JOEY HART v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 15, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002323-MR
JOEY HART
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00340
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Joey Hart (Hart) appeals pro se from an order
of the McCracken Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate his
sentence pursuant to the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42.
We affirm.
On December 1, 1997, Hart was indicted by the Grand
Jury on one count of Capital Murder and one count of Robbery in
the First Degree, for killing a woman at the Gold Exchange in
the course of a robbery.
On December 19, 1997, Hart, with
counsel, pled not guilty.
Hart was represented by two attorneys
from the Department of Public Advocacy throughout the
proceedings.
On January 20, 1998, the Commonwealth filed a
“Notice of Intent to Seek [the] Death Penalty.”
After filing a
series of motions, on December 11, 1998, Hart’s counsel filed a
“Motion to Suppress [Hart’s] Statements.”
This motion related
to the confession and incriminating statements Hart made to the
police.
After the suppression hearing, the trial court denied
this motion in an order entered March 16, 1999.
Thereafter, Hart, with counsel, pled guilty to murder
and robbery in the first degree in open court on April 7, 1999.
In exchange for Hart’s plea, the Commonwealth agreed to
recommend a sentence for Count 1 (murder) of life without the
possibility of parole for 25 years and for Count 2 (robbery in
the first degree) 20 years, the sentences to run concurrently.
Hart, with counsel, executed the “Motion to Enter Guilty Plea.”
On May 13, 1999, the trial court imposed a sentence consistent
with the Commonwealth’s recommendations.
On July 16, 2001, Hart filed a pro se request for RCr
11.42 relief.
The trial court entered an order denying Hart’s
motion on July 20, 2001.
Hart then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on August 29, 2001.
The trial court granted
Hart’s motion for appointment of counsel on December 18, 2002.
Following that, Hart’s counsel filed a Supplement to Hart’s pro
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se RCr 11.42 motion on June 5, 2002.
On October 4, 2002, the
trial court entered an order denying the RCr 11.42 motion, and
this appeal followed.
Hart asserts six issues on appeal.
First, Hart claims
the trial court erred in failing to suppress the confession he
made to the police, as he claimed it violated his Miranda1 rights
since he had requested an attorney and an attorney was not
present.
Second, Hart claims that by failing to suppress the
statements made to the police, the trial court violated his due
process and equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution
and his rights under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Third, Hart claims his due process and equal protection rights
and rights under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution were
violated because had he not been threatened to plead guilty by
the police, he would not have pled guilty but would have instead
gone to trial.
Fourth, Hart claims ineffective assistance of
counsel, claiming his counsel rendered “weak” legal advice,
failed to advise him not to plead guilty, and failed to
sufficiently consult with him.
Fifth, Hart claims the trial
court failed to establish the intent element on the record when
Hart gave his guilty plea.
Finally, Hart claims his guilty plea
was not voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently entered,
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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thereby violating Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and
the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Since the first three issues raised by Hart involve
the statements he made to the police, we will address them
together.
Hart specifically claims after he requested an
attorney, the police turned off the videotape, whereupon the
police coerced and threatened him into confessing.
He claims,
had his request for an attorney been honored, he would have made
a voluntary decision in whether to speak to the police, but
since the police threatened him with “death threats”, he felt he
had no other choice but to confess.
He also claims that had the
police not made the “threat on his life,” he would have retained
his plea of not guilty and gone to trial.
He asserts that the
trial court abused its discretion by failing to suppress the
confession under Miranda.
He also alleges that this failure to
suppress the coercion violates his due process and equal
protection rights under the U.S. Constitution, as well as his
rights under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
“A conviction after a plea of guilty normally rests on
the defendant’s own admission in open court that he committed
the acts with which he is charged.”
McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 766, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1446, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970),
citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct.
1463, 1468, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970); McCarthy v. United States,
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394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1170-1171, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418
(1969).
“[A] convict was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
upon a post-conviction motion attacking a judgment of conviction
based on a guilty plea, merely on the assertion that the guilty
plea (made with advice of counsel) had been motivated by a
coerced confession.”
Wheeler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 462 S.W.2d
921, 922 (1971), citing McMann, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25
L. Ed. 2d 763.
“. . . [T]he admissibility of the allegedly
coerced confession could have been tested at the original trial.
When the defendant voluntarily enters a plea of guilty, he
waives his right to challenge the admissibility of the
confession.”
Id.
“A guilty plea constitutes a break in the
chain of events, and the defendant therefore may not raise
independent claims related to the deprivation of constitutional
rights occurring before entry of the guilty plea.”
Centers v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 55 (1990), citing White
v. Sowders, 644 F.2d. 1177 (6th Cir. 1980).
By simply claiming his coerced confession caused him
to plead guilty, Hart cannot now try to challenge the
admissibility of that confession.
His conviction was based on
his open court admission of committing the crimes, not on the
alleged coerced confession.
Furthermore, during the plea
colloquy with the trial judge, Hart agreed he was voluntarily,
freely, willfully, knowingly and intelligently entering his
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guilty plea.
When Hart pled guilty to the crimes, he waived all
of his defenses to the charges (other than the indictment did
not charge an offense), including a defense related to coerced
confessions made to the police.
Quarles v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
456 S.W.2d 693, 694 (1970).
Hart’s fourth issue is he claims he had ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) provides us with the
test to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.
Under this
test, the appellant must show not only that his trial counsel’s
performance was deficient, but that this deficient performance
prejudiced his defense.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
This two-
prong test also applies in this situation, where the appellant
has pled guilty and challenges his plea based on an ineffective
assistance of counsel allegation.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).
In this situation,
the appellant must show (1) that his attorney gave a deficient
performance such that the performance fell outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance and (2) the plea
process was affected by the deficient performance because the
appellant would not have pled guilty had he received competent
assistance.
Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 724 S.W.2d 223,
226 (1986), citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.
To
meet the prejudice requirement, the defendant must show that
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there was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.”
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.
Under his fourth allegation, Hart specifically alleges
his counsel was deficient in (1) not obtaining the discovery in
order to prepare his defense, (2) failing to investigate whether
Hart’s confession violated his Miranda rights, (3) failing to
suppress his confession, (4) failing to advise Hart to not plead
guilty, and (5) advising Hart to plead guilty one day before
trial and having only met with Hart twice.
refutes Hart’s allegations.
We find the record
To begin with, Hart had not one,
but two attorneys representing him throughout the proceedings
who filed numerous motions prior to Hart’s guilty plea,
including (1) a motion to suppress the confession given to the
police, (2) a motion to suppress evidence and (3) several
discovery motions.
As to Hart’s first ineffective assistance of
counsel allegation, Hart’s counsel filed numerous discovery
motions on December 11, 1998.
As to Hart’s second and third
ineffective assistance of counsel allegations, Hart’s counsel
effectively handled the suppression issue.
Hart’s counsel filed
a motion to suppress the confession and litigated the issue at
the suppression hearing.
Failing to get the confession
suppressed does not mean that his counsel was ineffective,
especially since the confession was not used because Hart pled
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guilty.
As to Hart’s fifth ineffective assistance of counsel
allegation, Hart entered a guilty plea to the charges of murder
and robbery in the first degree.
In doing so, Hart stated in
open court that he was voluntarily, freely, and willingly
pleading guilty to the charges.
When trial counsel asked Hart
at the guilty plea proceeding whether he had conferred with his
attorneys and whether he was satisfied with the advice of his
counsel, Hart stated, “yes.”
Also, Hart was facing the death
penalty and by pleading guilty, his counsel secured a lesser
sentence, to which Hart admitted he understood.
When counsel,
after investigating the case, advises his client to plead guilty
in order to receive a lesser sentence, this is not ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Commonwealth v. Campbell, Ky., 415
S.W.2d 614, 616 (1967).
There is no need to analyze whether Hart has met the
second prong of the Strickland test since Hart has failed to
meet the first prong of the test.
Under his fifth issue, Hart specifically alleges that
his plea agreement did not apprise him of the elements of the
crimes he had been charged with, specifically the intent
element.
Although parts of his argument are missing from his
submitted brief, Hart admits that the trial court asked him if
he had been made aware of his Constitutional rights and the
elements of the crime, yet he claims the plea agreement does not
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do so.
After viewing the videotape of the proceedings, it is
clear the trial court asked Hart if he understood the nature of
the charges and Hart replied, “Yes.”
The trial court asked Hart
whether he understood the nature of the charges, to which Hart
replied he understood the nature of the charges and that he had
engaged in those crimes.
Trial counsel also asked Hart’s
counsel if he had gone over the plea agreement with Hart, to
which his counsel said, “Yes.”
Hart also claims that because he
had to sign the plea agreement twice, he was not apprised of the
circumstances surrounding the charges.
Having to sign the plea
agreement twice does not alter the information Hart had relating
to these crimes.
If anything, signing the agreement twice would
have ensured that Hart read the agreement and had two
opportunities to speak to his counsel regarding the
circumstances surrounding the crimes.
Hart’s counsel mistakenly
had Hart sign the plea agreement on April 2, 1999, in his
presence but not in the presence of open court.
The videotape
of the April 5, 1999 proceedings show that at the proceeding,
the Prosecutor pointed this out and requested for Hart to sign
the plea agreement in open court, which he did.
This double-
signing did not prevent Hart from being made aware of the crimes
he was pleading guilty to.
Hart’s sixth, and final, issue generally alleges that
since the trial court did not engage in a colloquy with him and
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that his counsel told him only at that moment to agree with the
plea agreement, his guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently entered into.
conflict with the record.
These allegations directly
After viewing the videotapes of the
proceedings, it is obvious that the trial court did engage in a
sufficient colloquy to ensure that Hart was pleading
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Hart stated he had
attended up to the twelfth grade and that he was satisfied with
the advice from his attorney.
He also stated he understood the
charges brought against him and that he did in fact engage in
those crimes.
Furthermore, the trial court asked Hart and his
counsel if Hart was under any drugs, alcohol and any other
substance which would impair his judgment, to which they both
answered in the negative.
The trial court also asked Hart if he
understood the rights he was waiving and that he could have
faced the death penalty had he not pled guilty, to which Hart
answered in the affirmative.
Clearly, the trial court engaged in sufficient
dialogue with Hart to ensure his understanding of the plea he
was making.
See Centers, 799 S.W.2d at 54.
Therefore, this
argument is also without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joey Hart, Pro se
Fredonia, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Elizabeth A. Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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