TAMMY HARRIS v. SANDRA BROCK; AND BISCEGLIA REALTY AND AUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
December 5, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: February 13, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
MODIFIED: February 27, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002287-MR
TAMMY HARRIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00103
SANDRA BROCK; AND BISCEGLIA REALTY
AND AUCTION COMPANY, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
The appellant, Tammy Harris (Harris), appeals
from a July 31, 2002 order of the Bell Circuit Court that
granted summary judgment in favor of the appellee, Sandra Brock
(Brock).
Harris had sued Brock for fraud claiming that Brock
had misrepresented the boundaries of Brock’s property and
claimed to own more property that she actually could convey to
Harris in a real estate transaction.
On appeal, Harris argues that in fraud cases the
modern trend in the law has been to require less diligence on
the part of a person to whom a misrepresentation has been made.
Harris contends despite the fact that two recorded deeds and a
duly recorded subdivision plat contained the correct information
that contradicted Brock’s representations regarding the
property’s boundaries, she was under no duty to investigate.
Agreeing with Harris, this Court vacates and remands for further
proceedings.
Prior to September of 1993, Otis Hoskins (Otis) owned
lots four, five, six and seven of block nine of the Hull and
Barclay addition in Pineville, Kentucky.
The front boundary for
block nine ran along Tennessee Avenue in Pineville and the back
boundary for the block ran along a small alley.
The front and
back boundary for each lot in the Hull and Barclay addition was
twenty-five feet wide and each side boundary for the lots was
one hundred and twenty-five feet long.
Thus, each lot in the
addition, including those discussed in the case sub judice, was
twenty-five feet wide and one hundred and twenty-five feet long.
Lots four and five consisted of an open field and, to the east,
lots six and seven contained a house, which Otis kept as rental
property.
-2-
Also prior to September 29, 1993, Brock and Otis
entered into an agreement to trade property with one another.
Brock received the house that sat upon lots six and seven and
Otis received real estate that Brock had inherited.
On
September 29, 1993, Otis conveyed the house and the lots it sat
upon to Brock.
The deed from Otis to Brock described what Brock
received as follows:
Lots Six (6) and Seven (7), Block 9 of the
Hull and Barclay addition to the City of
Pineville as shown by map and plat thereof
in the Bell Court Clerk’s Office.
Brock duly recorded the deed in the Bell County Clerk’s office.
According to Brock’s testimony, when she acquired the house from
Otis, she believed, despite the legal description in the abovementioned deed, that she had also received the open field
situated on lots four and five.
In 1999, Brock decided to sell her house in the Hull
and Barclay addition and move to Louisville, Kentucky.
Brock
contracted with Coldwell Bankers Bisceglia Realty Company
(Bisceglia Realty) for it to market and sell the house.
Kathy
Hoskins (Kathy), who worked for Bisceglia Realty, was the agent
responsible for selling Brock’s property.
According to both
Brock’s testimony and Kathy’s testimony, Brock pointed out to
Kathy the property’s boundaries, and when Brock did so, she
claimed ownership of lots four and five.
-3-
Kathy testified that
when she showed the property to Harris, she told Harris that the
property included the open field situated on lots four and five.
Eventually, Harris bought Brock’s property and on October 27,
1999, Brock conveyed the property to Harris.
The deed described
the property that Harris received as follows:
Lots Six (6) and Seven (7), Block 9 of the
Hull and Barclay addition to the City of
Pineville as shown by map and plat thereof
of record in the Bell County Court Clerk’s
Office.
Being that same property conveyed to Sandra
Brock, single, by Deed of Conveyance from
Otis Hoskins, single, dated September 27,
1993 and recorded in Deed Book 274, page
643, Bell County Court Clerk’s Office.
In Harris’ deposition, she testified that, despite the legal
description in the deed, she thought that she had received lots
four and five along with the house.
After moving in, Harris
decided to do some home improvements on her new house.
At this
point, Harris found out that Otis, not she, owned lots four and
five.
Harris filed suit against Brock and claimed that Brock
fraudulently misrepresented the boundaries of the property to
induce Harris to buy the property.
Eventually, Harris moved to
amend her complaint to include mutual mistake as well.
Brock
filed third party complaints against both Otis and Bisceglia
Realty.
judgment.
On August 15, 2001, Otis filed a motion for summary
On August 16, 2001, Bisceglia Realty originally filed
-4-
a motion for summary judgment as well.
On August 27, 2001, the
circuit court granted a partial dismissal in Otis’ favor but
stated that the partial dismissal did not affect the claims of
the other parties.
On July 16, 2002, Bisceglia re-noticed its
motion for and summary judgment and on July 16, 2002, Brock also
filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that the deed
that conveyed Harris the property had been duly recorded and
stated that Harris was receiving lots six and seven.
Furthermore, a plat describing in detail the Hull and Barclay
addition had been duly recorded as well.
Thus, these
instruments placed Harris on constructive notice as to their
contents, which contradicted Brock’s representations regarding
the boundaries of the property.
Furthermore, Harris’ deed
incorporated by express reference to the recorded plat; thus,
Harris should have been estopped from relying upon Kathy’s
representations regarding the boundaries of the property.
On
July 31, 2002, the circuit court granted summary judgment in
favor of both Brock and Bisceglia Realty.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Harris argues that she was justified in
relying on Brock’s representations regarding the property’s
boundaries despite the fact that the public record contained the
correct information.
Citing Cowles Ex’r v. Johnson, 297 Ky.
454, 179 S.W.2d 674 (1944), Harris argues that she was under no
duty to investigate, because, “[t]he general rule is that fraud
-5-
may be predicated on false representation although the truth
could have been ascertained from public records.” (Citations
omitted.) Id. at 675
Harris points to the case of Stallard v. Adams, 312
Ky. 532, 228 S.W.2d 430 (1950).
In Stallard, buyer wished to
purchase seller’s property for the sole purpose of using the
property to open a tavern.
Id. at 431.
Knowing this, seller
sold the property to buyer but failed to disclose that a zoning
restriction prevented the construction of a tavern on the
property.
Id.
Buyer sued seller for fraudulent
misrepresentation.
The former Kentucky Court of Appeals, now
the Supreme Court of Kentucky, held despite the fact that buyer
could have gone to the public records and learned of the zoning
restriction, buyer was not precluded from bringing a lawsuit
against seller for fraud.
Id. at 432.
Harris cites Reis v. Peabody Coal Company, Mo. App.
E.D., 997 S.W.2d 49 (1999), in which the Missouri Supreme Court
noted that in lawsuits for fraudulent misrepresentations, the
modern trend has been to require less diligence on the part of
the person to whom the misrepresentations have been made.
According to the Missouri Supreme Court, “[t]he opportunity for
investigation will not of itself preclude the right of
reliance.”
Id. at 67.
Harris points out that the Kentucky high
court acknowledged the modern trend of requiring less diligence
-6-
from the victims of fraud in Bankers Bond Company v. Cox, 263
Ky. 481, 92 S.W.2d 790, 793 (1936).
Harris also cites Chesapeake Homes v. McGrath, 249 Md.
480, 240 A.2d 245 (1968).
In Chesapeake Homes, buyer purchased
a home in a subdivision that was laid out in lots, similar to
the case sub judice.
Id. at 246.
Buyer, who was an attorney,
relied on the seller’s representation regarding the back
boundary line of the property in question.
Id. at 247.
The
seller argued that buyer failed to exercise due diligence by
examining the subdivision plat that had been duly recorded.
at 247, 248.
Id.
The Maryland Court of Appeals stated:
[W]here statements of fact which are
essentially connected with the subject of
the transaction . . . “and especially where
they are concerning matters which, from
their nature or situation, may be assumed to
be within the knowledge or under the power
of the party making the representation, the
party to whom it is made has a right to rely
on them, he is justified in relying on them,
and in the absence of any knowledge of his
own, or of any facts which should arouse
suspicion and cast doubt upon the truth of
the statements, he is not bound to make
inquiries and examination for himself.”
This rule has been applied in many cases in
other jurisdictions, even though the truth
could have been ascertained by an
examination of the public records.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 247-48.
The Maryland high court reasoned that the seller of a piece of
property would be in a better position than a potential buyer to
have actual knowledge of the property’s boundary lines.
-7-
Id.
Furthermore, the Maryland Court of Appeals quoting from an
earlier Maryland case stated:
[A] purchaser of land has a right to rely
upon representations made to him by the
vendor as to its location when the facts
concerning which the representations are
made are unknown to the purchaser; and the
vendor can be held liable for damages if he
makes a false representation as to its
boundaries with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard for its truth or
falsity, and the purchaser relies upon it.
But where the boundaries of land are
unmarked and the vendor undertakes to point
out the boundaries to the purchaser, he is
under an obligation to point them out
correctly; and the purchaser has a right to
rely upon such a representation, without
being required to make an examination of the
land records or to employ a surveyor to make
a plat of the land, and he can hold the
vendor liable for any fraudulent
misrepresentation. (Citations omitted.) Id.
at 248-49.
Harris argues that Chesapeake Homes is directly on point and
urges this Court to apply its holding to the case sub judice and
reverse summary judgment.
On appeal, Brock argues that the deed from Otis to
herself described the property in question as lots six and seven
of block nine in the Hull and Barclay addition, “as shown by map
and plat thereof of record in the Bell County Clerk’s office.”
Since she recorded this deed in the Bell County Clerk’s office,
this deed placed Harris on constructive notice of its contents.
Brock points out that Harris never hired an attorney to conduct
-8-
a title examination, never had the property surveyed, never had
it appraised and never examined either the recorded deeds or the
recorded plat.
Brock cites Stephens v. Click, Ky., 287 S.W.2d
630 (1956) and argues that instruments of record, such as deeds
and plats, place all people everywhere on constructive notice of
their contents.
Since two deeds and a plat had been duly
recorded and contained the correct information regarding the
property’s boundaries, Harris was on constructive notice of the
property’s correct boundaries.
Furthermore, the deed from Brock
to Harris specifically referenced lots six and seven.
Thus,
Harris was estopped from relying on Brock’s representations
regarding the property’s boundaries.
According to Brock, when
Harris accepted the deed that contained a legal description
based on a recorded plat, she waived any prior, contrary
representation.
Summary judgment is only proper, “where the movant
shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any
circumstances.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991) (citing Paintsville
Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985)).
The circuit
court must view the record, “in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts
are to be resolved in his favor.”
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480
(citing Dossett v. New York Mining and Manufacturing Co., Ky.,
-9-
451 S.W.2d 843 (1970)).
However, “a party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat that motion
without presenting at least some affirmative evidence
demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact
requiring trial.”
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171
(1992) (citing Steelvest, supra, at 480).
This Court has
previously stated that, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
There is no requirement that the appellate court defer to the
trial court since factual findings are not at issue.”
(Citations omitted.)
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d
779, 781 (1996).
To prove fraud, a plaintiff must establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, the following elements: 1) a material
representation, 2) which is false, 3) known to be false or made
recklessly, 4) made with inducement to be acted upon, 5) acted
in reliance thereon, and 6) causing injury.
United Parcel
Service Co. v. Rickert, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 464, 468 (1999) (citing
Wahba v. Don Corlett Motors, Inc., Ky. App., 573 S.W.2d 357, 359
(1978)).
According to the record, Brock testified that she
pointed out the property’s boundaries, and she claimed that her
-10-
property included lots four and five.
In her deposition, Kathy
Hoskins of Bisceglia Realty confirmed this.
According to the
record, no one disputed the fact that Brock’s representations
regarding the property’s boundaries were false.
In her defense,
Brock testified that she thought she received lots four and five
when she traded property with Otis Hoskins.
However, in his
deposition, Otis opined that, after they had traded property,
Brock had to have realized that she did not in fact own lots
four and five.
According to her deposition, Harris thought that
she had received lots four and five when she bought the property
from Brock.
Harris claimed that she would not have bought it
otherwise.
Despite the evidence presented, the Bell Circuit Court
granted summary judgment in both Brock’s and Bisceglia Realty’s
favor.
In its order, the circuit court stated:
The property in dispute is not described by
a metes and bounds description whereby
parties could be mistaken as to the property
lines or the size of the tract. At all
times herein the Plaintiff/Purchaser
[Harris] was on constructive notice as to
the dimensions of the property by virtue of
recorded instruments, i.e., the deed and a
subdivision plat which unequivocably [sic]
showed that the property in question
consisted of two lots. Each lot is twentyfive feet wide. The Plaintiff had a duty
and obligation to ascertain the dimension of
the property despite any representations
made to her by the Defendant or the ThirdParty Defendant. Misrepresentations can
only occur when one party has exclusive
-11-
knowledge of facts withheld from another
party. The dimensions of the lots in
question were not exclusive and were not
known only to the Defendant/Sellers. The
dimensions of Lots 6 and 7 of the Barclay
and Hull Addition was a fact available to
the Plaintiff/Purchaser and the entire free
world simply by making reference to the
records of the Bell County Court Clerk.
The Bell Circuit Court based its decision on the proposition
that the deed between Otis and Brock, the deed between Brock and
Harris and the subdivision plat all contained the correct
information regarding the property’s boundaries.
Since these
instruments were duly recorded, Harris was placed on
constructive notice regarding their contents.
Also, the circuit
court concluded that Harris was under an affirmative duty to
investigate.
Thus, Harris could not rely upon Brock’s
representations regarding the boundaries of the property in
question.
In addition to the cases cited by Harris, Stallard v.
Adams, Ky., 228 S.W.2d 430 (1950) and Chesapeake Homes v.
McGrath, 249 Md. 480, 240 A.2d 245 (1968), this Court has found
two earlier cases which shed light on the case sub judice.
First is Sellars v. Adams, 190 Ky. 723, 228 S.W. 424 (1921).
In
Sellars, the appellees induced the appellants to purchase the
appellees’ property by fraudulently representing that they had
complete title to the property including the rights to any gas
and oil that might exist on the property.
-12-
Id. at 425.
Appellants would not have purchased the property absent the
mineral rights.
the appellees.
The trial court granted demurrer in favor of
Id.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
In its opinion, the high court stated:
The fact that a vendee holds under a deed
containing covenants of warranty covering
the defects complained of does not preclude
him from the right to maintain an action for
damages for deceit and fraud where he has
been induced by such to purchase the land,
and suffers an injury therefrom.
Furthermore, although the title to land may
be ascertained by an examination of the
public records, a failure of a vendee to
examine such records does not preclude him
from maintaining an action for deceit
against a vendor who knowingly misrepresents
the condition of the title to him, and he,
in ignorance of the title, relies upon the
representations to his damage. (Citations
omitted.) Id. at 427.
The second case is Young v. Hopkins, 22 Ky. 18, 6 T.B.
Mon. 18 (1827).
In Young, an individual, Richard Manifee,
conveyed the property in question to Elijah Atchison and Henry
Atchison jointly.
Id.
Elijah Atchison, along with two of his
cronies, Joseph Hopkins and William Rice, fraudulently
represented to the appellant, Young, that Atchison held sole
title to the property in question.
Id.
In reliance on the
representations made by Atchison, Hopkins and Rice, Young bought
the property.
Young brought suit against the three, who
defended themselves by arguing that they themselves thought that
-13-
the title was in Elijah Atchison alone.
dismissed Young’s lawsuit.
and remanded.
Id.
The trial court
The Court of Appeals reversed
In its opinion, the high court cogently stated:
It is in effect assumed by the court below,
that the title deeds being matter of record,
Young was bound to look into them, and must
be presumed to have seen them, as he took a
deed for the lot. If this is to excuse from
the effects of false representations, with
regard to title, it would obviate the
consequences of fraud in nearly all landed
controversies, as all our titles are matters
of record. Indeed men prudent and cautious,
will examine them before they purchase, as
the title papers are the safest guide. But
we know that in many cases the credulous and
confiding dealers do not do so, but act on
seeing how the possession is held, and the
representations of vendors. If these
representations are false, the maker of them
is, in such case, responsible. It is a bad
defense in the mouth of a misrepresentation
of fact, to say that the vendee might have
discovered these falsehoods, by using due
caution and diligence, and therefore he
ought to be excused. It is true, in the
case of warranty of personal chattels, the
warranty is not supposed to extend to patent
defects of the article sold, because the
vendee is supposed to have seen their
existence and not to have required a
warranty against them. But in case of
fraudulent misrepresentations, this does not
excuse the fraud, and the case with which
the defects can be seen, is given in
evidence to prove that the vendee knew at
the time, of the defect in relation to which
he contends he is cheated. So far only is
the evidence of use to the vendee. But we
have seen in this case, that Young was,
beyond all doubt, ignorant of this defect,
and the defendants do not attempt to excuse
themselves by alleging he was acquainted
-14-
with it, but by contending they were
ignorant of it also.
It is no defense to an allegation of fraud
in the sale of land, by representing the
title complete, where vendor owned but a
moiety, to show that the conveyances were
recorded whereby vendee might with proper
diligence have discovered the defect. Young,
supra. (Emphasis supplied.)
In light of the case law, this Court must disagree with the
circuit court’s decision.
This Court concludes that, regarding
a real estate transaction, where a purchaser has alleged the
seller has made fraudulent misrepresentations to the purchaser;
the seller cannot defend himself by arguing that the purchaser
should have examined the duly recorded instruments, such as
deeds, that contain the correct information.
In other words, in
the case of fraud, the victim of fraud is not required to search
public records, including instruments of record, to ascertain
the truth of the misrepresentation.
Given this and given the
record clearly shows a genuine issue of material fact whether
Brock knew that she did not own lots four and five when she
claimed to have owned it and whether she claimed such ownership
to induce Harris to buy Brock’s property, this Court finds that
the Bell Circuit Court erred when it granted summary judgment in
favor of the appellees.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, this Court vacates
the Bell Circuit Court’s order of July 31, 2002, granting
-15-
summary judgment and remands for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Henry Lawson
Lawson & Lawson, P.S.C.
Pineville, Kentucky
Ralph W. Hoskins
Corbin, Kentucky
-16-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.