JAMES W. BURKHART v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 25, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2002-CA-002495-MR
JAMES W. BURKHART
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLEN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00162
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from the Marion Circuit
Court’s judgment and sentence on appellant James Burkhart’s
conditional guilty plea to escape in the second-degree.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not granting
his motion to dismiss for failure to conduct a trial within 180
days pursuant to KRS 500.110.
For the reasons stated hereafter,
we affirm.
On November 24, 2001, appellant escaped from the
Marion Adjustment Center, where he was serving a fifty-two year
sentence for prior felony convictions.
Appellant was indicted
on December 17 for escape in the second-degree and for being a
persistent felony offender in the first-degree.
Subsequently,
the Northpoint Training Center sent a letter to the Marion
Circuit Court acknowledging that Northpoint was lodging the
circuit court’s detainer against appellant.
On February 22,
2002, appellant filed a pro se motion requesting a final
disposition of the criminal charges pending against him within
180 days, pursuant to KRS 500.110 (motion for a speedy trial).
At appellant’s June 3 arraignment, the trial court
appointed Glenda Edwards of the Department of Public Advocacy as
appellant’s counsel.
Appellant pled not guilty to the charges
against him, and the trial judge asked Edwards when the case
should be set for trial.
Edwards was unaware of appellant’s pro
se motion for a speedy trial but replied that the trial should
be set within 180 days (the judge had told her that there was a
six-month window in which to hold appellant’s trial, though he
had not told her why).
The trial judge asked Edwards if
November 14 was an acceptable date, and Edwards indicated that
it was.
The judge then asked Edwards whether she would prefer
an August 15 trial date.
Edwards replied that she had quite a
few cases set for trial in August and that the November 14 date
was satisfactory.
The trial court set that trial date (a date
outside of the speedy trial time limit), as well as dates for
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the pretrial conference and review.
Appellant was present at
all times during this exchange between the trial judge and his
counsel.
The court’s June 3 docket sheet indicated that
appellant “waived [his] 180 day limit.”
At the October 7 pretrial conference, Edwards
indicated that she had become aware of appellant’s pro se motion
for a speedy trial during an August 23 telephone conversation
with appellant, over two months after his arraignment.
Edwards
requested that the trial court review the June 3 arraignment
videotape to see if appellant had waived his right to a speedy
trial (as the court’s docket sheet indicated that he had).
At
the November 4 pretrial review, Edwards moved the court to
dismiss the charges against appellant because he had not been
given a speedy trial upon request.
The trial judge stated that
he had reviewed the June 3 arraignment tape and denied
appellant’s motion, because the constitution did not set a
specific number of days in its guarantee to a speedy trial.
Edwards indicated that appellant’s motion was statutorily based,
not constitutionally based, and that a Kentucky statute required
a trial to be conducted within 180 days if a detainer had been
lodged against a defendant and the defendant properly requested
a speedy trial.
The judge again denied the motion, based on his
review of the June 3 arraignment tape.
Appellant subsequently
entered a conditional guilty plea to escape in the second-degree
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on the grounds that he could appeal the trial court’s denial of
his motion to dismiss for failure to hold a speedy trial.
This
appeal followed.
KRS 500.110 provides as follows:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional
institution of this state, and whenever
during the continuance of the term of
imprisonment there is pending in any
jurisdiction of this state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which a detainer has been lodged
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within one hundred and eighty (180)
days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the
place of his imprisonment and his request
for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information or complaint;
provided that for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of
the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance.
It is uncontested that appellant effected KRS
500.110’s protection, because a detainer was lodged against him,
he informed the proper individuals where he was incarcerated,
and he requested that the pending charges against him be
determined within 180 days.
Therefore, if appellant’s right to
a speedy trial was not waived, the Commonwealth had until August
21, 2002 (180 days from the date appellant’s request for a
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speedy trial was received) to produce a final disposition of the
charges against appellant.
Kentucky has adopted the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (IAD) at KRS 440.450-440.990.
“As a congressionally
sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal
construction.”
Parks v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 395, 397 (2002)
(citing New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S.Ct. 659, 662,
145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000)).
“The IAD applies to interstate
detainers, i.e., detainers lodged by one state against prisoners
incarcerated in another state, whereas KRS 500.110, applies to
intrastate detainers, i.e. detainers lodged by Kentucky courts
against in-state prisoners.”
25, 28 (2003).
Rosen v. Watson, Ky., 103 S.W.3d
“KRS 500.110 was adopted after the IAD and
[uses] the same language.
In addition, the reasons supporting
the IAD seem to apply with equal force to the intrastate
statute.”
(2001).
Dunaway v. Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 563, 567
Thus, when construing KRS 500.110, cases interpreting
the IAD are insightful.
Id. at 567.
“[T]he most basic rights of criminal defendants
are. . . subject to waiver.”
Hill, 528 U.S. at 114, 120 S.Ct.
at 663 (citing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111
S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991)).
And in some circumstances,
a defendant may “waive his right to object to a given delay
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under the IAD.”
Hill, 528 U.S. at 114, 120 S.Ct. at 663.
Additionally, a defendant may personally waive his right to a
speedy trial or “waiver may be affected by action of counsel.”
Hill, 528 U.S. at 114, 120 S.Ct. at 664.
Counsel may especially
waive a defendant’s right to a speedy trial when the waiver
occurs due to a scheduling matter, because “[s]cheduling matters
are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally
controls.”
Id. at 115, 120 S.Ct. at 664.
In the matter before
us, both appellant and counsel waived appellant’s right to a
speedy trial.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding
that he waived his right to a speedy trial, because one must act
affirmatively in order to waive this right.
We disagree.
In
Hill, the Court held that defense counsel waived the defendant’s
right to a speedy trial under the IAD, even though neither the
defendant nor defense counsel made an affirmative act.
Hill,
528 U.S. 110 120 S.Ct. 659; accord Parks, 89 S.W.3d 395.
In
fact, the Court found there to be no differences between waivers
a defendant proposed and waivers to which a defendant agreed.
Id. at 118, 120 S.Ct. at 666.
In Hill, the prosecutor suggested
May 1 as the trial date (a date outside of the IAD time limit).
The trial judge asked defense counsel if that date was
acceptable, and defense counsel responded, “That will be fine,
Your Honor.”
Id. at 113, 120 S.Ct. at 663.
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Hill is
indistinguishable from the matter now before us, and the trial
court was correct in finding that Edwards waived appellant’s
right to a speedy trial when she agreed to a trial date outside
of the 180-day period.
Next, appellant argues that Edwards could not have
waived his right to a speedy trial, because Edwards did not know
about appellant’s pro se motion at the time she agreed to the
trial date outside of the speedy trial time limits.
disagree.
We
“IAD rights are not constitutionally based; waiver of
them must be voluntary, but need not be knowing and
intelligent.”
People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 695 (Colo. 1984)
(citing United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1979)).
Edwards did not have to know she was waiving appellant’s right
to a speedy trial; she merely had to voluntarily waive this
right.
Edwards voluntarily consented to the trial date outside
of the speedy trial time limits and waived any objection
thereto.
Edwards’ consent to the trial date outside of the
speedy trial time limits and waiver of defendant’s right to a
speedy trial are binding on appellant.
Additionally, appellant personally waived his right to
a speedy trial, because he was present at the June 3 arraignment
yet said nothing when the trial date was set outside of the
speedy trial time limit.
Though appellant argues his silence
cannot be considered a personal waiver that is simply not the
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case.
In Ward v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 62 S.W.3d 399, 404
(2001), the court held:
Ward waived his right to complain of the
[IAD] violation by acquiescing to be tried
outside the required time period and by
failing to raise the issue of alleged
noncompliance with the IAD on the numerous
occasions when he was before the trial court
prior to the expiration of the 120 days.
Appellant was present at the June 3 arraignment, when the trial
date was set, and was certainly aware at that time of his pro se
motion for a speedy trial.
Even though appellant was not before
the trial court “numerous times” before the 180-day period
expired, he did have ample time between the time the trial date
was set and the time the 180-day period expired in which to
request an earlier trial date.
Pursuant to Hill, 528 U.S. 110,
120 S.Ct. 659 and Ward, 62 S.W.3d 399, appellant’s silence was
enough to waive his right to a speedy trial.
See Parks, 89
S.W.3d 395 (defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the IAD
was waived when defense counsel made no response to the trial
judge’s proposed trial date outside of the IAD time limits).
Because both appellant and Edwards waived appellant’s
right to a speedy trial, the court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Palombi
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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