JULIE ROSE DENTON v. THOMAS G. ROSE, SR. AND THOMAS G. ROSE, SR. v. JULIE C. DENTON; DIANA SKAGGS
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 15, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000142-MR
JULIE ROSE DENTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH O'REILLY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-FC-007997
THOMAS G. ROSE, SR.
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2003-CA-000143-MR
THOMAS G. ROSE, SR.
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH O'REILLY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-FC-007997
JULIE C. DENTON; DIANA SKAGGS
AND B. MARK MULLOY
CROSS-APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2003-CA-000545-MR
JULIE DENTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH O'REILLY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-FC-007997
THOMAS G. ROSE, SR.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
SCHRODER AND TACKETT, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.
This case arises from an action for
dissolution of marriage.
Both parties appeal the trial court’s
division of the sizable marital estate.
Thomas Glenn Rose also
appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Julie
Denton.
We affirm.
The parties were married on August 13, 1983, and were
divorced in November 2000.
Three children born of the marriage
are in Julie’s custody by agreement.
Tom works at Coin Phone
Management, a business owned by the parties, and in 2001 earned
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
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approximately $235,000.
Julie is a State Senator and is
employed part-time as a dental hygienist earning approximately
$38,885 per year.
DISSIPATION OF MARITAL ASSETS
Shortly after the parties’ separation, on October 11,
1999, an order was entered in Jefferson Family Court restraining
Tom from disposing of, or damaging, any property of the parties.
On February 22, 2000, the parties confirmed in court their
agreement that $126,000 of their assets transferred by Tom to a
Morgan Keegan account would not be transferred without the joint
signature of the parties or a court order.
In March of that
same year, another order was entered prohibiting either party
from dissipating, disposing of, or encumbering any asset of any
kind or character in which either party has an interest.
Despite these orders, Tom moved marital assets, encumbered
marital property, gave money to charity and family, and invested
on margin accounts resulting in significant losses to the
marital estate.
Specifically, the family court found he
dissipated marital assets through stock trading in the following
amounts and assigned the amounts to Tom’s share of the marital
assets:
Morgan Keegan Acct. #16072076 - $116,471.94
First Alliance/Westminister - $40,140.36
Morgan Keegan IRA/Am. Funds - $12,095.93
Kaufman Brothers Stock - $4,502.00
National Electronics Tech. - $17,845.00
-3-
Tom contends that the trial court erred when it found
he dissipated marital assets.
Although he does not deny that
marital funds were transferred to his sole name and that he
unilaterally invested and lost the amounts as found by the
family court, he counters that he did so to support Julie and
the children.
He points out that the business was struggling
for financial survival and on the advice of his stockbroker he
invested in what turned out to be a struggling stock market.
A
court may find dissipation when marital property is expended:
(1) during a period when there is a
separation or dissolution impending; and (2)
where there is a clear showing of intent to
deprive one spouse of her proportionate
share of the marital property.2
In Brosick, the court rejected the contention that a
party must show dissipation by clear and convincing evidence.
Instead, the spouse alleging dissipation is required to present
evidence establishing dissipation and then the burden of going
forward with the evidence is on the spouse charged with
dissipation.3
The assets Tom dissipated were not expended on support
of his family.
Although he might have been motivated to
increase his net worth, this does not legally excuse the act of
2
Brosick v. Brosick, Ky. App., 974 S.W.2d 498, 500 (1998).
3
Id. at 502.
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intentionally violating previous court orders and unilaterally
investing marital assets that decreased the amount to which
Julie is entitled.
The family court’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
There is also sufficient evidence to support the
finding that non-marital expenses were paid, not from his
income, but from marital assets.
He gave $11,446 in marital
funds to Southeast Christian Church, $6,038 in excess of the
couple’s customary donation; spent $11,578.60 on a private
investigator; and, paid $4,681.62 to his sister’s attorney.
Additionally, the evidence revealed that Tom received various
investment proceeds without informing Julie.
These amounts were
properly included in Tom’s marital share.
Julie argues that the family court, while correctly
finding that Tom dissipated the assets specified, failed to
include $110,000 traceable to a 1999 marital tax refund.
The
family court found that there was a $170,000 refund for a 1999
tax overpayment.
Although Tom contends that this was a Coin
Phone Management Company asset, it was paid to him.
He placed
it in a personal Morgan Keegan investment account, and lost all
but $60,000.
The Coin Phone Management Company is a marital
asset owned exclusively by the parties and is a Subchapter S
corporation taxed on Tom and Julie’s return.
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The tax refund was
marital property.4
Julie contends that Tom dissipated the
marital asset and that in addition to receiving one-half of the
remaining $60,000, the family court should also have assigned
the $110,000 loss to Tom’s share of the marital property
division.
The loss of the $110,000 was the result of Tom’s
engaging in risky margin trading, the same conduct that the
court held dissipated other marital assets.
But the question
remains whether the family court, having found that Tom
dissipated $110,000 of marital funds, was required to include
the amount in his marital share or retained discretion to divide
it as marital property in just proportions.5
In Robinette v.
Robinette,6 the court noted that although KRS 403.190 does not
make reference to the dissipation of marital assets, the courts
have recognized a court’s discretion in fashioning an equitable
remedy, but that in dividing marital property dissipation is
only a factor to be considered.7
The same principle was
recognized in Brosick, supra, where the court held that the
court has “authority to fashion equitable relief where a party
has dissipated marital property. . . .”8
The dissipation of
assets is a factor to be considered by the court in the division
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.190(3).
5
KRS 403.190(1).
6
Ky. App., 736 S.W.2d 351 (1987).
7
Id. at 354.
8
Id. at 501.
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of marital assets.
On review, this court must look at the
entire marital distribution to determine if the factors
contained in KRS 403.190 have been applied and whether the
resulting division is equitable.
We find that although Tom’s
marital share could have included the $110,000 lost from the
Morgan Keegan account, we find nothing that mandated the court
to make such a finding, and in view of the entire property
distribution, it was not an abuse of discretion.9
CAPITAL LOSS CARRY FORWARD
Related to the dissipation of assets, Julie contends
that she should have been awarded the value of a capital loss
carry forward in the amount of $40,000 created by stock trading
losses incurred by Tom in 2000.
We agree with Julie that the
tax benefit created by the stock losses is a marital asset.10
But under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, tax loss carryovers cannot be split between former spouses
once they begin filing separately and must be deducted only on
the return of the spouse who actually had the loss, in this case
Tom.11
9
We find no error.
Ghali v. Ghali, Ky. App., 596 S.W.2d 31 (1980).
10
See Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 701 N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000),
holding that a capital loss carry forward is a marital asset.
11
Calvin v. U.S., 354 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1965).
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SALE OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE
Julie contends that the trial court erred when it
ordered the marital residence sold to a third party.
sold for $365,000, $30,000 less than appraised.
The house
After Julie’s
remarriage in December 2000, the marital residence was ordered
to be listed for sale and prior to the hearing, an offer was
made and the property placed under contract.
Julie contends
that she offered to purchase the residence and would have paid
the entire appraised amount but cites to no order in the record
denying her offer and we can find none.
The marital residence
was heavily encumbered and Julie remarried shortly after the
dissolution decree was entered.
Julie was awarded all the
equity in the residence and Tom the property tax debt.
Under
the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in ordering
the sale of the residence.
AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
Both parties have heavily litigated this case
resulting in large attorney’s fees and costs.
As of September
2001, Tom had incurred $84,972.12 and Julie $154,634.03, with
$66,402.65 being owed her first attorney, Mark Mulloy.
The
family court ordered that Tom pay $40,000 toward the fees of
Mulloy and $40,000 toward the fees of her second attorney, Diana
Skaggs.
It further ordered that Tom pay 83% of the attorney’s
fees for the children’s Guardian Ad Litem.
-8-
The family court, in listing the parties’ marital
debts and assets, listed the $40,000 owed Mulloy as a marital
debt.
Julie argues that an award of attorney’s fee is separate
from a marital debt and the court’s characterization constitutes
reversible error.
Contrary to Julie’s claim there is no
indication that the court’s inclusion of this amount as a
marital debt negated its intent to achieve a just distribution
of the property.
The court, for purposes of clarity, summarized
the entire property distribution in a table.
It is apparent
from the court’s finding in conformity with KRS 403.220 it
understood the nature of an award of attorney’s fees and costs
as a consideration separate from the division of marital
property.
Any error is harmless.
Tom was ordered to pay $80,000 in attorney’s fees and
costs and 83% of the Guardian Ad Litem fee.
The trial court
found that Tom’s income greatly exceeded Julie’s and much of the
litigation expenses were incurred as a result of Tom’s
resistance to discovery requests.
An award of attorney’s fees
and costs is within the broad discretion of the trial court.12
Relative to Tom’s income, Julie has little employment income but
was awarded over one million dollars in assets.
We find no
abuse of discretion in the amount of attorney’s fees awarded.
12
Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, Ky., 52 S.W.3d 513 (2001).
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FINAL DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY AND DEBT
A trial court is required to divide marital property
without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions
considering all relevant facts.13
The statute does not require
that the marital property be divided equally.14
Julie contends that the award of $1,161,172.74 to Tom
and $1,106,681.77 to her in marital assets is an abuse of
discretion.
Tom contends that Julie’s figures are inaccurate
and the difference in the estates is only $11,975.
The
discrepancy in the parties’ relative calculations arises from
Julie correctly including the amount of the assets dissipated as
assets; from Tom’s erroneous classification of these amounts as
debt; and from mathematical miscalculation.
Even using Julie’s
proposed figure, $60,000, given the evidence and the complexity
and size of the total estate we cannot say that the court abused
its discretion.
Although Tom’s margin trading activities and
accumulation of debt during the pendency of this action is not
condoned, over $200,000 of the assets attributable to his
marital property award is the result of the dissipation of
assets and no longer exists.
majority of the parties’ debt.
And he is responsible for the
We find no abuse of discretion.
13
KRS 403.190; Brosick, supra.
14
Russell v. Russell, Ky. App., 878 S.W.2d 24 (1994).
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There is no merit to Tom’s argument that the family
court should have used the June 2000 purchase price when valuing
a home he purchased at 4502 Wolf Spring Drive.
It was within
the court’s discretion to accept the appraisal produced by Julie
valuing the property at $290,000, $30,000 over the purchase
amount as of the date of the hearing.15
MISCELLANEOUS FACTUAL ISSUES
This has been a vigorously fought dissolution action
by both parties and involves a sizeable marital estate and
significant debt.
In conformity with the history of this case,
the parties have raised numerous issues in an attempt to deprive
each other of as much property as possible.
the remaining issues.
We find no merit in
The objective of our property division
statute is to obtain a just distribution.
We have reviewed the
record and find that the family court properly applied the law
and its factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
The judgment in all respects is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT JULIE ROSE
DENTON:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE THOMAS G.
ROSE, SR.:
Diana L. Skaggs
Sandra Ragland
DIANA L. SKAGGS & ASSOCIATES
Louisville, Kentucky
Victoria Ann Ogden
OGDEN & OGDEN
Louisville, Kentucky
15
Culver v. Culver, Ky. App., 572 S.W.2d 617 (1978).
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