TERRY WAYNE WHOBREY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and KENNETH DAVIDSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 3, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000428-MR
TERRY WAYNE WHOBREY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 98-CR-001157
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2003-CA-000686-MR
KENNETH DAVIDSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 98-CR-001157
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE, JUDGE; AND EMBERTON, SENIOR
DYCHE, JUDGE:
In 2003-CA-000428-MR, Terry Wayne Whobrey appeals
from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on January
15, 2003 in which the trial court denied his motion, pursuant to
RCr 11.42, to vacate his criminal conviction.
In 2003-CA-
000686-MR, Kenneth Davidson appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court entered on March 11, 2003, in which the
trial court denied his pro se motion, pursuant to CR 60.02(f),
to correct his sentence.
2003-CA-000428-MR
On appeal, Whobrey argues that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to
tender instructions regarding Extreme Emotional Disturbance
(“EED”) and voluntary intoxication.
Also, Whobrey argues that
the trial court erred when it failed to sua sponte instruct the
jury on EED and voluntary intoxication.
Finally, Whobrey argues
the trial court erred when it denied his RCr 11.42 motion
without holding an evidentiary hearing since he insists that his
allegations cannot be clearly refuted by the record.
1
Finding no
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton, sitting as Special Judge by
Assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b)
of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
-2-
error, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the RCr 11.42
motion.
On the night of March 23, 1998, Johnnie Hightower and
his friend John Rosenbarger went to a local bar, JR’s.
When the
two friends arrived at the bar at approximately 11:30 p.m., they
found Terry Whobrey, Gregory Curtis, and Bobby Whobrey already
there.
According to the evidence presented at trial, Whobrey
approached Rosenbarger.
There was a brief exchange between the
two in which Whobrey told Rosenbarger that what was to transpire
did not concern him.
with a pool cue.
At this point, Davidson struck Hightower
(It is unclear whether Davidson was already at
the bar or if he arrived shortly after Hightower and
Rosenbarger.)
Bobby and Curtis began to strike Hightower with
pool cues as well.
Hightower fled the bar but the four
attackers pursued him.
They quickly caught Hightower.
While
Curtis and Bobby continued to strike Hightower with pool cues,
Whobrey stabbed Hightower multiple times.
Davidson either
helped Whobrey stab Hightower or continued to strike Hightower;
regardless, they continued the assault.
After the attack,
Hightower was transported to a local hospital where he died the
next day from multiple stab wounds.
Whobrey was indicted on one count of capital murder,
KRS 507.020, and one count of being a persistent felony offender
-3-
in the second degree, KRS 532.080.
Curtis, Davidson, and Bobby
were indicted as Whobrey’s co-defendants.
The four proceeded to
a jury trial which lasted from January 12 to January 21, 1999.
At trial, Whobrey and his co-defendants claimed that they had
acted in self-defense.
The jury convicted Whobrey of
intentional murder and of being a persistent felony offender in
the second degree.
Whobrey appealed his conviction, but the Supreme Court
of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in 1999-SC-0396-MR.
On
April 9, 2001, Whobrey filed a pro se motion, pursuant to RCr
11.42, to vacate his conviction.
The trial court appointed
counsel for Whobrey and gave his counsel an opportunity to
supplement the pro se motion.
On October 2, 2002, Whobrey’s
appointed counsel filed a supplemental memorandum and argued
that Whobrey’s trial counsel was ineffective since he failed to
tender jury instructions regarding EED and voluntary
intoxication.
Whobrey’s appointed counsel also argued that the
trial court should have instructed the jury on both EED and
voluntary intoxication given the evidence which came to light at
trial.
The trial court denied Whobrey’s RCr 11.42 motion and
Whobrey appealed to this Court.
On appeal, Whobrey, through appointed counsel, argues
that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel because he failed to tender jury instructions regarding
-4-
EED and voluntary intoxication.
Whobrey argues that facts
surrounding the attack on Hightower would have justified both an
EED instruction and a voluntary intoxication instruction.
Whobrey argues that his trial counsel’s failure to
tender the proper instructions cannot be considered the result
of legitimate trial strategy, although he fails to explain why.
Furthermore, he argues that his trial counsel’s failure to
tender these instructions clearly prejudiced his defense because
the jury was not allowed to consider all legal options.
Whobrey also argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court
erred when it failed to instruct the jury on EED and on
voluntary intoxication.
Whobrey cites Spears v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 30 S.W.3d 152 (2000), for the proposition that the
triggering event for EED need only be sudden and uninterrupted,
and the time between the triggering event and the killing can be
any length of time as long as the EED is not interrupted.
Whobrey argues that the trial court should have instructed the
jury on EED and voluntary intoxication.
Finally, Whobrey argues that his allegations were not
refuted by the record; thus, the trial court erred when it
denied his RCr 11.42 motion without holding an evidentiary
hearing.
According to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), a petitioner who has alleged ineffective assistance of
-5-
counsel must show: (1) trial counsel’s performance was
deficient, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance actually
prejudiced the petitioner and rendered his trial fundamentally
unfair.
Id. at 687.
In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), the United
States Supreme Court re-affirmed its holding in Strickland that
the petitioner must show that his trial counsel’s errors
prejudiced the defense.
The petitioner must show with a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the results
of his trial would have been different.
____.
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at
The Supreme Court has defined reasonable probability as a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id., quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky defined EED as “a
temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to
overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably
from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance
rather than from evil or malicious purposes.”
McClellan v.
Commmonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-9 (1986).
There are
three requirements for EED: (1) there must be a sudden and
uninterrupted triggering event; (2) the defendant must be
extremely emotionally disturbed as a result; and (3) the
defendant must act under the influence of this disturbance.
Spears v. Commonwealth, supra at 155.
-6-
In the instant case, Whobrey claims that he believed
that either Hightower or one of his acquaintances (but not
Rosenbarger) “snitched” on his brother, Keith Whobrey.
Keith
Whobrey was convicted on federal drug charges and, on the day of
the attack, had been sentenced to five years.
In light of these
facts, Whobrey argues that the triggering event for EED occurred
when Hightower said to him, “What the fuck are you looking at,
punk?
What’s your problem?
I heard you been talking trash.”
However, Whobrey does not cite to the record and does not point
to any witness who testified at trial that Hightower ever said
these triggering words.
Moreover, Whobrey does not claim that
he could produce a witness who would have testified at a hearing
that Hightower spoke the triggering words.
The only evidence
that Whobrey presented to the trial court that this triggering
event occurred was his own self-serving statement.
At trial, Rosenbarger testified that while he sat at
the bar, he heard someone behind him state, “Kill the rat
motherfucker.”
According to Rosenbarger, he turned around and
saw Whobrey standing behind him with a knife.
Rosenbarger
testified that he said to Whobrey, “What the fuck is wrong with
you?”
These words are strikingly similar to those allegedly
spoken by Hightower.
According to Rosenbarger, Whobrey then
stated, “This doesn’t concern you.” (Tape 0, 01/13/1999,
-7-
11:26:23 to 11:33:33).
The record refutes Whobrey’s assertion
that Hightower uttered the alleged triggering words.
Furthermore, Whobrey alleges that because of
Hightower’s statement he became so enraged that he struck
Hightower with a pool cue.
However, the record clearly shows
that Kenneth Davidson, not Whobrey, initially struck Hightower
with a pool cue, after Rosenbarger, not Hightower, directed
profanity toward Whobrey.
The record clearly refutes Whobrey’s
allegation that he was acting under the influence of EED.
Whobrey fails to produce any credible evidence that a
triggering event actually occurred.
He fails to produce any
credible evidence that he was extremely emotionally disturbed.
And he fails to produce any credible evidence that he acted
under the influence of such a disturbance.
Not only has Whobrey
failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was
deficient, but he also failed to show with any degree of
probability that his trial counsel’s alleged deficient
performance undermined the confidence in the outcome of his
trial.
Thus, Whobrey has failed to satisfy either the first or
second prong of Strickland.
To justify an instruction for voluntary intoxication,
there must be evidence not only that the defendant was
intoxicated but also evidence that the defendant was so
intoxicated that he or she did not know what he or she was
-8-
doing.
Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112, 118
(1990); see also Meadows v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 511
(1977).
In the instant case, the fact that Whobrey may have
consumed four drinks fails to show that he was so intoxicated
that he did not know what he was doing.
Moreover, the fact that
Hightower’s blood alcohol level was .205 at the time Whobrey
killed him is completely irrelevant.
Whobrey has simply failed to allege specific facts
that would have supported a voluntary intoxication instruction.
While the record discloses that Whobrey may have been drinking,
it also shows that he was aware of his actions when he attacked
Hightower; thus, he has failed to show that his trial counsel’s
performance was deficient.
Whobrey’s allegation that the trial court erred by not
tendering instructions on EED and voluntary intoxication should
have been raised by direct appeal.
RCr 11.42 cannot be used to
present issues that should have been presented on direct appeal.
Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 23 S.W. 3d 619, 626 (2000).
However,
even if his allegations were properly raised, the trial court
did not err since the evidence presented at trial did not
support instructions on either EED or voluntary intoxication.
It is well settled that an evidentiary hearing is not
required where the allegations raised pursuant to RCr 11.42 are
refuted by the record.
Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 116 S.W.3d
-9-
463, 468 (2003).
Since the record soundly refuted Whobrey’s
claims, the trial court did not err when it denied Whobrey’s
claims without holding an evidentiary hearing.
2003-CA-000686-MR
Davidson was indicted on one count of capital murder,
KRS 507.020, and one count of being a persistent felony offender
in the first degree, KRS 532.080.
Davidson was convicted of
facilitation to murder and of being a persistent felony offender
in the first degree.
He was sentenced to five years for
facilitation but his conviction for PFO I enhanced his sentence
to twenty years.
On December 10, 2002, Davidson filed a pro se motion,
pursuant to CR 60.02, to correct his sentence.
The trial court
denied Davidson’s pro se motion, and he appealed to this Court.
On appeal, Davidson avers that the Commonwealth used
two of Davidson’s prior felony convictions, one from 1978 and
the other from 1996, as predicates for the PFO I charge.
In
1978, Davidson was convicted for receiving stolen property over
$100.00 and was sentenced to two years probated for five years.
In 1996, Davidson was convicted on four counts of wanton
endangerment in the first degree and was sentenced to a total of
four years.
Davidson argues, as he argued before the trial court,
that he completed service of the sentence on his 1978 conviction
-10-
more than five years before the commission of the instant
offense.
He contends that when the Commonwealth used his 1978
conviction as one of the predicates for the current PFO I
charge, it violated the five-year look-back rule set forth in
KRS 532.080.
Because the Commonwealth violated KRS 532.080, he
concludes that he should have only been convicted as being a
persistent felony offender in the second degree.
He also argues that CR 60.02(f) is the appropriate
means to address this issue.
Furthermore, he insists that his
trial counsel was ineffective for not explaining to him
ramifications of the PFO statute.
The case of Howard v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 608
S.W.2d 62 (1980), is directly on point.
In Howard, appellant
was convicted of felony theft by unlawful taking and of being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree.
On appeal, he
argued that the jury instructions were erroneous because they
allowed him to be convicted as being PFO when the service of the
sentence on one of his prior felony convictions had occurred
more than five years prior to the commission of the instant
offense.
This Court held:
The statute, KRS 532.080(2)(c), only
requires that completion of service of
sentence or discharge from probation or
parole on any, not each, of the prior
convictions shall have occurred within five
years of the commission of the instant
offense. As we read the plain language of
-11-
the persistent felony offender statute it is
only necessary that the Commonwealth
establish that as to any one of the previous
felonies the defendant has completed service
of sentence or has been discharged from
parole within the past five years or has not
yet completed his sentence or has not yet
been discharged from probation or parole.
Id. at 64.
According to the holding in Howard, the Commonwealth
was not required to establish that Davidson had completed the
sentences in all of his prior felony convictions within five
years of the commission of the instant offense.
All the
Commonwealth had to establish to convict Davidson of PFO I was
that he had two prior felony convictions and that he had
completed the service of the sentence of one of his prior felony
convictions within the five year look-back rule set forth in KRS
532.080.
The Commonwealth established, at trial, that Davidson
had completed the sentence for his 1996 conviction within five
years of the commission of the instant offense.
In the instant
case, Davidson was properly convicted of PFO I.
Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his CR 60.02
motion.
CONCLUSION
In 2003-CA-000428-MR, this Court affirms the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s denial of Terry Whobrey’s RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate his conviction.
In 2003-CA-000686-MR, this Court affirms
-12-
the Jefferson Circuit Court’s denial of Kenneth Davidson’s CR
60.02 motion to correct his sentence.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
TERRY WAYNE WHOBREY:
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Hartford, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
KENNETH DAVIDSON:
Kenneth Davidson, pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-13-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.