RETA FAYE YOUNG v. PIKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD; HON. BONNIE KITTINGER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 16, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002052-MR
&
NO. 2002-CA-002075-MR
ROY SCOTT MORROW
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM LEWIS SHADOAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00091
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, and JOHNSON, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
Roy Scott Morrow appeals from a Fulton Circuit
Court judgment convicting him of the crimes of escape in the
second degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the
second degree (PFO).
He argues that the trial court erred
during the guilt phase of his trial in allowing the Commonwealth
to introduce evidence of other bad acts.
He also contends that
he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor improperly
questioned him about the number of his prior felony convictions
in violation of the rule articulated in Commonwealth v.
Richardson, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 515, 518 (1984).
After reviewing
the record, we agree with the contentions of the Commonwealth
that the alleged evidentiary error was not preserved for our
consideration and that the Richardson violation constituted
harmless error.
Thus, we affirm.
The facts underlying Morrow’s conviction are not in
dispute.
Following his 2001 conviction for the offenses of
theft by unlawful taking and criminal possession of a forged
instrument, Morrow was incarcerated in the Fulton County
Detention Center.
After serving only a few months of his
sentence, he was allowed to participate in a work release
program.
Under the terms of the program, Morrow was allowed to
work for Jeff Swearingen, a roofer doing business in South
Fulton, Tennessee.
In allowing Morrow to leave the center in
order to work, the court order required that he return to the
detention center no later than 6:00 p.m. each work day; that he
not drink alcoholic beverages or attend to personal business
while on release; and that he immediately notify the jail and
the clerk of the court of any changes in his employment.
On February 22, 2002, Morrow signed out to work for
Swearingen.
However, he did not work for Swearingen that day,
nor did he return to the detention center.
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Instead, he was
arrested in Tennessee at 9:00 p.m. that evening and was charged
with speeding and driving on a revoked driver’s license.
He was
released by Tennessee authorities to the Fulton County Detention
Center several days later.
He was subsequently indicted for the
offenses of escape and of being a PFO.
Prior to his trial on these charges, Morrow filed a
motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from introducing
evidence of any bad acts he may have committed prior to his
arrest.
In a brief hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth
attempted to discover just exactly what evidence Morrow sought
to have excluded.
The Commonwealth agreed not to introduce
evidence of prior criminal acts.
However, Morrow agreed that
the Commonwealth could introduce evidence of his arrest in
Tennessee on the evening that he failed to report to the
detention center.
During its case in chief, the Commonwealth called
Swearingen as a witness.
He testified that he had not had much
work for Morrow and that Morrow had only worked for him
sporadically since the previous June.
He told the jury that
Morrow had last worked for him on two days in January 2002 and
that he believed that Morrow was working for a painting
contractor in Clinton.
The Commonwealth then offered testimony
of jail officials that established that Morrow had not reported
any change in his employment status with Swearingen.
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It then
presented documents which revealed that Morrow signed out to
work for Swearingen on the day of his alleged escape –- all the
while knowing that he would not be working for the only employer
to whom he had been legitimately released.
In his defense, Morrow testified that the jail
officials knew that he had obtained other employment.
He also
told the jury that on the day in question, he was putting on a
roof for a different employer; that he got off work at 4:00 in
the afternoon; that he was emotionally upset about the recent
death of his grandmother; that he stopped by a liquor store and
bought a six-pack of beer; and that he got lost while driving on
the back roads of Tennessee as he was trying to get the odor of
beer off his breath.
The jury disbelieved Morrow’s defense that he did not
intend to escape and that he was headed back to the detention
center at the time of his arrest.
It found him guilty of escape
in the second degree and sentenced him to serve three years.
At
the conclusion of the PFO portion of the trial, the jury again
found Morrow guilty and imposed the minimum sentence of fiveyears’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Morrow argues that the evidence relating to
his failure to comply with the requirements of the work release
program constitutes evidence of “other bad acts” that the
Commonwealth was prohibited from introducing.
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We disagree.
Morrow’s disregard of the conditions and terms of the workrelease program (i.e., failing to report a change of employer)
was directly relevant to the offense of escape with which he was
charged.
Moreover, he did not specifically seek exclusion of
this evidence in his motion in limine; nor did he object to its
introduction during trial.
Thus, the Commonwealth is correct
that any error in the admission of this evidence has not been
preserved for our review.
West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 789 S.W.2d
600 (1989).
Morrow next contends that he was deprived of a fair
trial when he responded in the affirmative to the prosecutor’s
question as to whether he had ever been convicted of a felony.
Rather than allowing the matter to drop as required by
Richardson v. Commonwealth, supra, the prosecutor persisted and
asked Morrow if he had in fact been convicted of two felonies.
Morrow again answered “yes,” explaining that because he had been
convicted of both at the same time, he believed that they
constituted only one felony.
On re-direct, Morrow testified
that both of his prior felony convictions were for non-violent
crimes.
Morrow is correct in arguing that the prosecutor
violated the procedure for impeaching a witness with a prior
felony conviction as established in Richardson, 674 S.W.2d at
517-518, as follows:
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[A] witness may be asked if he has been
previously convicted of a felony. If his
answer is “Yes,” that is the end of it and
the court shall thereupon admonish the jury
that the admission by the witness of his
prior conviction of a felony may be
considered only as it affects his
credibility as a witness, if it does so. If
the witness answers “No” to this question,
he may then be impeached by the Commonwealth
by the use of all prior convictions. . . .
The trial court compounded the error by failing to give the
required admonition.
After reviewing the evidence, we agree with the
Commonwealth that the error was harmless.
Morrow freely made
numerous admissions concerning his conduct on the night in
question –- including drinking and driving long past the time
that he was supposed to have returned to the jail.
The very
nature of the charged offense of escape put the jury on notice
from the outset that Morrow must have had some history of
previous problems with the law.
Therefore, we conclude that
“there is no reasonable possibility that, absent the error, the
verdict would have been any different.”
Hodge v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 848 (2002).
The judgment of the Fulton Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Natalie Lynn Lewellen
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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