STANLEY WAYNE SNIDER v. BECKY JEAN SNIDER (NOW VAUGHN)
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 1, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000503-MR
STANLEY WAYNE SNIDER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00175
BECKY JEAN SNIDER (NOW VAUGHN)
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MINTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Stanley Wayne Snider appeals from an order
of the Henry Circuit Court in his dissolution proceeding.
He
contends that the trial court erred when it suspended for one
hundred twenty-three weeks the obligation of his former spouse
to make child support payments to him.
Stanley also contests
the valuation and division of the marital property by the trial
court.
He complains of Becky’s failure to abide by various
portions of the court’s order:
(1) to permit Stanley to
retrieve certain personal items, (2) to copy family photographs,
and (3) to provide him with tax information necessary for filing
his tax returns for 1999 and 2000.
While these issues concern
matters lying within the enforcement powers of the trial court,
their presence is relevant to the profusion of clear error that
we have found.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
The appellee, Becky Jean Snider, filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage on August 4, 2000, in the Henry Circuit
Court.
Her petition recited that the parties had married in
1982 and that they had separated in mid-July 2000.
children were born of the marriage:
Three
Mary Beth in November 1982;
Cody in October 1989; and Hayley in October 1990.
In his response to the petition, Stanley sought sole
custody of the children as well as child support.
In a
temporary order entered December 1, 2000, the Henry Circuit
Court ordered Becky to pay $85.00 per week to Stanley as part of
her child support obligation.
The marriage was dissolved by order entered December
15, 2000, with the issues of the distribution of property and
child custody to be reserved for later determination.
The trial
court conducted a lengthy hearing concerning these remaining
issues on July 8, 2002.
On February 25, 2003, the trial court entered its
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.
followed.
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This appeal
Stanley contends that the trial court erred by
inflating the value of marital assets awarded to him so as to
result in an inequitable division of the property.
Compounding
that error, the court then ordered the suspension of Becky’s
child support payments in order “to equalize” the division of
marital property.
We agree that serious error has occurred.
The trial court calculated Becky’s child support
obligation based upon its finding that she earned $1,720.00 per
month.
Next, taking into account the parents’ combined monthly
adjusted income (imputing income of $910 per month to Stanley),
the court set the total child support obligation at $617.00 per
month.
Finally, after the total monthly child support
obligation was divided between the parents in proportion to
their monthly income, Becky was ordered to pay $360.00 per month
to Stanley.
Without stating any reason or justification for
deviating from the child support guidelines set out in KRS1
403.212, the trial court summarily ordered that Becky’s child
support obligation be suspended for one hundred twenty-three
weeks.
The court captioned the final paragraph of its order of
February 4, 2004, as “Equitable Distribution,” detailing the
following set-off provision:
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
In assigning the marital property and debts,
the court finds that there is a balance owed
to Becky (see attached worksheet). As such,
the prescription and medical bills assigned
to Becky in the amounts of $642.50 and
$609.91 will be subtracted from the amount
owed to Becky and her obligation to
reimburse Stanley for those bills is
suspended. This leaves a balance of
$10,231.73 owed to Becky is (sic) order to
equalize the distribution between the two
parties. Rather than order Stanley to pay
Becky this amount, the Court orders that
Becky’s child support obligation shall be
suspended for the next one hundred twentythree (123) weeks following this order. As
such, Becky shall recommence payment of
child support on July 2, 2004.2
By virtue of this order, Becky effectively received a credit of
$10,000.00 against her future child support obligation.
It is a fundamental principle underlying child support
that a custodial parent receives the support in a fiduciary
capacity.
Minor children are the sole beneficiaries of the
award, and a custodial parent is obligated to expend the funds
for their well-being and support.
The suspension of Becky’s
child support obligation in this case is a wholly impermissible
distortion and diversion of the funds owed to the children under
the statutory guidelines.
Regardless of any arguable shortfall
to Becky with respect to the court’s division of marital
property, an order suspending her child support obligation
cannot be fashioned as an attempted set-off in order to equalize
2
This date was later amended to July 2, 2005.
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her interests at the expense of the children.
The order is
clearly erroneous, socially inconceivable, and legally
unprecedented.
As to the underlying issue of equitable division of
marital property, we are not persuaded that the court’s
allocation of the property resulted in any significant shortfall
to Becky.
KRS 403.190(1) directs the court to divide the
marital property in just proportions considering all relevant
factors -- including the value of property set apart to each
spouse.
While an accurate valuation of non-liquid assets is
imperfect, it is nevertheless essential to an equitable division
of property.
In this case, the court awarded to Stanley the value
of a number of guns (whether or not in his possession); a
vandalized and inoperable Chevrolet Corvette; and a farm
subsidy.
The court valued the guns at $10,000.00; the car at
$6,500.00; and the subsidy at $1,987.00.
With the exception of
a Ford Mustang valued at $2,000.00 (assigned to Stanley), these
were the only marital assets to be divided.
It was their
assigned or presumptive value that formed the basis of the socalled shortfall to Becky.
With respect to the value of the gun collection, Becky
indicated that she had no idea of its worth.
Prompted by
counsel, she could not provide even a “rough guess.”
-5-
Prompted
once again, Becky gave a “rough estimate” of $45,000 as the
value of the collection.
Stanley indicated that the formerly
valuable collection had been “lived up”; i.e., it had been sold
off during the marriage for living expenses when neither party
was employed.
With respect to the Corvette, Becky admitted that the
vehicle had been purchased some ten to fifteen years earlier;
that it had been abandoned to the elements; that it was in rough
shape; and that it had been uninsured and inoperable for years.
Stanley testified that the vehicle had been vandalized and was
no more than junk.
The assigned estimate of $6,500 apparently
was far inflated as the car at most was worth only salvage
value.
With respect to the farm subsidy, Becky’s records
indicated that the funds had been paid out between September 24,
1996, and November 1, 1999 -– before the filing for dissolution
of marriage.
Stanley contended that the proceeds had been
entirely consumed before the parties separated in July 2000.
That contention remained unrebutted.
Its value for purposes of
the property settlement was both illusory and irrelevant.
While a trial court normally retains broad discretion
in such matters, we cannot agree that the court had competent
proof to conclude that the value of the marital assets awarded
to Stanley amounted to more than $20,000.00.
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The scant evidence
reinforced the fact that there was an utter lack of evidence for
purposes of evaluating the meager marital estate.
Becky acknowledged that she was not competent to
testify as to the value of the gun collection.
She admitted
that the Corvette was in poor condition and that it was
otherwise inoperable.
She candidly reported that the value of
the farm subsidy had been paid out long before the parties
separated.
Her testimony as to each of these assets gave the
court no evidentiary basis for its extrapolation of figures
wholly unrelated to actual values.
We find nothing in the
record or in the court’s findings of fact to support the
assigned values.
Consequently, we conclude that the court’s
determinations were clearly erroneous.
CR3 52.01.
The order of the Henry Circuit Court is reversed, and
this matter is remanded for entry of an order reinstating the
full value of the child support to Stanley that was erroneously
suspended, for a judgment as to the valuation and distribution
of marital property, and for appropriate relief as to the
matters of personalty previously ordered to be made accessible
to Stanley.
ALL CONCUR.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stanley Wayne Snider, pro se
Gratz, Kentucky
Alan Q. Zaring
New Castle, Kentucky
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