DEBRA GIBSON, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF EDITH HARRIS v. ROB LEATH, INDIVIDUALLY; AND BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC. D/B/A BAPTIST REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 30, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000490-MR
DEBRA GIBSON, AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF EDITH HARRIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00339
ROB LEATH, INDIVIDUALLY; AND
BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC.
D/B/A BAPTIST REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY AND MINTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Debra Gibson, as Personal Representative and
Administratrix of the Estate of Edith Harris, (hereinafter
“Gibson”) has appealed from the Whitley Circuit Court’s Summary
Judgment entered March 3, 2003, following the entry of the
November 19, 2002, order granting a motion to exclude testimony
as hearsay.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the testimony
of two witnesses as to statements attributed to Ethel Harris,
now deceased,1 comes within the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule.
We affirm.
On June 12, 1998, Gibson filed a complaint in Whitley
Circuit Court against Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc., d/b/a
Baptist Regional Medical Center (hereinafter “BRMC”), BRMC
employee Rob Leath (hereinafter “Leath”) and unknown aids,
alleging that her mother, Edith Harris (hereinafter “Edith”),
was injured on July 19, 1997, while she was a patient in the
rehabilitation unit of BRMC.
Edith was admitted to BRMC on June
12, 1997, to receive rehabilitation from a prior hip fracture.
According to the complaint, Edith was injured when Leath and an
unknown aid recklessly, carelessly, negligently, and/or grossly
negligently fractured two of her ribs when they threw her into
her hospital bed and then continued with daily physical therapy
despite her complaints of pain.
Furthermore, Gibson alleged
that the conduct complained of demonstrated a wanton and willful
disregard for Edith’s rights and safety, thereby entitling her
to punitive damages.
Gibson demanded medical expenses; damages
for Edith’s emotional and physical pain and suffering from July
19, 1997, through March 22, 1998; and punitive damages.
1
Edith passed away on March 22, 1998, but her death was not related to the
subject of her lawsuit.
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Extensive discovery ensued, and a trial was eventually scheduled
for October 10, 2002.2
On July 30, 2002, the defendants filed a motion in
limine to exclude the testimony of two witnesses as inadmissible
hearsay pursuant to KRE 802.
The trial court ruled that the
motion was prematurely made by order entered September 6, 2002,
and indicated that the motion should be brought at trial.
The
defendants’ motion for a partial summary judgment was also
denied by the September 6, 2002, order.
On October 2, 2002, the
defendants filed another motion for summary judgment as well as
a motion in limine, again to prohibit the use of hearsay
testimony of Charlotte Harris and Harold Harris (hereinafter
“Charlotte” and “Harold”).
The trial court entertained
arguments on October 10, 2002, the day of trial.
Gibson argued
that Edith’s statement to Leath, in the presence of Charlotte
and Harold, that he had broken her ribs by dropping her into her
bed constituted an excited utterance and was therefore
admissible through the hearsay testimony of Charlotte and
Harold.
The trial court determined that Edith’s statement did
not fall into the category of an excited utterance and excluded
the testimony in question.
An order memorializing this ruling
was entered November 19, 2002.
The trial court then entered a
2
Prior to the trial, the parties entered into a stipulation that there was no
evidence that Edith had fractured ribs upon her admission to BRMC and that
she did have fractured ribs upon her discharge. The parties did not enter
into a stipulation as to the causation of the rib fractures.
-3-
summary judgment for the defendants on March 3, 2003, upon
Gibson’s admission that she probably could not sustain her
burden of proof regarding causation to defeat a motion for
directed verdict without the excluded testimony.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Gibson argues that the trial court erred in
excluding the testimony of Charlotte and Harold because it fell
within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule based
upon the totality of the circumstances.3
On the other hand, BRMC
and Leath argue that the trial court properly excluded the
testimony in question as the statements attributed to Edith did
not constitute an excited utterance, in particular because there
were numerous reasons to doubt the validity of those statements.
KRE 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.”
Pursuant to KRE 802, “[h]earsay is not admissible
except as provided by these rules or by rules of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky.”
One of these exceptions is for an excited
utterance, which is defined by KRE 803(2) as “[a] statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the
3
Although Gibson argued below that the statements were admissible under
several exceptions to the rule against hearsay, she only argues to this Court
that the excited utterance exception applies. Therefore, we shall confine
our review to that exception only.
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declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition.”
In Souder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 730 (1986),
the Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted as a general rule
Professor Lawson’s definition of a spontaneous statement and
when such spontaneous statements should be considered exceptions
to the hearsay rule.
Lawson cited to Souder in the latest
version of his Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook as follows:
A spontaneous statement is one uttered under
the stress of nervous excitement and not
after reflection or deliberation. Whether
or not a given statement is “spontaneous”
depends upon an evaluation of the particular
circumstances under which it was made, with
the following circumstances most
significant: (i) lapse of time between the
main act and the declaration, (ii) the
opportunity or likelihood of fabrication,
(iii) the inducement to fabrication, (iv)
the actual excitement of the declarant, (v)
the place of the declaration, (vi) the
presence there of visible results of the act
or occurrence to which the utterance
relates, (vii) whether the utterance was
made in response to a question, and (viii)
whether the declaration was against interest
or self-serving.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.60, at 454 (3d
ed. Michie 1993)(quoting Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d at
733).
The Supreme Court held further in Souder that:
Whether or not a particular statement
qualifies as “spontaneous” must “depend upon
the particular circumstances in each case.”
Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Earl’s Adm’r,
263 Ky. 814, 94 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1936). Thus,
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to a certain extent, because the
circumstances in each case are different, no
case is exactly in point as precedent.
Deciding whether the circumstances in which
a particular statement was made qualify as
(sufficiently) “spontaneous” to admit the
evidence, is sometimes an arguable point,
and when this is so the trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude the evidence is
entitled to deference.
Id.
See also Jarvis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 960 S.W.2d 466
(1998).
The Supreme Court went on to refine this definition in
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d 266, 268 (1990), another
pre-code case:
“Souder is not a strict true-false test for the
admission of excited utterances, but provides guidelines for
consideration.”
The same year Smith was rendered, the Supreme Court
stated in a subsequent opinion that, “[t]he theory behind the
rule is that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement
which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces
utterances free of conscious fabrication.”
Mounce v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 375, 379 (1990)(citing Preston v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 406 S.W.2d 398, 401 (1966), cert. denied 386
U.S. 920, 87 S.Ct. 886, 17 L.Ed.2d 792 (1967), quoting 6 J.
Wigmore on Evidence, § 1747 at 136 (1976)).
The Supreme Court
restated the premise for this exception in Noel v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 76 S.W.3d 923, 926 (2002):
The premise for the exception is that
statements made under the stress of the
-6-
excitement caused by a startling occurrence
are more likely the product of that
excitement and, thus, more trustworthy than
statements made after the declarant has had
an opportunity to reflect on events and to
fabricate.
Furthermore, we note “the party seeking admission of hearsay
evidence has the burden to prove that it falls within an
exception to the hearsay rule.”
Id.
Lastly, the Supreme Court addressed the standard of
review to be utilized in these cases in Young v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 50 S.W.3d 148 (2001):
Whether a particular statement qualifies as
an excited utterance depends on the
circumstances of each case and is often an
arguable point; and “when this is so the
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
the evidence is entitled to deference.”
Souder, supra, at 733. That is but another
way of saying that when the determination
depends upon the resolution of a preliminary
question of fact, the resolution is
determined by the trial judge under KRE
104(a) on the basis of a preponderance of
the evidence, Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778-79,
97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987); and the resolution
will not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous, i.e., unless unsupported by
substantial evidence. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Deloney, Ky., 20 S.W.3d 471, 473-74
(2000)(trial judge’s findings of fact are
not clearly erroneous if supported by
substantial evidence).
Id. at 167.
In the present matter, Gibson had the burden to prove
that statements attributed to Edith came within the excited
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utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
Charlotte, who is
Edith’s daughter-in-law, testified both by deposition and at the
hearing on October 10, 2002.
In her deposition, she testified
as follows when asked about what she knew about what had
happened to Edith at BRMC:
But there was a young man4 that came in, and
he was filling her water pitcher, and when
he walked in she said, “What are you doing
here,” to that effect. And she said, “You
are the one that broke my ribs.” And he
said, “I don’t reckon.” And she said, “Have
you paid my doctor bill yet?” And he said,
“I don’t know what you mean.” So she was,
you know, pretty upset when he walked in,
and then he went out. (footnote added).
Charlotte testified similarly at the hearing, when she also
stated that the statements were made between July 20 and July 23
and that Edith “was very angry and upset” at the time she made
them.
Harold, who is Edith’s son and Charlotte’s husband,
testified by deposition and at the hearing as well.
In addition
to testifying about the exchange between Edith and the hospital
worker, Harold testified that Edith “told me that that boy
jerked her out of bed there.
She said that he jerked her up out
of bed and hurt her, is the way she explained it to me.”
Harold
also testified that Edith’s statements were not elicited by any
questioning from him.
4
The young man was later identified as Leath.
-8-
In applying the facts of this case to the law, we must
hold that the trial court properly excluded the testimony in
question as it does not meet the definition of an excited
utterance.
As to the time factor, at least one day, but
possibly more, had elapsed from the time of the incident when
Edith was injured to her confrontation with Leath.
The time
lapse in this case would not be determinative by itself, but it
must be viewed in conjunction with the other factors established
by the evidence.
There was also a valid argument that Edith
fabricated her claim that Leath caused her to be injured.
The
record contains evidence to the effect that Edith’s family
members did not believe her accusations when she made them, that
Edith was known to be confused at times, that Edith wanted to go
home rather than continue with her therapy at BRMC, and that
Edith told different versions of how she became injured.
Furthermore, medical evidence established that Edith could have
sustained her rib injury in many ways unrelated to negligence or
abuse.
The circumstances set forth above do not lend
themselves to supporting the trustworthiness of Edith’s
statement, which is the premise of the excited utterance
exception.
For this reason, we must hold that substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s decision to exclude
Charlotte’s and Harold’s testimony regarding causation and that
-9-
therefore the trial court was not clearly erroneous in so
ruling.
Accordingly, Gibson failed in her burden of proof to
establish that the statements attributed to Edith fell within
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
For the foregoing reasons, the Whitley Circuit Court’s
judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Annette Morgan-White
Manchester, KY
Lynn Rikhoff Kolokowsky
Benny C. Epling, II
Lexington, KY
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