimination consisting of Tom Campbell’s statements
suggesting that Hallahan was not offered the State Division
Manager’s position because of his back condition.
Direct
evidence of an unlawful employment practice is evidence that
directly reflects the alleged animus and that bears squarely on
the contested employment decision.
See Patten v. Wal-Mart
Stores East, Inc., 300 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002); Deneen v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 436 (8th Cir.
1998)(direct evidence is that which demonstrates a specific link
between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged
employment decision sufficient to support a finding by a
reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually
motivated the employer’s decision to take the adverse employment
action); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir.
1999)(direct evidence is evidence that in and of itself suggests
-20-
someone with managerial authority was animated by an illegal
employment criterion). However, direct evidence does not include
stray remarks in the workplace, statements by decision-makers
unrelated to the decisional process itself, or statements by
nondecision-makers.
Crock v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261
F.Supp.2d 1101, 1114 (S.D. Iowa 2003).
See also Patten, supra;
Sheehan, supra; Spivey v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 246 F.Supp.2d 714,
720 (W.D.Ky. 2003).9
While Tom Campbell was the supervisor of
the State Division, The Courier-Journal presented evidence that
he had no role in the decisions to fill the position, which
Hallahan failed to rebut.
Tom Campbell also was not involved in
the decisions concerning the other positions and Hallahan’s
termination.
1.
Substantial Impairment in Class of Jobs
or Broad Range of Jobs
Even assuming that Campbell’s statement reflected the
attitude of the decision-makers at The Courier-Journal, Hallahan
has presented insufficient evidence that The Courier-Journal
perceived him as substantially impaired in either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs.
Hallahan maintains that the
division management position constitutes a class of jobs, but
this view is too restrictive.
9
The cases cited by Hallahan on the relevance of statements by non-decision
makers are distinguishable because none deals with disability discrimination.
-21-
In order to determine a class of jobs, courts may look
to the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills, and ability required to perform the work at
issue, and the geographical area available to the employee.
See
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(3)(ii)(A) and (B).
Common groupings within
a particular industry would be relevant.
See DePaoli v. Abbott
Laboratories, 140 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 1998).
The Supreme
Court stated in Sutton, “To be substantially limited in the
major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from
more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular
job of choice.
If jobs utilizing an individual’s skills (but
perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not
precluded from a substantial class of jobs.”
527 U.S. at 492,
119 S.Ct. at 2151 (plaintiffs regarded as precluded from holding
positions as global airline pilots because of poor vision were
not within a class of jobs because other pilot jobs utilizing
plaintiffs’ skills were available).
See also Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, 527 U.S. at 524-25, 119 S.Ct. at 2138-39
(plaintiffs regarded as unable to perform mechanic job requiring
Department of Transportation certification not within a class of
jobs because other mechanic jobs available); Black v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 297 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2002)(plaintiff excluded
from truck driving jobs on trucks without cruise control because
of knee impairment not substantially limited in class of jobs);
-22-
Shipley v. City of University City, 195 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 1999)
(firefighter position not considered a class of jobs under ADA).
The division manager’s position is a single particular
job, rather than a substantial class of jobs.
Hallahan
presented no evidence on how the training, knowledge, skills or
abilities used in this position applied within the publishing
industry or other jobs in the geographical area.
The lifting of
bundles of newspapers became a part of the division manager’s
position only after The Courier-Journal reorganized its
distribution system.
this employer.
It was only one aspect of the job with
Hallahan has not shown that The Courier-Journal
misperceived him as having an impairment or limitation that
would have disqualified him from any jobs other than those with
this single employer.
Hallahan contends the State Division
Manager’s job in Indiana that he was denied required less
strenuous physical activity, but denial of a particular job of
his choice likewise does not concern a substantial class of
jobs.
Thus, Hallahan has not shown that The Courier-Journal
regarded him as being substantially limited in the major life
activity of working.
D. “Lifting” as Major Life Activity
Although Hallahan relies on the major life activity of
working, his impairment and restrictions implicate his ability
to lift items.
Lifting has been recognized as conduct subject
-23-
to inclusion within the definition of major life activities.
See, e.g., Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 684 (8th
Cir. 2003); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service, Inc., 283 F.3d
11, 21 (1st Cir. 2002); Rakity v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 302
F.3d 1152, 1158 (10th Cir. 2002); Henderson v. Ardco, Inc.,
supra; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(i).
In Toyota Motor
Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct.
681, 691, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002), the Supreme Court defined
“major life activities” other than working as “those activities
that are of central importance to daily life.”
The Court also
held that to be substantially limiting, an impairment must do
more than interfere with the activity in a minor way or for a
temporary period.
“[A]n individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing
activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives.
The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long
term.”
534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. at 691.
Even though Toyota Motor dealt with the activity of
manual tasks, the court in Mack v. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d
776 (7th Cir. 2002), applied the same criteria to a “regarded as”
claim involving the activity of lifting.
We see no basis for confining Toyota’s
analysis to only those cases involving the
specific life activity asserted by the
plaintiff in that case. Toyota’s point was
that an inability to perform “occupation-
-24-
specific” tasks does not necessarily show an
inability to perform the central functions
of daily life, and that analysis applies
equally to the work-related restriction at
issue here. An inability to lift heavy
objects may disqualify a person from
particular jobs but does not necessarily
interfere with the central functions of
daily life. There may well be cases in
which, because of the nature of the
impairment, one could, from the workrestriction alone, infer a broader
limitation on a major life activity. An
inability to lift even a pencil on the job
might suggest an inability to lift a
toothbrush, for example, or to otherwise
care for oneself-or at least might support
an inference that the employer believed the
employee was so limited. But the work
restriction in this case was not nearly of
that nature, and instead fits neatly into
the sort of occupation-specific limitation
at issue in Toyota. Under Toyota, evidence
of such a restriction, without more, is
insufficient to show a substantial
limitation on a major life activity.
Furthermore, while Toyota did not address
a claim that the employee was regarded as
disabled, its analysis still controls in this
case. Under the ADA, the concepts of
“substantially limits” and “major life
activity” are the same whether the employee is
proceeding under a claim that she is actually
disabled or regarded as disabled.
308 F.3d at 781 (citations omitted).
See also EEOC v. United
Parcel Service, Inc, 306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2002)(applying Toyota
Motor’s requirement that impairment significantly affect daily
life to visual impairment); Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d
1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2003)(finding Toyota Motor’s analysis
-25-
applicable to claims involving life activities of gripping,
reaching, lifting, standing and walking).
Hallahan suffered from a back impairment with
restrictions from his physician that were conveyed to The
Courier-Journal that he not be required to lift objects over
twenty pounds above shoulder level, but that “working at the
waist level is certainly acceptable.”
Several cases have found
that employers who perceived employees with lifting restrictions
comparable to Hallahan’s were not liable for discrimination
because the impairment did not qualify as substantially limiting
the major activities of lifting or working.
See, e.g., Pryor v.
Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024 (5th Cir. 1998)(no repetitive lifting
over 20 pounds or constant lifting over 10 pounds); Helfter v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 115 F.3d 613 (8th Cir.
1997)(frequent lifting of 10 pounds); Thompson v. Holy Family
Hospital, 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1997)(lifting no more than 25
pounds continuously); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc.,
110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997)(frequent lifting of 10 pounds);
Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635 (2nd Cir.
1998)(10-20 pound lifting restriction); Williams v. Channel
Master Satellite Systems, Inc., 101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 1996)(25
pound lifting limitation not significant restriction on ability
to lift or work).
A general lifting restriction without
evidence that it significantly impacts the ability to perform
-26-
major life activities is insufficient.
See, e.g., Helfter, 115
F.3d at 613 (conclusory statements of impact on daily life
activities insufficient).
Where an impairment is not so severe
that it is substantially limiting on its face, a plaintiff must
present evidence showing that his restriction reduces his
capabilities below those of an average person.
See Lusk v.
Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001).
Under the “regarded as” prong, the plaintiff must show that the
employer misperceived the existence or extent of the plaintiff’s
limitation of his daily life activities.
Id.
Hallahan has
presented no evidence that The Courier-Journal perceived him as
limited in tasks associated with daily life.
In the recent case of Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave,
Ky., 127 S.W.3d 589 (2003), the Kentucky Supreme Court applied
the Toyota Motor analysis in finding that Schave failed to show
that his employer regarded him as substantially limited in any
major life activities under KRS 344.010 because of a shoulder
impairment that limited his ability to lift frequently more than
40 pounds over his head.
The Court held that while the employer
felt Schave was not able to return to work as a milk-peddle
driver, he did not show that the employer perceived him as not
qualified to perform a broad range of jobs or that he was
significantly restricted in the central functions of daily life.
-27-
In the current case, Hallahan established that he
suffered a spinal impairment that led his physician to recommend
restrictions on his lifting over 25 pounds above his shoulders.
Viewing the evidence favorably to him, Hallahan failed to
present evidence even creating an inference that The CourierJournal misperceived his impairment as precluding him from a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, or severely restricting
his ability to perform tasks central to daily life.
As a
result, Hallahan failed to create a genuine issue of material
fact that he was “disabled” because he was regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activities of work or
lifting.
Thus, the trial court did not err in holding that
there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and
that The Courier-Journal was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-28-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Grant S. Roark
Louisville, Kentucky
Jon L. Fleischaker
Ashley C. Pack
Louisville, Kentucky
-29-
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