WILLIE LEON FARTHING v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 9, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
APRIL 23, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002283-MR
WILLIE LEON FARTHING
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOMMY W. CHANDLER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CR-00018 AND 01-CR-00019
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Willie Leon Farthing has appealed from the
final judgment and sentence entered by the Union Circuit Court
on October 15, 2002, which convicted him of manufacturing
methamphetamine by complicity,1 two counts of possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree by complicity,2 and
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1432 and KRS 502.020.
2
KRS 218A.1415 and KRS 502.020.
possession of drug paraphernalia by complicity.3
Having
concluded that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient
to support Farthing’s conviction on one of the counts of
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree by
complicity, we reverse in part.
Having further concluded (1)
that the evidence submitted at trial was sufficient to support
Farthing’s remaining convictions; (2) that the jury instruction
under which Farthing was convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine by complicity did not constitute a palpable
error or result in a manifest injustice; and (3) that the trial
court did not err by consolidating the indictments for trial, we
affirm in part.
Sometime prior to November 1, 2000, Kentucky State
Police Trooper Christopher Armbrust received information
indicating that methamphetamine was being manufactured in an
apartment located above the Trading Post in Morganfield, Union
County, Kentucky.
On November 1, 2000, Trooper Armbrust and
several officers from the Morganfield Police Department executed
a search warrant for the apartment.
The search revealed several
items of contraband commonly associated with the manufacture of
methamphetamine.
Conrad Wolf and Angie Luko were present in the
apartment when the search took place and they were both
transported to the Morganfield Police Department after the
3
KRS 218A.500 and KRS 502.020.
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search was completed.4
Shortly thereafter, Wolfe provided a
written statement implicating himself and Farthing.
Specifically, Wolfe stated that “[he] and Willie [Farthing] were
making crank together” and that “they did it outside their
apartment.”5
Consequently, Farthing was arrested on November 11,
2000.
On January 16, 2001, Officer Daniel Christopher Tolman
of the Morganfield Police Department was patrolling the Legion
Park area of Morganfield when he observed Farthing sitting in a
parked car with two other individuals.
Officer Tolman
approached the vehicle6 and informed Farthing that he had a
warrant for his arrest.7
Shortly thereafter, Officer Tolman
placed Farthing under arrest and escorted him to his police
cruiser.
Officer Tolman then proceeded to search the vehicle
for contraband.
Officer Tolman discovered a pack of rolling
papers, a Mason jar covered with white residue, and a container
of aluminum foil in the rear compartment of the car.8
Officer
Tolman also found a set of scales in a coat that belonged to
4
The record is unclear as to whether Wolfe and Luko were placed under arrest
at this point.
5
Wolfe further stated that Luko was just visiting his apartment the night
they were arrested and that “she had no knowledge of what was there.”
6
Farthing was sitting in the front passenger seat, Jacqueline Springer was
sitting in the driver’s seat, and Conrad Wolfe was sitting in the rear seat.
7
The arrest warrant was not related to the November 1, 2000, incident.
8
The car, which Officer Tolman described as a two-door Ford Probe, belonged
to Springer’s mother.
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Wolfe.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Jason Corbitt and Officer
DeWayne Jackson of the Morganfield Police Department arrived on
the scene.
Farthing, Wolfe and Springer were then transported
to the Morganfield Police Department, where Springer provided a
statement implicating Wolfe and Farthing in the crime of
manufacturing methamphetamine.
Springer stated that Wolfe and
Farthing had manufactured methamphetamine on several occasions.
Springer further stated that she drove Wolfe and Farthing to one
of their labs earlier that evening where they picked up the
Mason jar that was found in the car.
Springer then escorted
several officers from the Morganfield Police Department to an
isolated area along Peter Cruz Road in Union County, Kentucky,
where they discovered several items commonly associated with the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
On March 6, 2001, Farthing was indicted by a Union
County grand jury and charged with one count of manufacturing
methamphetamine by complicity, one count of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree by complicity,9 and one
count of possession of drug paraphernalia by complicity with
respect to the November 1, 2000, incident.
The grand jury also
returned an indictment against Farthing charging him with one
count of manufacturing methamphetamine and one count of
possession of a controlled substance with respect to the January
9
KRS 218A.1412 and KRS 502.020.
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16, 2001, incident.10
Farthing was arraigned on January 14,
2002, and he pled not guilty to all the crimes for which he was
charged.11
On May 30, 2002, the trial court entered an order
consolidating the indictments for trial.12
Farthing’s case was
tried before a Union County jury on August 26, 2002.
Trooper Armbrust was the first witness to testify at
trial.
Trooper Armbrust explained that he had significant
training and experience in the investigation and detection of
methamphetamine labs.
Trooper Armbrust testified that he was
the lead officer with respect to the November 1, 2000, search of
the apartment located above the Trading Post.
Trooper Armbrust
explained that the items seized during the search were
consistent with the “Nazi Dope Method” of manufacturing
methamphetamine, which is prevalent in Western Kentucky.
In
addition, Trooper Armbrust described the items that were seized
during the search and he explained the significance of each item
in the manufacturing process.13
Trooper Armbrust testified that
the corrosion on several of the items was likely caused by the
10
The manufacturing charge concerned the items that were found along Peter
Cruz Road.
11
The apparent delay between the filing of the indictments and Farthing’s
arraignment can be accounted for by the fact that Farthing fled the
jurisdiction prior to his initial arraignment, which was set for March 12,
2001. Farthing was arrested in Oklahoma in December 2001, after which he
waived extradition to Kentucky.
12
Farthing objected to having the indictments consolidated for trial.
13
The items seized during the search were then entered into evidence.
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process of manufacturing methamphetamine.
Trooper Armbrust
further testified that several of the items contained white
residue.
Trooper Armbrust stated that Wolfe and Luko were
present during the search and that they were both transported to
the Morganfield Police Department after the search was
performed.
Trooper Armbrust explained that after they arrived
at the Morganfield Police Department, Wolfe provided a written
statement implicating himself and Farthing.14
Trooper Armbrust
testified that Wolf informed him that “Willie [Farthing] was the
one that showed him how to make meth.”
On cross-examination, Trooper Armbrust testified that
the “meth lab” discovered during the November 1, 2000, search
lacked anhydrous ammonia, a critical ingredient in the
manufacturing process.
Trooper Armbrust further testified that
no amount of anhydrous ammonia was discovered during the search.
Wolfe testified on direct examination that he was
living with his brother in the apartment located above the
Trading Post on November 1, 2000.
Wolfe stated that Farthing
was not living with him at the time.
Wolfe further testified
that he never manufactured methamphetamine with Farthing.
Wolfe
admitted that he provided the police with a written statement
14
According to Trooper Armbrust, Luko was unresponsive at this point. In
addition, Trooper Armbrust testified that he informed Wolfe of his Miranda
rights prior to initiating questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 890, 87
S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966).
-6-
implicating Farthing, however, he claimed that the “whole
purpose of [the statement] was to get Angie Luko . . . out of
trouble.”15
Wolfe contended that he tried to tell the police
that everything at the apartment belonged to him but that they
did not believe him.
Wolfe further testified that the Mason
jar, the set of scales, and the aluminum foil that was seized
when Farthing was arrested on January 16, 2001, belonged to him.
Wolfe claimed that he had the Mason jar with him when he met
Springer and Farthing that evening.
Wolfe testified that he
pled guilty to the same offenses for which Farthing was charged
and that he received an 11-year sentence.
On cross-examination, Wolfe stated that he never
manufactured methamphetamine with Farthing.
Wolfe testified
that he was told Angie would “get out of trouble” if he provided
a statement implicating Farthing.
Wolfe also stated that
Springer drove him to pick up the supplies he used to
manufacture methamphetamine on several occasions.
Officer Tolman testified concerning the events that
transpired on January 16, 2001.
Officer Tolman testified that
he observed Farthing sitting in a parked car with two other
individuals in the Legion Park area of Morganfield.
Officer
Tolman explained that he approached the vehicle and informed
Farthing that he had a warrant for his arrest.
15
Officer Tolman
The statement Wolfe provided at the Morganfield Police Department was
entered into evidence.
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stated that he engaged in brief conversation with Farthing,
after which he placed him under arrest.
Officer Tolman
explained that he then proceeded to search the vehicle for
contraband.
Officer Tolman stated that he discovered a pack of
rolling papers, a Mason jar covered with white residue,16 and a
container of aluminum foil in the rear compartment of the car.
Officer Tolman also stated that he found a set of scales in a
coat that Wolfe claimed belonged to him.
Officer Tolman
testified that after several additional officers arrived at the
scene, Farthing, Wolfe and Springer were transported to the
Morganfield Police Department.
Officer Tolman explained that
while at the Morganfield Police Department Springer provided a
statement implicating Wolfe and Farthing in the business of
manufacturing methamphetamine.
According to Officer Tolman,
Springer claimed that she had been to several labs where Wolfe
and Farthing manufactured methamphetamine.
Officer Tolman
testified that Springer then escorted several officers from the
Morganfield Police Department to an isolated area along Peter
Cruz Road where they discovered several items commonly
associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Springer also testified that she saw Farthing, who she
claimed was her ex-boyfriend, and Wolfe manufacture
methamphetamine on at least one occasion.
16
Springer further
David Wayne Hack, a drug chemist employed by the Kentucky State Police,
testified that the Mason jar contained methamphetamine.
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testified that she drove Farthing and Wolfe to purchase supplies
that they used to manufacture methamphetamine on several
occasions.
Springer stated that Farthing and Wolfe were both
involved in the manufacturing process.
Springer further stated
that Farthing was living with Wolfe in the apartment above the
Trading Post on November 1, 2000.
In fact, Springer testified
that Farthing was present when the apartment was searched.
She
claimed that Farthing escaped detection by hiding behind a
refrigerator and that she picked him up after the police left.
Farthing testified in his own defense and denied that
he had manufactured or sold methamphetamine on any occasion.17
Farthing admitted that he had smoked methamphetamine on several
occasions with Wolfe and Springer.
Farthing insisted, however,
that he never lived with Wolfe in the apartment located above
the Trading Post.
Farthing further testified that he never
purchased supplies with Springer and Wolfe for the purpose of
manufacturing methamphetamine.
fiancé.
Farthing stated that Luko is his
Farthing did not renew his motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal at the close of the evidence.
The jury convicted Farthing of manufacturing
methamphetamine by complicity, possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree by complicity, and possession of
drug paraphernalia by complicity with respect to the November 1,
17
Farthing moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the
Commonwealth’s case. His motion was denied.
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2000, incident.18
The jury also convicted Farthing of possession
of a controlled substance in the first degree with respect to
the January 16, 2001, incident.19
On October 15, 2002, the trial
court entered its final judgment and sentence of imprisonment.
The trial court sentenced Farthing to ten years’ imprisonment on
the conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine by complicity,
and one year on each conviction for possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree by complicity.20
The trial court
ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total of
12 years.
This appeal followed.
Farthing raises the following issues on appeal: (1)
whether the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
support his conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine by
complicity with respect to the November 1, 2000, incident; (2)
whether the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
support his conviction for possession of a controlled substance
in the first degree by complicity with respect to the November
1, 2000 incident; (3) whether the jury was improperly instructed
on the charge of manufacturing methamphetamine by complicity;
18
The jury acquitted Farthing of the trafficking charge with respect to the
November 1, 2000, incident and convicted him of the lesser-included offense
of possession.
19
The jury acquitted Farthing of the manufacturing charge with respect to the
January 16, 2001, incident.
20
As recommended by the jury, the trial court ordered no punishment on the
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia by complicity. Pursuant to
KRS 532.110(1)(a) any sentence on this misdemeanor conviction would have to
run concurrently with the felony sentences.
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(4) whether the trial court erred by consolidating the
indictments for trial; and (5) whether the trial court abused
its discretion by preparing the final judgment and sentence
prior to the sentencing hearing.
We will address the arguments
advanced by Farthing seriatim.
As previously discussed, Farthing moved for a directed
verdict of acquittal at the close of the Commonwealth’s case-inchief, but he failed to renew the motion at the close of all the
evidence.
It is well-established that “in order to preserve an
insufficiency-of-the-evidence allegation for appellate review,
‘[a] defendant must renew his motion for a directed verdict,
thus allowing the trial court the opportunity to pass on the
issue in light of all the evidence[.]’”21
Thus, Farthing has
failed to preserve his insufficiency of the evidence argument
for appellate review.
Nevertheless, Farthing urges us to review
this issue for palpable error pursuant to RCr22 10.26.23
Since a
conviction based on insufficient evidence would undoubtedly
21
Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 830, 836 (2003)(quoting Baker
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 54, 55 (1998)).
22
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
23
RCr 10.26 provides as follows:
A palpable error which affects the substantial
rights of a party may be considered by the court on
motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on
appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
granted upon a determination that manifest injustice
has resulted from the error.
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deprive a criminal defendant of substantial due process rights,24
we will review Farthing’s insufficiency of the evidence argument
under the standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham:25
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserve[e] to the
jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable
for a jury to find guilt, only then is the
defendant entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.26
KRS 218A.1432 details the offense of manufacturing
methamphetamine.
The statute provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(1)
A person is guilty of manufacturing
methamphetamine when he knowingly and
unlawfully:
24
See Schoenbachler, 95 S.W.3d at 837 n.10 (“‘[a]ppellee argues that these
[insufficiency of the evidence] errors are not preserved for our review since
appellant made no motion for a directed verdict at any point during the
trial. Ordinarily, we would agree with appellee, but a conviction in
violation of due process constitutes “[a] palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party” which we may consider and relieve though it
was insufficiently raised or preserved for our review’”)(quoting Perkins v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 694 S.W.2d 721, 722 (1985)).
25
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991).
26
Schoenbachler, supra at 837 (quoting Benham, supra at 187).
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(a) Manufactures methamphetamine; or
(b) Possesses the chemicals or
equipment for the manufacture of
methamphetamine with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine.27
In Kotila v. Commonwealth,28 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held
that the language “the chemicals or equipment” permits a
conviction under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) only if the defendant
possesses “all of the chemicals or all of the equipment
necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.”29
Farthing faces an arduous task in attempting to
convince this Court that the evidence introduced by the
27
As previously discussed, Farthing was convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine by complicity. KRS 502.020 details the elements of
complicity. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1)
A person is guilty of an offense committed
by another person when, with the intention
of promoting or facilitating the commission
of the offense, he:
(a) Solicits, commands, or engages in a
conspiracy with such other person to commit
the offense; or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such
person in planning or committing the
offense; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the
commission of the offense, fails to make a
proper effort to do so.
28
Ky., 114 S.W.3d 226 (2003).
29
Id. at 237. The trial court in the case sub judice did not instruct the
jury on KRS 218A.1432(1)(a), effectively granting a directed verdict of
acquittal on that issue. Id. at 236. “The proscription against double
jeopardy precludes retrial of the same offense after a directed verdict of
acquittal.” Id. at n.1 (citing Commonwealth v. Mullins, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 28,
30 (1966)).
-13-
Commonwealth at trial was insufficient to support his conviction
for manufacturing methamphetamine by complicity.30
Farthing
places a great deal of emphasis on Trooper Armbrust’s testimony
that no amount of anhydrous ammonia was discovered during the
search that took place on November 1, 2000.
Farthing neglects
to mention, however, that Trooper Armbrust also testified that
the corrosion on several of the items seized during the search
was likely caused by the process of manufacturing
methamphetamine, which necessarily entails the use of anhydrous
ammonia.31
The Commonwealth was not required to establish that
anhydrous ammonia was present when the search was performed in
order to convict Farthing of manufacturing methamphetamine by
complicity under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b).
The Commonwealth was only
required to establish that Farthing possessed anhydrous ammonia
and the other chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine
in the recent past,32 or that “with the intention of promoting or
30
See Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
31
Trooper Armbrust further testified that the odor of Ether was emanating
from the apartment. Ether is a critical ingredient in the manufacture of
methamphetamine via the “Nazi Dope Method.”
32
See Varble v. Commonwealth, Ky., 125 S.W.3d 246, 254 (2004)(“[t]estimony
that the odor of anhydrous ammonia was emanating from the two air tanks and
that the discoloration of the brass fittings was likely caused by exposure to
anhydrous ammonia was circumstantial evidence that Appellant had, in fact,
possessed anhydrous ammonia in the recent past”)(citing United States v.
Morrison, 207 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2000)). We recognize that there are
several different methods for manufacturing methamphetamine. See Kotila, 114
S.W.3d at 236. As previously discussed, however, Trooper Armbrust explained
that the items seized during the search were consistent with the “Nazi Dope
Method” of manufacturing methamphetamine, which entails the use of anhydrous
ammonia.
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facilitating the commission of the offense, he . . . engaged in
a conspiracy . . . to commit the offense; or [a]ide[d],
counsel[ed], or attempt[ed] to aid [another] in planning or
committing the offense[.]”33
The Commonwealth introduced a
written statement provided by Wolfe which implicated Farthing
and Springer testified that she had witnessed Farthing and Wolfe
manufacture methamphetamine on at least one occasion.
In
addition, Springer verified that Farthing was living with Wolfe
in the apartment above the Trading Post on November 1, 2000.34
While Farthing certainly raised legitimate arguments at trial
concerning the credibility of Wolfe and Springer, it is wellsettled that credibility and weight of the evidence issues are
matters that are within the exclusive province of the jury.35
In
sum, we are persuaded that the evidence introduced by the
Commonwealth was sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Farthing was guilty of
manufacturing methamphetamine by complicity under KRS
218A.1432(1)(b) with respect to the November 1, 2000, incident.36
33
KRS 502.020(1).
34
Springer’s testimony also placed Farthing at the apartment during the
search.
35
See Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 126, 129 (1999).
36
Farthing also claims that “there was no testimony that the equipment
recovered at the scene was sufficient to manufacture methamphetamine.” While
we acknowledge that the Commonwealth’s expert did not specifically testify
that Farthing possessed “all” of the equipment necessary to manufacture
methamphetamine, we are persuaded that a reasonable juror could conclude from
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Although the Commonwealth’s case is based largely on
circumstantial evidence, it is well-established that “‘[c]rimes
may be proved entirely by circumstantial evidence[.]’”37
We now turn to the question of whether the evidence
was sufficient to support Farthing’s conviction for possession
of a controlled substance in the first degree by complicity with
respect to the November 1, 2000, incident.
As previously
discussed, Trooper Armbrust testified that several of the items
found in the apartment contained white residue.
Farthing
contends that since the Commonwealth failed to have the residue
tested and failed to introduce any evidence as to the nature of
the substance, there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction.
We agree.
The Commonwealth failed to introduce any
evidence whatsoever demonstrating that the white residue found
on several of the items was in fact methamphetamine.
The
manufacture of methamphetamine involves several chemicals, the
combination of which produces methamphetamine.
In addition, the
process often involves the use of various cutting agents.38
In
Trooper Armbrust’s description of the items seized on November 1, 2000, and
his testimony concerning the significance of each item in the manufacturing
process that the equipment was sufficient to accomplish the task. See
Kotila, 114 S.W.3d at 236-37.
37
United States v. Robinson,
States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d
Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d
Ky.App., 675 S.W.2d 397, 399
161 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998)(quoting United
1385, 1390 (7th Cir. 1991)). See also Graves v.
858, 862 (2000); and McRay v. Commonwealth,
(1984).
38
In fact, Trooper Armbrust testified that he seized a certain quantity of a
substance commonly used as a cutting agent during the manufacturing process.
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sum, we simply cannot conclude that the evidence introduced by
the Commonwealth was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to
find that the white residue was in fact methamphetamine.
Consequently, we must reverse Farthing’s conviction for
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree with
respect to the November 1, 2000, incident.
Farthing next contends that the jury was improperly
instructed on the charge of manufacturing methamphetamine by
complicity.
The particular instruction under which Farthing was
convicted provided as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You will find the Defendant, Willie
Leon Farthing, guilty of Manufacturing
Methamphetamine by Complicity under this
Instruction if, and only if, you believe
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
all of the following:
A. That in Union County, Kentucky, on
or about November 1, 2000, and
before the finding of the indictment
herein, he, alone or in complicity
with another, possessed chemicals or
equipment used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine;
AND
B. That he intended to use the
chemicals or equipment to
manufacture methamphetamine.39
39
Complicity was defined as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 -- DEFINITIONS
-17-
Farthing contends this instruction was erroneous
pursuant to Kotila, supra, as it did not require the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that he, alone or in complicity
with another, possessed all of the chemicals or all of the
equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.
While
Farthing concedes that he failed to preserve this issue for
appellate review by objecting to the instruction that was given
to the jury,40 he nevertheless urges us to review this issue as a
palpable error pursuant to RCr 10.26.
“A palpable error is one which affects the substantial
rights of a party and relief may be granted for palpable errors
only upon a determination that a manifest injustice has resulted
from the error.
This means, upon consideration of the whole
case, the reviewing court must conclude that a substantial
possibility exists that the result would have been different in
order to grant relief.”41
For an error to be palpable, it must
Complicity –- means that a person is guilty of an
offense committed by another person when, with the
intention of promoting or facilitating the commission
of the offense, he solicits, commands, or engages in
a conspiracy with such other person to commit the
offense, or aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such
person in planning or committing the offense.
40
See, e.g., Blades v. Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 246, 249 (1997) (“a
party cannot assign error to instructions unless that party ‘makes a specific
objection to the giving or failure to give an instruction before the court
instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and
the ground or grounds of his objection’” (quoting Chumbler v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 905 S.W.2d 488, 499 (1995)). See also RCr 9.54(2).
41
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996).
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have been “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily
noticeable.”42
However, when new precedent has changed the law, it is
impossible for an appellate court to hold the trial court’s
action in applying the previous case law to have been palpable
error.
A new decision should not be applied retroactively
unless the issue was properly preserved for appellate review.43
As the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has stated in a similar
context, “in determining whether a party should be given the
benefit of retroactive application of a change in the law upon a
particular issue, the controlling question is whether the
reasoning of the new decision was urged as the basis for relief
in the trial court by that party[.]”44
As previously discussed,
Farthing failed to object at trial to the instruction that was
given in the case sub judice.
Thus, not only was any error not
palpable, but also no manifest injustice has occurred.45
42
Burns v. Level, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (1998) (citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1995).
43
Id.
Farthing’s case was pending on direct review when Kotila was decided.
44
Commonwealth v. McMillan, 545 A.2d 301, 308 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1988) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 446 A.2d 1268, 1271 (Pa. 1982)). See also Smith
v. State, 598 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. 1992) (“[t]o benefit from the change in
law, the defendant must have timely objected at trial if an objection was
required to preserve the issue for appellate review”).
45
Farthing cites Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93
L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), for the proposition that “a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or
federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for
cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”
Farthing’s reliance on Griffith is misplaced, however, as Griffith applies
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Farthing next asserts that the trial court erred by
consolidating the indictments in the case sub judice for trial.
We disagree.
Pursuant to RCr 6.18 and RCr 9.12, a trial court
may join offenses for trial which are similar in character or
are based on the same acts connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan.46
A decision to join or sever
charges for trial is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a “‘showing of
a clear abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant.’”47
“A significant factor in identifying such prejudice is the
extent to which evidence of one offense would be admissible in a
trial of the other offense.”48
only to rules of criminal procedure that are grounded on the United States
Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Sexton, 580 N.W.2d 404, 410 (Mich. 1998);
Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 602 (Wyo. 1993); and People v. Carrera, 777
P.2d 121, 142 (Cal. 1989). Cf., Smith, 598 So.2d at 1066 (adopting Griffith
for all new rules regardless of whether the new rule is of constitutional
origin provided that the issue was preserved for appellate review). The
Supreme Court of Kentucky’s holding in Kotila turned on the Court’s
interpretation of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b). See Kotila, 114 S.W.3d at 237
(“[w]hether a conviction under [KRS 218A.1432(1)(b)] requires possession of
all (as opposed to any) of the chemicals or equipment necessary to
manufacture methamphetamine under some manufacturing process is a matter of
statutory construction” [emphasis original]). Simply put, Kotila was decided
on state law grounds. Consequently, we are not bound by Griffith.
46
See Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 556 S.W.2d 669, 670 (1977). RCr 9.16
provides that a trial court must grant separate trials if it appears that a
joinder of offenses would be prejudicial to the defendant.
47
Cannon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 591, 597 (1989)(quoting Seay v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 128, 131 (1981)).
48
Rearick v. Commonwealth, Ky., 858 S.W.2d 185, 187 (1993)(citing Spencer v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 355 (1977)).
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We are persuaded that the evidence relative to the
November 1, 2000, incident would have been admissible in a
separate trial concerning the January 16, 2001, incident.
This
evidence would have been admissible, not as Farthing
mischaracterizes it, as proof of criminal disposition, but
rather, as proof of a similar course of conduct or common scheme
or plan.49
Consequently, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by consolidating the indictments in the
case sub judice for trial.
In closing, Farthing contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by preparing the final judgment and
sentence in his case prior to the sentencing hearing.
This
argument merits little attention as Farthing has failed to
produce any evidence whatsoever indicating that the trial court
prepared the final judgment and sentence prior to the sentencing
hearing.
Based on the foregoing reasons, Farthing’s conviction
for possession of a controlled substance in the first degree by
complicity with respect to the November 1, 2000, incident is
reversed and his remaining convictions are affirmed.
49
All of the offenses for which Farthing was tried were closely related in
character, circumstance and time. See Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 933
S.W.2d 811, 816 (1996)(“this Court has held that joinder is proper where the
crimes are closely related in character, circumstance and time” [citations
omitted]). With the exception of the misdemeanor paraphernalia charge, all
of the offenses for which Farthing was tried involved the manufacture,
trafficking, or possession of methamphetamine. In addition, each offense
involved Farthing’s alleged accomplice, Conrad Wolfe.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Timothy G. Arnold
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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