HARSCO CORPORATION v. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET; RICHARD ELLIS; THOMAS ELLIS; AND RICHARD E. ELLIS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF VERNON ELLIS, DECEASED
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RENDERED: May 14, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000025-MR
HARSCO CORPORATION
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CI-01541 & 01-CI-01543
v.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
CABINET; RICHARD ELLIS;
THOMAS ELLIS; AND RICHARD E.
ELLIS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF VERNON ELLIS, DECEASED
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
This matter is before this Court for a review of
an Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit Court involving a
decision of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet.
Upon a full review, we reverse.
Appellant, Harsco Corporation, buys and processes
slag through its Heckett Multiservice1 division from Gallatin
Steel Company, which uses an electric arc furnace to melt scrap
steel and turn it into new carbon steel rolls.
product of steel production.
Slag is a waste
The handling and processing of
slag can emit pollutants into the air.
In order to continue the steel making process, slag
must continually be removed.
Likewise, in order for slag to be
processed, steel must continually be made.
Accordingly, Harsco
and Gallatin Steel entered into a contract for their mutual
benefit, which can best be termed as a supply and demand
contract.
Other terms of the contract include that Gallatin
Steel actually selected the site for Harsco’s facility.
The
contract also specifies that Gallatin Steel can make Harsco move
its facility to another mutually suitable location.
Gallatin
Steel also has the option to acquire Harsco’s premises.
However, Gallatin Steel does not have any ownership interest in
Harsco, and they do not share employees.
Appellees Thomas Ellis, Richard Ellis, and Vernon
Ellis2 live on their family’s farm which is near both the
1
At times, Harsco has been referred to as Heckett throughout the prior
proceedings and in various documents.
2
Vernon Ellis died on March 9, 2004; his executor was substituted as a party
to this appeal by order entered April 20, 2004.
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Gallatin Steel and Harsco facilities.
Dust from transporting
and processing the slag is carried by the wind onto their farm.3
Appellee Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet (“Cabinet”) through its Division for Air
Quality (“DAQ”) is the entity responsible in this matter for
making the determination that Harsco and Gallatin Steel are a
single source of air pollutants.4
James E. Bickford was the
Secretary (“Secretary”) of the Cabinet when the single source
determination at issue was made.
The issues in this case involve Kentucky regulations
promulgated to comply with the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401, et seq.
Individual states can regulate companies within
their respective boundaries under the CAA after developing State
Implementation Plans (“SIPs”), which have to be approved by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (“US EPA”).
However, even after approval of the SIPs, the US EPA continues
to have oversight of each state’s program.
been approved by the US EPA.
Kentucky’s SIP has
See 40 CFR § 52.923.
SIPs define source-by-source emissions limits to
ensure that states are meeting the National Ambient Air Quality
3
The Ellises have also been involved in citizen suits in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Covington Division,
against Harsco and Gallatin Steel.
4
Another entity called Air Liquide Industrial Gas Plant was also included in
this determination and is often referenced in documents. Air Liquide, under
the terms of a contract with Gallatin Steel, operates an industrial gas
production facility which provides all of the vaporized oxygen, nitrogen, and
argon, which Gallatin Steel requires as part of its steel making process.
However, Air Liquide is not a party to this appeal.
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Standards (“NAAQS”), which specify the maximum allowable
concentrations of air pollutants for different areas of the
country.
U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 628
(M.D. N.C. 2003)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7409).
The CAA was amended
to include measures entitled “Prevention of Significant
Deterioration” (“PSD”) to protect areas with relatively clean
air.
“PSD was designed to ensure that the air quality of
relatively unpolluted areas, i.e., attainment areas, did not
decline to the minimum levels permitted by NAAQS due to
increases in total annual emissions.”
Id.
Any company in
Kentucky that is defined by 401 KAR 51:017 sec. 1(25)(a) as a
“major stationary source” of air pollutants is included in the
requirements of the PSD program and must receive a PSD permit.
The term “stationary source” of air pollutants means
“a building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or
may emit an air pollutant subject to regulation under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401 to 7671q (Clean Air Act).”
401 KAR 51:017 sec. 1(38).
In turn, a “‘[b]uilding, structure, facility, or installation’
means all of the pollutant activities which belong to the same
industrial grouping, are located on one (1) or more contiguous
or adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same
person (or persons under common control). . . .”
sec. 1(9).
401 KAR 51:017
Each of these three factors must be met for multiple
sources to be considered a single source.
-4-
There is no dispute that Gallatin Steel is a major
stationary source of air pollutants.
However, Harsco, if not
grouped with Gallatin Steel, is not a major stationary source of
air pollutants and would not be required to apply for a PSD
permit.5
The main issue in the present matter is whether Harsco
and Gallatin Steel’s mutual contractual obligations and nature
of their dependent operations are relevant factors to support a
determination that they are a single source of air pollutants
for PSD purposes pursuant to 401 KAR 51:017 sec. 1(9).
Kentucky’s DAQ, via its PSD program, issues PSD
permits for Kentucky sources.
The DAQ has not been consistent
in making this determination with these two entities.6
From 1995
until July of 2000, the DAQ did not treat Gallatin and Harsco as
a single source.
However, in July of 2000, the DAQ made a
determination that Gallatin Steel and Harso were one source for
PSD purposes.
Harsco filed for an administrative review of this
determination pursuant to KRS 224.10-420(2) and 401 KAR 50:060
sec. 5(2).
Because of the potential impact on Gallatin Steel,
5
Apparently, applying for a PSD permit is time consuming and costly.
Further, if an entity is required to operate under a PSD permit, additional
burdens are placed on it to comply with the CAA.
6
The Ellises and the Cabinet maintain that the DAQ was misled regarding the
extent of the relationship between Harsco and Gallatin Steel in 1995.
However, the DAQ had copies of the contract between the two entities in 1995,
when it first determined that they should not be considered as a single
source. Yet, in reviewing the matter in 2000, the primary reason given for
the single source determination was the mutual dependency created by the
contractual obligations.
-5-
it was permitted leave to intervene in that matter.
After
discovery, the parties filed cross motions for a summary
recommendation before the hearing officer.
After oral argument
on the motions, the hearing officer filed a seventy-nine page
Report and Recommendation concluding that the DAQ erred in its
determination that Gallatin Steel and Harsco were one source.
Thereafter the Cabinet and Ellises filed exceptions
thereto to the Secretary of the Cabinet.7
The Secretary declined
to adopt the Report and Recommendation and upheld the earlier
determination by the DAQ that Gallatin Steel and Harsco were a
single source for PSD purposes.
Gallatin Steel and Harsco filed separately for review
of the matter in Franklin Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 224.10420.
The two matters were thereafter consolidated.
The Circuit
Court upheld the Secretary’s determination, and Harsco filed a
timely notice of appeal.
Gallatin Steel did not join in this
appeal.
The main issue regarding the single source
determination is one of law, not fact, regarding the proper
construction of 401 KAR 51:017 sec. 1(9).8
7
This Court is
Gallatin Steel also filed exceptions. However, those exceptions are not
under review as Gallatin Steel did not join in the appeal from the circuit
court.
8
Harsco maintains that the Circuit Court used the wrong standard of review in
deferring to the Secretary by adopting the substantial evidence standard
normally used to review agency decisions. Instead, it argues that the
Circuit Court should have reviewed the matter de novo arguing that the
initial matter was resolved under summary judgment standards where no
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authorized to review issues of law on a de novo basis.
Aubrey
v. Office of Attorney General, Ky. App., 994 S.W.2d 516, 518-519
(1998) (citing American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, Ky., 379 S.W.2d
450, 458 (1964)).
The rules of regulatory interpretation follow the same
standards as those for statutes.
Aubrey, 994 S.W.2d at 520
(citing Revenue Cabinet v. Gaba, Ky. App., 885 S.W.2d 706, 707
(1994) (citing Revenue Cabinet v. Joy Technologies, Inc., Ky.
App., 838 S.W.2d 406 (1992))).
“It is a fundamental rule that
‘all statutes should be interpreted to give them meaning, with
each section construed to be in accord with the statute as a
whole.’” Aubrey, id. (citing Transportation Cabinet v. Tarter,
Ky. App., 802 S.W.2d 944 (1990)).
“Statutes should not be
construed such that their provisions are without meaning,
whether in part or in whole.”
Aubrey, id. (citing George v.
Scent, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 784 (1961)).
“A court may not interpret
a statute at variance with its stated language.”
SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet, Ky. App., 40 S.W.3d 883, 885
(2001).
evidentiary hearing was held. Our resolution of this matter does not involve
issues of fact. Therefore, Harsco’s argument on the correct standard of
review is moot.
-7-
In Hagan v. Farris, Ky., 807 S.W.2d 488, 490 (1991),
the Kentucky Supreme Court summarily laid out the guidelines to
be followed in reviewing agency action:
An agency must be bound by the
regulations it promulgates. Shearer v.
Dailey, 312 Ky. 226, 226 S.W.2d 955 (1950).
Further, the regulations adopted by an
agency have the force and effect of law.
Linkous v. Darch, [Ky.] 323 S.W.2d 850
(1959). An agency’s interpretation of a
regulation is valid, however, only if the
interpretation complies with the actual
language of the regulation. Fluor
Constructors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, 861 F.2d 936
(6th Cir. 1988). KRS 13A.130 prohibits an
administrative body from modifying an
administrative regulation by internal policy
or another form of action.
****
In most cases, an agency’s interpretation of
its own regulations is entitled to
substantial deference. Fluor Constructors,
Inc., supra. A construction of law or
regulation by officers of an agency
continued without interruption for a long
period of time is entitled to controlling
weight. Barnes v. Department of Revenue,
Ky., 575 S.W.2d 169 (1978). It is usually
the practice to conform to an agency’s
construction when that agency was
responsible for a regulation’s adoption.
Passafiume v. Shearer, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 456
(1951).
In Board of Trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement
System v. Attorney General of the Com., Ky., ___ S.W.3d ___,
2003 WL 22415383, *16 (Oct. 23, 2003), the Court added further
guidance on the deference due an agency, holding that the
deference generally given pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
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Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984),
“is normally granted only when the agency interpretation is in
the form of an adopted regulation or formal adjudication.”
Board of Trustees, ___S.W.3d at ___, 2003 WL 22415383, at *16
(citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 687, (2000)
(“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—
do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”); Mid-American Care
Found. v. N.L.R.B., 148 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Chevron
deference is limited in application to those situations in which
the administrative agency has formally adopted a particular
interpretation of a statute.”);
Johnson City Med. Ctr. v.
United States, 999 F.2d 973, 976 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[A] revenue
ruling, as opposed to a legislative regulation, is not entitled
to the deference accorded a statute.”)).
However, “courts do
not face a choice between Chevron deference and no deference at
all.
Administrative decisions not subject to Chevron deference
may be entitled to a lesser degree of deference; the agency
position should be followed to the extent persuasive.”
Scharpf
v. AIG Marketing, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 455, 465 (W.D. Ky. 2003)
(citing U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)(citing
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
-9-
The phrase under review in 401 KAR 51:017 sec. 1(9) is
“under the control of the same person (or persons under common
9
control).”
“[U]nder common control” is defined in a 1985
Policy Manual as follows:
The term “under common control” in 401 KAR
51:017, Section 2(6) shall mean that persons
with as much as 50% voting interest in an
entity are considered to control the entity.
This Policy Manual was thereafter incorporated by
reference in 401 KAR 50:016, which remains a properly
promulgated regulation.
Nonetheless, the Secretary determined
that this was not the exclusive definition of “common control.”
Unfortunately, the Secretary failed to justify his
reasons for his conclusion that the above reference was nonexclusionary.
On the contrary, courts in this Commonwealth have
long interpreted “shall” as a mandatory term.
See Alexander v.
S & M Motors, Inc., Ky., 28 S.W.3d 303 (2000); Commonwealth v.
Fint, Ky., 940 S.W.2d 896, 897 (1997).
Moreover, in KRS 446.010
(29), our legislature pronounced that in statutory construction,
“shall” is a mandatory term.
Because we use rules of statutory
construction to interpret regulations, we apply this principle
9
While there is no issue regarding whether Harsco and Gallatin Steel are on
contiguous property, there is an issue regarding the correct industrial
grouping of Harsco. Nonetheless, if one factor listed in 401 KAR 51:017 sec.
1(9) is absent, multiple sources cannot be combined. Because we ultimately
conclude that under the current regulations Harsco and Gallatin Steel are not
under common control, a determination of Harsco’s industrial grouping is
irrelevant. Hence, we decline to review it.
-10-
in the matter.
Thus, “shall” is a mandatory term, not open to
alternatives meanings.
Moreover, the Secretary’s interpretation has not gone
through the regulatory promulgation process, nor is it a
longstanding interpretation.
little deference.
Thus, we find it is entitled to
We make this finding based on his unsupported
conclusion which is not persuasive in light of the unambiguous
regulatory language.
We conclude that his decision was
arbitrary and not in accord with a properly promulgated
regulation.
Further, we find the reasons stated in the record for
not following 401 KAR 50:016 in making the single source
determination a compelling buttress for our conclusion.
Reasons
given by those in decision making authority in the DAQ10 include
that the Policy Manual was old and outdated and that the DAQ
“just never got around to updating [it].”
Instead, of relying
on 401 KAR 50:016, decision makers relied on case studies and
guidance documents.
Pursuant to KRS 13A.130, this was an
impermissible attempt to alter or modify a regulation by
internal policy.
The bulk of the argument put forth by the Ellises in
their brief is that “under the control of the same person” is an
alternative definition of control.
10
The reason they advocate
These persons include Edd Frazier, John Hornback, and Dan Gray.
-11-
this so strenuously is that this phrase is not limited by a
specific definition anywhere in the regulations, whereas “under
common control” is limited in meaning by 401 KAR 50:016.
The Ellises brought up this argument before the
hearing officer, but did not include it in their exceptions to
the Report and Recommendations.
Pursuant to KRS Chapter 13B,
“the filing of exceptions provides the means for preserving and
identifying issues for review by the agency head.
In turn,
filing exceptions is necessary to preserve issues for further
judicial review.”
Rapier v. Philpot, Ky., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2004
WL 102199, *3 (Jan. 22, 2004).
Hence, this argument was not
properly before the Circuit Court and is not properly before us.
Nonetheless, the Circuit Court reviewed this issue and
agreed with the Ellises.11
The Circuit Court, in its Opinion and
Order, upheld the Secretary’s determination.
However, we
conclude the Circuit Court’s analysis and conclusions are
erroneous as it misstated the findings made by the Secretary.
The Circuit Court stated in relevant part as follows:
The Secretary interprets the “under common
control” clause as merely one option. The
alternative clause, “under the control of
the same person”, is not defined by either
the Kentucky or the EPA regulations. In the
absence of a definition, a word must be
given its ordinary meaning. Consalvi v.
Cawood, Ky. App., 63 S.W.3d 195, 198 (2001).
The Secretary applied the ordinary meaning
11
Most likely the Circuit Court reviewed this issue because Harsco did not
argue preservation before it. Nor has Harsco argued it before us.
-12-
of the phrase “under the control of the same
person” and made a finding that Harsco and
Gallatin were under such control.
The Secretary, however, did not use the phrase “under
the control of the same person” as an alternate definition of
control.
Thus, the Circuit Court clearly erred.
Moreover, in the relevant documents relating to this
matter and in the Secretary’s Final Order, 401 KAR 51:017 sec.
1(9) has not been treated as having two alternative definitions.
Instead, the two phrases have been used cooperatively.
The
reasonable conclusion is that the phrase in parenthesis, “(or
persons under common control),” is descriptive or explanatory of
“under the control of the same person.”
Neither the Cabinet nor
the Ellises point us to any authority reaching a different
conclusion.
The Ellises argue, nonetheless, that, if 401 KAR
51:017 is the exclusive definition of common control, it is less
stringent than the federal law.
They, therefore, conclude that,
due to this conflict, Kentucky’s definition is in violation of
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States
Constitution.
We, however, disagree.
Under considerations concerning the Supremacy Clause,
among other factors, we look for a conflict between state and
federal law, where federal law has preempted an area.
-13-
However,
a conflict arises when “compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43,
83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217-18, 10 L.Ed.2d 248
(1963), or when state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581
(1941).
Ohio Mfrs. Ass’n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 828 (6th Cir.
1986).
However, the US EPA has not defined the term “common
control.”
There being no definition by the US EPA, we cannot
say that Kentucky’s definition creates a conflict wherein an
entity cannot comply with both federal and state law.
As a side note to their Supremacy Clause issue, the
Ellises point out that 401 KAR 50:016 is not part of the
federally approved SIP regarding PSD’s.
However, there are a
number of DAQ regulations under Kentucky’s CAA program which
were not included in the federally approved SIP program.12
We
have found no authority to say that simply because a state
regulation is not specifically incorporated into the federally
approved SIP, it has no force as state law.
To say otherwise
would be to invalidate a number of properly promulgated
regulations.
We decline to do so.
12
For example, the following regulations are not included in the federally
approved SIP for Kentucky: 401 KAR 50:031; 401 KAR 50:033; 401 KAR 50:034;
401 KAR 50:038.
-14-
For the reasons so stated, we hereby reverse.
This
matter is remanded to Franklin Circuit Court for proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
TACKETT, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Robert B. Craig
Robert A. Bilott
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister,
LLP
Covington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Robert B. Craig
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister,
LLP
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CABINET:
Jack B. Bates
Susan Rose Green
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
CABINET:
Jack B. Bates
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLEES ESTATE OF VERNON
ELLIS, RICHARD ELLIS, AND
THOMAS ELLIS:
Jeffrey M. Sanders
Sanders, Tismo & Associates,
PSC
Covington, Kentucky
-15-
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