ROBERT DAVID MARSCH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: January 23, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000221-MR
ROBERT DAVID MARSCH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY W. GRIFFIN, III, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 88-CR-00024
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY AND MINTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Robert Marsch (hereinafter “Marsch”) appeals
from an order of the Butler Circuit Court1 denying him leave to
file a successive RCr 11.42 motion.
We affirm.
On March 4, 1985, Marsh was indicted on charges of
murder and arson.
Following a trial by jury, he was convicted
of both charges and sentenced to sixty-five years in prison.
1
On
We note that Marsch was convicted in Butler County. However, Judge Griffin
signed the order denying the RCr 11.42 motion as a Daviess Circuit Judge. We
believe Judge Griffin was acting as a Special Judge for the Butler Circuit
Court.
direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court his convictions were
reversed based upon errors in jury selection.2
On remand, the
Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion and transferred the case
from Hancock County to Butler County.
Marsch was again
convicted of murder and arson and received a life sentence on
the murder charge and twenty years on the arson charge.
sentences were ordered to run consecutively.
The
His conviction and
sentence was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court.3
In April 1997, Marsch filed his initial RCr 11.42
motion.
On September 22, 1997, the trial court denied his RCr
11.42 motion.
On appeal, this Court issued an opinion affirming
in part, vacating in part, and remanding.4
That opinion affirmed
the order denying Marsch’s RCr 11.42 motion but vacated the
trial court’s order running the sentences consecutively.
See
KRS 532.110(1)(c); Bedell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 779
(1994).
Marsch’s motion for discretionary review to the
Kentucky Supreme Court was denied.
Thereafter, Marsch sought relief in the federal court
system, via a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
After the
Federal District Court denied his petition, Marsch appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Although the Sixth Circuit affirmed the order denying his Rule
2
3
4
Marsch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 830 (1987).
No. 88-SC-587-MR, a not-to-be-published opinion rendered August 3, 1989.
1997-CA-002549-MR, a not-to-be-published opinion rendered December 30, 1998.
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59(e) motion, it did so for reasons other than those set forth
in the Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion and the Federal Court
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.
Specifically, on the issue
that evidence was lost or destroyed between the first and second
jury trials, the Federal Appellate Court, on page four of its
opinion, held:
Concerning all of Marsch’s claims
except for the preservation of exculpatory
evidence issue, the district court properly
found that the state court’s disposition of
Marsch’s grounds for relief represented a
reasonable application of constitutional law
as set forth by the Supreme Court.
Regarding the exculpatory evidence issue, we
affirm the district court’s decision on
other grounds. See City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S.
Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1994).
The district Court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation that the exculpatory
evidence claim was procedurally barred
because the issue had been previously raised
and decided on appeal in the state courts.
An examination of the record reveals that
the issue was not raised before and was not
decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
However, because this claim could have been
decided on appeal, it is still subject to
the state procedural bar rule. See Bronston
v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1972). Marsch has not shown cause
and prejudice to excuse this procedural
default, so he is not entitled to relief on
this claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 750 (1991).5
Empowered by the fact that the Sixth Circuit order
stated that the exculpatory evidence claim had not been raised
5
Marsch v. Seabold, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, No. 00658815696, order filed October 31, 2001.
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or decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court in its 1989 memorandum
opinion (88-SC-587-MR), Marsch filed his latest RCr 11.42 motion
on July 19, 2002.
While acknowledging that this is a successive
RCr 11.42 motion, Marsch contends that since the first Court of
Appeals opinion did not address the issue raised as to missing
evidence that the court should now review his arguments.
In the
December 30, 1998, Court of Appeals opinion (No. 1997-CA-002549MR), this Court stated at page four:
Marsch’s next argument is that he is
entitled to a reversal as a result of the
Commonwealth’s failure to preserve evidence.
This argument was raised on appeal to the
Supreme Court and rejected. Thus, we need
not discuss it further.
The apparent problem arose in this case because Marsch
filed motions relating to preservation of the following
evidence: the rifle used in the shooting; bullet fragments
removed from the victim; and x-rays of the victim, his injuries
and the path of the bullet.
Although all three issues were
raised at trial, the Kentucky Supreme Court opinion affirming
Marsch’s conviction addressed only the missing rifle.
opinion, our Supreme Court stated:
The trial judge did not commit
reversible error in allowing the
Commonwealth to display a rifle similar to
one found in the defendant’s home. The
actual rifle seized from Marsch was stolen
from the courthouse prior to trial. The
trial court suggested that the example rifle
not be admitted as an exhibit but refused a
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In its
motion by the defense that the prosecution
be required to keep the sample rifle out of
the view of the jury. Thus, error, if any,
is harmless. RCr 9.22
(88-SC-587-MR, pp. 3-4).
It appears that both the Kentucky
Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals were
partially correct in their review of this matter.
Our Supreme
Court did address one aspect of Marsch’s argument as to missing
evidence but not all three.
Not addressed were the issues
concerning bullet fragments and x-rays.
Nothing in the record
before this Court indicates that the issue of bullet fragments
and x-rays was raised on direct appeal by Marsch.
The Supreme
Court opinion does not list these two evidentiary matters as
issues on appeal and this Court’s review of the first RCr 11.42
motion did not indicate that those matters had been raised in
Marsch’s first RCr 11.42 motion.
This Court’s opinion stated
that the issue presented as to the missing rifle was addressed
on direct appeal and as such, not properly before the Court on a
RCr 11.42 motion.
In addition, in Marsch’s initial RCr 11.42
motion, he does not argue that he had raised these issues and
the Supreme Court simply ignored them.
Rather, he sets them
forth in great detail as if presented for the first time.
In
either case, whether first presented in his initial RCr 11.42
motion or not addressed in the Supreme Court’s opinion following
his direct appeal following his second trial, the result is the
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same.
As the Sixth Circuit held:
these were issues that could
have been and should have been raised in his direct appeal.
Failure to do so or failure by Marsch to notify the Court of its
failure to address a substantial direct appeal issue (if this
occurred and we do not believe it did) is fatal to a collateral
attack through a RCr 11.42 motion.
See generally, Gross v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983); McQueen v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 70 (1997).
Despite Marsch’s
arguments to the contrary, these issues were previously
addressed by trial counsel during the second trial.
As such,
they needed to be addressed in his direct appeal following his
conviction and sentence.
One of the three issues now raised by
Marsch relative to missing evidence was the rifle.
The Kentucky
Supreme Court addressed that issue in its opinion and found no
error.
The remaining issues as to the bullet fragments and x-
rays should have been raised on direct appeal.
and as such cannot be raised at this late date.
They were not
Having reviewed
the entire record, we believe that even if these issues could be
raised at this time, Marsch would fail in his arguments.
The
evidence as to his guilt was overwhelming, his trial counsel was
not ineffective and the trial court did not err in permitting
the Commonwealth’s witnesses to testify as to their knowledge of
the bullet fragments and x-rays.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Butler Circuit Court denying Marsch’s successive RCr 11.42
motions.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert David Marsch
LaGrange, KY
A. B. Chandler
Attorney General
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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