TIMOTHY TYLER v. VERTNER L. TAYLOR
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RENDERED: November 26, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-001771-MR
TIMOTHY TYLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00054
v.
VERTNER L. TAYLOR
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Timothy Tyler appeals pro se from an order of the
Lyon Circuit Court, entered June 28, 2002, dismissing his
petition for declaratory and other relief against the
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections.
Tyler contends
that the trial court erred when it found his petition barred by
the statute of limitations.
We disagree.
Tyler was convicted in 1999 of having used a minor in
a sexual performance in violation of KRS 531.310.
He was
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and appealed his
conviction.
Tyler’s offense renders him a “sex offender” as
defined by KRS 197.410.
Under KRS 197.045, a sex offender’s
parole eligibility and receipt of good-time credit is deferred
until the offender successfully completes the Department’s Sex
Offender Treatment Program (SOTP).
Desiring to avail himself of
those benefits, Tyler applied for the SOTP soon after his
incarceration, but in May 2000 he was told that he would not be
admitted while his appeal was pending.
The program’s
administrators apparently believe that the program will not
benefit inmates who deny their offenses.
According to Tyler, he reapplied for the program at
six-month intervals thereafter and was repeatedly denied
admission.
Finally, in December 2001, Tyler invoked the
Department’s grievance procedure.
In due course, both Tyler’s
warden and the Commissioner of the Department upheld the
decision denying Tyler a place in the SOTP.
The Commissioner
rendered his decision on January 16, 2002.
On March 19, 2002,
Tyler filed the present action in the Lyon Circuit Court.
He
sought a declaration, among other things, that the Department’s
refusal to admit him to the SOTP during his appeal illegally
burdened his constitutional right of access to the courts.
2
As noted above, the trial court did not reach the
merits of Tyler’s petition.
It held that Tyler’s claim was
subject to the one-year limitations period provided by KRS
413.140 for personal-injury actions and that the claim had
accrued in May 2000 when Tyler was first denied admission to the
SOTP.
Tyler’s petition more than one year after that denial,
the court ruled, was outside the limitations period and was thus
barred.
On appeal, Tyler contends that the trial court applied
the wrong limitations period, misconceived when the cause of
action accrued, and failed to make allowance for Tyler’s pursuit
of an administrative remedy.
In Polsgrove v. Kentucky Bureau of Corrections,1
our
Supreme Court held that a declaratory judgment action under KRS
418.040 et seq. was an appropriate avenue for inmates to bring
their non-habeas disputes with the Department of Corrections
before the courts.
Our research has discovered no Kentucky case
addressing the limitations period or periods applicable to such
actions.
However, as the appellee notes, Tyler has alleged the
sort of constitutional tort that in actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 is subject to our one-year limitations period under KRS
1
Ky., 559 S.W.2d 736 (1977).
3
413.140 for personal injury actions.2
This is the limitations
period the trial court applied, and we agree that it is
suitable.
Not only is it consistent with federal law, but the
one-year period, we believe, rather than the five-year period
Tyler urges us to apply, achieves the proper balance, in the
continually and rapidly changing prison context, between
protecting valid claims and prohibiting stale ones.
Even if the limitations period is one year, Tyler
contends that his petition was timely because he reapplied for
the program several times and was again denied admission within
one year of bringing suit.
the limitations clock.
Each denial, he argues, restarted
We disagree.
Because the circumstance
leading to Tyler’s initial rejection—his appeal of his
conviction—did not change, his reapplications were essentially
requests to reconsider the initial decision.
That decision,
therefore, remained the point at which Tyler’s claim accrued.3
Finally, Tyler contends that his petition was timely
because he filed it soon after exhausting his administrative
appeal.
We agree with Tyler that in general an inmate’s pursuit
of prison grievance procedures will toll the statute of
2
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254, 105 S.
Ct. 1938 (1985); Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d
179 (6th Cir. 1990).
3
Cf. Vandiver v. Hardin County Board of Education, 925 F.2d
927 (6th Cir. 1991) (mere adherence to an initial decision does
not convert that decision into a continuing violation).
4
limitations.4
In this case, however, Tyler’s limitations period
expired in May 2001, but he did not initiate the grievance
process until December 2001.
Recourse to administrative
remedies can not, of course, toll a limitations period that has
already expired.5
For these reasons, we affirm the June 28, 2002, order
of the Lyon Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy Tyler, pro se
Central City, Kentucky
Rebecca Baylous
Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Kentucky
4
Cf. Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying
federal law). And see KRS 454.415 (requiring exhaustion of
prison remedies with respect to certain claims).
5
Woods v. Young, 279 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 nt. 3 (Cal. 1991)
(“Tolling may be analogized to a clock that is stopped and then
restarted. Whatever period of time that remained when the clock
is stopped is available when the clock is restarted, that is
when the tolling period has ended.” No time remained when Tyler
attempted to stop the clock.)
5
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