KARLOS BROWN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
December 23, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000292-MR
KARLOS BROWN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-000497
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
SCHRODER AND TACKETT, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Karlos Brown (Brown) appeals his conviction
for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine),2 driving
without a valid license,3 and persistent felony offender (PFO)
1
Senior Judge Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS
21.580.
2
KRS 218A.1412; KRS 218A.070(1)(d).
3
KRS 186.450(4).
first degree4 for which he was sentenced to eighteen years.
Brown contends the court erred in allowing defense counsel to
step outside the courtroom when the appellant testified and when
he gave his closing argument.
Because an attorney may not
ethically assist in presenting false testimony, nor argue false
facts in his closing, the court did not err.
Also, the right to
testify does not include the right to testify falsely; therefore
appellant waives his right to counsel for that part of the trial
where he proceeds against his counsel’s advice.
Brown was arrested on August 29, 2000, by Detective
Bouie and Officer King of the Louisville Police Department.
At
trial, the police and the defendant gave different versions of
what occurred that evening.
According to the police, that
evening, Brown drove by the police going south on 19th Street in
a Ford Fairmont.
Officer King recognized Brown and knew he did
not have a driver’s license (at this time he did have a permit
which required him to have another licensed driver in the
vehicle).
The police turned on 19th Street and got several cars
behind Brown.
Around the 1700 block, they turned on their blue
lights and sirens.
Appellant was alone and when the lights and
siren were activated, Brown turned and looked at the police,
then began reaching over to the passenger seat, and continued
this gesture for several blocks.
4
At 15th and Broadway, Brown
KRS 532.080.
-2-
turned right and turned into Findley’s Barbeque.
Brown
immediately exited the vehicle and the police rushed to grab him
because they thought he was going to run.
Brown’s fists were
clenched and he put his right hand down the back of his pants.
One officer grabbed his right hand and another grabbed his left.
A couple of seconds later his hand opened up and two pieces of
crack cocaine fell to the ground.
The police picked up the
cocaine and searched the vehicle.
They recovered a loaded gun
in a shoebox under the passenger seat.
After the Commonwealth rested, Brown insisted he be
permitted to take the stand, against his attorney’s advice.
Brown’s insistence that he testify required his attorney to
request he be permitted to withdraw, stating (after approaching
the bench) that he believed Brown planned on testifying
differently from what the attorney had learned from his
investigation.
Defense counsel was permitted to leave during
Brown’s testimony.
Brown made no opening statement and took the
stand to give his version of the events of that night.
He
called no other witnesses and made his own closing statement.
Defense counsel joined him in the sentencing phase of trial.
Brown testified that on the evening in question, he
was driving his girlfriend’s car and had a valid permit (which
did require a licensed driver in the car).
He said he was
driving his girlfriend, Ms. McCauley, to the hair salon at 16th
-3-
and Broadway, and that he was unaware that the police were
following him.
He proceeded to drop her off and continued on
his way, not aware of the police lights or sirens until he
turned at 15th and Broadway when he immediately pulled over into
Findley’s Barbeque.
He explained his reaching was an attempt to
get his insurance and other papers from the glove compartment.
Brown alleges he was pulled from the vehicle and his arms were
pulled behind him and handcuffed.
When the police said he was
going to jail for the bag of crack he threw down, Brown did not
see any bag.
If there were drugs in a bag he believed the
police planted them.
He testified that the loaded gun was his
girlfriend’s and that he did not know she had it in the car.
The jury believed the police’s version of the events
of that evening and found Brown guilty of:
driving without a
valid license with a twenty-five dollar fine and possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine) for which he received five years,
enhanced to eighteen years by the PFO I charge.
On appeal, Brown contends the trial court erred in
allowing defense counsel to withdraw during his defense without
appointing substitute counsel.
The problem arose at trial when
the appellant insisted on testifying, which is his right.
However, defense counsel became aware that Brown’s testimony
would not be consistent with what he knew about the case.
Ethically, defense counsel cannot assist a defendant in offering
-4-
false testimony, (SCR 3.130(3.3)) and requested that he be
permitted to withdraw.
Because the trial was underway, the
trial court denied a request to seek substitute counsel, but did
permit defense counsel to step out during Brown’s testimony and
cross-examination.
No other witnesses were called by the
defense and Brown made his own closing, which was inconsistent
with defense counsel’s understanding of the facts.
Defense
counsel was on call through the rest of the trial and was back
in the courtroom for sentencing.
It is uncontroverted that appellant is
constitutionally entitled to effective representation at all
stages of the proceedings, has the right to present evidence in
his defense, and is entitled to his right to remain silent,
regardless of guilt.
However, there is no constitutional right
to present false testimony, Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173,
106 S. Ct. 988, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1986); Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 912 (1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1025, 119 S. Ct. 1266, 143 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1999), and an
attorney may not participate, even by silence, in presenting
false testimony.
In Re Carroll, Ky., 244 S.W.2d 474 (1951);
Hogg v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 848 S.W.2d 449 (1992); Tamme v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 31 (1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1153, 119 S. Ct. 1056, 143 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1999).
Because
Brown had no right to present false testimony, he had no right
-5-
to an attorney during that phase of his defense and the court
did not err in permitting counsel to step out during Brown’s
narrative or his closing, which emphasized his narrative
defense.
Brown did not have an adequate reason for substitute
counsel.
Henderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 636 S.W.2d 648 (1982).
Brown also alleges the trial court erred when it
disallowed evidence intended to impeach the testimony of Officer
King by showing bias and a motive to lie.
Brown wanted to
cross-examine Officer King to show King and Brown had a ten-year
history of conflicts and past run-ins.
The court would not
allow Brown to bring up the specific incidents for impeachment
purposes, but did allow Brown to indicate, during crossexamination, that there was friction and even a past history
between Officer King and himself.
Brown also was allowed to
argue in his closing that Officer King wanted him so badly that
he planted the drugs on Brown.
Brown was attempting to impeach
Officer King through collateral facts to reveal bias or
hostility.
The Kentucky Rules of Evidence, like the Federal
Rules, do not address this issue.5
Professor Lawson6 opines the
common law of evidence allows evidence of bias, but the
admissibility of the specific acts is governed by the provisions
on relevance in Rules 401 and 402 of the Kentucky Rules of
5
Robert Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 4.10, p. 277 (4th ed.
Lexis Nexis 2003).
6
Id. at p. 278.
-6-
Evidence.
In Caudill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 120 S.W.3d 635, 661
(2003), cert. denied, _____ U.S. _____, 124 S. Ct. 2877, 159 L.
Ed. 2d 781 (2004), our Supreme Court recognized that limitations
on cross-examination to expose bias or prejudice should be
cautiously applied, but that the judge has the power to set
reasonable boundaries as long as a complete picture of the bias
and motivation is developed.
Although the trial court allowed Brown to show bias or
prejudice, we cannot say whether the trial court’s limitations
were reasonable or unreasonable because Brown did not preserve
any of the questions or answers he wanted to ask.
Brown’s
dialogue with the court inferred that he wanted to discuss
specific run-ins with Officer King over the years.
However,
when the court would not allow it, he did not request that the
evidence be preserved by avowal as required by RCr 9.52.
Hart
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 116 S.W.3d 481 (2003); Charash v. Johnson,
Ky. App., 43 S.W.3d 274 (2000); Commonwealth v. Ferrell, Ky., 17
S.W.3d 520 (2000).
Without the avowal testimony, we cannot say
the court erred.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-7-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.