RICHARD A. HIRSCH, JR. v. SUSAN M. HIRSCH
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 5, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000329-MR
RICHARD A. HIRSCH, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN R. JAEGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-01934
v.
SUSAN M. HIRSCH
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Richard Hirsch (Richard), appeals the
actions of the Kenton Circuit Court, claiming that the court was
in error basing a child custody and support determination in
part on telephonic testimony taken when Richard was not present.
Appellee, Susan Hirsch (Susan), failed to file a brief, instead
filing a motion to strike Appellant’s Brief due to its failure
to contain citation to the Record on Appeal.
The Notice of
Appeal shows that the determination Richard is appealing is an
order affirming division of child support and visitation, with a
few minor changes, and amending the parties’ written agreement
regarding division of holidays with the child to reflect the
year in which such division was to commence.
A hearing was held on December 13, 2002, regarding
Susan’s motion for contempt, Richard’s motion for review of
child support, and a counter motion for contempt.
The court
overruled both motions for contempt, and ordered payment of
child support by Richard.
The court found the parties’ written
Property Settlement Agreement, which included matters of
visitation and child support, enforceable, with changes only as
to when division of holidays starts.
Richard asserts that the
court took testimony over the telephone regarding the propriety
of custody and the amount of child support when neither Richard
nor his counsel were present.
Richard claims to have objected
to the evidence prior to entry of judgment in the case.
Richard
asserts that his objection was overruled by the trial court.
No
citation to the record is made in Appellant’s Brief, and this
Court finds no objection to the hearing in the record.
Richard
argues that the right of confrontation should extend to civil
matters involving dissolution, custody and support proceedings.
The dissolution action underlying this appeal was
filed in September, 2000.
On November 14, 2000, the parties
filed an Agreed Order permitting them joint custody of the minor
children, who were 16 and 12 at the time.
The parties agreed
that Susan would be the residential parent for the 12 year old
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girl and her 18 year old daughter, while the parties’ son would
stay with Richard.
The parties agreed that Richard would pay
child support in accordance with the child support guidelines.
The parties agreed to share the marital residence.
Susan
renewed her motion for an award of temporary child support and
maintenance in January, 2001.
The trial court entered an order
directing the marital residence to be sold, and awarding custody
and child support in March, 2001.
The court denied Susan’s
request for maintenance, but directed that Richard should pay
child support in the sum of $21.52 per week, as well as payment
of $28.48 weekly on the child support arrearages.
In May, 2001, Susan filed an affidavit stating that
she had full custody of all three children, and was supporting
all of them.
She requested a new award of child support to
reflect those facts.
The court directed Richard to make
mortgage payments on the marital residence, but denied the
request for modification in child support.
In June, 2001, the court entered an order showing that
Susan had moved orally to modify support due to her continued
full time care of the parties’ minor children.
The court
modified the child support requirements based on these facts.
The court also ordered again that Richard pay arrearages on past
due child support.
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In November, 2001, Richard moved the court to hold a
contested hearing.
The motion was not filed with the financial
disclosure forms required by Local Rule 33(c).
The court
reserved a ruling on the motion for that reason until a motion
complying with the rules was filed.
The matter was eventually
set for trial in January, 2002.
In January, 2002, the parties entered into a Property
Settlement Agreement, the stated purpose of which was “to settle
and determine forever and completely all obligations and matters
between them. . . .”
The parties agreed that Susan would have
physical custody of the parties’ minor daughter, and Richard
would have custody of the parties’ minor son.
Reasonable
visitation was granted to each non-custodial parent.
Richard
agreed to pay child support in the sum of $60.00 per week for
the daughter, half her school fees, and all her health
insurance.
The court’s order of dissolution incorporated this
written agreement without change.
In June, 2002, Susan filed an affidavit showing that
the parties’ son had graduated from high school and became
emancipated, and asked for a recalculation of child support
based on the fact that she was the primary custodian of the
parties’ only minor child.
August, 2002.
A hearing on this matter was held in
Richard was not present at the hearing, but
counsel for Richard appeared on his behalf.
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In September, 2002,
the court entered an order recalculating child support.
Richard
was ordered to pay child support in the sum of $132.38 per week,
as well as making payments on the arrearage.
Richard objected
to the court’s ruling, claiming that the income amounts used to
make the child support determination were erroneous.
was scheduled on this matter for December, 2002.
A hearing
Susan and her
counsel were present in person at the hearing, and Richard and
his counsel appeared via telephone.
The court amended its
ruling regarding child support and arrearages based on the
evidence determined in the hearing.
Richard appeals that final order, contending that he
was not present during the hearing.
supports Richard’s assertion.
No evidence in the record
The trial court’s order states on
its face that both parties were present, Richard and his counsel
by telephone.
Richard asserts that Susan gave testimony used by
the court prior to his appearance on the telephone.
There is
nothing supporting Richard’s contention in his brief, or in the
evidence before this Court.
The record reflects the fact that
both parties frequently appeared via telephone, rather than in
person, at hearings in the underlying action.
The record also
reflects extensive documentation regarding the parties’
expenses, income, and financial condition.
It must also be
noted that the order appealed from only slightly modifies the
court’s earlier rulings, which were based on hearings in which
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both parties were present, and on documents provided by both
parties.
No contemporaneous objection is preserved regarding
the court’s actions in the final hearing.
Richard did not file
any objection to the court’s ruling following entry of the final
order.
The record contains substantial documentation regarding
the issues before this Court.
While this Court does not approve
of Susan’s failure to file a brief in support of her position,
in this case a ruling may properly be made on the evidence
contained in the record.
Richard cites to foreign case law in support of his
claim that he was denied his right to confront and cross-examine
the witness.
In Bonamarte v. Bonamarte, 866 P.2d 1132 (Mont.
1994), the Montana Supreme Court held that it was in error for
the wife to testify telephonically at child support and custody
hearings over the objection of the husband.
That case differs
from the present one in that it was the pattern of the parties
in the underlying action to appear before the trial court
telephonically, and no objection was ever made by either party
to this method of appearing.
Further, as numerous hearings
permitting confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses
had been held in the underlying action, this case differed from
Bonamarte, supra., where the ruling at issue was an initial
custody and support determination.
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The final hearing, out of
many, in the present case, related solely to a minor adjustment
in child support already ordered, and the ruling was based on
documentation before the court and in possession of the parties.
Richard also cites In Re., Baby K., N.H. 722 A.2d 470, 471
(1998), a case involving termination of parental rights.
In
that case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court overruled the
termination based on the fact that procedural safeguards were
not in place to protect an incarcerated father’s due process
rights.
In the present case, due process rights were not an
issue.
The court was ruling on a slight modification in child
support and visitation, and the ruling was not objected to by
Richard.
We affirm the ruling of the Kenton Circuit Court, as
there is ample evidence in the record supporting the court’s
ruling, and that under the circumstances in this case, the court
permitting the parties to testify via telephone at repeated
hearings, in the absence of contemporaneous objection by either
party, does not constitute reversible error.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
C. Ed Massey
Erlanger, Kentucky
No Brief Filed.
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