WOFFARD STEPHEN JENKINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 27, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001041-MR
WOFFARD STEPHEN JENKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-01272
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court revoking Appellant’s probation and
sentencing him to ten years’ imprisonment.
Having reviewed the
record, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part for
findings of fact.
On December 1, 1998, the Fayette County Grand Jury
returned an indictment charging Woffard Stephen Jenkins
(Jenkins) with flagrant non-support and with being a persistent
felony offender, second degree, based on a prior conviction for
flagrant non-support in 1992.
On December 18, 1998, Jenkins
entered a plea of guilty to the two charges for which he was
indicted.
Jenkins received a sentence of one year for flagrant
non-support enhanced to ten years by the persistent felony
offender conviction.
The trial court withheld the judgment
imposing imprisonment and sentenced Jenkins to a period of five
years’ probation subject to a number of conditions, including in
relevant part, the following condition:
7.
Pay Court ordered child support each
week;
On June 1, 2001, the probation and parole officer
assigned to Jenkins filed an affidavit to revoke Jenkins’
probation after Jenkins failed to pay court-ordered child
support and failed to enter into a court-ordered wage
assignment.
Subsequently, the trial court issued an arrest
warrant for Jenkins, and Jenkins was arrested on July 5, 2001.
Ultimately, Jenkins was released from custody the following day
with orders to appear for a probation review on October 4, 2001.
Jenkins appeared at the October 4, 2001, probation
review hearing and a subsequent hearing; however, he failed to
appear at a hearing scheduled for March 28, 2002.
Consequently,
another warrant was issued for Jenkins’ arrest, and Jenkins was
taken into custody.
On April 12, 2002, the trial court held a
-2-
hearing to revoke Jenkins’ probation for his failure to appear
at the March 28, 2002, probation review hearing.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that
Jenkins violated the terms of his probation by 1) failing to
appear for a probation review hearing and 2) failing to pay his
court-ordered child support.
Accordingly, the trial court
revoked probation, precipitating this appeal.
On appeal, Jenkins argues that the trial court erred
in failing to consider any alternative forms of punishment
before revoking probation.
In addition, he states the trial
court denied him due process of law by making no specific
findings of fact other than the two conclusory findings listed
in the preceding paragraph.
The standard of review of a trial court’s decision to
revoke conditional probation is whether the trial court abused
its discretion.
156, 158 (1956).
See Ridley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 287 S.W.2d
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (2000).
We first address Jenkins’ due process argument.
Probation revocation proceedings “must be conducted in
accordance with minimum requirements of due process of law.”
-3-
Rasdon v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 701 S.W.2d 716, 718 (1986).
In relevant part, KRS 533.050 states:
(1) At any time before the discharge of the
defendant or the termination of the sentence of
probation or conditional discharge:
(a) The court may summon the defendant to appear
before it or may issue a warrant for his arrest
upon a finding of probable cause to believe that
he has failed to comply with a condition of the
sentence;
...
(2) The court may not revoke or modify the
conditions of a sentence of probation or
conditional discharge except after a hearing with
defendant represented by counsel and following a
written notice of the grounds for revocation or
modification.
In addition to the procedure mandated in KRS 533.050,
the United States Supreme Court has specified minimal due
process requirements involving post-sentencing actions affecting
one’s liberty.
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89,
92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972) (parole revocation
proceedings).
Such additional requirements include (a)
disclosure of evidence against the defendant; (b) opportunity to
for the defendant to be heard; (c) “the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses”; and (d) a written statement by
the factfinder “as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking” probation.
Id.
In this case, the trial court did not issue any
findings of fact, either oral or written, other than its
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conclusions that Jenkins violated the terms of his probation by
failing to appear for a probation review hearing and failing to
pay his court-ordered child support.
The absence of the entry
of any factual findings by the trial court prevents us from
conducting a meaningful review of the matter.
As such, we
remand this issue to the trial court for factual findings.
See
Rasdon, 701 S.W.2d at 719 (A trial court’s failure to make
written findings in support of probation revocation is the type
of error that can be “corrected by a remand rather than a total
reversal and vacation of the court’s decision.”).
We move to Jenkins’ additional argument that the trial
court erred in failing to consider any alternative forms of
punishment before revoking probation.
In support of this
argument, Jenkins relies on KRS 533.030(3) and Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983),
however, we hold that this reliance is misplaced.
KRS
533.030(3) specifically applies to nonpayment of restitution,
not child support.
Moreover, Bearden pertains to a defendant’s
nonpayment of court-imposed fines and restitution, not child
support.
See id. at 665.
In this case, the trial court was not
required to consider alternative forms of punishment before
revoking probation for Jenkins’ non-payment of child support and
failure to appear for a probation review hearing.
-5-
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s
revocation of probation is vacated and remanded for factual
findings in support of the decision.
Further, the judgment is
affirmed as to the claimed error pertaining to the trial court’s
failure to consider alternative forms of punishment.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART AND
FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
I fully concur with the majority’s conclusion that the
trial court was not obligated to consider alternative forms of
punishment before revoking Jenkins’s probation.
However, I
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court made
inadequate factual findings to support that decision.
The trial
court conducted a hearing on April 12, 2002, which Jenkins and
his counsel attended.
After hearing the evidence, the trial
court found “that the Defendant has violated the terms of his
probation by Failure to appear for Probation Review Hearing;
[and] non payment of court ordered child support.”
Although this
finding is somewhat conclusory, it clearly sets out the factual
basis for finding that Jenkins had violated the conditions of his
probation.
Furthermore, the trial court’s findings implicitly
reject Jenkins’s attempted justifications for failing to comply
-6-
with these conditions.
Consequently, I perceive no need to
remand this case for additional factual findings.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Rampulla
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Nyra Shields
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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