DAVID LESLIE CASH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001624-MR
DAVID LESLIE CASH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: David Leslie Cash appeals from a July 1, 2002,
judgment of the Bracken Circuit Court.
We affirm.
On March 22, 2002, the Bracken County Grand Jury
indicted appellant on six counts of first degree wanton
endangerment, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and
for being a persistent felony offender in the second degree.
Appellant subsequently filed a motion to enter guilty plea.
The
circuit court accepted the plea and set a date for sentencing.
Appellant appeared for sentencing on June 28, 2002, and
requested a continuance.
Appellant asserted he was eligible for
probation with an alternative sentence and requested the
continuance to prepare such a plan.
The court granted the
continuance and postponed sentencing.
Appellant then submitted a memorandum on the issue;
wherein, he argued that probation with an alternative sentence
was available to him.
He further argued the court was compelled
to consider probation with an alternative sentence before it
could impose a sentence of imprisonment.
By judgment entered July 1, 2002, the circuit court
accepted appellant’s guilty plea on six counts of first degree
wanton endangerment and one count of possession of a handgun by
a convicted felon.
dismissed.
The persistent felony offender charge was
Appellant was then sentenced to five years on each
count and the sentences were ordered to run concurrently for a
total of five years’ imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the circuit court erred by failing
to recognize probation with an alternative sentence as a
distinct sentencing option.
Specifically, he asserts the
circuit court erred in its interpretation of Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 533.060(2).
Appellant also contends the circuit
court abused its discretion by failing to rule on his
eligibility for probation with an alternative sentence.
-2-
He
asserts the circuit court “compressed and truncated the
sentencing hearing, omitting the critical step of considering
the full range of [sentencing] options prior to its ruling.”
KRS 533.060(2) explicitly prohibits a convicted felon
who commits a felony while on probation from being eligible for
“probation, shock probation or conditional discharge.”
Appellant, however, argues the statute does not prohibit such a
person from being eligible for probation with an alternative
sentence.
To support his contention, appellant argues that KRS
533.010(1) and (2) both identify “probation with an alternative
sentencing plan” as separate and distinct from “probation.”
He
contends that although KRS 533.060(2) precludes the possibility
of probation, shock probation and conditional discharge, it does
not specifically preclude probation with an alternative
sentence.
He further argues that “[h]ad the legislature
intended the term ‘probation’ to encompass every possible type
of probation; there would be no need to set out ‘shock
probation’ as a separate entity under KRS 533.060.”
Appellant
also asserts that pursuant to KRS 533.010, he was entitled to
consideration of probation with an alternative sentence before
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment.
A review of the record indicates the circuit court did
consider probation with an alternative sentence as a distinct
sentencing option and did so before imposition of the sentence.
-3-
In fact, the circuit court granted appellant’s request for a
continuance and postponed sentencing to allow counsel to prepare
a proposed alternative sentencing plan.
Pursuant to the circuit
court’s order, a hearing was to be “held for the purpose of
determining whether the [appellant] should receive a sentence of
probation with an alternative sentence.”
The circuit judge began the sentencing hearing on July
1, 2002, by stating he had reviewed appellant’s memorandum of
law in support of probation with an alternative sentence.
Furthermore, the circuit court explicitly found in its “Judgment
and Sentence on Plea of Guilty,” that a term of imprisonment was
necessary to protect the public because “[p]robation, probation
with an alternative sentencing plan, or conditional discharge
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the [appellant’s]
crime.” (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has
addressed this very issue in Hughes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875
S.W.2d 99, 101 (1994).
The Court held that when a circuit court
has stated in its judgment that “probation with an alternative
sentencing plan would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
crime,” alternative sentencing is not available to a defendant.
Thus, when a circuit court states in a judgment that it has
considered probation with an alternative sentence, and has
decided against it, the language of the judgment is controlling.
-4-
In the case sub judice, the circuit court did consider
the distinct option of probation with an alternative sentence.
The court found, however, that due to the seriousness of
appellant’s crime the option would not be exercised.
The
circuit court included this finding in its judgment and, thus,
we are of the opinion that the court adequately considered the
option.
Id.
The circuit court did not, as appellant contends,
abuse its discretion by failing to rule on his eligibility for
probation with an alternative sentencing plan.
As the judgment
reflects, the circuit court clearly ruled on the issue and found
probation with an alternative sentence was not available to
appellant due to the seriousness of the crime.
For the foregoing reasons, the July 1, 2002, judgment
of the Bracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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