LIST BROKERS, INCORPORATED;and JOHN BAKER v. PEAK ACHIEVEMENT TRAINING d/b/a ATTENTION CONTROL TRAINING, INCORPORATED, and JONATHAN D. COWAN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 30, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001156-MR
LIST BROKERS, INCORPORATED;
and JOHN BAKER
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00542
v.
PEAK ACHIEVEMENT TRAINING d/b/a
ATTENTION CONTROL TRAINING, INCORPORATED,
and JONATHAN D. COWAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
This is an appeal from the Oldham Circuit
Court’s order setting aside a foreign default judgment based
upon lack of personal jurisdiction.
Specifically, the Oldham
Circuit Court found that a Texas judgment was void when the
defendant was improperly named, service of process was by
certified mail and the return receipt was signed for by someone
other than the defendant or the defendant’s agent.
Finding no
error, we affirm.
In November of 1998, Appellant, List Brokers,
Incorporated (List Brokers) and Appellee, Peak Achievement
Training d/b/a Attention Control Training, Inc. (Peak
Achievement Training), entered into a written contract under
which List Brokers printed and mailed advertising brochures for
Peak Achievement Training.
List Brokers is a Texas Corporation
doing business in San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas.
At the
time, Peak Achievement Training was a Kentucky Corporation.
dispute arose under the contract.
A
Ultimately, List Brokers sued
Peak Achievement Training and Jonathan D. Cowan (Cowan), the
president and CEO of Peak Achievement Training, in the Bexar
County district court (the Texas court) seeking compensatory and
punitive damages.
In the petition, List Brokers identified the
defendants as follows:
Peak Achievement Training d/b/a
Attention Control Training, Inc. and John D. Cowan.
As admitted
by List Brokers, the defendants that they intended to sue are
properly identified as Attention Control Training, Inc. d/b/a
Peak Achievement Training and Jonathan D. Cowan.
In accordance
with the Texas long arm statute, List Brokers attempted to serve
Peak Achievement Training and Cowan with notice of the suit by
serving the Secretary of State of Texas (the Secretary).
-2-
The
Secretary then forwarded a copy of the petition by certified
mail, return receipt requested to the address of the registered
agent for service of process.
The Secretary further contributed
to the misidentification of Cowan by addressing process to “John
D. Cown.”
Despite the errors in identifying the proper names of
the defendants, the street address was correct.
Leonard Barnes, an employee of a different company
incorporated by Cowan named NeuroTechnology, signed both of the
return receipts.
The registered address for NeuroTechnology was
the same as the registered address for Peak Achievement
Training.
When Cowan learned that Leonard Barnes had signed for
letters addressed to “non-existent parties,” Cowan asked him to
return the envelopes to the post office without opening them,
which Barnes later did.
In accordance with the sequence of events set out in
the preceding paragraph, as to the petition forwarded to Peak
Achievement Training, the Secretary issued a certification that
it received the return receipt dated October 20, 1999, in its
office bearing the signature of addressee’s agent.
As to the
petition forwarded to “John D. Cown”, the Secretary issued
another certification that it received the return receipt dated
October 20, 1999, in its office bearing the signature of
addressee’s agent.
The Secretary later issued a subsequent
certification that, as to the citation forwarded to Peak
-3-
Achievement Training, process was returned to the Secretary’s
office on October 26, 1999, “bearing the notation Addressee
Unknown.”
Moreover, as to the citation forwarded to “John D.
Cown”, process was returned to the Secretary’s office on October
26, 1999, “bearing the notation Attempted -- Not Known.”
On December 14, 1999, a default judgment was entered
against Peak Achievement Training and Cowan in the amount of
$105,808.48 with post-judgment interest at 10% per annum.
List
Brokers then sought to enforce the judgment in Kentucky pursuant
to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, KRS
426.950-.975, and filed the appropriate papers with the Oldham
Circuit Court.
In response, Cowan, who was represented by
counsel at this point, filed a motion to set aside or stay
enforcement of the Texas judgment.
In support, Cowan asserted
that there was no such Kentucky corporation and no such person
as John D. Cowan.
The trial court agreed with Cowan and issued
an order setting aside the default judgment.
List Brokers
appeals from this order.
On appeal, List Brokers argues that the trial court
erred in concluding that that the Texas court lacked personal
jurisdiction.
In addition, List Brokers claims that the trial
court committed reversible error in setting aside the default
judgment.
Finally, List Brokers asserts that the default
judgment should be enforced as a matter of equity.
-4-
The underlying action was filed in a Kentucky state
court to recognize a default judgment rendered by a Texas state
court.
It is well-settled that “[t]he United States
Constitution requires our courts to give full faith and credit
to the judgments of the courts of all our sister states.
A
foreign judgment is presumptively valid and the party attacking
it has the burden to demonstrate its invalidity.”
Waddell v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 893 S.W.2d 376, 379 (1995) (internal
citations omitted).
To this end, Cowan insists that the 1999
Texas judgment is void due to improper service of process and
not entitled to full faith and credit.
See id.
We determine
the issue of whether Cowan and his corporation were properly
served by applying Texas law.
See Sunrise Turquoise, Inc. v.
Chemical Design Co., Inc., Ky. App., 899 S.W.2d 856, 857-58
(1995) (“The law in Kentucky is that a sister state’s judgment
is entitled to full faith and credit and to registration if the
judgment is valid under that state’s own laws.”); Morrel & West,
Inc. v. Yazel, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 501, 502 (1986) (“Escape
from obedience to a judgment of a sister-state can be had only
if said judgment is void and entitled to no standing even in
that state.”).
To support a default judgment against a jurisdictional
challenge, Texas law requires List Brokers to prove that (1) the
pleadings established that the defendants were amenable to
-5-
service; and (2) evidence in the record demonstrates that the
defendants were in fact served in the manner required by the
Texas long arm statute.
See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty
& Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Whitney v. L &
L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Tex. 1973).
These
requirements “reflect a strong policy that defendants ought not
to be cast in personal judgment without notice.”
S.W.2d at 97.
Whitney, 500
In this appeal, Peak Achievement Training and
Cowan do not argue that they were not amenable to service, thus
the inquiry before this Court implicates only the second prong
of Whitney.
See Harper Macleod, 260 F.3d at 398.
Under Section 17.045(a) of the Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code, plaintiffs must comply with the following notice
requirements when suing a nonresident defendant:
If the secretary of state is served with
duplicate copies of process for a
nonresident, the documents shall contain a
statement of the name and address of the
nonresident’s home or home office and the
secretary of state shall immediately mail a
copy of the process to the nonresident at
the address provided.
“Texas courts have consistently required strict
compliance with the terms of the Texas long arm statute.”
Harper Macleod, 260 F.3d at 398 (citing Mahon v. Caldwell,
Haddad, Skaggs, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App. 1990).
Here, the statement of the name of the nonresident defendant was
-6-
incorrect.
According to the Texas Supreme Court, an incorrect
name is sufficient to show a citation is not in strict
compliance.
See Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
Inc., 690 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. 1985); see also Mega v. Anglo
Iron & Metal Co. of Harlingen, 601 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. App.
1980)(“A mistake in stating the defendant’s name in the citation
has been consistently held to be fatally defective.”
The same
rule applies where the “citation states one name, but the same
was mailed to and presumably served on a person with a different
name.”)
Although Uvalde Country Club did not involve a
defendant being sued by way of the Texas long arm statute, it
did involve a mistake as to the name of the defendant’s
registered agent for service of process.
Specifically, the
court held that attempted service of process was invalid and of
no effect when the original petition alleged that the defendant
could be served by serving its registered agent, “Henry Bunting,
Jr.”, and the citation and sheriff’s return on the citation
showed delivery to “Henry Bunting.”
See id. at 884.
In this case, List Brokers misidentified both the
corporate defendant and the individual defendant; thus, the
defendants were improperly identified in all respects.
Not only
were the corporate and individual names misidentified, but also,
the Secretary addressed process to “John D. Cown.”
-7-
Moreover,
only a minimal amount of due diligence was required of List
Brokers in correctly identifying Peak Achievement Training and
Cowan as List Brokers had a contract signed by Jonathan Cowan
and numerous written communications with Jonathan Cowan.
Further, there is no dispute that Attention Control Training,
Inc. d/b/a Peak Achievement Training was properly registered
with the Kentucky Secretary of State.
In addition to the defendants’ names being incorrect
on the Texas default judgment, Cowan did not sign the return
receipt.
Under Texas law, if a citation is served by certified
mail and someone other than the addressee signs the return
receipt, then service of process is defective.
See Ramirez v.
Consolidated HGM Corp., 124 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Tex. App. 2004)
(Service of process was held to be ineffective when the
addressee of the certified mail was “Consolidated HGM
Corporation serving its registered agent Dana T. White . . .”
and the return illustrated that “Jack Danley” signed for the
mailing.)
As a final point on the issue of service of process in
strict compliance with the law, we note that in Texas, “[a]ctual
notice to a defendant, without proper service, is not sufficient
to convey upon the court jurisdiction to render default judgment
against [the defendant].
Rather, jurisdiction is dependent upon
citation issued and served in a manner provided for by law.”
-8-
Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990)(internal
citations omitted).
Thus, it is of no consequence to Cowan that
the documents from the Secretary did arrive by U.S. Mail at his
address.
Further, it is of no consequence that Cowan knew the
documents had arrived and he “could surmise some things” as to
the contents of the documents.
“[T]he Texas Supreme Court has
expressly rejected an actual notice exception to strict
compliance with the terms of the long arm statue.”
See Harper
Macleod, 260 F.3d at 399 (citing Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 836).
For the foregoing reasons, the Oldham Circuit Court
properly determined that service was inadequate under Texas law
and could not support a default judgment.
Further, the trial
court was correct in setting aside the foreign default judgment.
Having concluded as such, we decline to consider List Brokers
equitable arguments.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Douglas W. Becker
Clarence A. Wilbon
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Louisville, Kentucky
Jonathan D. Cowan, Ph.D.,
Pro Se
Goshen, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.