LOUELLA C. ASH v. WILLIAM WOLFE AND ALMA WOLFE
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RENDERED: MARCH 12, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002572-MR
LOUELLA C. ASH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LEWIS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00137
WILLIAM WOLFE AND
ALMA WOLFE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Louella Ash (“Ash”) appeals from findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of the Lewis Circuit
Court dismissing her action to permanently enjoin William and
Alma Wolfe (“the Wolfes”) from blocking a roadway over which Ash
sought to access a parcel of real property.
stated herein, we affirm.
For the reasons
On March 8, 1999, Ash purchased from Larry Fannin a
parcel of real property situated in Lewis County, Kentucky.
The
Wolfes purchased a nearby parcel from Emil and Jacqulin
Bloomfield on August 25, 1978.
Situated between the two parcels
is a third parcel owned by Alice Hronek, who is not a party to
the instant action.
When Ash purchased her parcel, she did not investigate
whether there existed a right of way to the property, but she
did observe an alleged roadway running across the Wolfes’ parcel
to her parcel.
The alleged roadway is sometimes referred to in
the record as Lower Twin Branch Road.
She also noted at the
time of purchase that the alleged roadway was blocked by a
cable.
On July 21, 2000, Ash filed a complaint against the
Wolfes in Lewis Circuit Court.
She alleged therein that the
roadway in question was once maintained by Lewis County and that
it provided the only access to her parcel.
She sought an order
establishing her right to use the roadway and permanently
enjoining the Wolfes from blocking it.
She also sought damages
for the alleged wrongful deprivation of her rights to use the
road.
A bench trial was conducted on May 28, 2002.
taking proof, the court rendered its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment on July 11, 2002.
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It
Upon
determined in relevant part that Ash was not alleging the
existence of a prescriptive easement or adverse possession, and
opined that an easement by necessity and/or implication could
not be found because the two parcels at issue did not come from
a common grantor.
It also found that no evidence was tendered
to establish that Lewis County ever maintained or incorporated
into the county road system a road known as Lower Twin Branch
Road.
It concluded that Ash was not entitled to use the alleged
roadway, and it dismissed her action.
On November 15, 2002, an
amended judgment was rendered which reached the same conclusion
as the July 11, 2002 judgment, but went into greater detail
regarding the conclusions of law upon which the judgment was
based.
This appeal followed.
Ash now argues that the trial court erred in rendering
a judgment in favor of the Wolfes.
Specifically, she maintains
that the general and long-continued use of the roadway by the
public creates the right to continue its use; that she has the
right to use the roadway whether it was abandoned by the public
or adversely possessed by the Wolfes; that she has no other
access to her parcel; that she presented evidence of a former
right of way; and, that the disputed roadway is a county road.
She seeks an order reversing the judgment and granting her
access to her property over the disputed roadway without
interference from the Wolfes.
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We are not persuaded by Ash’s first argument, i.e.,
that the general and long-continued use of the roadway by the
public creates the right to continue its use.
Ash contends that
the only testimony before the trial court showed conclusively
that the road is a public road, and she relies on this
contention as a basis for concluding that she (and others) have
the right to use what should be characterized as a public
roadway.
The trial court, however, found that all of Ash’s
witnesses on this issue were young children decades ago when
they used the roadway, and that none knew if they used it with
permission or whether they had a right to use the roadway.
Conversely, the Wolfes offered unrebutted testimony that they
purchased their property in 1978 and that the roadway was closed
and blocked by a cable ever since that date.
Thus, the court
opined that even if it were a public roadway, it would have been
closed by adverse possession.
675 (1950).
Funk v. Whitaker, Ky., 342 S.W.2d
We have no basis for tampering with these findings
of fact and conclusions of law, Carroll v. Meredith, Ky. App.,
59 S.W.3d 484 (2001), and thus find no error on this issue.
Ash goes on to contend that even if the roadway was
abandoned by the public, she still has a private right to use it
by virtue of the holding in Hylton v. Belcher, Ky., 290 S.W.2d
475 (1956).
Hylton, however, is distinguishable from the facts
at bar in that the parties in Hylton shared a common grantor and
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were seeking to quiet title to an abandoned county road that
bordered each of the parcels.
The trial court found in the
matter at bar that the roadway was never a county roadway, and
Ash and the Wolfes do not share a common grantor.
Hylton is not
persuasive, and does not support Ash’s claim that she is
entitled to use the roadway at issue even if it was abandoned.1
Ash’s third argument is that her property is
landlocked and that she has no means of accessing the property
without the use of the disputed roadway.
She reasons that
because the parcel is landlocked, she must retain a private
easement over the roadway to the extent necessary for reasonable
ingress and egress.
Without so stating, Ash appears to contend
that she is entitled to an easement by necessity.
This argument
must fail as a matter of law, as such an easement requires a
common grantor of the affected parcels.
Carroll, supra, citing
28A C.J.S Easements § 93 (1996 and Supp. 2001).
Ash next contends that she presented evidence of a
former right of way to one of the tracts which now make up her
parcel, and suggests that this evidence supports her assertion
that she is entitled to traverse the Wolfes’ parcel.
1
She
An easement may be created by express written grant, implication,
prescription or estoppel. Easement by implication includes two legal
theories: (1) quasi-easement and (2) easement by necessity. A quasi-easement
arises from a prior existing use of land, whereas an easement by necessity is
based on public policy and an implied intent of the parties favoring the use
and development of land as opposed to rendering it useless. Carroll, 59
S.W.3d at 489.
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concedes, however, that this alleged former easement does not
cross or otherwise affect the Wolfes’ parcel, and she cites no
case law or statutory law in support of the assertion that this
alleged former easement would have any bearing on the issues at
bar.
As such, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred
in failing to rely on the evidence of the alleged former
easement, and accordingly find no error.
In her final argument, Ash raises the issue of whether
the disputed roadway is a county roadway.
She notes that
evidence was adduced at trial that the roadway has appeared on
county road maps, but concedes that the Lewis County Judge
Executive and a county road foreman each testified that to the
best of their knowledge it was not a county road.
She argues
that if it were to be determined to be a county road, the Wolfes
have failed to comply with guidelines set forth in KRS 178.116
requiring a joint petition to discontinue the roadway.
The evidence on this issue is conflicting.
Clearly,
the Judge Executive and county road foreman testified that no
evidence existed that the roadway was maintained by the county,
and the Wolfes produced county road maps showing no roadway.
Conversely, Ash produced maps showing a county roadway to exist.
A trial court's factual findings shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
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witnesses.
Carroll, 59 S.W.3d at 489.
The trial court’s
finding that no county roadway existed is supported by the
evidence and is not clearly erroneous, and accordingly we find
no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of the Lewis Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Delores Woods Baker
Maysville, KY
John R. McGinnis
Greenup, KY
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