RACHEL NETHERY v. VERLINDA K. KEELING, EXECUTRIX OF ESTATE OF HERMAN LEE NETHERY, DECEASED
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
DECEMBER 24, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
JANUARY 9, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001852-MR
RACHEL NETHERY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00437
VERLINDA K. KEELING, EXECUTRIX
OF ESTATE OF HERMAN LEE NETHERY,
DECEASED
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Rachel Nethery appeals the order of the Shelby
Circuit Court which granted the Motion to Enforce the Agreement
of the Parties to Settle filed by Verlinda Keeling, executrix of
the estate of Herman Lee Nethery.
Rachel Nethery (hereinafter
appellant) argues on appeal that the court should not have
entered the order because Keeling’s (hereinafter appellee)
acceptance was too late and it occurred after she made a
counteroffer.
Additionally, she argues the settlement agreement
could not be enforced because it was not in writing.
We agree
that the trial court erred in entering an order to impose the
settlement, and we vacate and remand.
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
In 1997, appellant filed a petition in the Shelby
Circuit Court for dissolution of her marriage from Herman
Nethery.
Appellant and Herman entered into a written Partial
Settlement Agreement, which specifically reserved certain
property issues for future resolution.
However, Herman died
before he and appellant resolved those issues which remained.
Appellee, Herman’s daughter, was substituted as a party, as
executrix of his estate, and the parties continued to litigate
the remaining issues.
On April 12, 2001, the trial court conducted a
settlement conference.
Appellant verbally offered to settle all
her remaining claims for the sum of $35,000.
accept the offer.
Appellee did not
That same day, appellee wrote a letter to
appellant indicating that she would pay $20,000 to settle the
claims.
Appellant did not respond to the counteroffer.
The
litigation continued, including discovery and further
negotiations.
On September 24, 2001, appellee sent a letter to
appellant to state that she would accept the original offer of
-2-
$35,000 in settlement of all claims.
Appellant’s attorney
responded that he would inform appellant of the letter, and he
indicated that he would begin preparation of final settlement
documents.
But, on January 30, 2002, in open court, appellant
stated that she rejected appellee’s acceptance as not being
timely.
On February 10, 2002, appellee filed a motion to
enforce the agreement.
Appellee argued that appellant did not
place a time limitation on the offer, and never revoked it.
Appellee informed the court that the standard when a time limit
was not set was whether the offer was accepted within a
reasonable time.
the motion.
In response, appellant raised objections to
She stated that there was no written agreement.
She contended that appellee’s failure to accept the offer in a
timely fashion -- that is, prior to discovery and additional
litigation -- constituted a rejection of the offer.
Appellant
maintained that, in any event, whether the offer was accepted
within a reasonable time was a question of fact which made the
case unsuitable for summary disposition.
The trial court’s order of August 6, 2002, granting
appellee’s motion concluded that the offer was accepted prior to
its withdrawal.
The court found that appellant did not place a
time limitation on the offer, and that the lapse of time between
the offer in April and appellee’s acceptance in September was
-3-
not unreasonable due to the “complex nature of this litigation.”
Therefore, the court ordered settlement of the parties’
remaining claims for the sum of $35,000.
It is from this order
that appellant appeals.
First, the fact that the proposed settlement was not
in writing is not determinative of whether an agreement was
reached.
It is well-settled in Kentucky that the fact that a
compromise agreement is verbal and not yet reduced to writing
does not make it any less binding.
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Glass, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 437, 445 (1997).
If the minds of the
parties meet regarding a compromise settlement, it is
enforceable even though not in writing.
Ky. 582, 265 S.W. 6, 9 (1924).
Barr v. Gilmour, 204
Furthermore, because this was a
settlement agreement, and not a separation agreement between
divorcing spouses, we conclude that KRS 403.180 does not apply
to require that the settlement be in writing.
Nonetheless, we agree with appellant that it was error
for the trial court to enter the order since there is a factual
dispute about whether a settlement agreement was reached.
An
agreement to settle legal claims is essentially a contract
subject to the rules of contract interpretation.
Cantrell
Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Ky. App., 94 S.W.3d 381,
384 (2002).
Thus, a settlement agreement is valid if it
satisfies the requirements associated with contracts generally,
-4-
i.e., offer and acceptance, full and complete terms, and
consideration.
Id.
See also Hines v. Thomas Jefferson Fire
Ins. Co., Ky., 267 S.W.2d 709, 711
(1954).
As with a contract,
the primary object in construing a compromise settlement
agreement is to effectuate the parties’ intentions.
Cantrell
Supply, 94 S.W.3d at 384.
If the parties do not reach a final conclusion and
their minds do not meet upon a compromise, then neither party is
bound, and the proposition of a compromise settlement is of no
effect.
Barr, 265 S.W. at 9.
But, if the parties agree upon
all the terms of the compromise agreement, neither party can
withdraw from it.
Id.
If a dispute exists as to whether an
oral agreement was reached, the issue is to be resolved by a
jury.
Glass, 996 S.W.2d at 445; Barr, 265 S.W. at 9.
In the
case at bar, there are disputes as to whether the acceptance in
this case was within a reasonable time, and whether the initial
offer was still valid after appellee made a counteroffer and
continued negotiations.
While we note the worthy attempt of the
trial court to finally resolve matters between the parties, we
conclude that the resolution of these questions of fact was
improper, as these were jury issues.
order was not valid.
-5-
Thus, the trial court’s
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s
order imposing a settlement in this case, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael L. Judy
David J. Guarnieri
Johnson, Judy, True &
Guarnieri, LLP
Frankfort, Kentucky
Vic Brizendine
Shelbyville, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.