JERRY LEE WARNER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 7, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000452-MR
JERRY LEE WARNER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISSAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00443
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Jerry Lee Warner has appealed from a final
judgment and sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on
February 11, 2003, which, following Warner’s conditional guilty
pleas to incest1 and to being a persistent felony offender in the
first degree (PFO I),2 sentenced Warner to five years’
imprisonment for his incest conviction, which was then enhanced
to ten years’ imprisonment pursuant to his PFO I conviction.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 530.020.
2
KRS 532.080(3).
Having concluded that Warner has failed to show that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his ex parte motion for
funds to obtain expert psychiatric testimony, we affirm.
On April 22, 2002, a Fayette County grand jury
indicted Warner on three counts of incest and for being a PFO I.
The grand jury charged that on three separate occasions between
2000 and 2002, Warner engaged in sexual intercourse with his
stepdaughter.
On April 26, 2002, Warner entered pleas of not
guilty to all of the charges in his indictment.
On July 10, 2002, Warner filed an ex parte motion for
funds pursuant to KRS 31.110(1)(b).3
Warner asked for the
allotment of approximately $3,000.00 to retain the services of
Dr. Douglas Ruth, a psychiatrist who Warner claimed would
3
KRS 31.110 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) A needy person who is being detained by a law
enforcement officer, on suspicion of having
committed, or who is under formal charge of having
committed, or is being detained under a conviction
of, a serious crime, or who is accused of having
committed a public or status offense or who has been
committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice or
Cabinet for Families and Children for having
committed a public or status offense as those are
defined by KRS 610.010(1)(a), (b), (c), or (d) or
630.020(2) is entitled:
. . .
(b) To be provided with the
necessary services and facilities
of representation including
investigation and other
preparation. The courts in which
the defendant is tried shall waive
all costs.
-2-
provide testimony regarding the voluntariness of Warner’s
videotaped confession.4
According to Warner, there were
questions that needed to be explored concerning his mental state
at the time of his confession.
At a hearing held on July 12, 2002, the trial court
noted that Warner’s ex parte motion for funds was not supported
by any specific facts to explain why the retention of an expert
would be necessary.
As such, the trial court ordered Warner to
provide specific facts in support of his motion.
At some point
thereafter, an ex parte hearing was apparently held in camera.
At this hearing, Warner purportedly explained to the trial court
his reasons for requesting funds to retain the services of Dr.
Ruth.5
On August 7, 2002, the trial court entered an order
denying Warner’s ex parte motion for funds.
The trial court
stated that after reviewing the videotape of Warner’s confession
and a pre-sentence investigation report from a prior conviction,
it was apparent that Warner was “of normal or above normal
intelligence,” and that there was no indication that his
confession was involuntary.
4
Warner’s videotaped confession, which has not been made a part of the record
on appeal, purportedly shows Warner confessing to one act of sexual
intercourse with his stepdaughter.
5
Neither a transcript nor a recording of this hearing was included in the
record on appeal.
-3-
Following the denial of his ex parte motion for funds,
Warner accepted a plea offer from the Commonwealth, and entered
conditional guilty pleas to one count of incest and to being a
PFO I, while preserving his right to appeal the denial of his ex
parte motion for funds.
In exchange for Warner’s conditional
guilty pleas, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend that the two
remaining counts of incest be dismissed, and that Warner be
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on his incest conviction,
which would then be enhanced to ten years’ imprisonment pursuant
to his PFO I conviction.
On February 11, 2003, the trial court followed the
Commonwealth’s recommendation and sentenced Warner to five
years’ imprisonment on his incest conviction, which was then
enhanced to ten years’ imprisonment pursuant to his PFO I
conviction, for a total sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.
This appeal followed.
Warner’s sole claim of error on appeal is that the
trial court erred by denying his ex parte motion for funds to
obtain expert psychiatric testimony.
We disagree.
It is well-
settled that “trial courts are not required to provide funds to
defense experts for fishing expeditions.”6
A defendant is only
entitled to the appointment of funds under KRS 31.110(1)(b), if
he makes a showing before the trial court that the funds are
6
Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 837, 838 (1984).
-4-
“reasonably necessary.”7
A trial court’s denial of funds will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a finding that the trial court
abused its discretion.8
In the case sub judice, Warner has conceded that the
ex parte hearing during which he purportedly explained his
reasons for needing funds to the trial court, was either not
recorded or, at the very least, has not been included in the
record on appeal.
In Commonwealth v. Thompson,9 our Supreme
Court stated that when the record on appeal is incomplete, it
will be assumed that the omitted portion supports the trial
court’s decision:
We will not engage in gratuitous speculation
as urged upon us by appellate counsel, based
upon a silent record. It has long been held
that, when the complete record is not before
the appellate court, that court must assume
that the omitted record supports the
decision of the trial court.
Furthermore, if in fact no recording of the in camera
proceeding was made, Warner could have challenged the evidence
in support of the trial court’s factual findings by availing
himself of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 75.13.
This
provision allows an appellant to prepare a “narrative statement”
of the proceedings below in the absence of a recording.
7
Id.
8
Dillingham v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995 S.W.2d 377, 381 (1999).
9
Ky., 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1985).
-5-
Thus, from the incomplete record before us, it is
impossible for this Court to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion by denying Warner’s ex parte motion for
funds.
Accordingly, we must presume that the trial court’s
finding that Warner failed to show that the funds were
“reasonably necessary” was supported by the omitted portions of
the record below.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alicia A. Sneed
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Carlton S. Shier, IV
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
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