TYRONE MARSHALL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000249-MR
TYRONE MARSHALL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL W. ROSENBLUM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00042
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, MINTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Tyrone Marshall appeals from a January 14, 2003,
order of the Oldham Circuit Court.
We affirm.
On April 19, 1996, appellant was indicted by a Trimble
County Grand Jury upon the offenses of murder, attempted murder
and first-degree burglary.
Pursuant to appellant’s motion for
change of venue, the case was subsequently transferred to the
Oldham Circuit Court.
Appellant waived his right to jury trial and,
following a bench trial, was found guilty of the charged
offenses.
He was sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for twenty-five years on the murder
conviction and received two twenty-year sentences for the
attempted murder and burglary convictions.
These sentences were
ordered to run concurrently for a total of life without
possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
On direct appeal,
the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence
imposed by the Oldham Circuit Court in Marshall v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 60 S.W.3d 513 (2001).
On November 21, 2002, appellant filed a motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42.
On January 14, 2003, the Oldham Circuit Court denied the motion
without a hearing.
This appeal follows.
When a circuit court denies an RCr 11.42 motion
without a hearing, our review is focused upon whether there are
any “material issue[s] of fact that cannot be conclusively
resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an
examination of the record.”
S.W.3d 448, 452 (2001).
Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59
If so, the circuit court must grant
appellant a hearing on the motion.
With this standard in mind, we turn to appellant’s
contentions regarding the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.
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The proper standard for reviewing a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
See
Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985); Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905 (1998).
The Strickland
standard requires a showing that (1) counsel’s performance was
deficient as it fell outside the range of professionally
competent assistance and (2) such deficiency was prejudicial as
there exists a reasonable probability the outcome would have
been different if not for counsel’s performance.
Id.
Although
it is necessary for an appellant to satisfy both prongs of the
Strickland standard, it is not necessary to “determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered . . . . ”
Id. at 697.
Appellant contends his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to adequately investigate and call witnesses vital
to his defense.
Appellant asserts his counsel did not properly
investigate and introduce evidence to negate the “intent”
element of the murder and attempted murder charges.
Appellant
claims he “had no prior knowledge that the victims of the
burglary would be placed at risk to their respective lives,”
and, as such, he lacked the intent necessary to support the
convictions.
Appellant asserts the testimony of his co-
conspirator, Mark Downey, who was not called as a witness, would
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have clarified appellant’s role in the crimes and demonstrated
appellant’s lack of intent with regard to the murder and
attempted murder.
Kim Long, the girlfriend of one of appellant’s coconspirators, testified she was with the men shortly after the
crimes took place.
Long’s testimony revealed that Downey told
her, in appellant’s presence, that appellant said he did not
want to be present when the couple was shot.
Thus, the record
reflects that Long’s testimony makes the point which appellant
claims Downey was needed to make (i.e., that appellant did not
have the intent necessary to support the murder and attempted
murder convictions).
As Downey’s testimony would have been merely
cumulative evidence, we are of the opinion the outcome of the
trial would not have been different if counsel had called Downey
to testify.
As such, we do not believe the prejudicial prong of
Strickland has been satisfied.
Therefore, we believe
appellant’s contention is conclusively resolved by an
examination of the record.
Appellant’s next contention focuses upon whether
counsel’s performance was deficient for not seeking dismissal of
the indictment.
Appellant claims each count of the indictment
charged him with either murder, attempted murder or burglary,
and at the same time also charged him with complicity.
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He
claims that by offering “alternative charges” the indictment
failed “to present a definite statement of the facts
constituting the specific offense” as required by RCr 6.10, and
instead, “presents a plurality of offenses in the particular
count.”
Appellant further contends the indictment was defective
for not specifically alleging each element of complicity as set
forth in KRS 502.020.
It is well established that “[a]n indictment is
sufficient if it fairly informs the accused of the nature of the
charged crime, without detailing the formerly ‘essential’
factual elements . . . . ”
Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 931
S.W.2d 446, 449 (1996); citing Finch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 419
S.W.2d 146 (1967).
Furthermore, under the present-day notice
pleading of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an indictment is
sufficient if it puts a defendant on notice of the crime for
which he was being charged and does not mislead him.
Id.
In this case, the record reflects the indictment was
sufficient to inform the appellant of the crimes for which he
was being charged and was not misleading.
As the indictment was
not defective, we cannot conclude counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the alleged defects.
Thus, we believe the
record in this case clearly refutes appellant’s contention that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
indictment.
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Appellant’s next contention is that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to derogatory name calling by
the Commonwealth.
Specifically, appellant asserts counsel
failed to object when the Commonwealth referred to appellant by
his nickname, “Tiger.”
Appellant argues the nickname unfairly
portrayed him as a predator and that the depiction was
prejudicial.
A decision by counsel not to raise a particular
objection is considered trial strategy.
When challenging trial
strategy an appellant “must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered
sound trial strategy.’”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Furthermore, even if appellant could overcome the strong
presumption that counsel’s strategy was sound, he would still be
required to satisfy the prejudice inquiry of Strickland.
As the
trier of fact in this case was a judge, and not a jury, the
prejudicial effect of such a comment is almost non-existent.
Upon the whole, we conclude that appellant’s contention of trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object to the name
calling is refuted upon the face of the record.
Appellant also asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to seek a mental evaluation.
Appellant
claims to have informed counsel that he had been taking several
prescription drugs for his “mental condition” and, thus, counsel
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was ineffective for not pursuing an evaluation of mental
competency.
The record reflects, however, that appellant did not
identify his alleged mental condition, nor did he identify the
nature of any medication he was taking.
More importantly,
appellant did not allege how either of these factors may have
affected his mental competency to stand trial.
When seeking post-conviction relief, an appellant
“must aver facts with sufficient specificity to generate a basis
for relief.”
(1971).
Lucas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 267, 268
Furthermore, a motion made pursuant to RCr 11.42 “does
not require a hearing to serve the function of a discovery
deposition” and, as such unsupported conclusory allegations such
as this cannot justify a hearing.
975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (1998).
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Accordingly, we believe this
allegation of ineffectiveness was not sufficiently specific to
require an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant next argues trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to ensure that appellant understood the “meaning and
importance of the waiver of [a] jury trial . . . . ”
However,
the record reflects appellant executed a written waiver of his
right to a jury trial and was present when counsel assured the
court appellant understood the waiver of those rights.
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In appellant’s direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme
Court addressed the waiver issue and concluded that appellant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
An
opinion of this state’s highest court “is the law of the case”
and, thus, binding on this Court, we believe.
appellant’s contention is without merit.
Therefore,
Thomas v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 931 S.W.2d 446, 450 (1996); citing Martin v.
Frasure, Ky., 352 S.W.2d 817 (1961).
Appellant’s final contention is that he “was denied
his right [to] due process and to a fair trial due to the
prejudicial comments made by the commonwealth attorney which
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.”
A motion made pursuant
to RCr 11.42 “is limited to issues that were not and could not
be raised on direct appeal.”
Sanborn, at 909.
Furthermore,
when an issue has been raised and rejected on direct appeal, it
“may not be relitigated in these proceedings by claiming it
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Id. at 909;
citing Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d 500 (1990);
Standford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
Since
any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct must be raised on
direct appeal, it may not now be considered in an RCr 11.42
motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the January 14, 2003, order
of the Oldham Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Amy M. Daniel
Erlanger, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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