STEWART SERVICES, INC. v. TILFORD MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.
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RENDERED: May 7, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000523-MR
STEWART SERVICES, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00556
TILFORD MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Stewart Services, Inc. (“Stewart”) appeals
from an order of the McCracken Circuit Court, entered December
11, 2002, granting summary judgment in favor of Tilford
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (“Tilford”).
Having carefully
reviewed the record, the arguments presented herein by counsel
and the applicable law, we affirm in part, reverse in part and
remand.
In order to fully decide the arguments presented by
Stewart in this appeal, we begin with a careful examination of
the long and litigious relationship between Stewart and Tilford.
Three separate pieces of litigation involving these two parties
must be examined:
97-CI-004170 in the Jefferson Circuit Court,
02-CI-00430 in the McCracken Circuit Court, and the subject of
this appeal, 98-CI-00556 in the McCracken Circuit Court.
All
three actions arose out of a contract between Tilford and
Stewart for the performance of mechanical and plumbing work.
In October 1995, Western Baptist Hospital entered into
a $29 million construction contract with Centex Rodgers
Construction Company (“Centex”) for the renovation and
construction of its hospital facilities in Paducah, Kentucky.
Centex entered into a first-tier subcontract with Stewart, whose
home offices are located in Louisville, Kentucky, in January
1996.
Stewart agreed to perform all mechanical, plumbing and
fire protection work on the contract in exchange for Centex
paying it approximately 7.2 million dollars.
That same month,
Stewart entered into a second-tier subcontract with Tilford, a
Paducah company, to perform all of the mechanical and plumbing
installation for approximately 3.7 million dollars.
Under the terms of the contract, Tilford was required
to perform its work in accordance with the designs of Earl
Swensson, Architect and Phoenix Design Group Incorporated.
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Problems arose when Tilford commenced its work only to discover
that the electrical contractor had installed electrical conduits
at the precise location where Tilford was to install the
plumbing and mechanical systems.
Moreover, the designs supplied
by the architect turned out to be defective, necessitating
approximately 1,500 changes.
As a result of these numerous
design changes, Tilford incurred approximately one million
dollars in additional costs before its work was complete.
Tilford requested extra compensation from Stewart for its
additional costs, which Stewart denied.
In response, Stewart
withheld a portion of the money due Tilford because Tilford
refused to sign a release.
In April 1997, Tilford filed an arbitration claim
against Stewart in accordance with the provisions of the
contract between them.
On July 25, 1997 Stewart filed a motion
in Jefferson Circuit Court, assigned case number 97-CI-004170,
seeking to stay arbitration.
The Jefferson Circuit Court first
entered an order denying the motion to stay.
However, after
Stewart filed a motion to vacate the original order, the circuit
court reversed itself and granted a stay in the arbitration
proceedings.
On appeal, a panel of this Court reversed the
Jefferson Circuit Court after finding that the arbitration
clause applied even though Stewart never issued a change order
authorizing any modifications in Tilford’s work.
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Tilford
Contractors, Inc. v. Stewart Services, Ky. App., 1997-CA-003059MR (not-to-be published opinion rendered March 26, 1999).
Stewart’s petition for rehearing was denied on May 6, 1999, and
the Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review on
November 10, 1999.
On remand, Tilford and Stewart executed an agreed
order to proceed with arbitration.
In September and October
2000, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) held five
days of hearings into Tilford’s claims against Stewart.
The AAA
found that Stewart had breached its contract with Tilford and
awarded Tilford $1,005,894.37 in damages.
On January 10, 2001,
the AAA denied Stewart’s request to modify this award.
Thereafter, Stewart filed a motion in the Jefferson Circuit
Court to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrators exceeded
their authority.
On May 23, 2001, the Jefferson Circuit Court issued an
opinion and order overruling Stewart’s request to vacate the
arbitration award.
Instead, on July 19, 2001, the trial court
granted Tilford’s motion to confirm the arbitration award.
However, on December 11, 2001, the trial court entered an order
stating that the arbitration award was not a judgment upon which
Tilford could execute.
Apparently, the court believed that the
arbitration award established that Tilford was only entitled to
collect damages due to Stewart’s breach of contract, but did not
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specify from whom Tilford was entitled to collect due to the
pass-through nature of the claims.
The Jefferson Circuit Court
opined that Tilford must file an additional action in order to
collect damages against Stewart.
Consequently, Tilford filed a
petition for a declaration of rights and motion for summary
judgment in McCracken Circuit Court, case number 02-CI-00430.
Stewart responded by filing a motion to dismiss case number 02CI-00430, arguing that this action was barred by abatement
because the same parties were already litigating the same
matters before the McCracken Circuit Court in case number 98-CI00556.
On October 25, 2002, the McCracken Circuit Court
dismissed 02-CI-00430 with prejudice, thereby denying Tilford’s
motion for declaratory judgment.
this decision.
A panel of this Court affirmed
Tilford Contractors, Inc. v. Stewart Services,
Ky. App., 2002-CA-002436-MR (not-to-be published opinion
rendered February 6, 2004).
Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, Tilford had
already filed a complaint against Stewart in the McCracken
Circuit Court.
This complaint, assigned case number 98-CI-
00556, was later amended to add Centex and Western Baptist
Hospital as defendants.
In May 2000, the McCracken Circuit
Court stayed this case pending the outcome of the arbitration
proceedings between Tilford and Stewart.
After the arbitration
award was entered, Tilford filed a motion in this particular
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case to confirm the arbitration award.
The McCracken Circuit
Court denied Tilford’s motion citing lack of jurisdiction, but
granted motions for summary judgment in favor of Centex and
Western Baptist Hospital.
On December 11, 2002, the trial court
denied Stewart’s motion for summary judgment against Tilford and
granted Tilford summary judgment in the amount of $1,005,894.37,
despite the fact that Tilford never filed a motion for summary
judgment against Stewart.
The trial court denied Stewart’s
motion to alter, amend or vacate this judgment.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Stewart presents several arguments for our
review supporting its contention that the trial court
erroneously granted summary judgment to Tilford.
First, Stewart
argues that Tilford was not entitled to summary judgment because
Tilford failed to file a motion for summary judgment.
We find
this assertion to be without merit.
The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Commission, Ky., 637
S.W.2d 626 (1982).
In Green, the Supreme Court held that
Kentucky law permits a trial judge to grant summary judgment in
favor of a party who had not requested it.
Id., at 629.
In
reaching this decision, the Supreme Court found Collins v. Duff,
Ky., 283 S.W.2d 179, 183 (1955) to be dispositive:
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"Collins raises some procedural objections
to the judgment of the Perry Circuit Court.
He maintains that, since the Duffs, as
plaintiffs, did not themselves move for a
summary judgment, but merely opposed his
motion for such judgment, the court could
not enter summary judgment for the
plaintiffs. We do not agree. It is our
opinion that in this kind of situation,
where overruling the defendant's motion for
summary judgment necessarily would require a
determination that the plaintiffs were
entitled to the relief asked, a motion for
summary judgment by the plaintiffs would
have been a useless formality. See Hennessey
v. Federal Security Administrator, D.C., 88
F.Supp. 664; Hooker v. New York Life Ins.
Co., D.C., 66 F.Supp. 313; 3 Moore's Federal
Practice, 1st Ed., sec. 56.02, p. 3183."
Green, 637 S.W.2d at 629-30.
Moreover, in Storer Communications of Jefferson
County, Inc. v. Oldham County Board of Education, Ky. App., 850
S.W.2d 340, 342 (1993), a panel of this Court held that a trial
court has no authority to grant summary judgment to any party
without a motion, proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to
be heard.
Thus, according to Green and Storer, a trial judge
having all of the pertinent issues before him at the time a case
is submitted on a motion for summary judgment would be justified
in considering the propriety in granting summary judgment to the
non-moving party so long as all parties were provided with
notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In the matter before us, we believe that the trial
court did not err in granting summary judgment to Tilford.
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The
record reveals that Stewart filed its motion for summary
judgment on July 3, 2002.
motion on July 26, 2002.
Tilford filed a response to this
The trial court heard oral arguments
from both parties on October 30, 2002 and permitted both parties
to file supplemental pleadings thereafter.
After examining the
pleadings and considering oral arguments, the trial court
determined that the only issue of material fact was whether
Tilford could enforce the arbitration award.
In its December
11, 2002 judgment, the trial court determined that Tilford could
enforce the arbitration award, making Tilford entitled to
judgment against Stewart in the amount of $1,005,894.37 as
determined by the AAA.
Since Stewart filed the original motion
for summary judgment alleging that this was the only issue of
material fact being submitted to the court, received notice of
Tilford’s position and was provided with an opportunity to be
heard, the trial court had all of the pertinent issues before it
at the time the case was submitted for a decision.
We believe
that requiring Tilford to submit a formal motion for summary
judgment would have been a futile measure.
Clearly, we believe
the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Tilford.
Next, Stewart argues that the trial court erred in
finding that Tilford was entitled to declaratory judgment,
sought in case number 02-CI-00430, because the trial court was
too late to sua sponte reverse itself.
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A careful review of the
trial court’s December 11, 2002 order, however, reveals that the
trial court, using hindsight, merely acknowledged that it should
have granted Tilford’s motion for declaratory judgment in 02-CI00430.
The trial court denied Tilford’s motion for declaratory
judgment in 02-CI-00430 because that proceeding was dismissed
pursuant to the rule of abatement.
The rule of abatement holds
that a party to a pending litigation cannot bring a declaratory
judgment action seeking a determination of issues which are the
subjects of another pending litigation.
Gibbs v. Tyree, 287 Ky.
656, 154 S.W.2d 732 (1941); Pritchett v. Marcel, Ky. App., 375
S.W.2d 253 (1963); City of Paducah v. Electric Plant Board, 449
S.W.2d 907 (1970).
As such, the issue that was the subject of
Tilford’s motion for declaratory judgment, whether it was
entitled to enforce the arbitration award, was never decided on
the merits in 02-CI-00430.
Accordingly, there is no indication
from the record that the trial court entered any order sua
sponte reversing its final decision in 02-CI-00430.
Instead, we
perceive that the trial court was merely commenting upon what
action it should have previously taken concerning this issue.
As such, we find this argument to be without merit.
Third, Stewart believes that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to award Tilford summary judgment.
In
support of this argument, Stewart notes that Tilford filed a
notice of appeal on November 22, 2002, to this Court after the
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McCracken Circuit Court, in 02-CI-00430, denied Tilford’s motion
for declaratory judgment and dismissed that action.
According
to Stewart, this notice of appeal automatically transfers
jurisdiction of all matters pending before the trial court from
the trial court to this Court.
Stewart’s assertion is simply
contrary to both the facts of this matter as well as Kentucky
law.
It is well settled in Kentucky that a second action based
on the same cause will generally be abated where there is a
prior action pending in a court of competent jurisdiction within
the same state, between the same parties, involving the same or
substantially the same subject matter and cause of action.
Brooks Erection Co. v. William R. Montgomery & Associates, Inc.,
Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 273, 275 (1979).
Upon the abatement of the
second action, the court is free to determine and adjudge the
rights of the parties in the first action.
Id.
Here, this
Court ruled that the trial court, upon Stewart’s urging,
properly dismissed 02-CI-00430 pursuant to the doctrine of
abatement.
As such, it is clear that the trial court was free
to consider and finally adjudicate all issues presented by these
parties in 98-CI-00556.
Therefore, Stewart’s argument
concerning this issue is completely without merit.
Next, Stewart argues that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to Tilford because the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s proceedings and its December 20, 2001 order are
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res judicata concerning Tilford’s entitlement to a money
judgment.
Again, we disagree.
In order to fully address this issue, we must again
explore the proceedings and orders of the Jefferson Circuit
Court. In November 2000, the AAA rendered its arbitration
judgment in favor of Tilford.
Pursuant to the Kentucky
Arbitration Act, Tilford moved the Jefferson Circuit Court to
enforce the arbitration award.
In an order entered July 19,
2001, the Jefferson Circuit Court stated:
The Court confirms the arbitration award as
it is written. The case sub judice was not
brought to determine who shall pay the award
or when it shall be paid, but simply whether
the parties must submit to arbitration.
Nothing in the Court of Appeals decision
suggests that the Court must make such a
determination. Therefore, the Court adopts
in its entirety the November 30, 2002
arbitration award, which is attached as an
appendix to this Opinion and Order. Pursuant
to KRS 417.180, this Opinion and Order shall
also serve as an enforceable judgment and is
entitled to enforcement just as any other
judgment or decree.
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
that the Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award
brought by defendant, Tilford Contractors,
Inc., be and is hereby GRANTED and the
November 30, 2002 arbitrator’s award is
adopted in its entirety.
Thus, the Jefferson Circuit Court’s July 19, 2001
order confirmed: (i) the AAA award; (ii) declared that the only
issue before it was simply whether the parties must submit to
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arbitration; (iii) noted that this Court, in its unpublished
opinion rendered March 26, 1999, did not require the Jefferson
Circuit Court to determine to whom or when the arbitration award
should be paid; (iv) adopted the arbitration award in its
entirety; and (v) ordered that this award is an enforceable
judgment.
Yet, in an order entered December 20, 2001, the
Jefferson Circuit Court amended its July 19, 2001 order “to
provide that said Opinion and Order is not a judgment for the
payment of money against Stewart Services, Inc. upon which
Defendant, Tilford Contractors, Inc., may execute.”
With this
order, the Jefferson Circuit Court reinforced its belief that it
only possessed jurisdiction to determine if these parties were
required to arbitrate their differences.
In other words, the
December 20, 2001 order appears to absolve the Jefferson Circuit
Court from determining whether Tilford could enforce the
arbitration award against Stewart.
Eventually, the McCracken Circuit Court addressed the
primary issue that dominates this appeal, that being whether
Stewart must pay Tilford $1,005,894.37 as determined by the AAA.
The trial court, in its December 11, 2002 order, found that the
AAA award had been confirmed by the Jefferson Circuit Court and
granted Tilford summary judgment for the amount listed in the
arbitration award.
In essence, the McCracken Circuit Court
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found the Jefferson Circuit Court’s July 19, 2001 order
confirming the arbitration award to be res judicata.
Kentucky courts have thoroughly addressed the meaning
behind the legal doctrine of res judicata.
The doctrine of res
judicata requires a final adjudication on the merits and
identity of parties and subject matter.
Vega v. Kosair
Charities Committee, Inc., Ky. App., 832 S.W.2d 895 (1992);
Haeberle v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Ky.
App., 769 S.W.2d 64 (1989).
Res judicata is not only applicable
“to the issues disposed of in the first action, but to every
point which properly belonged to the subject of the litigation
in the first action and which in the exercise of reasonable
diligence might have been brought forward at the time.”
Egbert
v. Curtis, Ky. App., 695 S.W.2d 123, 124 (1985).
As the orders to the Jefferson Circuit Court clearly
reveal, that court specifically refused to determine the
question of who must pay the arbitration award.
Contrary to
Stewart’s contentions, the action before the Jefferson Circuit
Court was not brought to determine who should pay.
Instead, the
issues before the Jefferson Circuit Court were whether the
parties were required to arbitrate their differences and whether
the arbitration award was valid under KRS 417.160(1).
The
Jefferson Circuit Court confirmed the arbitration award after
specifically finding that the award did not conflict with and
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was rationally derived from the express terms of the subcontract
between these parties.
Thus, the decision by the AAA, and the
Jefferson Circuit Court’s orders of July 19, 2001, and December
20, 2001, each acknowledged that Tilford possessed a judgment
against Stewart, but that the Jefferson Circuit Court was the
improper forum for Tilford to enforce that judgment.
As such,
the AAA award and the Jefferson Circuit Court’s orders
recognizing that judgment are res judicata.
As Stewart correctly notes, the Jefferson Circuit
Court’s decisions only established the amount of money that
Tilford is entitled to collect from Stewart.
Tilford, pursuant
to KRS 417.180, was required to enforce the arbitration award in
its original action before the McCracken Circuit Court.
In its
December 11, 2002 order, the McCracken Circuit Court recognized
that the AAA arbitration award was confirmed by the Jefferson
Circuit Court, acknowledging that those decisions are res
judicata.
As such, the arbitration award, as confirmed by the
Jefferson Circuit Court, is entitled to deference.
Wyandott,
Inc. v. Local 227 UFCW, 205 F.3d 922, 929 (6th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, we believe that the trial court herein properly
recognized that the arbitration award was, in fact, res judicata
and correctly determined that it possessed the authority to
determine whether Stewart was required to pay damages to Tilford
pursuant to that award.
Therefore, we believe the trial court
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correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Tilford since no
genuine issues of material fact ever existed.
Next, Stewart asserts that the trial court erred by
failing to apportion these damages between Tilford, Stewart,
Centex and Western Baptist Hospital.
We reject this assertion
because neither Centex nor Western Baptist Hospital were made
parties to the arbitration proceedings.
Kentucky law clearly
provides that fault cannot be apportioned to entities not named
as parties to the litigation.
Copass v. Monroe County Medical
Foundation, Inc., Ky. App., 900 S.W.2d 617, 619-20 (1995).
Thus, the trial court correctly refused to apportion damages.
Stewart next argues that the trial court erred by not
granting summary judgment in its favor because, under the terms
of the subcontract, it owes no obligation to pay Tilford any
damages awarded by the AAA.
In support of this proposition,
Stewart invites us to examine several provisions of the
subcontract.
We decline this invitation.
Since we have upheld
the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in
Tilford’s favor, Stewart’s assertion that it is entitled to
summary judgment, along with its supporting arguments, are
rendered moot.
Finally, Stewart submits that the trial court
improperly awarded Tilford post-judgment interest on the
arbitration award.
We find this argument to be well taken.
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In its December 11, 2002 order, the McCracken Circuit
Court awarded Tilford post-judgment interest as follows:
[Tilford] is further awarded interest on
said judgment pursuant to the provisions of
KRS 360.040 of twelve (12%) percent
compounded annually from the date the Award
was confirmed by the Jefferson Circuit Court
in its Opinion and Order dated July 19, 2001
until fully paid, for all of which execution
may issue forthwith.
In Kentucky, a prevailing party’s right to recover
post-judgment interest is granted by statute.
KRS 360.040
provides that “[a] judgment shall bear twelve percent (12%)
interest compounded annually from its date.”
The language of
the statute has been interpreted as requiring the imposition of
interest on a judgment unless there are factors which would make
an award of interest inequitable.
App., 655 S.W.2d 41, 42 (1983).
Courtneay v. Wilhoit, Ky.
The statute’s obvious purpose
is to encourage a judgment debtor to promptly comply with the
terms of the judgment and to compensate the judgment creditor
for the judgment debtor’s use of his money.
Stone v. Kentucky
Insurance Guaranty Association, Ky. App., 908 S.W.2d 675, 678
(1995).
Nothing in Kentucky’s Uniform Arbitration Act prohibits
a court from awarding post-judgment interest on an arbitration
award.
In fact, KRS 417.180 specifically provides that upon the
confirmation of an arbitration award by a circuit court, the
prevailing party may enforce that award like a judgment.
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In this matter before us, we have noted that the
Jefferson Circuit Court confirmed Tilford’s arbitration award
against Stewart, but later determined that its confirmation of
that award was not a judgment that Tilford could execute before
it.
Instead, Tilford was required to return to its original
action before the McCracken Circuit Court and obtain a judgment
to enforce the arbitration award.
As such, the arbitration
award never became due and payable until Tilford sought to
enforce the award in the McCracken Circuit Court.
It appears to
us that, under Kentucky law, the trial court erred by ordering
post-judgment interest from July 19, 2001, the date the
Jefferson Circuit Court confirmed the arbitration award.
Instead, it should have awarded post-judgment interest beginning
December 11, 2002, the date that its order granting Tilford
summary judgment was entered.
Thus, we are compelled to reverse
the McCracken Circuit Court’s award of post-judgment interest
and remand this matter to that court with directions to enter an
order awarding Tilford post-judgment interest from December 11,
2002.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part
and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
G. Bruce Stigger
Alber Crafton, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert C. Fields
Frankfort, Kentucky
Serieta G. Jaggers
Princeton, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Robert C. Fields
Frankfort, Kentucky
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