FRANCIS JAMES PEISEL, JR., M.D. v. KENTUCKY BOARD OF MEDICAL LICENSURE
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001942-MR
FRANCIS JAMES PEISEL, JR., M.D.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-004194
KENTUCKY BOARD OF MEDICAL
LICENSURE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Francis James Peisel, Jr., M.D., (hereinafter
“Dr. Peisel”) has appealed from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s
Opinion and Order denying his Petition for Judicial Review of
the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure’s (hereinafter “the
Board”) final order denying his application for licensure.
Peisel asserts that he was denied his due process right to a
Dr.
hearing and that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and
constituted an abuse of discretion.
We affirm.
The basic facts underlying this appeal do not appear
to be in dispute, but need to be summarized for a full
understanding of the issues presented on appeal.
On January 23,
2001, the Board received Dr. Peisel’s Application for License to
Practice Medicine/Osteopathy by Endorsement.
In the
application, Dr. Peisel indicated that he received his Bachelor
of Science degree from the University of Louisville in 1971 and
his medical degree from the University of Kentucky in 1975.
He
received his original medical license in North Carolina in 1976,
and subsequently received licenses from the Georgia and Virginia
licensure boards in 1978 and 1983, respectively.
At the time he
filed the subject application in Kentucky, all three licenses
were current.
Dr. Peisel stated that he had been working at
Candler Hospital in Savannah, Georgia, since 1985.
He further
indicated that he specialized in anesthesiology, but had not
received Board certification in that specialty, and that he was
seeking licensure in Kentucky to obtain additional training to
enter the board certification process.
For his response to
question 9 of the application, Dr. Peisel indicated that he had
never applied for nor been issued a Kentucky medical license.
The section of the application entitled “Category I”
contains a series of “yes” or “no” questions designed to allow
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the Board to determine whether the applicant meets the essential
eligibility elements for licensure.
accompanied by a written explanation.
Any “yes” answer must be
In his application, Dr.
Peisel answered “yes” to four questions, the first being:
3. Have you ever had any license,
certificate, registration or other privilege
to practice as a health care professional
denied, revoked, suspended probated or
restricted by a State, Federal or
International authority, or have you ever
surrendered such credential to avoid or in
connection with disciplinary
investigation/action by such jurisdiction?
For his explanation, Dr. Peisel stated that had been “diagnosed
and treated for chemical dependency in 1983.”
As a result, his
licenses in Virginia, Georgia and North Carolina were placed on
probation, and were all reinstated after he had complied with
several consent orders.
The second question was, “4. Has any
hospital, hospital medical staff or any other health care entity
ever revoked, suspended, restricted, limited, reprimanded,
placed on probation or otherwise disciplined your staff
privileges?”
Dr. Peisel explained that he was currently under
suspension from Candler, and was being required to re-enter the
board examination process as a result of a malpractice action.
The third question was, “11. Have you ever been convicted of a
felony or misdemeanor by any State, Federal or International
court?”
He explained that he “pled guilty to several
misdemeanors involving falsifying records” in relation to the
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1983 events.
The final question was, “13. Have you ever had to
pay a judgement [sic] in a malpractice action or other civil
action against your medical practice or are any malpractice or
other civil actions against your medical practice presently
pending in any court?”
Dr. Peisel attached two malpractice
forms indicating that he had a settled a 1990 incident for $9999
and that another malpractice action was pending.
The form also
included a question as to whether the applicant had ever been
denied a license by any state, federal or international
licensure jurisdiction.
the negative.
Dr. Peisel answered this question in
At the conclusion of the questions, Dr. Peisel
signed an affidavit to the effect that the information in his
application was true, accurate and complete to the best of his
knowledge and belief, and that he understood that the submission
of any false statement would constitute grounds for the denial
of licensure.
During the course of the Board’s investigation of Dr.
Peisel’s application, it obtained and reviewed several documents
regarding disciplinary actions taken against him as well as a
March 2, 2001, Summary of Reported Actions from the Federation
of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc.
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The Summary
revealed that in 1988, Dr. Peisel had applied for and been
denied a license to practice medicine in Kentucky.1
On February 26, 2001, the Board sent Dr. Peisel a
letter indicating that the Board would formally consider his
application at their March 22, 2001, meeting.
The Board made
clear in the letter that several of his responses could be
grounds for the denial of his application, citing the version of
KRS 311.571(7) then in effect, which gave the Board the power to
deny an application for licensure without an evidentiary hearing
upon proof of a violation delineated in KRS 311.595 or KRS
311.597.
The letter indicated that the March 22, 2001, meeting
would be Dr. Peisel’s one opportunity to address the Board.
letter concluded with the following sentence:
The
“Please consider
this letter your Due Process notice of the Board’s intention to
consider your application for medical licensure and your
opportunity to be heard on the above matter.”
Notes from the
Board’s March 22, 2001, meeting reveal that both Dr. Peisel and
Dr. Burns Brady of the Kentucky Physicians Health Foundation
addressed the Board that day.
On May 14, 2001, the Board entered an order denying
Dr. Peisel’s application for licensure based upon three sections
1
The Board attached a copy of the June 30, 1988, order denying Dr. Peisel’s
application for licensure to its brief. In the order, the Board found that
he had pled guilty to misdemeanor crimes for falsifying medical records, that
his hospital privileges had been suspended for diverting Fentanyl from
patients to himself, and that his medical licenses in Virginia, North
Carolina and Georgia had been placed on probation.
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of KRS 311.595 then in effect, in that he knowingly made a false
statement in his application;2 that he had had his medical
license revoked, suspended, restricted, or limited;3 and that he
had been disciplined by a licensed hospital or medical staff of
the hospital.4
Relying upon those findings and upon KRS
311.571(7), the Board concluded that there was a legal basis to
deny Dr. Peisel’s application.
Dr. Peisel filed a Petition for
Judicial Review with the Jefferson Circuit Court, arguing that
he was deprived of his right to be heard and that the Board’s
decision was arbitrary and capricious.
In an Opinion and Order
entered August 19, 2002, the circuit court denied Dr. Peisel’s
petition, holding that the Board sufficiently protected Dr.
Peisel’s due process rights by providing him with notice and an
opportunity to be heard and that its decision was not arbitrary.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Dr. Peisel continues to argue that the
Board’s reliance on KRS 311.571(7), which permits it to deny an
application without an evidentiary hearing, is constitutionally
defective in that it denies him his due process right to be
heard.
Additionally, Dr. Peisel asserts that the Board’s
decision to deny his application was arbitrary and an abuse of
its discretion.
2
3
4
On the other hand, the Board argues that its
KRS 311.595(1).
KRS 311.595(17).
KRS 311.595(21).
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procedures did not deprive Dr. Peisel of his due process rights
and that its action in denying the application was supported by
substantial evidence.
KRS 311.530, et seq., address the licensing
requirements for the practice of medicine and osteopathy in this
Commonwealth.
KRS 311.530 provides for the formation of a State
Board of Medical Licensure consisting of fifteen members, made
up for the most part of licensed physicians.
KRS 311.565(1)(c)
permits the Board to “[i]ssue, deny, suspend, limit, restrict,
and revoke any licenses or permits that may be issued by the
board . . . in compliance with the provisions of KRS 311.530 to
311.620.”
In this case, because Dr. Peisel had previously
obtained a medical license in another state, he had to comply
with KRS 311.571(5).
That section provides that the applicant
does not have to complete any further testing or training so
long as he has been endorsed by the original licensing state as
being a current license holder in good standing and would have
satisfied all of the requirements for original licensing.
However, KRS 311.571(5) must be read in conjunction with KRS
311.571(7), which at that time provided:
Notwithstanding any of the requirements for
licensure established by subsections (1) to
(6) of this section, the board may deny
licensure to an applicant or the
reregistrant of an inactive license without
a prior hearing upon a finding that the
applicant or reregistrant has violated any
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provision of KRS 311.595 or 311.597 or is
otherwise unfit to practice. Orders denying
licensure may be appealed pursuant to KRS
311.593.[5]
When circumstances permit, KRS 311.5726 provides that the Board
“may” order an applicant to show cause why he should be granted
a license.
If this is done, the matter is assigned to a hearing
panel, and the burden of proof lies with the physician.
We shall first address Dr. Peisel’s assertion that the
procedure the Board followed in this case violated his
constitutional right to due process.
The question here is
whether the notice he received regarding the upcoming meeting
and his actual opportunity to address the Board were sufficient
to provide him his full right to due process.
We agree with the
Board’s argument and the circuit court’s reasoning that Dr.
Peisel’s right to due process was not violated in this matter.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47
L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the United States Supreme Court addressed the
5
The current version of this subsection, now KRS 311.571(8), which became
effective July 15, 2002, provides:
Notwithstanding any of the requirements for licensure
established by subsections (1) to (7) of this section
and after providing the applicant or reregistrant
with reasonable notice of its intended action and
after providing a reasonable opportunity to be heard,
the board may deny licensure to an applicant or the
reregistrant of an inactive license without a prior
evidentiary hearing upon a finding that the applicant
or reregistrant has violated any provision of KRS
311.595 or 311.597 or is otherwise unfit to practice.
Orders denying licensure may be appealed pursuant to
KRS 311.593.
6
Subsection (3) of this section has also been amended, but the amendment has
no effect on this case.
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issue of due process and set out a three-prong analysis to
determine if that right has been violated:
In recent years this Court increasingly has
had occasion to consider the extent to which
due process requires an evidentiary hearing
prior to the deprivation of some type of
property interest even if such a hearing is
provided thereafter. . . .
These decisions underscore the truism that
“’[d]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules,
is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.” Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743,
1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). “[D]ue process
is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation
demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d
484 (1972). Accordingly, resolution of the
issue whether the administrative procedures
provided here are constitutionally
sufficient requires analysis of the
governmental and private interests that are
affected. . . . More precisely, our prior
decisions indicate that identification of
the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: first, the private
interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333-35, 96 S.Ct. at 902-03, 47
L.Ed.2d at 32-33.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted this
three-prong analysis in Division of Driver Licensing v.
Bergmann, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 948 (1987).
In Kentucky Cent. Life
Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 897 S.W.2d 583 (1995), the Supreme Court
of Kentucky also addressed the sufficiency of due process
safeguards:
Not always does due process require a trial
or the strict application of evidentiary
rules and/or unlimited discovery. The court
may construct, especially under special
statutory proceedings, a more flexible
procedure to account for the affected
interest or potential deprivation.
Procedural due process is not a static
concept, but calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation may
demand.
Id. at 590.
In the present matter, Dr. Peisel was afforded
sufficient notice of the board’s meeting and the problems with
his application, and was also provided with the opportunity to
address the Board, which he chose to do.
We have reviewed the
circuit court’s decision, and agree with Judge Abramson’s
analysis of the Eldridge factors as they pertain to the facts of
this case:
While the private interest in obtaining a
license to practice medicine is certainly
substantial, the state has a compelling
interest in providing its citizens with
quality health care. Furthermore, the risk
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of erroneous deprivation of a license to
practice medicine under KRS 311.571(7) is
low. Any offenses described in KRS 311.595
may be fairly determined by prima facie
evidence. Thus, under the Mathews v.
Eldridge[] analysis, the Board’s denial of
Petitioner’s application, without a prior
hearing, does not violate the due process
guarantees in the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Sections
10 and 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The Board’s procedure in this case was sufficient to protect Dr.
Peisel’s due process rights even under the current version of
the statute, as the February 26, 2001, correspondence informed
Dr. Peisel that his application could be denied based upon his
answers to several questions and allowed him the opportunity to
respond.
As pointed out by the Board in its brief, nowhere does
Dr. Peisel indicate what additional information he could have
provided or how this would have supported his position.
As he
should have, Dr. Peisel provided information as to his prior
licensure and legal problems on his application, to which he
completed a sworn affidavit.
Furthermore, all of the
information used by the Board in making its determination was
either provided by Dr. Peisel, or within his knowledge, although
omitted from the application.7
In sum, Dr. Peisel had a
sufficient opportunity to present his case to the Board and to
7
Dr. Peisel appears to argue, somewhat disingenuously,
forgotten that the Board had denied his application for
misunderstood the question. In any event, even without
his application, there still remained four questions of
allow the Board to deny his application pursuant to KRS
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that he had either
licensure in 1998 or
these deficiencies in
which any one could
311.571(7).
explain why his application for licensure should be granted
despite his multiple violations of KRS 311.595.
We shall next address Dr. Peisel’s argument that the
Board’s decision to deny his application for licensure was
arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.
The General Assembly
provided the standard of review for decisions of the Board in
KRS 311.555:
It is the declared policy of the General
Assembly of Kentucky that the practice of
medicine and osteopathy should be regulated
and controlled as provided in KRS 311.530 to
311.620 in order to prevent empiricism and
to protect the health and safety of the
public. Further, the General Assembly of
Kentucky has created the board, as defined
in KRS 311.530, to function as an
independent board, the majority of whose
members are licensed physicians, with the
intent that such a peer group is best
qualified to regulate, control and otherwise
discipline the licensees who practice
medicine and osteopathy within the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. In furtherance of
this intent, the judiciary of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, who may be caused
to review the actions of the board, shall
not interfere or enjoin the board’s actions
until all administrative remedies are
exhausted, and modify, remand, or otherwise
disturb those actions only in the event that
the action of the board:
(1) Constitutes a clear abuse of its
discretion;
(2) Is clearly beyond its legislative
delegated authority; or
(3) Violated the procedure for disciplinary
action as described in KRS 311.591.
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In relation to judicial review of an agency’s action generally,
this Court discussed arbitrariness in its opinion of Com.
Transp. Cabinet v. Cornell, Ky.App., 796 S.W.2d 591, 594 (1990),
as follows:
Judicial review of an administrative
agency’s action is concerned with the
question of arbitrariness. American Beauty
Homes Corporation v. Louisville and
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission, Ky.[], 379 S.W.2d 450, 456
(1964). The Constitution prohibits the
exercise of arbitrary power by an
administrative agency. In determining
whether an agency’s action was arbitrary,
the reviewing court should look at three
primary factors. The court should first
determine whether the agency acted within
the constraints of its statutory powers or
whether it exceeded them. American Beauty
Homes Corporation, supra. Second, the court
should examine the agency’s procedures to
see if a party to be affected by an
administrative order was afforded his
procedural due process. The individual must
have been given an opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the reviewing court must determine
whether the agency’s action is supported by
substantial evidence. American Beauty Homes
Corporation, supra. If any of these three
tests are failed, the reviewing court may
find that the agency’s action was arbitrary.
With this rule and our particular standard of review in mind, we
shall review the Board’s action in the present matter.
Based upon the power the General Assembly granted to
it in KRS 311.591(7), the Board did not exceed the constraints
of its statutory power under the first prong of the test
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enunciated in Cornell, supra.
As to the second prong, we have
already determined that Dr. Peisel was afforded his due process
rights.
The third prong addresses the question of whether the
Board’s action is supported by substantial evidence.
KRS
311.591(7) gives the Board the power to deny an application for
licensure without an evidentiary hearing upon proof of a
violation delineated in KRS 311.595 or KRS 311.597.
Here, Dr.
Peisel admitted to violating two subsections of KRS 311.595, as
he admitted to having had his medical licenses probated in other
states and to having been disciplined at Candler Hospital.
Furthermore, the Board obtained supporting documentation from
other licensing boards as well as from the National Practitioner
Data Bank.
Additionally, the Board obtained documentation
regarding false statements Dr. Peisel made in his application as
to his never having been denied licensure by a licensing board.
The Board itself had previously denied Dr. Peisel’s 1988
application for licensure.
As a result of Dr. Peisel’s own answers in his
application and the supporting documentation, we must agree with
the circuit court that substantial evidence supports the Board’s
action in denying his application.
Dr. Peisel submits that this
action is unfair in that his chemical dependency problem, which
resulted in the probation of his licenses and misdemeanor
convictions, ended many years before and that he should not
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continue to be harmed by his past history.
Although we agree
that the Board could just as easily have granted his application
for licensure despite his multiple violations, the Board was
well within its statutory power to ultimately deny his
application.
The Board did not abuse its discretion in so
doing, as its action was supported by substantial evidence in
the form of Dr. Peisel’s own responses on his application and
the supporting documentation.
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s Opinion
and Order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Fox DeMoisey
Jonathan E. Breitenstein
Louisville, KY
C. Lloyd Vest, II
General Counsel
Kentucky Board of Medical
Licensure
Louisville, KY
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