N.P., THE MOTHER OF J.L.F., A CHILD, AND J.D.P., A CHILD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 16, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001781-MR
N.P., THE MOTHER OF
J.L.F., A CHILD,
AND J.D.P., A CHILD1
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARGARET RYAN HUDDLESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-AD-00034
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
N.P. has appealed from an order of the Warren
Circuit Court entered on July 23, 2002, which, following a bench
trial, terminated N.P.’s parental rights to her son J.D.P., and
her daughter, J.L.F.
1
Having concluded that the trial court
In order to protect the privacy of the children, we will use initials to
identify the parents and children.
erred by relying upon impermissible hearsay evidence at trial,
we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On July 24, 2001, the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Cabinet for Families and Children filed a petition in Warren
Circuit Court, seeking the termination of N.P.’s and C.F.’s
parental rights to their two children, J.D.P. and J.L.F.
bench trial was held in this matter on July 10, 2002.
A
C.F.
appeared at trial and agreed to the termination of his parental
rights to both children.2
In the Cabinet’s case-in-chief against
N.P., Susan Rigsby, a compiler of records for the Cabinet, and
Judy Parsons, an investigator and treatment worker for the
Cabinet, both testified on behalf of the Cabinet and provided
the bulk of the evidence against N.P.
Their testimony, as well
as the other evidence presented, reveals the following.
N.P. and C.F. are the biological parents of both
J.D.P. and J.L.F.3
J.D.P. was born on March 5, 1993, and J.L.F.
was born on October 3, 1994.
In April 1995 the couple ceased
living together and N.P. retained custody of the two children.
Shortly after the couple’s separation, N.P. first became aware
of the possibility that C.F. had sexually abused J.D.P.
The
Cabinet took emergency custody of the children after this
2
Prior to trial, C.F. pled guilty to sexual abuse charges involving his
children and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. C.F.’s parental rights
are not at issue in this appeal.
3
N.P. and C.F. were never married.
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initial allegation of sexual abuse arose.
Rigsby testified that
on April 18, 1995, the Cabinet substantiated one incident of
sexual abuse by C.F. on J.D.P.
The children were returned to
N.P.’s custody following the Cabinet’s internal investigation
and the court granted C.F. supervised visits at the Cabinet’s
offices.
Rigsby further testified that despite the district
court’s order that C.F. be allowed supervised visits only, N.P.
permitted the children to have unsupervised, weekend visits with
C.F. while she was working.
Approximately one year later, on
April 24, 1996, the district court granted C.F. unsupervised
visits with the children.4
N.P. retained custody of the children
until approximately September 11, 1997, when she sought
psychiatric treatment.
N.P. was eventually hospitalized at
Western State Hospital, where she was diagnosed with a psychotic
disorder and cannabis abuse.
While N.P. was hospitalized, she left her two children
with C.S., her fiancé, whom she and the children had been living
with at that time.
By the time N.P. was released from the
hospital on November 5, 1997, C.F. had sought and had been
granted emergency custody of his children.
Over the next year,
C.F. and N.P. continued to have disagreements concerning their
4
Rigsby testified that the Cabinet substantiated another incident of sexual
abuse by C.F. on J.D.P. in October 1996.
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respective custodial and visitation rights to their children.
In October 1998 the children were placed in foster care after
the Cabinet substantiated an allegation of neglect on the part
of C.F.5
The children remained in foster care until
approximately March 1999.
On June 1, 1999, the children were once again returned
to C.F.’s custody and N.P. was awarded unsupervised visitation
rights.
The children’s cases were closed on January 6, 2000,
but later reopened in April 2000, after the Cabinet
substantiated an incident of physical abuse committed by C.S. on
J.D.P.6
At this same time, an incident of sexual abuse on J.L.F.
was substantiated.7
In addition, the Cabinet substantiated an
incident of neglect against N.P. for failing to prevent these
abuses from occurring in her presence.
In January 2001 another incident of neglect was
substantiated against N.P. and C.S.
According to testimony from
both Parsons and Rigsby, the children reported that they were
allowed to view pornographic videos while N.P. and C.S. smoked
marijuana in their bedroom.
Three months later, on March 29,
5
According to Rigsby’s testimony, the children reported to a Cabinet
investigator that on this occasion, C.F. became extremely intoxicated, left
the children alone in the home, and forced them to clean up his vomit.
6
Parsons testified that C.S. hit J.D.P. with a “cane pole.” Her finding was
based on interviews she conducted with J.D.P. and C.S., as well as her
observations of a bruise on J.D.P.’s backside.
7
Parsons testified that J.D.P. told her he observed one of C.S.’s relatives
sexually abusing J.L.F.
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2001, after the Cabinet substantiated an allegation of sexual
abuse by C.F. on J.L.F., the children were once again returned
to foster care.
On July 24, 2001, the Cabinet filed its
petition seeking the involuntary termination of N.P.’s and
C.F.’s parental rights to J.D.P. and J.L.F.
On July 23, 2002,
the trial court granted the Cabinet’s petition and terminated
N.P.’s parental rights to both J.D.P. and J.L.F.
This appeal
followed.
N.P. claims that the trial court erred (1) by
admitting impermissible hearsay evidence at trial; (2) by
determining that N.P. neglected and/or abused her children; (3)
by determining that the termination of N.P.’s parental rights
was in the best interest of the children; (4) by determining
that N.P. inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the children
physical injury; (5) by determining that N.P. caused or allowed
the children to be sexually abused or exploited; (6) by
determining that N.P. continuously and repeatedly failed to
provide essential food, clothing, medical care, shelter, or
education and that there was no reasonable expectation of
improvement; (7) by determining that the Cabinet rendered all
reasonable services to N.P.; (8) by taking judicial notice of
various juvenile, criminal, and circuit court files; and (9) by
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failing to expedite the proceedings as required by KRS8
625.080(5).
We first turn to N.P.’s argument that the trial court
erred by admitting impermissible hearsay testimony into
evidence.
Specifically, N.P. claims that Rigsby was allowed to
testify as to “conclusions and/or opinions of other [Cabinet]
workers,” and that this testimony constituted inadmissible
hearsay evidence.9
We agree.
In Prater, supra, our Supreme Court explained that not
all portions of a social worker’s report fall within the
business records exception10 to the hearsay rule:
Thus, we have held that the factual
observations of social workers recorded in
CHR case records are admissible under the
business records exception, because such
observations would be admissible if the
social worker testified in person; but the
8
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
9
The Cabinet’s entire response to this claim of error by N.P. is as follows:
Susan Rigsby is a social worker with the Permanency Unit in
Warren County. She has never been the case worker for [N.P.]. She has
had contact with the children. Ms. Rigsby testified from the Cabinet’s
record as to factual information contained therein. She did not
testify as to other worker’s [sic] opinions or conclusions. Rigsby did
testify regarding her own opinions after reviewing the record which she
is entitled to do.
As Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Ky., 954
S.W.2d 954, 958 (1997), and Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 74 S.W.3d 263, 269
(2002) make clear, the Cabinet’s characterization of Rigsby’s testimony is
simply incorrect. It is also noted that this portion of the Cabinet’s brief
contains no citations to the record as required by Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(v). This rule requires, inter alia, that a
party’s argument contain “ample supportive references to the record.”
10
See Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 803(6).
-6-
recorded opinions and conclusions of social
workers are not admissible, because the
persons offering those opinions are
insufficiently qualified to render expert
opinions.
Further, in Jordan, supra, the Supreme Court stated:
In Prater, we specifically held that "[t]he
recorded opinions and conclusions of social
workers are not admissible," and a social
worker's "professional determination" that
an allegation of abuse is "substantiated" is
nothing more than improper opinion testimony
[footnote omitted].
In the case sub judice, the record is replete with
instances in which the trial court, over N.P.’s objection,
permitted Rigsby to testify regarding “substantiated” instances
of neglect and/or abuse that had been reported in the Cabinet’s
records.
Rigsby’s testimony was not limited to simply
reiterating the factual observations of the various social
workers; rather, she was permitted to testify as to the
impermissible opinions and/or conclusions of those investigating
workers.
In addition, Parsons’s testimony was also improperly
admitted into evidence.11
She testified regarding an incident of
11
N.P. made no contemporaneous objection to Parsons’s testimony. However,
for preservation purposes, it was not necessary to repeat the objection N.P.
had made earlier to Rigsby’s testimony, when the basis for the objection
would have been the same and the trial court had overruled the prior
objection. See Burnett v. Commonwealth, 252 Ky. 521, 67 S.W.2d 683, 684
(1934)(holding that “‘[h]aving properly objected to similar evidence from
Wilson when that objection was overruled, it was not necessary to repeat the
objection every time a question along that same line was asked the same or
any other witness’”)(quoting Brown’s Adm’r v. Wilson, 222 Ky. 454, 1 S.W.2d
767, 768 (1927)).
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abuse involving a cane pole that she had “substantiated” after
conducting an investigation.
This opinion/conclusion testimony
was not admissible evidence.
Further, Parsons was allowed to
testify as to out-of-court statements that J.D.P. had made to
her during her investigation.
Hearsay statements made by
children to social workers during the course of their
investigation do not become admissible merely because they may
be later memorialized in the agency’s records.12
In support of its determination that J.D.P. and J.L.F.
were “abused and neglected children as defined in KRS
600.020(1),” the trial court found that “N.P. inflicted or
allowed to be inflicted upon the children” physical injury or
emotional harm13 and that N.P. “allowed the children to be
sexually abused or exploited.”14
As the basis for these
statutory findings, the trial court relied primarily upon its
underlying factual findings that N.P. had allowed C.F. to have
unsupervised visits with the children after she knew of C.F.’s
alleged sexual abuse,15 and that N.P. had failed to prevent
J.D.P.’s physical abuse in her presence when C.S. allegedly
12
Prater, 954 S.W.2d at 959.
13
KRS 625.090(2)(c).
14
KRS 625.090(2)(f).
15
It is noteworthy that subsequent to the allegations of sexual abuse by C.F.
and N.P. allowing C.F. to have unsupervised visits with the children, the
district court also allowed unsupervised visitation by C.F. and the court
eventually awarded custody to C.F..
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struck J.D.P. with a cane pole.
At trial, Rigsby and Parsons
provided most, if not all, of the evidence pertaining to these
incidents in the form of the aforementioned testimony related to
the “substantiated” nature of these alleged abuses.
As we
stated above, this testimony was not admissible evidence.
Hence, absent this inadmissible evidence, there was not “clear
and convincing evidence” before the trial court which justified
its ultimate findings that J.D.P. and J.L.F. were abused and
neglected children as defined under KRS 600.020(1).16
Accordingly, we hold that this evidentiary error was so
substantial that it affected the quantum of proof required to
meet the statutory standard of clear and convincing evidence.
The trial court’s order must be reversed and this matter must be
remanded for further proceedings.
N.P.’s next six claims of error are all based on her
assertion that there was insufficient evidence in the record to
justify the trial court’s factual determinations and/or that the
evidence justified a contrary conclusion.
There is no need for
this Court to address these six alleged errors other than to
state that before a trial court can terminate parental rights,
it must “state specifically the facts which justify its
16
See KRS 625.090(2)(stating that a “clear and convincing evidence” standard
governs a circuit court’s determination of whether to terminate parental
rights).
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decision.”17
Thus, on remand, it is crucial that specific
factual findings be made by the trial court in order to
facilitate meaningful review on appeal.18
We next turn to N.P.’s argument that the trial court
erred by taking judicial notice of certain juvenile, criminal,
and circuit court files.
We first note that N.P. failed to make
a timely objection to the trial court’s action as required by
KRE 103(a)(1).19
Ordinarily, this alleged error would be deemed
unpreserved and it would not be considered for review on appeal.
However, since this issue is likely to arise again on remand, we
will examine the merits of N.P.’s argument.
The concept of judicial notice has been codified in
Kentucky under KRE 201.
In relevant part, this rule states:
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either:
(1) Generally known within the county from
which the jurors are drawn, or, in a nonjury
matter, the county in which the venue of the
action is fixed; or
17
Department for Human Resources v. Moore, Ky.App., 552 S.W.2d 672, 675
(1977).
18
Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 443 (1986)(holding that one of the
principal reasons for requiring specific factual findings “is to have the
record show the basis of the trial judge's decision so that a reviewing court
may readily understand the trial court's view of the controversy”).
19
KRE 103(a)(1) states that an alleged error will not be preserved for review
on appeal unless a substantial right of the party is affected and “[i]n case
the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike
appears of record, and upon request of the court stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context[.]”
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(2) Capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
In his highly respected treatise on Kentucky evidence law,
Professor Lawson provides some helpful insight regarding how KRE
201 should be interpreted with respect to the noticeability of
court records:
[KRE 201] requires that the critical inquiry
be focused [ ] not on the noticeability of
court records as such but rather on the
noticeability of indisputable facts which
just happen to be evidenced by court
records. The propriety of taking notice
would depend first and foremost upon whether
the fact in question is indisputable and
secondly upon whether it is “capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.” It is not critical that the
fact in question is contained in a court
record but rather that it is capable of
verification by resort to a readily
available and accurate source of
information.20
In the case at bar, the trial court took judicial
notice of, inter alia, district court case files containing the
birth certificates of J.D.P. and J.L.F., and a psychological
evaluation of N.P.
While the birth certificates certainly fall
within the definition of a fact that is “indisputable” and
“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” N.P.’s
20
Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 1.00 p.10, (3d ed.
1993).
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psychological evaluation and the hearsay statements and opinions
contained therein clearly do not.
In General Electric Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution
Corp.,21 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in discussing the federal counterpart to KRE 201,
further explained the requirement that a fact in a court record
be sufficiently “indisputable” before judicial notice may be
taken:
We agree [with the Second and Eleventh
Circuits] that courts generally cannot take
notice of findings of fact from other
proceedings for the truth asserted therein
because these findings are disputable and
usually are disputed. However, it is
conceivable that a finding of fact may
satisfy the indisputability requirement of
[Federal Rule of Evidence] 201(b).
Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must limit the facts to
which it takes judicial notice to only those facts falling
within the standard mandated by KRE 201 and the aforementioned
principles.
Finally, we turn to N.P.’s claim that the trial court
erred by failing to expedite the proceedings as required by KRS
625.080(5).22
N.P. contends that since the bench trial was not
held within the 60-day period after the Cabinet filed its motion
21
128 F.3d 1074, 1082 n.6 (7th Cir. 1997).
22
KRS 625.080(5) provides that a hearing to determine the possible
involuntary termination of parental rights “shall be held within sixty (60)
days of the motion by a party or the guardian ad litem for a trial date.”
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for a trial date, the trial court committed “reversible error.”
However, it is well-settled that “[t]he decision whether to
grant or to deny a motion for continuance lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.”23
In the case sub judice, the
trial court granted C.F.’s motion for a continuance on two
occasions and continued the case sua sponte on one other
occasion, due to the fact that C.F. was facing criminal sexual
abuse charges in Warren Circuit Court.
In light of the fact
that these charges were germane to the issues in the pending
termination proceeding, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by granting the continuances.
Accordingly, we reject N.P.’s claim that this action on the part
of the trial court constituted “reversible error.”
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Warren
Circuit Court is reversed and this matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
MINTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
It is important to note
that this case involved a bench trial, thus precluding a jury
from sifting through and perhaps being misled by inadmissible
hearsay.
The trial judge, wholly aware of the Prater and Jordan
precedents, also heard compelling testimony based on the
23
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Burton, Ky.App., 922 S.W.2d
385, 388 (1996).
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admissible portions of the social workers’ reports rendered
admissible under the business records exceptions.
Those
recorded incidents of repeated abuse speak for themselves –
separate and apart from any taint of possible hearsay offered by
opinion testimony of either Susan Rigsby or Judy Parsons.
I am
convinced that there is a quantum of admissible evidence that
suffices to satisfy the “clear and convincing” standard of KRS
625.090(2) governing termination of parental rights.
Additionally, the findings of the trial court amply
recited other grounds compelling termination, noting that these
children had needed the Cabinet’s protective services “almost
continuously since 1995” – from the tender ages of two years and
one year.
#12.)
(Opinion of trial court of July 22, 2002, finding
The court dutifully noted the failure of the mother to
provide the essential needs of food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, or education, citing to the serious likelihood that these
needs would not be met in the foreseeable future.
After meticulous findings of fact based on non-hearsay
evidence, the court concluded that termination of parental
rights was warranted in the best interests of these children.
The erroneously admitted hearsay evidence constituted harmless
error in light of the weight of non-hearsay evidence reviewed
and recited by the trial court in its Findings of Fact and
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Conclusions of Law.
Therefore, I would affirm the Order of
termination of the Warren Circuit Court.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
B. Alan Simpson
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Mary Gaines Locke
Munfordville, Kentucky
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